Reynaldo Figueroa-Sanabria v. State of Florida ( 2023 )


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  •            Supreme Court of Florida
    ____________
    No. SC2021-1070
    ____________
    REYNALDO FIGUEROA-SANABRIA,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    June 29, 2023
    COURIEL, J.
    Reynaldo Figueroa-Sanabria was convicted of two counts of
    first-degree murder after stabbing John Travlos and Germana
    Morin to death on their houseboat. See § 782.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
    (2013). At the end of the penalty phase, he was sentenced to death
    for each murder. This is Figueroa-Sanabria’s direct appeal of his
    convictions and sentences, over which we have jurisdiction. See
    art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
    We affirm Figueroa-Sanabria’s convictions. The trial court
    committed no reversible error during Figueroa-Sanabria’s guilt
    phase proceedings, and the State presented competent, substantial
    evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. But we set aside Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s sentences of death and remand his case for a new
    penalty phase because we find that he was deprived of his right to
    “have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence” when the trial
    court put him to an improper choice at the outset of that phase of
    the proceedings. Amend. VI, U.S. Const.
    I
    A
    Early in the morning on April 12, 2013, Germana Morin and
    John Travlos were stabbed to death on their houseboat in St.
    Petersburg. Both were found face down; duct tape bound together
    Morin’s ankles and wound around Travlos’s left wrist and ankle.
    Morin was stabbed first in bed and then, mortally, on the
    ground. A stab wound twenty centimeters long severed her jugular
    vein; it was deep enough to hit a disc of her spinal cord. She also
    suffered two stab wounds to the chest, which resulted in two
    perforations of her left lung and slowly made it harder for her to
    breathe. Travlos, too, was first stabbed in bed, then suffered ten
    -2-
    more stab wounds to his chest before he died. The intruder made
    off with the victims’ jewelry, valued at over $80,000.
    As the authorities investigated, they learned that the last time
    the victims were seen alive was around 9:00 p.m. on April 11 by a
    visiting neighbor. Security footage showed that the houseboat’s
    motion-sensing lights, which could be triggered by a person walking
    across the gangplank, turned off at 10:42 p.m. on the 11th and
    were next illuminated at 2:29 a.m. on the 12th. The lights then
    turned off at 3:49 a.m. and did not come on for the rest of the day.
    An examination of Travlos’s computer revealed that someone had
    used it to access his contact list at 3:43 a.m. That list contained
    the combination to his safe where some of the jewelry was stored.
    There was no evidence of damage to any of the locks on the
    houseboat. Two workers found the bodies around 11:00 a.m.
    According to a neighbor, Reynaldo Figueroa-Sanabria was
    seen at the houseboat at 7:00 p.m. on the 11th, but he left soon
    after. Figueroa-Sanabria, the victims’ handyman, was often given a
    key to the houseboat so that he could access it to work. Some
    weeks earlier, according to both Figueroa-Sanabria and other
    -3-
    witnesses, Figueroa-Sanabria had argued with Travlos about his
    wages, but he eventually returned to the job.
    Figueroa-Sanabria lived in an apartment complex across the
    street from the marina where the houseboat was docked with his
    girlfriend, Tessa Cooper. According to Cooper, who later assisted
    the police with its investigation, the couple went to sleep around
    1:00 a.m. on the 12th. She woke up to a phone call from Figueroa-
    Sanabria around 4:30 a.m. that morning. He sounded to Cooper
    “like he was in a panic” and asked her to pick him up near the
    marina.
    Cooper found Figueroa-Sanabria holding a backpack. He told
    her that he needed to travel to New York to see his brother. 1 The
    couple stopped at their apartment before heading to the airport. On
    the way to the airport, however, Figueroa-Sanabria told Cooper he
    had changed his mind; he asked her to take him to rent a car.
    1. Figueroa-Sanabria was in frequent communication with his
    brother on the 11th and 12th. One detective testified that certain
    text messages sent to Figueroa-Sanabria by his brother after the
    crimes occurred were no longer on Figueroa-Sanabria’s phone.
    -4-
    Cooper later testified that, sometime during this drive, she saw
    Figueroa-Sanabria hold a knife in his lap with his hand over it.
    They stopped at a gas station and Cooper vacuumed out her
    van. Figueroa-Sanabria walked over to a dumpster and threw away
    some grocery bags. Later, the assistant manager of the gas station
    discovered bloodstained clothes in the dumpster, including two t-
    shirts—one white and the other gray—a pair of jeans, and a belt, all
    of which Cooper later identified as Figueroa-Sanabria’s. 2 After
    leaving the gas station, the couple went back to their apartment,
    and then later went on the hunt for a rental car.
    Failing to find one, the couple instead went to a jewelry store.
    There, around 9:30 a.m., Figueroa-Sanabria sold a necklace and
    bracelet for a combined $2,569, which included $2,000 in bills
    wrapped in a bank strap. 3 Cooper testified that Figueroa-Sanabria
    2. Some of the clothing also had what appeared to be white
    paint stains. Figueroa-Sanabria testified that he had been painting
    the victims’ houseboat on April 11.
    3. Figueroa-Sanabria also tried to sell two rings but,
    according to testimony of a staff member at the jewelry store, he
    decided against it when the staff member informed him that a
    gemologist would need to look at them first. Figueroa-Sanabria told
    one investigator that he had owned the jewelry for a while, yet at
    -5-
    carried the jewelry in the backpack that he had when she picked
    him up earlier that morning.
    After leaving the jewelry store, Figueroa-Sanabria finally found
    a company that would rent him a car. There, after Figueroa-
    Sanabria instructed Cooper to mention nothing about the morning
    other than that she dropped him off at a car rental business and
    that he was traveling to see his brother, the couple parted ways.
    Figueroa-Sanabria began to travel northeast, reaching a shipping
    business in Palm Coast on the afternoon of the 12th. From there,
    Figueroa-Sanabria sent a package to his brother in New York. It
    was later found to contain over one hundred pieces of jewelry.
    As Figueroa-Sanabria continued north, the investigation into
    the murders began. According to the testimony of a detective, the
    name “Rey” came up repeatedly around the marina. Soon
    investigators found the apartment complex where Cooper and
    Figueroa-Sanabria lived and impounded the van that the couple
    had been driving around town. Cooper told the police what had
    another point testified that Cooper had given it to him that
    morning. The jewelry was later identified as Travlos’s.
    -6-
    happened earlier that morning. 4 They persuaded a judge to issue a
    warrant for Figueroa-Sanabria’s arrest.
    Figueroa-Sanabria’s run ended just hours later in North
    Carolina. The officer who arrested him explained that law
    enforcement in Florida wanted to speak with him; Figueroa-
    Sanabria replied that he “figured they would.” A search of
    Figueroa-Sanabria’s vehicle revealed, among other things, a cell
    phone with the battery removed and a black backpack. He was
    carrying the money band from the jewelry store that he had visited
    the prior day; later, he tried to get rid of it outside the county jail
    where he was held. An officer found it tucked behind a gutter.
    On April 18, 2013, a grand jury indicted Figueroa-Sanabria on
    two counts of first-degree murder.
    4. Cooper and Figueroa-Sanabria remained in communication
    throughout the day on the 12th. At one point, Figueroa-Sanabria
    texted Cooper asking her if she had seen the police. He told her
    that he had received a call from the property manager of their
    apartment complex informing him that police were there and
    wanted to speak with him.
