& SC13-1976 Bradley Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, etc. and City of St. Petersburg, etc. v. Bradley Westphal , 194 So. 3d 311 ( 2016 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC13-1930
____________
BRADLEY WESTPHAL,
Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, etc., et al.,
Respondents.
____________
No. SC13-1976
____________
CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, etc.,
Petitioner,
vs.
BRADLEY WESTPHAL,
Respondent.
[June 9, 2016]
PARIENTE, J.
In this case, we consider the constitutionality of section 440.15(2)(a), Florida
Statutes (2009)—part of the state’s workers’ compensation law—which cuts off
disability benefits after 104 weeks to a worker who is totally disabled and
incapable of working but who has not yet reached maximum medical
improvement. We conclude that this portion of the worker’s compensation statute
is unconstitutional under article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution, as a
denial of the right of access to courts, because it deprives an injured worker of
disability benefits under these circumstances for an indefinite amount of time—
thereby creating a system of redress that no longer functions as a reasonable
alternative to tort litigation.
In Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk
Management, 122 So. 3d 440, 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), an en banc majority of the
First District Court of Appeal valiantly attempted to save the statute from
unconstitutionality by interpreting section 440.15(2)(a) so that the severely injured
worker who can no longer receive temporary total disability benefits, but who is
not yet eligible for permanent total disability benefits, would not be cut off from
compensation after 104 weeks.1 The judiciary, however, is without power to
1. In its decision, the First District ruled upon the following question, which
it certified to be of great public importance:
IS A WORKER WHO IS TOTALLY DISABLED AS A RESULT
OF A WORKPLACE ACCIDENT, BUT STILL IMPROVING
FROM A MEDICAL STANDPOINT AT THE TIME TEMPORARY
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS EXPIRE, DEEMED TO BE AT
MAXIMUM MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT BY OPERATION OF
LAW AND THEREFORE ELIGIBLE TO ASSERT A CLAIM FOR
PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS?
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rewrite a plainly written statute, even if it is to avoid an unconstitutional result.
See Brown v. State, 358 So. 2d 16, 20 (Fla. 1978) (“When the subject statute in no
way suggests a saving construction, we will not abandon judicial restraint and
effectively rewrite the enactment.”). We accordingly quash the First District’s
decision.
Consistent with the views of both the petitioner, Bradley Westphal, and the
principal respondent, the City of St. Petersburg, we conclude that section
440.15(2)(a) of the workers’ compensation law is plainly written and therefore
does not permit this Court to resort to rules of statutory construction. See Knowles
v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004). Instead, we must give the
statute its plain and obvious meaning, which provides that “[o]nce the employee
reaches the maximum number of weeks allowed [104 weeks], or the employee
reaches the date of maximum medical improvement, whichever occurs earlier,
temporary disability benefits shall cease and the injured worker’s permanent
impairment shall be determined.” § 440.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. The statute does not—
Westphal, 122 So. 3d at 448. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.
Const. Because of our conclusion that the First District’s interpretation of the
statute cannot withstand scrutiny, and our holding that the statute is
unconstitutional, we do not specifically answer the certified question. As our
analysis in this opinion explains, to the extent the certified question simply asks
whether the workers’ compensation law constitutionally permits the statutory
“gap” at issue, we answer that question in the negative.
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as the First District erroneously concluded—provide that the worker is at that time
legally entitled to permanent total disability benefits, nor does it provide that the
worker is automatically deemed to be at maximum medical improvement based on
the cessation of temporary total disability benefits. See Westphal, 122 So. 3d at
444.
Applying the statute’s plain meaning, we conclude that the 104-week
limitation on temporary total disability benefits results in a statutory gap in
benefits, in violation of the constitutional right of access to courts. The stated
legislative intent of the workers’ compensation law is to “assure the quick and
efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and to
facilitate the worker’s return to gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the
employer.” § 440.015, Fla. Stat. (2009). Section 440.15(2)(a), however, operates
in the opposite manner. The statute cuts off a severely injured worker from
disability benefits at a critical time, when the worker cannot return to work and is
totally disabled but the worker’s doctors—chosen by the employer—deem that the
worker may still continue to medically improve.
As applied to these circumstances, the workers’ compensation law
undoubtedly fails to provide “full medical care and wage-loss payments for total or
partial disability regardless of fault.” Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1171-
72 (Fla. 1991). Instead, for injured workers like Westphal who are not yet legally
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entitled to assert a claim for permanent total disability benefits at the conclusion of
104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the workers’ compensation law
lacks adequate and sufficient safeguards and cannot be said to continue functioning
as a “system of compensation without contest” that stands as a reasonable
alternative to tort litigation. Mullarkey v. Fla. Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So. 2d 363,
366 (Fla. 1972). Contrary to Justice Canady’s dissenting opinion, the seminal case
on the meaning of the Florida Constitution’s access to courts provision, Kluger v.
White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), specifically discussed the test for determining the
constitutionality of the workers’ compensation statutory scheme under the access
to courts provision, article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution. The
constitutional yardstick, which we applied in Martinez and Mullarkey for
determining whether an access-to-courts violation occurred as a result of changes
made to the workers’ compensation statutory scheme, is whether the scheme
continues to provide “adequate, sufficient, and even preferable safeguards for an
employee who is injured on the job.” Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
Accordingly, we hold that the statute as written by the Legislature is
unconstitutional. However, we conclude that this unconstitutional limitation on
temporary total disability benefits does not render the entire workers’
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compensation system invalid.2 Rather, we employ the remedy of statutory revival
and direct that the limitation in the workers’ compensation law preceding the 1994
amendments to section 440.15(2)(a) is revived, which provides for temporary total
disability benefits not to exceed 260 weeks—five years of eligibility rather than
only two years, a limitation we previously held “passes constitutional muster.”
Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1172.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2009, Bradley Westphal, then a fifty-three-year-old firefighter
in St. Petersburg, Florida, suffered a severe lower back injury caused by lifting
2. To the extent Justice Lewis’s concurring in result opinion suggests as a
remedy that chapter 440 should be “invalidated where defective,” the remedy of
invalidating other sections in chapter 440 beyond section 440.15(2)(a) is not
properly before us. In his briefing on this matter to the Court, Westphal requested
reversal of the en banc decision of the First District Court of Appeal to “either
reinstate the panel decision”—which revived the pre-1994 statute that provided for
the administration of 260 weeks of temporary total disability benefits—or hold
“that the 104 weeks limitation on temporary disability” is “unconstitutional as
applied to the facts of this case and do so prospectively.” Petitioner’s Initial Brief
at 47. Because we hold that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to Westphal
and others similarly situated, we have granted Westphal’s requested relief of
reversing the en banc decision of the First District Court of Appeal and will not
consider an argument of the unconstitutionality of the entire workers’
compensation law when the parties have not raised such an expansive remedy.
