Antonio Lebaron Melton v. State of Florida ( 2023 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC2022-1394
____________
ANTONIO LEBARON MELTON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
May 4, 2023
PER CURIAM.
Antonio Lebaron Melton, a prisoner under sentence of death,
appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his sixth
successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We affirm. 1
In 1994, this Court affirmed Melton’s first-degree felony
murder and armed robbery convictions for the robbery and murder
of George Carter. Melton v. State, 638 So. 2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1994).
Melton was 18 years and 25 days old at the time of Carter’s murder.
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
The trial judge sentenced Melton to death in accordance with the
jury’s eight-to-four recommendation for the murder and to life
imprisonment for the robbery. Id. His convictions and sentences
became final in 1994 when the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari review. Melton v. Florida, 513 U.S. 971 (1994).
We have since affirmed the denial of Melton’s initial
postconviction motion and his second, third, fourth, and fifth
successive postconviction motions2 and denied his initial and
successive habeas petitions. See Melton v. State, 949 So. 2d 994,
999 (Fla. 2006); Melton v. State, 55 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2011); Melton
v. State, 88 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 2012); Melton v. State, 193 So. 3d 881,
884 (Fla. 2016); Melton v. Jones, No. SC2017-2032, 2018 WL
566451, at *1 (Fla. Jan. 26, 2018); Melton v. State, 236 So. 3d 234,
235 (Fla. 2018).
Months before Melton was apprehended for Carter’s murder,
he murdered Ricky Saylor. Melton, 949 So. 2d at 1000. Melton was
17 years old at the time of the Saylor murder. He was convicted of
2. Melton appealed the denial of his first successive
postconviction motion, but voluntarily dismissed the appeal before
the Court ruled on the merits.
-2-
armed robbery and first-degree felony murder and was sentenced to
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five
years. Melton v. State, 304 So. 3d 375, 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
The convictions served as the basis for the trial court’s finding of
the prior violent felony aggravator in the Carter murder case.
Melton, 949 So. 2d at 1000.
In 2022, Melton filed the sixth successive postconviction
motion at issue, contending that two pieces of alleged newly
discovered evidence—a declaration from a neurodevelopmental
psychologist and a resolution from the American Psychological
Association (APA)—show that there is a scientific consensus that
the brain does not fully develop until at least 21 years old. Melton
argues that this new evidence requires extending the rationale in
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), for barring the execution of
persons under the age of 18 at the time of the offense to bar the
execution of persons under the age of 21. In the alternative, he
argues that the alleged newly discovered evidence negates the two
-3-
aggravating factors 3 that the trial court found in imposing his death
sentence and therefore would probably yield a less severe sentence
on retrial. See Dailey v. State, 329 So. 3d 1280, 1285 (Fla. 2021)
(explaining that to obtain relief where alleged newly discovered
evidence relates to the penalty phase, “a defendant must establish:
(1) that the newly discovered evidence was unknown by the trial
court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial and it could
not have been discovered through due diligence, and (2) that the
evidence is of such a nature that it would probably . . . yield a less
severe sentence on retrial”).
The circuit court summarily denied relief, finding that Melton’s
claim was untimely and that his request to extend Roper is
meritless. We agree. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B) (“If the
motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the
movant is entitled to no relief, the motion may be denied without an
evidentiary hearing.”).
3. The two aggravating factors are: (1) prior violent felony
(first-degree murder and robbery of Saylor) and (2) pecuniary gain.
Melton, 638 So. 2d at 929.
-4-
Melton’s motion is not timely because it was not filed within
one year of the date upon which the claim became discoverable
through due diligence. See Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064
(Fla. 2008) (“To be considered timely filed as newly discovered
evidence, the successive rule 3.851 motion was required to have
been filed within one year of the date upon which the claim became
discoverable through due diligence.”). The declaration and
resolution that Melton argues are newly discovered evidence largely
rely on pre-2021 studies and, in fact, the declaration recognizes
that in 2015 the majority of the neuroscientific community accepted
that the human brain was not fully developed until late
adolescence. “ ‘[N]ew opinions or research studies based on a
compilation or analysis of previously existing data and scientific
information’ are not generally considered newly discovered
evidence.” Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 99 (Fla. 2023)
(alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. State, 125 So. 3d 745, 750
(Fla. 2013)); see also Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40, 72 (Fla. 2013)
(“[N]ew research studies are not recognized as newly discovered
evidence.”). But even if they could be, because Melton’s claim
-5-
depends on a consensus that has been accepted since 2015, the
record conclusively establishes that he failed to diligently raise it.
We also agree with the circuit court that Melton’s request to
extend Roper lacks merit. We have repeatedly held that “unless the
United States Supreme Court determines that the age of ineligibility
for the death penalty should be extended, we will continue to
adhere to Roper.” Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981, 987 (Fla. 2018);
see also Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248, 1253 (Fla. 2018)
(reaffirming this Court’s adherence to Branch and Roper). Melton,
who relies on evidence that is not newly discovered evidence and
advances the same reasoning for extending Roper that we have
previously rejected, has not persuaded us that our precedent is
“clearly erroneous.” State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020).
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of
Melton’s sixth successive postconviction motion.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
-6-
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County
W. Joel Boles, Judge
Case No. 171991CF000373XXXBXX
Robert Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Alice B.
Copek, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Drew A.
Sena, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent
-7-