    -7-
    B
    The court appointed Keith Hammond as Figueroa-Sanabria’s
    lawyer in January 2014 after the public defender’s office withdrew
    for conflict reasons. 5 The attorney-client relationship between
    Figueroa-Sanabria and Hammond was fraught. Over the next five
    years, Figueroa-Sanabria repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with
    Hammond’s representation. Along with complaints raised in
    pretrial hearings, Figueroa-Sanabria filed three motions before trial
    in which he asked the court to dismiss Hammond and appoint new
    counsel. His grievances included a lack of communication and a
    lack of progress in preparing for trial. For example, at one hearing
    Figueroa-Sanabria told the court that Hammond had not visited
    him for almost a year, and at a later hearing he told the court that
    Hammond had only been to see him ten times in the preceding
    twenty-two months, with the visits cumulatively lasting less than
    ten hours.
    5. The court also appointed Daniel Hernandez as co-counsel,
    who was assigned to handle the penalty phase if Figueroa-Sanabria
    was convicted.
    -8-
    Hammond himself recognized these issues, telling the court
    once that he had an “ethical problem” because of his workload and
    low staffing, and then suggesting to the court that it should
    “seriously consider appointing somebody else.” At another hearing,
    speaking of Figueroa-Sanabria, Hammond remarked that “I drive
    him crazy, and he drives me crazy.” And on another occasion,
    Hammond said that his ability to represent Figueroa-Sanabria was
    “borderline,” and projected that his representation of Figueroa-
    Sanabria was “going to cause a problem for the next 20 years.”
    Despite these issues, Hammond told the court that he could
    represent Figueroa-Sanabria.
    All three motions filed by Figueroa-Sanabria were denied by
    the trial court. 6 Each time, the court, after a hearing, found that
    Figueroa-Sanabria had not provided an adequate basis for his
    request and that Hammond was providing adequate representation.
    After the first request, which was in October 2014, Hammond met
    6. The three motions were denied by three different trial
    judges. The first, Judge Nancy Moate Ley, moved divisions, so
    Judge Thane Covert took over in early 2015. Judge Pat Siracusa
    then took over in early 2017 and eventually presided over the trial.
    -9-
    twice with Figueroa-Sanabria, demonstrated progress on discovery
    matters, and successfully sought a continuance. At one point,
    however, after his second request to replace Hammond was denied,
    Figueroa-Sanabria decided to represent himself. But almost six
    months later, in August 2016, he changed his mind and asked for
    counsel. Hammond, who was serving as standby counsel, was
    reinstated.
    In September 2017, after denying Figueroa-Sanabria’s third
    request to replace Hammond, the court asked Figueroa-Sanabria to
    list discovery objectives that he wanted accomplished. It told
    Figueroa-Sanabria that it would appoint a new attorney if
    Hammond failed to accomplish what was listed. Hammond
    demonstrated progress over the course of pretrial hearings that took
    place the next year; however, Figueroa-Sanabria continued to send
    letters to the court documenting his frustration with Hammond’s
    representation.
    In March 2019, the trial court asked Hammond and the State
    about the progress of certain discovery matters. Among other
    things, Figueroa-Sanabria had requested several depositions and
    background checks, and the acquisition of surveillance videos from
    - 10 -
    the gas station where the clothes were dumped. Hammond sought
    a continuance to allow for additional time to prepare for trial, which
    the court granted. Over the next months, Hammond again
    displayed progress when it came to Figueroa-Sanabria’s requests,
    leading the trial court to conclude that the case was ready to be
    tried.
    Only a few days before trial, though, Figueroa-Sanabria wrote
    another letter to the court with objections about Hammond’s
    representation. He again complained about Hammond’s lack of
    communication and lack of progress in investigating certain issues,
    such as whether the clothes found in the dumpster were Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s size or had his DNA on them, and the State’s acquisition
    of Figueroa-Sanabria’s cell phone and the historical cell site
    location information (CSLI) about the phone’s usage.7 The court
    7. When a cell phone is in use, it connects “to a set of radio
    antennas called ‘cell sites,’ ” which “typically have several
    directional antennas that divide the covered area into sectors.”
    Carpenter v. United States, 
    138 S. Ct. 2206
    , 2211 (2018). Each
    time a cell phone connects to one of these cell sites, “it generates a
    time-stamped record” that constitutes CSLI. 
    Id.
     In this case, as the
    intelligence analyst testified at trial, the historical CSLI allowed
    investigators to determine “a geographical area that the device
    could have been in” at the time of an incoming or outgoing phone
    - 11 -
    acknowledged receipt of the letter before jury selection began, and
    later that same day asked Figueroa-Sanabria if he had any
    questions or concerns that it could address. At that point, however,
    Figueroa-Sanabria did not mention any issue with Hammond, and
    he did not again raise an issue with Hammond’s representation
    throughout the rest of the trial.
    Figueroa-Sanabria, though, did ask the court about certain
    evidentiary issues, including the State’s acquisition of historical
    CSLI. Figueroa-Sanabria argued that the State’s warrantless
    acquisition of five days’ worth of CSLI, which the State planned to
    use in establishing Figueroa-Sanabria’s whereabouts on the dates
    relevant to the murders, violated the Fourth Amendment. 8
    In response, the State told the court that it went through all of
    the normal procedures for acquiring the evidence and had the
    call. It provides nothing further, however, such as a precise GPS
    location of the device.
    8. Five years after the historical CSLI was acquired in this
    case, but before trial, the United States Supreme Court concluded
    in Carpenter that the acquisition of seven days of historical CSLI
    constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, and as such,
    had to be supported by a warrant issued upon probable cause. 
    138 S. Ct. at
    2217 n.3.
    - 12 -
    documentation to prove it. 9 After hearing this, the trial court did
    not rule on the admissibility of the evidence in light of the Fourth
    Amendment. Instead, the court only provided that the acquisition
    of the historical CSLI would “certainly be part of the appellate
    issues that [Figueroa-Sanabria] would be contesting” if he was
    convicted. The record does not reflect any further objection when
    the historical CSLI evidence was admitted at trial.
    During the two-week trial that finally began on October 8,
    2019, the jury heard from the officers who conducted the
    investigation. They heard from those with whom Figueroa-Sanabria
    had interacted during the morning of April 12, such as the staff
    member at the jewelry store that purchased the necklace and
    bracelet, and the owner of the rental car business who rented
    Figueroa-Sanabria the vehicle. The jury also heard from Cooper,
    who testified about what had happened after she picked up
    Figueroa-Sanabria on the morning after the murders, and the
    girlfriend of Figueroa-Sanabria’s brother, who testified about
    9. The State later produced the subpoena used to acquire the
    historical CSLI.
    - 13 -
    receiving the jewelry in the mail. The State additionally called the
    medical examiner, who informed the jury that the cause of death for
    both victims was multiple sharp-force injuries and the manner of
    death for both was homicide.
    The jury heard from an intelligence analyst who had mapped
    out the general positioning of Figueroa-Sanabria and Cooper on
    April 11 and 12 using the historical CSLI acquired from Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s and Cooper’s service providers. The CSLI evidence
    revealed that, when Figueroa-Sanabria and Cooper spoke at 4:15
    a.m. and 4:16 a.m., his phone used an antenna south of the one it
    normally used when he was at the marina or his apartment.
    However, the analyst also testified that the southern antenna
    sometimes provides the strongest signal for a phone at the marina.