Although the remedy of invalidating the entire workers’ compensation law was
suggested at some length by the Florida Workers’ Advocates in an amicus curiae
brief filed in support of Westphal, we do not consider arguments raised by amici
curiae that were not raised by the parties. See Riechmann v. State, 966 So. 2d 298,
304 n.8 (Fla. 2007); Dade Cty. v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 212 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 1968);
Michels v. Orange Cty. Fire Rescue, 819 So. 2d 158, 159-60 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
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heavy furniture in the course of fighting a fire. As a result of the lower back
injury, Westphal experienced extreme pain and loss of feeling in his left leg below
the knee and required multiple surgical procedures, including an eventual spinal
fusion.
Shortly after his workplace injury, Westphal began receiving benefits
pursuant to the workers’ compensation law set forth in chapter 440, Florida
Statutes (2009). Specifically, the City of St. Petersburg began to provide both
indemnity benefits, in the form of temporary total disability benefits pursuant to
section 440.15(2), Florida Statutes, and medical benefits.
Under section 440.15(2)(a), entitlement to temporary total disability benefits
ends when a totally disabled injured worker reaches the date of maximum medical
improvement or after 104 weeks, whichever occurs earlier. § 440.15(2)(a), Fla.
Stat. The “date of maximum medical improvement” is defined in section
440.02(10), Florida Statutes (2009), as “the date after which further recovery from,
or lasting improvement to, an injury or disease can no longer reasonably be
anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.” Westphal did not reach
maximum medical improvement prior to the expiration of the 104-week limitation
on temporary total disability benefits.
At the expiration of temporary total disability benefits, Westphal was still
incapable of working or obtaining employment, based on the advice of his doctors
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and the vocational experts that examined him. In an attempt to replace his pre-
injury wages of approximately $1,500 per week that he was losing because of his
injuries, Westphal filed a petition for benefits, claiming either further temporary
disability or permanent total disability pursuant to section 440.15(1), Florida
Statutes (2009).
A. Judge of Compensation Claims Decision
The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) held a hearing on Westphal’s
petition and subsequently denied the claim for permanent total disability benefits
based on its interpretation of City of Pensacola Firefighters v. Oswald, 710 So. 2d
95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), and Matrix Employee Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d
621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). In Oswald, the First District held that to receive
permanent total disability benefits, “an employee whose temporary benefits have
run out—or are expected to do so imminently—must be able to show not only total
disability upon the cessation of temporary benefits but also that total disability will
be ‘existing after the date of maximum medical improvement.’ ” 710 So. 2d at 98,
abrogated by Westphal, 122 So. 3d at 448 (quoting § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (Supp.
1994)). The First District also observed that the statutory scheme could create a
statutory gap—a period of time when totally disabled individuals would no longer
be eligible for temporary total disability benefits and could not receive any
disability benefits until, possibly, finally being declared eligible for permanent
-8-
total disability benefits. Id. at 97-98. In Hadley, the First District again
acknowledged the concern of a statutory gap in benefits, but reaffirmed Oswald
nonetheless. See Hadley, 78 So. 3d at 624-25, receded from by Westphal, 122 So.
3d at 442.
Based on this line of case law, the JCC denied Westphal’s claim. In its final
order, the JCC found that Westphal had not reached maximum medical
improvement and that it was “too speculative to determine whether he will remain
totally disabled after the date of [maximum medical improvement] has been
reached from a physical standpoint.” Thus, Westphal fell into the statutory gap—
still totally disabled at the cessation of temporary total disability benefits, but not
yet entitled to permanent total disability benefits because he could not prove that
he would still be totally disabled when he reached maximum medical
improvement. He was, in essence, completely cut off from disability benefits for
an indefinite amount of time, unless and until he could claim entitlement to
permanent total disability benefits at some future date and, even then, without any
ability to recover disability benefits for his time in the statutory gap.
B. First District Panel Decision
Westphal appealed to the First District, contending that the JCC erred in
determining that he was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. He
further argued that the 104-week statutory limitation on temporary total disability
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benefits, as applied to him, was an unconstitutional denial of access to courts. A
panel of the First District agreed with the constitutional claim, holding that the
104-week limitation on temporary total disability benefits was unconstitutional as
applied to the facts of this case.
Specifically, relying on Kluger, 281 So. 2d 1, the First District panel
concluded that the 104-week limitation on temporary total disability benefits was
an inadequate remedy as compared to the 350 weeks available when voters
adopted the access to courts provision in the 1968 Florida Constitution. The First
District panel also observed that the 104-week limitation on temporary total
disability benefits was the lowest in the United States. The First District panel
applied its decision prospectively and instructed the JCC to grant Westphal
additional temporary total disability benefits, not to exceed 260 weeks, as would
have been provided under the relevant statutory provisions in effect before the
1994 amendment of section 440.15(2)(a), limiting eligibility for temporary total
disability benefits to a maximum of 104 weeks.
C. First District En Banc Decision
Subsequent to the panel decision, the First District granted motions for
rehearing en banc filed by the City and the State. The First District then issued an
en banc decision withdrawing the panel opinion that had declared the statute
unconstitutional. Setting forth a new interpretation of the statute to avoid a holding
- 10 -
of unconstitutionality, the First District’s en banc decision receded from Hadley,
78 So. 3d 621, and abrogated Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95.
In addressing the issue of Westphal’s entitlement to disability benefits, the
en banc majority determined that the First District’s construction of the statute
fifteen years earlier in Oswald, and then again two years earlier in Hadley, was
incorrect. Specifically, the First District noted that the statute requires a medical
evaluation either when an injured worker reaches maximum medical improvement
or six weeks before the expiration of the 104-week period of eligibility for
temporary total disability benefits, whichever occurs earlier, and that the doctor
must assign an impairment rating as part of this evaluation. Westphal, 122 So. 3d
at 444. The First District construed the use of the phrase “permanent impairment”
in section 440.15(2)(a) to signify that the worker has attained maximum medical
improvement. Id. at 445-46. Accordingly, the First District held that “a worker
who is totally disabled as a result of a workplace accident and remains totally
disabled by the end of his or her eligibility for temporary total disability benefits is
deemed to be at maximum medical improvement by operation of law and is
therefore eligible to assert a claim for permanent and total disability benefits.” Id.
at 442.
As a result of this new interpretation of the statute, which eliminated the
statutory gap, the First District found it unnecessary to consider whether its prior,
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now discredited interpretation of the statute in Hadley—recognizing the gap—
rendered the statute unconstitutional as a denial of the right of access to courts. Id.
at 447. The First District then certified the question it passed upon as one of great
public importance. Id. at 448. We granted review3 and now quash the First
District’s en banc decision and hold the statute unconstitutional as applied, in
accordance with the prior panel opinion.