    In contrast, the analyst testified that Cooper’s phone used one
    antenna, at the same longitude and latitude, throughout the night
    of the 11th and into the morning of the 12th when she
    communicated with Figueroa-Sanabria at 4:15 a.m. and 4:16 a.m.
    This antenna covered the area where both the marina and the
    couple’s apartment were located.
    - 14 -
    A DNA analyst also took the stand. The analyst testified that
    Figueroa-Sanabria’s DNA was found, within a reasonable degree of
    scientific certainty, on both a roll of duct tape and a wad of duct
    tape left at the scene. As the jury learned from a trace materials
    analyst who also testified, the duct tape used to restrain both
    victims came from this roll. As for the white shirt found in the
    dumpster, the DNA analyst testified that the blood from the cuff
    area of the right sleeve matched Morin’s DNA within a reasonable
    degree of scientific certainty, and testing of blood on the collar
    revealed that Travlos’s DNA was a major contributor. As for the
    jeans, testing of blood in three areas revealed the presence of
    Travlos’s DNA within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, and
    testing of blood on another area of the jeans revealed the presence
    of Morin’s DNA within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. 10
    The analyst also conducted testing on carpet clippings from the
    10. The analyst performed additional DNA tests on different
    areas of the white and gray shirts, the jeans, and the belt, but the
    results were largely inconclusive as to the presence of the DNA of
    Figueroa-Sanabria and Cooper.
    - 15 -
    front passenger side of Cooper’s van, which revealed the presence of
    Travlos’s DNA within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
    After the State rested, Hammond called only one witness:
    Figueroa-Sanabria. He testified that he awoke around 4:00 a.m. on
    April 12 to find that Cooper was gone. He said he called her, and
    she told him that she had gone to get cigarettes. When she
    returned, according to Figueroa-Sanabria, she asked him to drive
    her to an addiction treatment center. On the way to the treatment
    center, he said, Cooper asked him to stop at a gas station and
    vacuum out her van. She also, he said, asked him to throw away a
    grocery bag in the dumpster, which he did.
    Figueroa-Sanabria testified that Cooper was the source of the
    jewelry-filled backpack, which, he said, she gave him to make up for
    her selling his vehicle while he served a stint in prison. Figueroa-
    Sanabria testified that he decided to sell some of the jewelry, which
    he did at a jewelry store. Figueroa-Sanabria said that he gave
    Cooper most of the money earned from selling the jewelry, and that
    he promised her the proceeds from future sales. Figueroa-Sanabria
    said that he eventually rented a car, planning to visit his brother in
    New York, who would help him sell the rest of the jewelry. On the
    - 16 -
    way to New York, Figueroa-Sanabria shipped the jewelry to his
    brother.
    On October 23, the jury returned guilty verdicts for both first-
    degree murder charges.
    C
    The matter proceeded to the penalty phase. At a hearing on
    October 28, Daniel Hernandez, who had at that point taken over as
    counsel, told the court that Figueroa-Sanabria did “not wish
    mitigation to be presented.” The court asked Figueroa-Sanabria if
    those were in fact his wishes. He responded that he did not want
    his friends and family to “beg for life” to the jury on his behalf.
    Hernandez said he “obviously . . . was not seeking to do something
    against [Figueroa-Sanabria’s] wishes,” but he “suspected that the
    Court would require [him] to do so.” After failing to convince
    Figueroa-Sanabria that he should present mitigation, the court said
    that if Hernandez “wants to call [mitigation witnesses],” then the
    court is “going to let him call them so that they can do what’s
    necessary.” Figueroa-Sanabria responded by stating that if the
    court is “going to let [Hernandez] do it, then [he] would like to
    - 17 -
    dismiss [Hernandez]” and represent himself. The court made this
    effort to confirm Figueroa-Sanabria’s decision:
    THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Sanabria, are you telling me
    that not only you don’t want your family members to
    testify on your behalf, but you also don’t want the
    doctors to testify on your behalf[?] Is that what you’re
    saying?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I don’t.
    THE COURT: You want nothing presented on your
    behalf? And for the record he’s shaking his head. Now
    he doesn’t want anything.
    THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. I’m sorry. No.
    THE COURT: Now you’re saying you’re willing to
    represent yourself. If I’m going to order Mr. Hernandez to
    present things on your behalf, you’ll represent yourself so
    that you won’t have to present anything because I may
    have to order Mr. Hernandez to present things on your
    behalf?
    THE DEFENDANT: That’s what I say, your Honor, yes.
    After taking a short break, the court told Figueroa-Sanabria
    that it could not have defense counsel “go forward representing
    [him] not presenting . . . any mitigation,” and so “if [Hernandez]
    represents [Figueroa-Sanabria], he’s going to present mitigation on
    [Figueroa-Sanabria’s] behalf.” The colloquy concluded this way:
    THE COURT: With that in mind do you want to represent
    yourself or do you want to let Mr. Hernandez present the
    mitigation against your wishes?
    THE DEFENDANT: I don’t want no mitigation.
    THE COURT: Okay. So you want to represent yourself
    and not put on any mitigation?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
    - 18 -
    After a court-appointed expert witness testified that Figueroa-
    Sanabria was competent to make the decision to waive mitigation
    and represent himself, the court held a Faretta 11 hearing. At this
    hearing, the court inquired into Figueroa-Sanabria’s knowledge of
    the relevant law and procedural rules, reminded Figueroa-Sanabria
    of the difficulties of self-representation, and told Figueroa-Sanabria
    that he would not have much time to prepare before the penalty
    phase started. The trial court also ensured that Figueroa-Sanabria
    understood that the maximum penalty he could receive was death
    and told him that he would have a much better chance to receive a
    sentence of life if he was represented by counsel. Figueroa-
    Sanabria still chose to proceed pro se.
    Before accepting Figueroa-Sanabria’s waiver, the trial court
    asked Hernandez if there was any lawful reason that the court
    should not accept Figueroa-Sanabria’s decision, and Hernandez
    responded that there was not. After Hernandez summarized the
    11. Faretta v. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
     (1975) (concluding that
    a defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel in
    a state criminal trial as long as he knowingly, intelligently, and
    voluntarily chooses to do so).
    - 19 -
    mitigation evidence he planned to present, the court accepted
    Figueroa-Sanabria’s waiver and appointed Hernandez as standby
    counsel.
    During the penalty phase, the State presented one expert
    witness—who testified to the physical and medical condition of the
    victims—and victim impact testimony. Figueroa-Sanabria did not
    present mitigation evidence, nor did he provide an opening
    statement or closing argument. After the State’s closing argument,
    the trial court instructed the jury on its duties, and deliberations
    began.
    An hour in, the jury returned with questions about the verdict
    form, and Hernandez offered to provide some assistance. After the
    court assured Figueroa-Sanabria that the reinstatement of
    Hernandez would not affect his waiver of mitigation, Figueroa-
    Sanabria agreed to allow Hernandez to represent him again.
    Following deliberations, the jury unanimously found five
    aggravating factors and unanimously recommended sentences of
    death. After a series of Spencer 12 hearings at which both sides
    12. Spencer v. State, 
    615 So. 2d 688
     (Fla. 1993) (setting out a
    procedure that affords both the State and the defendant an
    - 20 -
    presented evidence on, among other things, whether Figueroa-
    Sanabria was cognitively impaired, the trial court sentenced
    Figueroa-Sanabria to death for each murder. This appeal follows.