II. ANALYSIS
Both Westphal as the petitioner and the City as the principal respondent
argue before this Court that the First District’s previous construction of the statute
in Hadley and Oswald was correct, and that the new interpretation advanced by the
en banc majority in Westphal amounts to a violation of separation of powers, due
process, and the principle of stare decisis. The State, which is also a respondent,
agrees that the previous interpretation of the First District in Hadley and Oswald is
correct, but argues that the First District’s new construction of section 440.15(2)(a)
is a reasonable alternative interpretation if this Court is inclined to declare the 104-
week limitation on temporary total disability benefits to be invalid as a denial of
access to courts. Westphal, however, argues that there is no judicial fix and that
3. Both Westphal and the City invoked this Court’s discretionary
jurisdiction. We consolidated the petitions but retained the two different case
numbers. During briefing, we treated Westphal as the petitioner and the City as
the respondent, and we accordingly employ those same designations here.
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the 104-week limitation in section 440.15(2)(a), as applied to him and others
similarly situated, is an unconstitutional denial of access to courts.
We thus begin our analysis by interpreting section 440.15 to determine if the
First District’s en banc opinion—eliminating the statutory gap—provides a
permissible statutory construction, or if the First District’s prior opinions in Hadley
and Oswald—recognizing the statutory gap created by the Legislature—provided
the correct interpretation. After concluding that the First District’s en banc opinion
is an impermissible judicial rewrite of the Legislature’s plainly written statute, we
are forced to confront the constitutional issue of whether the statute, as applied to
Westphal and other similarly situated severely injured workers, is unconstitutional.
Concluding that the statute, as applied, violates the access to courts provision of
the Florida Constitution, we conclude by considering the appropriate remedy.
A. Section 440.15, Florida Statutes
Section 440.15, Florida Statutes (2009), governs the payment of disability
benefits to injured workers. As of the 1968 adoption of the Florida Constitution,
permanent total disability benefits were determined “in accordance with the facts,”
and the term “maximum medical improvement” was not included in the workers’
compensation law. § 440.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1968). Nevertheless, the phrase
“maximum medical improvement” was part of this Court’s lexicon because it
assisted in determining the permanence of the injury. Indeed, in 1969, this Court
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noted that “[t]he date of maximum medical improvement marks the end of
temporary disability and the beginning of permanent disability.” Corral v.
McCrory Corp., 228 So. 2d 900, 903 (Fla. 1969). At that time, section 440.15(2)
provided for the payment of temporary total disability benefits for a duration not to
exceed 350 weeks. § 440.15(2), Fla. Stat. (1968).
In 1979, the Legislature added the term “date of maximum medical
improvement” to the statute, defining it consistently with this Court’s prior 1969
construction in Corral and requiring that the date be “based upon reasonable
medical probability.” § 440.02(22), Fla. Stat. (1979). That statutory definition has
remained unchanged to this day.
In 1990, the Legislature reduced the duration of temporary total disability
benefits from 350 weeks to 260 weeks. § 440.15(2), Fla. Stat. (1990). Then, just
four years later, and as part of an extensive statutory overhaul, the Legislature
further reduced the duration of temporary total disability benefits from 260 weeks
to 104 weeks. § 440.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1994).
Accordingly, in 2009, at the time of the events giving rise to this case,
section 440.15(1) provided in part:
(a) In case of total disability adjudged to be permanent,
2
66 /3 percent of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the
employee during the continuance of such total disability. No
compensation shall be payable under this section if the employee is
engaged in, or is physically capable of engaging in, at least sedentary
employment.
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(b) In the following cases, an injured employee is presumed to
be permanently and totally disabled unless the employer or carrier
establishes that the employee is physically capable of engaging in at
least sedentary employment within a 50-mile radius of the employee’s
residence:
....
In all other cases, in order to obtain permanent total disability
benefits, the employee must establish that he or she is not able to
engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50-mile radius of
the employee’s residence, due to his or her physical limitation. . . .
Only claimants with catastrophic injuries or claimants who are
incapable of engaging in employment, as described in this paragraph,
are eligible for permanent total benefits. In no other case may
permanent total disability be awarded.
Under the plain language of this provision, permanent total disability benefits are
expressly limited to “claimants with catastrophic injuries or claimants who are
incapable of engaging in employment.” § 440.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). “In no
other case may permanent total disability be awarded.” Id.
Section 440.15(2)(a), which governs temporary total disability benefits,
provided in part as follows:
Subject to subsection (7), in case of disability total in character
but temporary in quality, 662/3 percent of the average weekly wages
shall be paid to the employee during the continuance thereof, not to
exceed 104 weeks except as provided in this subsection, s. 440.12(1),
and s. 440.14(3).[4] Once the employee reaches the maximum number
4. Section 440.12(1), Florida Statutes (2009), provides: “No compensation
shall be allowed for the first 7 days of the disability, except benefits provided for in
s. 440.13. However, if the injury results in disability of more than 21 days,
compensation shall be allowed from the commencement of the disability.” Section
440.14(3), Florida Statutes (2009), provides in part: “The department shall
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of weeks allowed, or the employee reaches the date of maximum
medical improvement, whichever occurs earlier, temporary disability
benefits shall cease and the injured worker’s permanent impairment
shall be determined.
Under the plain language of this provision, temporary total disability benefits are
payable for no more than 104 weeks, after which the worker’s permanent
impairment rating must be determined. “The permanent impairment rating is used
to pay ‘impairment income benefits,’ ” as distinguished from permanent total
disability benefits, “commencing on ‘the day after the employee reaches
[maximum medical improvement] or after the expiration of temporary benefits,
whichever occurs earlier,’ and continuing for a period determined by the
employee’s percentage of impairment.” Hadley, 78 So. 3d at 624 (quoting
§ 440.15(3)(g), Fla. Stat.).
As the First District recognized in Hadley, “[t]he statutory scheme in section
440.15 works seamlessly when the injured employee reaches [maximum medical
improvement] prior to the expiration of the 104 weeks of temporary disability
benefits.” Id. But where “the employee is not at [maximum medical
improvement] at the expiration of the 104 weeks, there is the potential for a ‘gap’
in disability benefits because [temporary total disability] benefits cease by
establish by rule a form which shall contain a simplified checklist of those items
which may be included as ‘wage’ for determining the average weekly wage.”
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operation of law after 104 weeks and entitlement to [permanent total disability]
benefits is generally not ripe until the employee reaches [maximum medical
improvement].” Id.
Analyzing these statutory provisions, and in an apparent effort to avoid the
statutory gap, the First District in Westphal ultimately concluded that the
Legislature’s use of the term “permanent impairment” in section 440.15(2)(a)
signifies that the disabled worker has attained maximum medical improvement by
operation of law. See Westphal, 122 So. 3d at 445. The First District therefore
held that “a worker who is totally disabled as a result of a workplace accident and
remains totally disabled by the end of his or her eligibility for temporary total
disability benefits is deemed to be at maximum medical improvement by operation
of law and is therefore eligible to assert a claim for permanent and total disability
benefits.” Id. at 442.
Although this Court’s review of the First District’s statutory interpretation is
de novo, “statutes come clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and must
be construed whenever possible to effect a constitutional outcome.” Crist v. Fla.
Ass’n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Inc., 978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008). While we are
confident that the First District en banc majority was attempting to save the
statute’s constitutionality by interpreting it so as to avoid a draconian result for
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severely injured workers, the clear language of the statute simply does not allow us
to agree with the First District’s interpretation.
Rather, the previous interpretation provided by the First District in Oswald,
and adhered to in Hadley, is consistent with the Legislature’s plainly stated intent,
which nowhere indicates that the Legislature sought to equate the expiration of
temporary total disability benefits with maximum medical improvement. As stated
in Oswald, under the plain language of the statute, “an employee whose temporary
benefits have run out—or are expected to do so imminently—must be able to show
not only total disability upon the cessation of temporary benefits but also that total
disability will be existing after the date of maximum medical improvement” in
order to be eligible to receive permanent total disability benefits. 710 So. 2d at 98
(internal citation omitted).
Specifically, section 440.15(2)(a) requires an injured worker’s “permanent
impairment,”5 as opposed to permanent total disability, to be determined. In
addition, section 440.15(3), which pertains to “permanent impairment benefits,” is
the only section that discusses an “evaluation” for permanent impairment of the
employee, with entitlement to such benefits to commence the day after the
5. As defined in section 440.02(22), Florida Statutes (2009), “permanent
impairment” means “any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss determined as
a percentage of the body as a whole, existing after the date of maximum medical
improvement, which results from the injury.”
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employee reaches maximum medical improvement or his or her temporary total
disability benefits expire. Permanent impairment benefits are distinct from, and
not a substitute for, total disability benefits. Thus, the plain language of the statute
provides for permanent impairment to be determined for purposes of impairment
benefits as opposed to permanent total disability benefits.
It is clear from the statute that the Legislature intended to limit the duration
of temporary total disability benefits to a maximum of 104 weeks. It is further
clear that the Legislature intended to limit the class of individuals who are entitled
to permanent total disability benefits to those with catastrophic injuries and those
who are able to demonstrate a permanent inability to engage in even sedentary
employment within a fifty-mile radius of their home. In other words, these
provisions “create a gap in disability benefits for those injured workers who are
totally disabled upon the expiration of temporary disability benefits but fail to
prove prospectively that total disability will exist after the date of [maximum
medical improvement].” Hadley, 78 So. 3d at 626 (quoting Crum v. Richmond, 46
So. 3d 633, 637 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)).
Although this Court must, whenever possible, construe statutes to effect a
constitutional outcome, we may not salvage a plainly written statute by rewriting
it. See Sult v. State, 906 So. 2d 1013, 1019 (Fla. 2005) (“Courts may not go so far
in their narrowing constructions so as to effectively rewrite legislative
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enactments.”). The gap in benefits caused by the Legislature’s decision to reduce
the duration of entitlement to temporary total disability benefits may be an
unintentional, unanticipated, and unfortunate result. But even if potentially unwise
and unfair, it is not the prerogative of the courts to rewrite a statute to overcome its
shortcomings. See Clines v. State, 912 So. 2d 550, 558 (Fla. 2005) (“A court’s
function is to interpret statutes as they are written and give effect to each word in
the statute.” (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789 So.
2d 320, 324 (Fla. 2001))); Metro. Dade Cty. v. Bridges, 402 So. 2d 411, 414 (Fla.
1981), receded from on other grounds by Makemson v. Martin Cty., 491 So. 2d
1109 (Fla. 1986) (explaining that “courts may not vary the intent of the legislature
with respect to the meaning of the statute in order to render the statute
constitutional”).
Because we hold that the statute is clear in creating a statutory gap in
benefits, and thus not susceptible to the rules of statutory construction, we turn to
Westphal’s constitutional challenge—that the statute as plainly written results in a
denial of access to courts.
B. Denial of Access to Courts
Article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution, part of our state
constitutional “Declaration of Rights” since 1968, guarantees every person access
to the courts and ensures the administration of justice without denial or delay: “The
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courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay.” Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. (emphasis
added). This important state constitutional right has been construed liberally in
order to “guarantee broad accessibility to the courts for resolving disputes.”
Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992), receded from on
other grounds by Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc.,
678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996).
In Kluger, this Court explained the meaning of the access to courts provision
and the necessary showing for demonstrating a constitutional violation based on
access to courts:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular
injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of
the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or
where such right has become a part of the common law of the State
pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is without power
to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to
protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries,
unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for
the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting
such public necessity can be shown.
281 So. 2d at 4.
Prior to 1968, when the access to courts provision was adopted, the
Legislature had already abolished the common-law tort remedy for injured workers
and enacted a workers’ compensation law “as administrative legislation to be
simple, expeditious, and inexpensive so that the injured employee, his family, or
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society generally, would be relieved of the economic stress resulting from work-
connected injuries, and place the burden on the industry which caused the injury.”
Lee Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. Fellows, 209 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1968). The
workers’ compensation law “abolishes the right to sue one’s employer and
substitutes the right to receive benefits under the compensation scheme.” Sasso v.
Ram Prop. Mgmt., 452 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 1984).
Nevertheless, the fact that workers’ compensation was created prior to 1968
as a non-judicial statutory scheme of no fault benefits intended to provide full
medical care and wage-loss payments does not mean that changes to the workers’
compensation law to reduce or eliminate benefits are immune from a constitutional
attack based on access to courts. In fact, this Court in Kluger specifically
discussed the alternative remedy of workers’ compensation, explaining that
“[w]orkmen’s compensation abolished the right to sue one’s employer in tort for a
job-related injury, but provided adequate, sufficient, and even preferable
safeguards for an employee who is injured on the job, thus satisfying one of the
exceptions to the rule against abolition of the right to redress for an injury.”
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4 (emphasis added). In other words, as Kluger held,
workers’ compensation constitutes a “reasonable alternative” to tort litigation—
and therefore does not violate the access to courts provision—so long as it provides
adequate and sufficient safeguards for the injured employee. Id.
- 22 -
This Court has applied the Kluger analysis in subsequent cases that have
raised constitutional challenges to the workers’ compensation law based on access
to courts. Citing to Kluger, this Court in Martinez explained that in order to be
upheld as constitutional, the workers’ compensation law must continue to provide
a “reasonable alternative to tort litigation.” Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1171-72; see
also Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 440 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 1983)
(“Workers’ compensation, therefore, still stands as a reasonable litigation
alternative.”).
In Martinez, this Court noted that it “previously has rejected claims that
workers’ compensation laws violate access to courts by failing to provide a
reasonable alternative to common-law tort remedies.” Martinez, 582 So. 2d at
1171 (citing Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4). Although the 1990 amendment addressed by
the Court in Martinez “undoubtedly reduce[d] benefits to eligible workers,” by
reducing the administration of temporary total disability benefits from 350 weeks
to 260 weeks, this Court concluded at that time that “the workers’ compensation
law remains a reasonable alternative to tort litigation.” Id. at 1171-72 (emphasis
added). But this conclusion was premised on the holding that the workers’
compensation scheme as a whole continued to provide “injured workers with full
medical care and wage-loss payments for total or partial disability regardless of
fault and without the delay and uncertainty of tort litigation.” Id. at 1172. That is,
- 23 -
under the Kluger analysis, the law at the time of Martinez, which provided for 260
weeks for temporary total disability, continued to provide adequate and sufficient
safeguards for injured employees.