    II
    A
    Figueroa-Sanabria argues that two errors committed during
    the guilt phase require us to set aside his convictions. First,
    Figueroa-Sanabria argues that the trial court erred in refusing,
    more than once, to appoint new counsel before the start of the guilt
    phase. Second, Figueroa-Sanabria argues that the trial court erred
    in admitting historical CSLI that had been acquired without a
    warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Neither alleged
    error justifies reversing Figueroa-Sanabria’s convictions. And
    because, after a review of the record, we find that Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s convictions are supported by competent, substantial
    evidence, we affirm them.
    opportunity to be heard and present additional evidence to the trial
    court before it decides whether to impose a death sentence).
    - 21 -
    1
    As to the first issue, Figueroa-Sanabria argues that the trial
    court erred in refusing to dismiss Hammond from the case and
    appoint substitute counsel.13 We review a “trial court’s decision
    involving withdrawal or discharge of counsel . . . for abuse of
    discretion.” Guardado v. State, 
    965 So. 2d 108
    , 113 (Fla. 2007).
    Discretion is abused only when no reasonable person “would take
    the view adopted by the trial court.” Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382
    13. Figueroa-Sanabria argues that the trial court violated the
    Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
    guarantees him “the Assistance of Counsel for his defence,” amend.
    VI, U.S. Const., when it denied his motions to dismiss Hammond
    and appoint substitute counsel after it became apparent that the
    relationship between Figueroa-Sanabria and Hammond had
    “completely collapsed.” But the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected
    the claim “that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful
    relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.” Morris v.
    Slappy, 
    461 U.S. 1
    , 14 (1983). Instead, the Sixth Amendment only
    guarantees “the right to effective assistance of counsel at all critical
    stages of a criminal prosecution.” Taylor v. State, 
    87 So. 3d 749
    ,
    758 (Fla. 2012). Recognizing that our cases generally leave
    ineffective assistance arguments for postconviction proceedings, see
    Steiger v. State, 
    328 So. 3d 926
     (Fla. 2021), Figueroa-Sanabria does
    not now argue that Hammond was ineffective. Because of this, we
    decline to consider Figueroa-Sanabria’s Sixth Amendment
    arguments related to Hammond.
    - 22 -
    So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (quoting Delno v. Mkt. St. Ry. Co., 
    124 F.2d 965
    , 967 (9th Cir. 1942)). Here, we cannot say that.
    In reviewing the trial court’s refusal to discharge defense
    counsel and appoint a new one, we are mindful “that an indigent
    defendant has no right to choose a particular court-appointed
    attorney.” Weaver v. State, 
    894 So. 2d 178
    , 187 (Fla. 2004). Thus,
    “if a trial court decides that court-appointed counsel is providing
    adequate representation, the court does not violate an indigent
    defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights if it requires him to keep the
    original court-appointed lawyer or represent himself.” 
    Id. at 188
    .
    This makes sense given the “essential aim” of the Assistance of
    Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which is “to guarantee an
    effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure
    that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom
    he prefers.” Wheat v. United States, 
    486 U.S. 153
    , 159 (1988).
    In past cases we have concluded that a “lack of
    communication is not a ground for an incompetency claim.”
    Morrison v. State, 
    818 So. 2d 432
    , 440-41 (Fla. 2002); see, e.g.,
    Glover v. State, 
    226 So. 3d 795
    , 807-08 (Fla. 2017); Davis v. State,
    
    136 So. 3d 1169
    , 1209 (Fla. 2014); Guardado, 
    965 So. 2d at 115
    .
    - 23 -
    We also have rejected claims based on a defendant’s “displeasure
    with counsel’s refusal to provide copies of legal documents and
    efforts in contacting witnesses,” and a defendant’s “complaints
    about his attorney’s trial preparation, witness development, and
    trial strategy.” Morrison, 
    818 So. 2d at 441
    ; see Sexton v. State, 
    775 So. 2d 923
    , 930-31 (Fla. 2000). It is also our settled law that
    generalized grievances concerning these issues do not provide cause
    for a Nelson 14 hearing. See, e.g., Morrison, 
    818 So. 2d at 441
    ;
    Guardado, 
    965 So. 2d at 115
    .
    Here, Figueroa-Sanabria’s concerns with Hammond boil down
    to two issues: a lack of communication and a lack of progress in
    preparing for trial. Neither supplies a basis for the relief he seeks.
    The trial court convened multiple Nelson hearings to consider
    Figueroa-Sanabria’s grievances. The court inquired into
    Hammond’s ability to handle the case and Hammond’s stated
    14. Nelson v. State, 
    274 So. 2d 256
    , 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
    (“[W]here a defendant, before the commencement of trial, makes it
    appear to the trial judge that he desires to discharge his court
    appointed counsel, the trial judge, in order to protect the indigent’s
    right to effective counsel, should make an inquiry of the defendant
    as to the reason for the request to discharge.”).
    - 24 -
    concerns about his relationship with Figueroa-Sanabria. We find
    the court conducted “sufficient inquiry to determine whether there
    was reasonable cause to believe that counsel was not rendering
    effective assistance.” Morrison, 
    818 So. 2d at 442
    .
    The court also continually tracked Hammond’s progress on a
    list prepared by Figueroa-Sanabria enumerating issues he wanted
    addressed before trial. And, throughout trial, the court repeatedly
    asked Figueroa-Sanabria if he had any questions or concerns that
    could be addressed; not once during these colloquies did Figueroa-
    Sanabria object to Hammond’s preparation or representation.
    On the record before us, we cannot say the trial court
    inadequately addressed Figueroa-Sanabria’s concerns; to the
    contrary, the three separate judges who considered Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s motions each reasonably concluded that he failed to
    assert a sufficient basis for replacing Hammond. Figueroa-
    Sanabria has therefore failed to show that the court abused its
    discretion in denying his motions to substitute counsel, and he is
    not entitled to a new guilt phase on this basis.
    - 25 -
    2
    Figueroa-Sanabria next argues that the trial court reversibly
    erred when it refused to exclude historical CSLI obtained without a
    warrant. First, however, we must decide whether this question is
    preserved for our review.
    We have stated that “no magic words are required to make a
    proper objection.” Aills v. Boemi, 
    29 So. 3d 1105
    , 1109 (Fla.
    2010). An issue is preserved when it is “timely raised before, and
    ruled on by, the trial court” and was in its presentation “sufficiently
    precise that it fairly apprised the trial court of the relief sought and
    the grounds therefor.” § 924.051(1)(b), Fla. Stat. The argument on
    appeal “must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for
    the objection, exception, or motion below.” Steinhorst v. State, 
    412 So. 2d 332
    , 338 (Fla. 1982).
    In a hearing after the first day of jury selection, Figueroa-
    Sanabria questioned the legality of the State’s warrantless
    acquisition of historical CSLI given the U.S. Supreme Court’s
    decision in Carpenter, 
    138 S. Ct. at 2217
    , which, in Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s words, provided that the State “need[ed] a search
    warrant for cellular call logs, towers, and everything.” The court
    - 26 -
    told Figueroa-Sanabria that if the State could not show that it went
    through the procedural steps required to obtain the historical CSLI
    and Figueroa-Sanabria was convicted, then the acquisition of the
    historical CSLI would “certainly be part of the appellate issues that
    [he] would be contesting.” 15
    While this interaction cannot be said to have conclusively and
    clearly preserved the issue for our review, Figueroa-Sanabria did
    put “the trial judge on notice that error may have been committed,”
    Castor v. State, 
    365 So. 2d 701
    , 703 (Fla. 1978), and we decline, on
    these facts, to penalize Figueroa-Sanabria for proceeding in
    accordance with the trial judge’s statement about the preservation
    of the issue for appeal. We thus proceed on the assumption that
    this issue was preserved.