Therefore, although this Court has rejected constitutional challenges to the
workers’ compensation law in the past, our precedent clearly establishes that, when
confronted with a constitutional challenge based on access to courts, we must
determine whether the law “remains a reasonable alternative to tort litigation.”
Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hosp., 440 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1983). However,
because the workers’ compensation law had already been adopted in 1968, the
question in this case is whether the workers’ compensation law with regard to the
104-week limitation remains a “system of compensation without contest,”
Mullarkey, 268 So. 2d at 366, that provides “full medical care and wage-loss
payments for total or partial disability regardless of fault,” Martinez, 582 So. 2d at
1172 (emphasis added).
The 104-week limitation on temporary total disability benefits and the
statutory gap must therefore be viewed through the analytical paradigm of Kluger,
asking whether the workers’ compensation law continues to provide adequate and
sufficient safeguards for the injured worker and thus constitutes a constitutional,
reasonable alternative to tort litigation. Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. The “reasonable
alternative” test is then the linchpin and measuring stick, and this Court has
- 24 -
undoubtedly upheld as constitutional many limitations on workers’ compensation
benefits as benefits have progressively been reduced over the years and the
statutory scheme changed to the detriment of the injured worker.
But, there must eventually come a “tipping point,” where the diminution of
benefits becomes so significant as to constitute a denial of benefits—thus creating
a constitutional violation. We accordingly must review what has occurred to the
workers’ compensation system since the 1968 adoption of the access to courts
provision, as it relates to providing “full medical care and wage-loss payments for
total or partial disability regardless of fault,” Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1172, in order
to determine whether we have now reached that constitutional “tipping point.”
As applied to Westphal, the current workers’ compensation statutory scheme
does not just reduce the amount of benefits he would receive, which was the issue
we addressed in Martinez, but in fact completely cuts off his ability to receive any
disability benefits at all. It does so even though there is no dispute that Westphal
remained a severely injured and disabled firefighter under active treatment by
doctors the City selected for him. As stated in the First District’s original panel
opinion:
Under this law, the City—not Westphal—had the right to select
and, if appropriate, de-select, the doctors who would treat his work-
related injuries. Through this statutory system of recovery, the City
had the right to meet and confer with their selected doctors without
Westphal’s involvement, and obtain otherwise-confidential medical
information—whether or not Westphal consented to such
- 25 -
communications. And the City had the right to make decisions as to
whether it would authorize the medical treatment recommended by
the doctors of its choosing. For his part, Westphal, removed from his
otherwise inherent right to select his medical providers and make
unfettered decisions about his medical care, was required to follow the
recommendations of the doctors authorized by his employer. Should
he fail to do so, he risked losing entitlement to his workers’
compensation benefits, his only legal remedy.
As part of his medical care, Westphal required multiple surgical
procedures, culminating in a five-level fusion of the lumbar spine.
Under chapter 440, Westphal was then required to refrain from
working and go without disability pay or wages—and wait. Westphal
had to wait until the [City’s] authorized doctors opined that he had
reached maximum medical improvement, with no guarantee that such
a day would ever come. But, even once he fully recovered, Westphal
could not, under normal circumstances, recover disability benefits for
the indeterminate waiting period.
Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., No. 1D12-
3563, slip op. at 7-8 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 28, 2013) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added), opinion withdrawn and superseded on rehearing en banc by Westphal, 122
So. 3d 440. In other words, even though doctors chosen by the City had performed
multiple surgical procedures culminating in a five-level spinal fusion, because
those same doctors did not render an opinion that Westphal had reached maximum
medical improvement—that is, that he had reached the end of his medical recovery
and would improve no further—Westphal was not yet eligible for permanent total
disability benefits. And there was no way to know when those doctors would
determine that he had reached maximum medical improvement, leaving Westphal
- 26 -
without disability benefits for an indefinite amount of time while he was still
totally disabled and incapable of working.
In comparing the rights of a worker such as Westphal injured on the job
today with those of a worker injured in 1968, the extent of the changes in the
workers’ compensation system is dramatic. A worker injured in 1968 was entitled
to receive temporary total disability benefits for up to 350 weeks. See § 440.15(2),
Fla. Stat. (1968). In 1990, the Legislature reduced the availability of temporary
total disability benefits from 350 to 260 weeks—a 25.7% reduction of two years.
See ch. 90-201, § 20, Laws of Fla. Then, in 1993, the Legislature again reduced
the availability of temporary total disability benefits, this time from 260 weeks to
104 weeks—a 60% reduction. See ch. 93-415, § 20, Laws of Fla. This means that
an injured worker such as Westphal is now eligible to receive only 104 weeks of
temporary total disability benefits—a massive 70% reduction when compared to
the temporary total disability benefits available in 1968.
It is uncontroverted that decreasing substantially the period of payments
from 350 weeks to 104 weeks, standing alone, results in a dramatic reduction from
almost seven years of disability benefits down to two years. Whereas almost seven
years or even five years post-accident should be a reasonable period for an injured
worker to achieve maximum medical improvement, clearly two years is not for the
- 27 -
most severely injured of workers, like Westphal, who might be in need of multiple
surgical interventions.
Currently, at the conclusion of the 104-week limit, temporary total disability
benefits cease, regardless of the condition of the injured worker. Therefore, rather
than receive “full medical care and wage-loss payments” for a continuing
disability, as the workers’ compensation law was intended, an injured worker’s full
medical care and wage-loss payments are eliminated after 104 weeks if the worker
falls into the statutory gap. This is true even if the worker remains incapable of
working for an indefinite period of time, based on the advice of the employer-
selected doctors.
Recognizing the constitutional implications of such a statutory scheme,
Judge Van Nortwick, in his dissent in Hadley, cogently noted:
[I]n the case of a totally disabled claimant whose rights to temporary
disability benefits has expired, but who is prohibited from receiving
permanent disability benefits, the elimination of disability benefits
may reach a point where the claimant’s cause of action has been
effectively eliminated. In such a case, the courts might well find that
the benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law are no longer a
reasonable alternative to a tort remedy and that, as a result, workers
have been denied access to courts.
78 So. 3d at 634 (Van Nortwick, J., dissenting). We have now reached that point
at which “the claimant’s cause of action has been effectively eliminated”—the
constitutional “tipping point” of which Judge Van Nortwick forewarned.
- 28 -
We conclude that the 104-week limitation on temporary total disability
benefits, as applied to a worker like Westphal, who falls into the statutory gap at
the conclusion of those benefits, does not provide a “reasonable alternative” to tort
litigation. Under the current statute, workers such as Westphal are denied their
constitutional right of access to the courts. We agree with the point our colleague,
Justice Lewis, makes in his concurring in result opinion that:
Under the plain language of the statute, many hardworking Floridians
who become injured in the course of employment are denied the
benefits necessary to pay their bills and survive on a day-to-day basis.
The inequitable impact of this statute is patent because it provides
permanent total disability benefits to the disabled worker who reaches
maximum medical improvement quickly, but arbitrarily and
indefinitely terminates benefits to other disabled workers—i.e., until
the employee proves that he or she is permanently and totally disabled
once maximum medical improvement is attained, even where there is
no dispute that the employee is totally disabled at the time the
temporary benefits expire, and even if maximum medical
improvement will occur in the future.
Concurring in result op. of Lewis, J., at 39-40 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
in original).
Sadly, Westphal’s case is not an isolated one. As observed by Judge
Thomas in the First District’s panel opinion:
When an employee sustains serious injuries that require prolonged or
complicated medical treatment, it is not unusual for that claimant to
exhaust entitlement to 104 weeks of temporary disability benefits
before reaching maximum medical improvement (the status of full
medical recovery)—paradoxically leaving only seriously injured
individuals without compensation for disability while under medical
instructions to refrain from work that cannot be ignored lest a defense
- 29 -
of medical non-compliance be raised. Although this result is
anathema to the stated purposes of chapter 440, providing injured
workers with prompt medical and indemnity benefits, this court has
held on numerous occasions that an award of permanent total
disability benefits is premature until an injured worker reaches the
stage of full medical recovery.
Westphal, No. 1D12-3563, slip op. at 17-18 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Although Westphal has not argued at length that this Court should declare
the entire workers’ compensation law unconstitutional, the statutory gap cannot be
viewed in isolation from the remainder of the statutory scheme. Over the years,
there has been continuous diminution of benefits and other changes in the law. For
example, during the same period of time in which the Legislature reduced the
provision of disability benefits, the Legislature also gave employers and insurance
carriers the virtually unfettered right to select treating physicians in workers’
compensation cases. See § 440.13(2)(f), Fla. Stat. (2009); see also Butler v. Bay
Ctr./Chubb Ins. Co., 947 So. 2d 570, 572-73 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Further, the
right of the employee and the employer to “opt out” of the workers’ compensation
law, and preserve their tort remedies, was repealed. See §§ 440.015, 440.03, Fla.
Stat. (2009). Other changes have included a heightened standard that the
compensable injury be the “major contributing cause” of a worker’s disability and
need for treatment, and a requirement that the injured worker pay a medical
copayment after reaching maximum medical improvement. See §§ 440.09(1),
440.13(14)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009).
- 30 -
The current law also allows for apportionment of all medical costs based on
a preexisting condition. See § 440.15(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). As Judge Webster has
observed, allowing for the apportionment of medical costs means that “injured
workers will be less likely to seek medical treatment, making it more likely that
they will be unable to return to the workplace.” Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So. 3d
792, 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (Webster, J., concurring). This change, Judge
Webster commented, significantly reduces the benefits to which many injured
workers are entitled, thereby leading to a reasonable conclusion that “the right to
benefits has become largely illusory.” Id.
Although this Court in Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1171-72, upheld the 1990
version of the workers’ compensation law on constitutional grounds, we
wholeheartedly agree with Judge Thomas’s conclusion that the current version of
the law presents a materially different situation:
We are now presented with a different iteration of the Workers’
Compensation Law from that addressed in Martinez—one which
today provides an injured worker with limited medical care, no
disability benefits beyond the 104-week period, and no wage-loss
payments, full or otherwise. And, the lack of disability compensation
occurs only because the severely injured worker has not reached
maximum medical improvement as to the very injury for which
redress is guaranteed under the Florida constitution.
The natural consequence of such a system of legal redress is
potential economic ruination of the injured worker, with all the
terrible consequences that this portends for the worker and his or her
family. A system of redress for injury that requires the injured worker
to legally forego any and all common law right of recovery for full
damages for an injury, and surrender himself or herself to a system
- 31 -
which, whether by design or permissive incremental alteration,
subjects the worker to the known conditions of personal ruination to
collect his or her remedy, is not merely unfair, but is fundamentally
and manifestly unjust. We therefore conclude that the 104-week
limitation on temporary total disability benefits violates Florida’s
constitutional guarantee that justice will be administered without
denial or delay.
Westphal, No. 1D12-3563, slip op. at 18-19 (footnote omitted).
Thus, under the access to courts analysis articulated in Kluger, the only way
to avoid a holding of unconstitutionality under these circumstances would be to
demonstrate an overwhelming public necessity to justify the Legislature’s
elimination of temporary total disability benefits after 104 weeks for our most
injured workers. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. We conclude that this showing has
not been made. The statute is unconstitutional as applied.
Accordingly, the question becomes one of remedy. “Florida law has long
held that, when the legislature approves unconstitutional statutory language and
simultaneously repeals its predecessor, then the judicial act of striking the new
statutory language automatically revives the predecessor unless it, too, would be
unconstitutional.” B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 995 (Fla. 1994). We therefore
conclude that the proper remedy is the revival of the pre-1994 statute that provided
for a limitation of 260 weeks of temporary total disability benefits. See
§ 440.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). The provision of 260 weeks of temporary total
disability benefits amounts to two and a half times more benefits—five years of
- 32 -
eligibility for benefits rather than only two—and thus avoids the constitutional
infirmity created by the current statutory gap as applied to Westphal.
In this regard, we respectfully disagree with the assertion in Justice Lewis’s
concurring in result opinion that this remedy is insufficient because it still allows
for the possibility of a statutory gap, and would therefore unconstitutionally
deprive claimants of access to courts. Concurring in result op. of Lewis, J., at 35.
In fact, as we have indicated throughout this opinion, we previously held that the
pre-1994 statute’s limitation of 260 weeks “passes constitutional muster” because
it “remains a reasonable alternative to tort litigation,” where a worker “is not
without a remedy.” Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1171-72. Although the length of time
available for the administration of temporary total disability benefits to a worker
before the worker reaches maximum medical improvement does involve line
drawing, the difference between a period of only two years (104 weeks) and five
years (260 weeks) is significant as it relates to the time it takes a worker to attain
maximum medical improvement.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons explained in this opinion, we hold section 440.15(2)(a),
Florida Statutes (2009), unconstitutional as applied to Westphal and all others
similarly situated, as a denial of access to courts under article I, section 21, of the
Florida Constitution. The statute deprives a severely injured worker of disability
- 33 -
benefits at a critical time, when the worker cannot return to work and is totally
disabled, but the worker’s doctors—chosen by the employer—determine that the
worker has not reached maximum medical improvement.
Such a significant diminution in the availability of benefits for severely
injured workers, particularly when considered in conjunction with the totality of
changes to the workers’ compensation law from 1968, when the access to courts
provision was added to our Constitution, to the present, is unconstitutional under
our precedent. Accordingly, we quash the First District’s en banc decision in
Westphal and remand this case to the First District for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LEWIS, J., concurring in result.
I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that section 440.15(2)(a)
is unconstitutional as applied to Bradley Westphal. Valiant judicial attempts to
salvage the statute notwithstanding, the statutory gap that resulted from the
limitations in section 440.15(2)(a) is a plain denial of the right of access to courts
guaranteed by the Constitution of this State to Floridians who, after 104 weeks,
- 34 -
may still be totally disabled due to injuries received in the course of their
employment.