    Next, while we normally would address whether the State’s
    acquisition of Figueroa-Sanabria’s historical CSLI was a warrantless
    15. The court also said that “if a mistake was made . . . then
    certainly your appellate lawyer will look into it because Mr.
    Hammond has preserved that for appeal.” Hammond did file a
    motion to suppress, which was denied, but that motion only sought
    to suppress evidence garnered from Figueroa-Sanabria’s cell phone
    before the acquisition of a warrant, not the historical CSLI.
    - 27 -
    Fourth Amendment search, and if so, whether the exclusionary rule
    applies, we need not reach these issues to resolve this case. That is
    because the allegedly erroneous introduction of the CSLI evidence is
    harmless.16
    A trial court’s error in admitting evidence obtained from an
    unconstitutional search is subject to harmless error analysis.
    Smallwood v. State, 
    113 So. 3d 724
    , 739 (Fla. 2013); see § 924.33,
    Fla. Stat. “The harmless error test . . . places the burden on the
    state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable
    16. When the State acquires evidence as the result of a
    constitutionally unreasonable search, the exclusionary rule may
    bar its admission. The exclusionary rule is a prudential doctrine
    created by the U.S. Supreme Court to “compel respect for the
    constitutional guaranty” found in the Fourth Amendment, Davis v.
    United States, 
    564 U.S. 229
    , 236 (2011) (quoting Elkins v. United
    States, 
    364 U.S. 206
    , 217 (1960)), by deterring “deliberate police
    misconduct,” Rodriguez v. State, 
    187 So. 3d 841
    , 845 (Fla. 2015).
    The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has provided that the
    exclusionary rule does not apply when “the police conduct a search
    in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent.”
    Davis, 
    564 U.S. at 249-50
    . Although we do not reach the
    applicability of the good-faith exception, we note that, when the
    State acquired the historical CSLI in this case, binding precedent
    provided that the acquisition of such data was not a “search” under
    the Fourth Amendment—meaning a warrant was not
    constitutionally required. See Mitchell v. State, 
    25 So. 3d 632
    , 635
    (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Johnson v. State, 
    110 So. 3d 954
    , 958 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2013).
    - 28 -
    doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
    or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that
    the error contributed to the conviction.” State v. DiGuilio, 
    491 So. 2d 1129
    , 1135 (Fla. 1986). The test is focused “on the effect of the
    error on the trier-of-fact” and is not a “sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a
    correct result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more
    probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an overwhelming
    evidence test.” 
    Id. at 1139
    .
    Although the CSLI evidence is indeed inculpatory and was a
    part of the State’s case, after “an examination of the entire
    record . . . including a close examination of the permissible evidence
    on which the jury could have legitimately relied, and in addition an
    even closer examination of the impermissible evidence which might
    have possibly influenced the jury verdict,” 
    id. at 1135
    , we conclude
    the State has met its burden here. The CSLI evidence “was merely
    cumulative.” Odom v. State, 
    403 So. 2d 936
    , 940 (Fla. 1981).
    We start with the other evidence inculpating Figueroa-
    Sanabria. It is “clearly conclusive.” DiGuilio, 
    491 So. 2d at 1138
    .
    The State presented evidence that the two victims died on their
    houseboat after suffering multiple stab wounds, and that jewelry
    - 29 -
    valued at over $80,000 was stolen from the houseboat. There were
    no signs of a forced entry, and it was established that Figueroa-
    Sanabria was often given a key to the houseboat. Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s DNA was present on both a roll and wad of duct tape left
    at the scene. Testimony revealed that the duct tape used to
    restrain the victims came from this roll. Both victims’ DNA was
    found on discarded clothes that Cooper identified as Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s, and Travlos’s DNA was found on the carpet of the front
    passenger seat of the van in which Figueroa-Sanabria sat in the
    hours after the murders. Cooper recalled seeing Figueroa-Sanabria
    holding a knife that morning as they drove around with a backpack
    full of the victims’ jewelry—some of which Figueroa-Sanabria sold
    before mailing the rest to his brother.
    What is more, Figueroa-Sanabria elected to take the stand.
    When a defendant testifies on his version of events, the jury is “free
    to reject [his] version of events as unreasonable,” Finney v. State,
    
    660 So. 2d 674
    , 680 (Fla. 1995), and in turn may view this
    testimony as “evidence of a guilty mind.” Jackson v. State, 
    347 So. 3d 292
    , 307 (Fla. 2022); see also United States v. Allison, 
    908 F.2d 1531
    , 1535 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The jury may view defendant’s false
    - 30 -
    explanatory statement as substantive evidence proving guilt.”).
    Figueroa-Sanabria testified that he received the jewelry from
    Cooper. This contradicted what he told investigators, which was
    that he had owned the jewelry for a while. Figueroa-Sanabria also
    did not explain why his DNA was left at the scene, why Cooper’s
    DNA was not, and why Cooper would murder Travlos and Morin
    only to give Figueroa-Sanabria the jewelry. The jury was free to
    reject Figueroa-Sanabria’s version of the events in light of all this,
    and it did.
    As for the allegedly impermissible evidence, the jury heard
    from an intelligence analyst who, with Figueroa-Sanabria’s
    historical CSLI, placed Figueroa-Sanabria’s cell phone at a location
    south of the couple’s apartment when he called Cooper early on the
    morning of the 12th. The State used this evidence to argue that
    Figueroa-Sanabria was near the houseboat at the time of the crimes
    and to rebut his argument that Cooper was the one who committed
    the crimes. But there “was additional substantial, reliable and
    admissible evidence” on both these points, Hayward v. State, 
    24 So. 3d 17
    , 34 (Fla. 2009), as revised on denial of reh’g (Dec. 10, 2009),
    including the DNA evidence that placed Figueroa-Sanabria, not
    - 31 -
    Cooper, at the scene rather than in its vicinity. 17 This supports the
    conclusion that the admission of the historical CSLI was harmless.
    See Hojan v. State, 
    3 So. 3d 1204
    , 1210 (Fla. 2009) (“This Court has
    held that where the evidence introduced in error was not the only
    evidence on the issue to which the improper evidence related, the
    introduction can be harmless.”).
    Our conclusion about the harmlessness of any error regarding
    the admission of Figueroa-Sanabria’s historical CSLI evidence finds
    ample support in our cases. For example, in Jeffries v. State, we
    concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s
    shoes seized after an illegal arrest. 
    797 So. 2d 573
    , 577 (Fla. 2001).
    The jury learned that a shoe print at the crime scene was left by the
    same type of shoes as the defendant’s. 
    Id. at 579
    . Even with this
    connection, we concluded that the trial court’s error was harmless.
    
    Id.
     The expert that testified at trial was unable to conclusively
    determine that the shoe print was made by the defendant’s shoes.
    17. The historical CSLI for Cooper’s phone placed it in a
    sector that included both the apartment and the marina. Thus,
    while it does support Cooper’s testimony, it also does not
    completely rule out Figueroa-Sanabria’s version of events.
    - 32 -
    
    Id.
     And the State presented other, more inculpatory evidence:
    testimony from the defendant’s siblings, who overheard the
    defendant talk about his plans to commit the crimes, expert
    testimony linking the defendant to a fingerprint left at the scene,
    and a stipulation from both parties that the defendant pawned the
    victim’s jewelry shortly after the murder. 