However, at this point in time, I conclude that the remedy relied upon by the
majority is insufficient. Statutory revival of the 1994 limitation, which provides
for the administration of temporary total disability for 360 weeks, may provide
relief for those individuals who remain totally disabled but have not been deemed
permanently disabled at the end of 104 weeks. However, this remedy simply
moves the goalposts without eliminating the unconstitutional statutory gap that will
still persist for those who remain totally—but not permanently—disabled after 360
weeks. Therefore, I do not believe that this is a situation in which statutory revival
is appropriate. Cf. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 995 (Fla. 1994) (“[T]he judicial
act of striking the new statutory language automatically revives the predecessor
unless it, too, would be unconstitutional.” (emphasis added)). In my opinion, the
only appropriate remedy would be to require the Legislature to provide a
comprehensive, constitutional Workers’ Compensation scheme, rather than rely on
the courts to rewrite existing law or revive prior law. I believe that the remedy
provided today fails to fully address the problems with the Workers’ Compensation
scheme because it will still leave some injured Florida workers without access to
benefits to which they are entitled. Thus, the majority decision leaves Florida
workers in an only marginally better position than they were in prior to this matter
- 35 -
by failing to address and remove the inadequate alternative remedy, thereby
leaving the Workers’ Compensation scheme unconstitutional and in need of major
reform. As I see it, such a system is fundamentally unconstitutional and in need of
legislative—not judicial—reform.
Over time, the Florida judiciary has repeatedly rewritten provisions of the
Workers’ Compensation law to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality. No fair-
minded individual who reads these decisions can reasonably conclude that they
involve simple statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Newton v. McCotter Motors,
Inc., 475 So. 2d 230, 231-32 (Fla. 1985) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
the holding that section 440.16(1), which provides that for a death to be
compensable under the Workers’ Compensation law, it “must result within one
year of the accident or must follow continuous disability and must result from the
accident within five years of the accident,” see id. at 230, and does not violate
access to courts for deaths that occur more than five years after the accident; noting
that “[b]enefits paid during the life of the worker . . . cannot, and never were
intended by the legislature to, substitute as a reasonable alternative for a cause of
action for wrongful death”); Rhaney v. Dobbs House, Inc., 415 So. 2d 1277, 1279
(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (upholding statutory provision that the American Medical
Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment shall be used to
determine permanent impairment until a permanent schedule is adopted; noting
- 36 -
that “[a]lthough the provisions of § 440.15(3)(a)3. are not unconstitutional per se,
they could be unconstitutional in their application if this section were interpreted to
mean that there could be no permanent impairment unless a medical doctor
testified from the AMA Guides as to a certain percentage of permanent impairment
set forth therein. However, the section should not be interpreted in that fashion.”).6
I have a full appreciation for the judicial attempts to save the Workers’
Compensation statute from total disaster. Florida needs a valid Workers’
Compensation program, but the charade is over. Enough is enough, and Florida
workers deserve better.
The judicial rewriting of a problematic statute is no more evident than in the
present case where section 440.15 has been rewritten not once, but twice. See
Westphal, 122 So. 3d at 444 (avoiding a constitutional challenge by holding that
under section 440.15(2)(a), “an injured worker who is still totally disabled at the
end of his or her eligibility for temporary disability benefits is deemed to be at
maximum medical improvement as a matter of law, even if the worker may get
6. This Court has also held that the invalidation of a comprehensive revision
to the Workers’ Compensation law for a single-subject violation should operate
prospectively to avoid “the substantial impact on the entire workers’ compensation
system if we were to hold [the chapter law] void ab initio.” Martinez v. Scanlan,
582 So. 2d 1167, 1176 (Fla. 1991). But see id. at 1177 (Barkett, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“I do not believe it is the function of the judiciary to
suspend constitutional principles to accommodate administrative convenience.”).
- 37 -
well enough someday to return to work”); City of Pensacola Firefighters v.
Oswald, 710 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (bridging the unconstitutional gap
by holding that to be eligible for permanent total disability benefits, “an employee
whose temporary benefits have run out—or are expected to do so imminently—
must be able to show not only total disability upon the cessation of temporary
benefits but also that total disability will be ‘existing after the date of maximum
medical improvement’ ”); see also Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d
621, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Van Nortwick, J., dissenting) (“[B]oth the approach
adopted in Oswald (and reaffirmed by the majority opinion) and the approach
expressed in the dissent are judicial ‘patches’ crafted to attempt to avoid a material
‘gap’ in disability benefits for injured workers who remain totally disabled on the
expiration of temporary disability benefits. In my view, our concern with this
potential ‘gap’ is not simply a humanitarian concern for particular claimants, but is
based on our interest in avoiding a potential constitutional issue.”). Although both
rewrites of section 440.15 may have been good faith attempts to protect injured
workers, neither cures the underlying invalidity of the statute.7 One need only
consider the multiple opinions in this case to understand the essential problem.
7. Further, it is not the role of the judiciary to rewrite a problematic statute.
See Brown v. State, 358 So. 2d 16, 20 (Fla. 1978) (“When the subject statute in no
way suggests a saving construction, we will not abandon judicial restraint and
effectively rewrite the enactment.”).
- 38 -
The truth of the matter is that section 440.15 is hopelessly broken and cannot
be constitutionally salvaged. The judicial branch must terminate the practice of
rewriting the statute. Under the plain language of the statute, many hardworking
Floridians who become injured in the course of employment are denied the
benefits necessary to pay their bills and survive on a day-to-day basis.8 The
inequitable impact of this statute is patent because it provides permanent total
disability benefits to the disabled worker who reaches maximum medical
improvement quickly, but arbitrarily and indefinitely terminates benefits to other
disabled workers—i.e., until the employee proves that he or she is permanently and
totally disabled once maximum medical improvement is attained, even where there
is no dispute that the employee is totally disabled at the time the temporary
benefits expire, and even if maximum medical improvement will occur in the
future. Where totally disabled workers can be routinely denied benefits for an
indefinite period of time, and have no alternative remedy to seek compensation for
their injuries, something is drastically, fundamentally, and constitutionally wrong
with the statutory scheme. See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973)
8. Moreover, there is no way to determine how many of these injured and
disabled workers actually exist. Many may choose to suffer in silence rather than
fight a system that is so obviously and drastically skewed against them. Thus, the
number of disabled workers who are entitled to permanent total disability
benefits—but cannot receive them because they have not yet reached maximum
medical improvement—may be larger than anyone knows.
- 39 -
(“[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been
provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of
the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become a part of
the common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is
without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to
protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries.”).