    Id. at 578-79
    .
    In another case, Saavedra v. State, we had to determine
    whether a trial court had erred in denying the defendant’s motion to
    suppress evidence obtained from his home after the police entered
    without a warrant and arrested him. 
    622 So. 2d 952
    , 956 (Fla.
    1993). While we found that the police officers’ initial entry into the
    home was not supported by third-party consent, we did not proceed
    to determine whether exigent circumstances were present to
    support the entry, or if the defendant’s subsequent consent to
    search was tainted by his warrantless arrest. 
    Id. at 959
    . Instead,
    we assumed officers had entered without exigent circumstances
    and that the later consent was tainted, and we proceeded to
    conduct a harmless error review. 
    Id.
     We found the trial court’s
    error to be harmless, even though the search led to the recovery of
    two pairs of black pants and a hood, which is what the defendants
    - 33 -
    allegedly wore when they sexually assaulted the victim. 
    Id. at 955
    .
    This was because the verdict was strongly supported by the victim’s
    in-court identification of both defendants as her attackers, and
    other testimony that both corroborated the victim’s testimony about
    her injuries and tied the semen found on the victim’s body to both
    defendants. 
    Id. at 959
    .
    As in these cases, here, too, the State is correct that there is
    no reasonable possibility that the allegedly erroneous admission of
    the evidence at issue contributed to the convictions. See DiGuilio,
    
    491 So. 2d at 1135
    . Figueroa-Sanabria is therefore not entitled to a
    new guilt phase because of the trial court’s admission of the
    historical CSLI.
    3
    Even when the defendant does not contest the sufficiency of
    the evidence at trial, we have “an independent obligation to review
    the record for sufficiency of the evidence.” Blake v. State, 
    972 So. 2d 839
    , 850 (Fla. 2007). “[T]he concern on appeal must be whether,
    after all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable inferences
    therefrom have been resolved in favor of the verdict on appeal, there
    is substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict and
    - 34 -
    judgment.” Tibbs v. State, 
    397 So. 2d 1120
    , 1123 (Fla. 1981).
    Important to this case, a “general guilty verdict rendered by a jury
    instructed on both first-degree murder alternatives may be upheld
    on appeal where the evidence is sufficient to establish either felony
    murder or premeditation.” Crain v. State, 
    894 So. 2d 59
    , 73 (Fla.
    2004). 18
    The jury heard sufficient evidence of Figueroa-Sanabria’s guilt:
    the absence of forced entry on the houseboat and his frequent
    possession of a key to it; the DNA evidence on the duct tape at the
    crime scene and on his clothes; the knife on his lap and stolen
    jewelry in his backpack; his statement to investigators about how
    long he had the jewelry, which conflicted with his own later
    testimony; and the cumulative falsehood of that testimony, which
    18. The three elements of premeditated first-degree murder
    are: (1) the victim is dead; (2) the death was caused by the criminal
    act of the defendant; and (3) there was a premeditated killing of the
    victim. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2; § 782.04(1)(a)1., Fla.
    Stat. The three elements of felony murder as it pertains to this case
    are: (1) the victim is dead; (2) while engaged in the commission of a
    robbery and/or burglary, the defendant caused the death of the
    victim; and (3) the defendant was the person who actually killed the
    victim. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.3; § 782.04(1)(a)2., Fla.
    Stat.
    - 35 -
    the jury chose to reject. We conclude that “a rational trier of fact
    could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt,” Bradley v. State, 
    787 So. 2d 732
    , 738 (Fla.
    2001), and thus affirm Figueroa-Sanabria’s convictions.
    B
    We now turn to the penalty phase. While Figueroa-Sanabria
    asserts that the trial court committed multiple errors during this
    phase, we need reach only one. The trial court’s erroneous
    acceptance of Figueroa-Sanabria’s invalid waiver of his right to the
    assistance of counsel, and counsel’s subsequent absence for nearly
    the entire penalty phase, entitles Figueroa-Sanabria to a new
    penalty phase.
    1
    The parties disagree about whether Figueroa-Sanabria needed
    to preserve his argument concerning the trial court’s acceptance of
    his waiver and counsel’s subsequent absence. If an issue is
    preserved, we apply either the harmless error test or per se
    reversible error rule,19 Johnson v. State, 
    53 So. 3d 1003
    , 1007 (Fla.
    19. Again, an error is harmless if “there is no reasonable
    possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” DiGuilio,
    - 36 -
    2010), as revised on denial of reh’g (Jan. 27, 2011), and if it is not,
    we review only for fundamental error, F.B. v. State, 
    852 So. 2d 226
    ,
    229 (Fla. 2003). Here, though, because we conclude that the
    deprivation of counsel constitutes fundamental error, we need not
    answer the preservation question, as Figueroa-Sanabria is entitled
    to a new penalty phase whether or not he properly preserved this
    issue.
    2
    “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
    right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
    Amend. VI, U.S. Const. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted
    the Sixth Amendment to secure the right to appointed counsel for a
    defendant in federal court, Johnson v. Zerbst, 
    304 U.S. 458
    , 462-63
    (1938), and the Fourteenth Amendment to extend this right to state
    criminal proceedings, Gideon v. Wainwright, 
    372 U.S. 335
    , 344
    (1963). 20 The right to appointed counsel applies in the penalty
    
    491 So. 2d at 1135
    . An error is per se reversible if it is “so basic to
    a fair trial” that it “can never be treated as harmless error.” 
    Id.
    (quoting Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 23 (1967)).
    20. In Traylor v. State, we concluded that sections 2 and 16 of
    article I of the Florida Constitution combined to produce the
    - 37 -
    phase. See Muehleman v. State, 
    3 So. 3d 1149
    , 1156-57 (Fla.
    2009); Harris v. Dugger, 
    874 F.2d 756
    , 762 (11th Cir. 1989).
    Even if defendants exercise this right to appointed counsel,
    “all competent defendants have a right to control their own
    destinies.” Hamblen v. State, 
    527 So. 2d 800
    , 804 (Fla. 1988); see
    Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth App. Dist., 
    528 U.S. 152
    ,
    165 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Our system of laws
    generally presumes that the criminal defendant, after being fully
    informed, knows his own best interests and does not need them
    dictated by the State.”). This means that “[b]y exercising his
    constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, a defendant does
    not relinquish his right to set the parameters of that
    representation.” United States v. Teague, 
    953 F.2d 1525
    , 1533
    (11th Cir. 1992).
    In line with this principle, our case law “affords competent
    capital defendants ‘great control over the objectives and content of
    constitutional right to appointed counsel. 
    596 So. 2d 957
    , 969 (Fla.
    1992). This right extends to each crucial stage, which is “any stage
    that may significantly affect the outcome of the proceedings.” 
    Id. at 968
    . In most cases, indigent defendants are also entitled to counsel
    by statute. See § 27.40, Fla. Stat.; § 27.51, Fla. Stat.
    - 38 -
    [their] mitigation.’ ” Bell v. State, 
    336 So. 3d 211
    , 217 (Fla. 2022)
    (alteration in original) (quoting Boyd v. State, 
    910 So. 2d 167
    , 189
    (Fla. 2005)). Therefore, “regardless of ‘[w]hether [the] defendant is
    represented by counsel or is proceeding pro se, the defendant has
    the right to choose what evidence, if any, the defense will present
    during the penalty phase.’ ” 
    Id.
     (alterations in original) (quoting
    Boyd, 
    910 So. 2d at 189-90
    ); see also Hojan, 
    3 So. 3d at 1211
    ; Farr
    v. State, 
    656 So. 2d 448
    , 449 (Fla. 1995). Put plainly, “a defendant
    cannot be forced to present mitigating evidence during the penalty
    phase of the trial.” Grim v. State, 
    841 So. 2d 455
    , 461 (Fla. 2003).
    Here, however, the trial court informed Figueroa-Sanabria that
    “if [Hernandez] represents [Figueroa-Sanabria], he’s going to present
    mitigation on [his] behalf,” effectively telling Figueroa-Sanabria that
    his right to the assistance of counsel was conditioned on the
    presentation of mitigation. Faced with this choice, one he should
    not have been forced to make, Figueroa-Sanabria decided to
    proceed pro se.
    The trial court’s statements call into question Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to
    the assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. “[W]aivers of
    - 39 -
    counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a
    knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known
    right or privilege.” Edwards v. Arizona, 
    451 U.S. 477
    , 482 (1981).
    “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and
    sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of
    the right and how it would likely apply in general in the
    circumstances.” United States v. Ruiz, 
    536 U.S. 622
    , 629 (2002)
    (emphasis omitted). Additionally, “[t]here must be both the capacity
    to make an understanding choice and an absence of subverting
    factors so that the choice is clearly free and responsible.” Von
    Moltke v. Gillies, 
    332 U.S. 708
    , 729 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., separate
    opinion). And “courts generally will indulge every reasonable
    presumption against waiver of this fundamental right.” Traylor,
    
    596 So. 2d at 968
    . 21
    21. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that, as a matter of
    federal constitutional law, “it [is] incumbent upon the State to prove
    ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
    privilege.’ ” Brewer v. Williams, 
    430 U.S. 387
    , 404 (1977) (quoting
    Zerbst, 
    304 U.S. at 464
    ). Thus, on “direct appeal, the government
    bears the burden of proving the validity of the waiver.” United
    States v. Cash, 
    47 F.3d 1083
    , 1088 (11th Cir. 1995). We have said
    that the State bears the burden of proving the validity of a
    defendant’s waiver in a variety of circumstances, including the
    waiver of the right to counsel if a defendant confesses after the
    - 40 -
    Here, we cannot say that Figueroa-Sanabria knowingly and
    voluntarily waived his right to counsel for the penalty phase of his
    trial. While a “criminal defendant may be asked, in the interest of
    orderly procedures, to choose between waiver and another course of
    action as long as the choice presented to him is not constitutionally
    offensive,” Maynard v. Meachum, 
    545 F.2d 273
    , 278 (1st Cir. 1976),
    it was unconstitutional for the trial court to misinform Figueroa-
    Sanabria as to the nature of his rights and put him to the specific
    choice he faced: have a lawyer present mitigation, or go it alone.
    See Mora v. State, 
    814 So. 2d 322
     (Fla. 2002) (concluding that the
    trial court committed reversible error by requiring a defendant to
    choose between the right to counsel and the right to forgo
    mitigation investigation); Wilson v. State, 
    12 So. 3d 292
     (Fla. 4th
    administration of warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966). See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 
    739 So. 2d 568
    , 575 (Fla. 1999).
    “Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial resulting
    in his conviction and later seeks release by the extraordinary
    remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof rests upon him to
    establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his
    constitutional right to assistance of Counsel.” Zerbst, 
    304 U.S. at 468-69
    ; see also Mason v. State, 
    176 So. 2d 76
    , 78-79 (Fla. 1965)
    (imposing burden on a postconviction petitioner to establish an
    insufficient waiver of counsel).
    - 41 -
    DCA 2009) (same, as to requiring defendant to choose between the
    right to counsel and the right to testify); Turner v. State, 
    851 So. 2d 276
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (same, as to requiring defendant to choose
    between testifying against his will and the court declaring a
    mistrial). We cannot say under these circumstances that Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, meaning
    the trial court erred in accepting it.
    The trial court’s repeated inquiries throughout the penalty
    phase as to Figueroa-Sanabria’s desire to remain without counsel
    did not cure this error. Even though Figueroa-Sanabria refused to
    reinstate counsel each time the trial court asked, he did so almost
    assuredly because he remained under the impression that
    reinstating counsel would mean the presentation of mitigation
    evidence. Consider Figueroa-Sanabria’s response when the trial
    court asked whether he wanted Hernandez reinstated so that
    Hernandez could offer advice on the verdict form: he said, “[t]hat
    would not interfere in my—” and the trial court responded, “[i]t
    wouldn’t change the mitigation issue, no.”
    In sum, a defendant’s choice about whether to waive the right
    to present all mitigating evidence “is not altered when the defendant
    - 42 -
    has counsel.” Boyd, 
    910 So. 2d at 189
    . The trial court’s statement
    of the law to the contrary, which prompted Figueroa-Sanabria to
    waive his right to counsel, means we cannot conclude that
    Figueroa-Sanabria’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
    3
    Fundamental errors are few and rare. Smith v. State, 
    521 So. 2d 106
    , 108 (Fla. 1988). We have said they are those that
    “permeate or saturate the trial with such basic invalidity as to lead
    to a reversal regardless of a timely objection,” Brown v. State, 
    124 So. 2d 481
    , 484 (Fla. 1960), and go to “the foundation of the case or
    the merits of the cause of action and [are] equivalent to a denial of
    due process,” J.B. v. State, 
    705 So. 2d 1376
    , 1378 (Fla. 1998).
    Figueroa-Sanabria has established that the error here—which
    left him without the assistance of counsel for the majority of a
    penalty phase proceeding in a death penalty case on the basis of a
    waiver that was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary—qualifies
    as fundamental. “Florida courts, including this Court, have found
    deprivations of counsel to be fundamental error.” Jackson v. State,
    
    983 So. 2d 562
    , 575 (Fla. 2008). Such cases “generally involve
    deprivation of counsel during an entire proceeding.” 
    Id.
     For
    - 43 -
    example, in Gonzalez v. State, 
    838 So. 2d 1242
    , 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2003), the First District Court of Appeal found that the complete
    denial of counsel at resentencing constituted a fundamental error,
    and we approved that decision. See Jackson, 
    983 So. 2d at 575
    .
    Other examples from Florida cases include the complete
    deprivation of counsel during both a juvenile plea hearing and a
    disposition hearing, State v. B.P., 
    810 So. 2d 918
     (Fla. 2002); State
    v. T.G., 
    800 So. 2d 204
     (Fla. 2001), a juvenile plea hearing, J.R.V. v.
    State, 
    715 So. 2d 1135
     (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), a violation of probation
    hearing, Brady v. State, 
    910 So. 2d 388
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), and a
    violation of community control hearing, Tyler v. State, 
    710 So. 2d 645
     (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
    In certain cases involving only a partial deprivation of a
    defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel, Florida courts have
    applied our familiar harmless error analysis 22 or found no
    fundamental error. See, e.g., Jackson, 
    983 So. 2d at 577
     (finding
    22. Because “fundamental error is not subject to harmless
    error review,” Reed v. State, 
    837 So. 2d 366
    , 369-70 (Fla. 2002),
    these are all cases in which the absence of counsel did not
    constitute fundamental error.
    - 44 -
    no fundamental error when defense counsel was absent for part of a
    victim impact statement); Thompson v. State, 
    507 So. 2d 1074
     (Fla.