The reality is that Workers’ Compensation benefits have been steadily
chipped away and reduced by the Legislature to such an extent that intelligent, able
jurists have now concluded enough is enough and declared the entire statutory
scheme unconstitutional. See Cortes v. Velda Farms, No. 11-13661-CA-25, 2014
WL 6685226 at *10 (11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 2014) (“As a matter of law, Chapter
440, effective October 1, 2003[,] is facially unconstitutional as long as it contains §
440.11 as an exclusive replacement remedy.”), overruled for mootness and lack of
standing by State v. Fla. Workers’ Advocates, 167 So. 3d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).
Although the majority opinion does not take this step, it too has recognized that
Workers’ Compensation benefits have been steadily eroded. Majority op. at 29. I
submit that the time has come for this Court to uphold its sacred and constitutional
duty and simply apply the words of the Legislature. In lieu of continuing to uphold
the Workers’ Compensation law with rewrites, judicial patches, and flawed
- 40 -
analyses, Chapter 440 should be invalidated where defective and the Legislature
required to provide a valid, comprehensive program.
Florida families presume that when they report to work every day and
perform their duties with dedication and diligence, a valid Workers’ Compensation
program will be in place should they ever become injured on the job and be
precluded from seeking access to our courts. Indeed, the Workers’ Compensation
law was, at least initially, created to deliver adequate, fair, and prompt disability
benefits to injured workers and balance workers’ rights with business interests.
However, section 440.15—both under its plain meaning, and as interpreted by the
majority today—denies that critical safety net to the most seriously injured by
hinging the award of permanent total disability benefits upon the attainment of
maximum medical improvement, which cannot occur until a future date, but
eliminates benefits until that future date arrives. I cannot vote to uphold this
statute, or the interpretation of this statute, that denies such fundamental rights to
the hardworking citizens of this State. It is time that both business interests and
workers receive a valid, balanced program that can operate as Florida moves into
its economic future.
Accordingly, I concur in result.
CANADY, J., dissenting.
- 41 -
I agree with the majority that Westphal should prevail on his argument—
with which the City and the State agree—that the District Court erred in
concluding that he should be “deemed to be at maximum medical improvement,
regardless of any potential for improvement[,]” Westphal v. City of St.
Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Management, 122 So. 3d 440, 446 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2013), upon the expiration of his eligibility for temporary total disability
benefits. Majority op. at 3-4. As the majority explains, the District Court’s
interpretation effectively rewrites the statute. I therefore would answer the
certified question in the negative. But I would reject Westphal’s argument that the
statutory limitation on the period of eligibility for temporary total disability
benefits violates the right of access to courts provided for in article I, section 21 of
the Florida Constitution.
In the foundational case of Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973)
(emphasis added), we set forth the test for determining whether an access-to-courts
violation has occurred:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular
injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of
the Declaration of Rights of the [1968] Constitution of the State of
Florida, or where such right has become a part of the common law of
the State pursuant to [section 2.01, Florida Statutes], the Legislature is
without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable
alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for
injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public
necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method
of meeting such public necessity can be shown.
- 42 -
The threshold question in evaluating an access-to-courts claim therefore is whether
the Legislature has abolished a right of redress that was in existence when the
access to courts provision was incorporated into the 1968 Constitution.
Here, the challenged statutory provision restructures an existing right of
redress. It does not abolish that right. The State argues persuasively that “today’s
workers’ compensation system allowed Westphal substantially greater temporary
total disability benefits than any 1968 statutory right provided” and that “[t]he
amendment limiting temporary total disability benefits to 104 weeks, therefore, did
not ‘abolish’ any pre-existing right.” State’s Answer Brief at 14. Westphal does
not dispute the State’s assertion that the aggregate compensation paid to him for
temporary total disability benefits substantially exceeded the aggregate
compensation for such benefits that would have been available under the pre-1968
law, even when the pre-1968 benefits are adjusted for inflation. Instead, he
contends that “[t]his case is about weeks, not about dollars.” Petitioner’s Reply
Brief at 9. But the decision to substantially increase weekly compensation for
temporary total disability and to reduce the number of weeks that such benefits are
paid is a trade-off that is a matter of policy within the province of the Legislature.
The Legislature—rather than this Court—has the institutional competence and
authority to make such policy judgments.
- 43 -
We have long recognized that the Legislature should be afforded latitude in
the structuring of remedies both outside the worker’s compensation context, see,
e.g., White v. Clayton, 323 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975), and within the workers
compensation context, see, e.g., Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hosp., 440 So. 2d 1282
(Fla. 1983). We should do likewise here and reject Westphal’s access-to-courts
challenge.9
POLSTON, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Great Public Importance
First District - Case No. 1D12-3563
Richard Anthony Sicking of Touby, Chait & Sicking, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida;
and Jason Lawrence Fox of Bichler, Kelley, Oliver, Longo & Fox, PLLC, Tampa,
Florida,
for Petitioner/Respondent
John C. Wolfe, City Attorney, Jeannine Smith Williams, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, and Kimberly D. Proano, Assistant City Attorney, Saint Petersburg,
Florida,
for Respondent/Petitioner City of Saint Petersburg
9. I am inclined to agree with Judges Benton and Thomas that competent
substantial evidence does not support the determination by the Judge of
Compensation Claims that Westphal did not establish that he would meet the
requirements for permanent total disability when he reached maximum medical
improvement. See Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk
Management, 122 So. 3d 440, 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Benton, J., concurring in
result); id. at 459-64 (Thomas, J., concurring in result only, and dissenting in part).
But Westfall has not presented any argument to us on this point.
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Rachel Erin Nordby, Deputy Solicitor
General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent/Petitioner State of Florida
Mark Lawrence Zientz of the Law Offices of Mark L. Zientz, P.A., Miami,
Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Workers' Injury Law and Advocacy Group
Richard W. Ervin, III of Fox & Loquasto, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Workers Advocates
Noah Scott Warman of Sugarman & Susskind, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc.
William J. McCabe, Longwood, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Association
Geoffrey Bichler of Bichler, Kelley, Oliver & Longo, PLLC, Maitland, Florida,
for Amici Curiae Police Benevolent Association, The Florida Fraternal
Order of Police, and International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO
Matthew J. Mierzwa, Jr. of Mierzwa & Associates, P.A., Lake Worth, Florida,
for Amicus Curiae The International Association of Fire Fighters
Andre M. Mura of the Center for Constitutional Litigation, P.C., Washington,
District of Columbia,
for Amicus Curiae American Association for Justice
Jeffrey Edward Appel of Appel Harden Law Group, Lakeland, Florida; and
Barbara Ballow Wagner of Wagenheim & Wagner, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
- 45 -
for Amicus Curiae Voices, Inc.
William Harris Rogner, Winter Park, Florida,
for Amici Curiae Associated Industries of Florida, Associated Builders and
Contractors of Florida, The Florida Chamber of Commerce, The Florida
Insurance Council, The Property Casualty Insurers Association of America,
The Florida Justice Reform Institute, Publix Super Markets, United Parcel
Service, The Florida Roofing, Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors
Association, The Florida Retail Federation, The American Insurance
Association, The National Federation of Independent Business, The Florida
United Businesses Association, Inc., and The Florida Association of Self
Insureds
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