    1987) (reviewing for harmless error when defendant was deprived of
    counsel during a thirty-minute recess); Vileenor v. State, 
    500 So. 2d 713
     (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (reviewing for harmless error when defense
    counsel was absent for five minutes after the trial court started
    reading the jury instructions); Wilson v. State, 
    764 So. 2d 813
     (Fla.
    4th DCA 2000) (reviewing for harmless error when defendant did
    not have the assistance of counsel when the jury asked a question
    during deliberations).
    But here, Figueroa-Sanabria’s defense counsel was not absent
    for a brief time or during only part of the victim impact testimony.
    Counsel was discharged before the penalty phase began, only to be
    reinstated when the jury had questions about the verdict form
    during deliberations, meaning Figueroa-Sanabria was without the
    assistance of counsel for nearly all of the penalty phase in front of
    the jury. Figueroa-Sanabria has demonstrated that this deprivation
    “affected—and contaminated—the entire criminal proceeding”
    thereafter, Satterwhite v. Texas, 
    486 U.S. 249
    , 257 (1988), and is in
    - 45 -
    that sense like others we have found to constitute fundamental
    error.
    Even if we assume Hernandez could not have presented
    mitigation evidence, his presence could have bolstered Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s penalty-phase defense in multiple ways. For one,
    Hernandez could have provided an opening statement, which allows
    an attorney to outline what he “expects to be established by the
    evidence.” Occhicone v. State, 
    570 So. 2d 902
    , 904 (Fla. 1990). He
    might have cross-examined and impeached the State’s witness,
    thus requiring the State’s case in aggravation “to survive the
    crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” United States v. Cronic,
    
    466 U.S. 648
    , 656 (1984). He could have provided closing
    argument. Given that “one of the most important functions of the
    capital sentencing process is the opportunity to humanize the
    defendant, the importance of the defense’s closing argument
    cannot . . . be overstated.” Lawhorn v. Allen, 
    519 F.3d 1272
    , 1296
    (11th Cir. 2008). Closing argument by the defense “can remind the
    factfinder of favorable facts that it may have forgotten or mistakenly
    downplayed or prematurely misjudged.” 
    Id.
     And it allows defense
    counsel to show “the meaning and value of the defendant’s life and
    - 46 -
    worthiness to live.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Marshall v. Hendricks, 
    307 F.3d 36
    ,
    99, 103 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here,
    about to enter deliberations, the jury heard only from the State,
    which urged it to conclude that Figueroa-Sanabria was “among the
    worst of the worst,” and that “the death of those two people on that
    boat, that night, warrant that [Figueroa-Sanabria] pay with his.”
    “[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”
    Gideon, 
    372 U.S. at 344
    . “The Sixth Amendment stands as a
    constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it
    provides be lost, justice will not still be done.” Zerbst, 
    304 U.S. at 462
     (internal quotation marks omitted). The presence and
    assistance of counsel, one of these constitutional safeguards, is
    paramount, as it affects a defendant’s ability to “assert any other
    rights he may have.” Cronic, 
    466 U.S. at 654
     (quoting Walter V.
    Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 
    70 Harv. L. Rev. 1
    , 8 (1956)). Here, because of the trial court’s misstatement of the
    law, Figueroa-Sanabria stood alone during opening statements, the
    State’s presentation of aggravating evidence, and closing
    arguments. This means that Figueroa-Sanabria was without the
    assistance to which he was constitutionally entitled. While� the
    - 47 -
    “doctrine of fundamental error should be applied only in rare
    cases,” Smith, 
    521 So. 2d at 108
    , Figueroa-Sanabria has
    established that he is entitled to a new penalty phase.
    III
    We affirm Figueroa-Sanabria’s convictions for the first-degree
    murders of John Travlos and Germana Morin. We set aside his
    sentences of death and remand for new penalty phase proceedings.
    It is so ordered.
    MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, GROSSHANS, and FRANCIS, JJ.,
    concur.
    FRANCIS, J., concurs with an opinion.
    LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
    SASSO, J., did not participate.
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
    AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
    FRANCIS, J., concurring.
    I agree with the majority that Mr. Figueroa-Sanabria is entitled
    to a new sentencing hearing based on the trial court’s fundamental
    error in forcing him to abandon counsel during the penalty phase.
    That said, I write separately to reject Mr. Figueroa-Sanabria’s claim
    that the State violated his Fourth Amendment rights under
    Carpenter v. State, 
    228 So. 3d 535
     (Fla. 2017), when it obtained Mr.
    - 48 -
    Figueroa-Sanabria’s historical cell site location information (CSLI)
    via subpoena. As explained below, because Carpenter distorts the
    proper application of the exclusionary rule, I urge abandoning the
    decision’s misguided overreach in rejecting binding United States
    Supreme Court precedent. By overruling Carpenter, this Court
    would rightly relieve the unconstitutional burden on the State to
    forecast the “settledness” of Fourth Amendment law and conform
    our precedent to that of the U.S. Supreme Court, as mandated by
    the Florida Constitution.
    While investigating Mr. Figueroa-Sanabria as the prime
    suspect in the 2013 murders of John Travlos and Germana Morin,
    the State obtained Mr. Figueroa-Sanabria’s CSLI data via subpoena.
    This data revealed that Mr. Figueroa-Sanabria’s cellphone was
    within the area of the marina during the time the victims were
    murdered.23 When the State filed the subpoena to obtain Mr.
    23. The historical CSLI also demonstrated that Mr. Figueroa-
    Sanabria’s girlfriend, whom he accused of committing the murders,
    was likely within the area of their apartment north of the marina
    but pinged the tower closer to the apartment. By contrast, Mr.
    Figueroa-Sanabria’s CSLI data revealed that he was within range of
    the marina and his northern apartment, but his phone pinged the
    - 49 -
    Figueroa-Sanabria’s CSLI data, two opinions from the Fourth
    District Court of Appeal established that the Fourth Amendment
    did not require the State to seek a warrant for CSLI. See Mitchell v.
    State, 
    25 So. 3d 632
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Johnson v. State, 
    110 So. 3d 954
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Therefore, the State complied with
    binding precedent permitting their request at the time. 24
    Still, the State would be punished for a lack of prophetic
    ability. By the time the State brought the case to trial six years
    later, their search of Mr. Figueroa-Sanabria’s cell phone data hit a
    legal landmine: this Court’s 2017 Carpenter decision. Running with
    Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Davis v. United States,
    
    564 U.S. 229
    , 250-52 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring), the
    Carpenter decision addressed the question of whether the police
    could reasonably rely on binding appellate court precedent when
    that precedent was “unsettled” when the search occurred.
    Carpenter, 
    228 So. 3d at 541-42
    . In her opinion, Justice Sotomayor
    southmost tower, making it more likely that he was closer to the
    marina after the murders.
    24. Neither case was certified for review by this Court when
    the search was conducted.
    - 50 -
    cautioned that the Davis decision did not resolve this question.
    Davis, 
    564 U.S. at 252
     (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]hether
    exclusion would result in appreciable deterrence in the
    circumstances of this case is a different question from whether
    exclusion would appreciably deter Fourth Amendment violations
    when the governing law is unsettled. The Court’s answer to the
    former question in this case thus does not resolve the latter one.”).
    The Carpenter Court tasked itself with resolving that allegedly open
    question and held the State must seek a warrant if the precedent
    disclaiming the need for one was “unsettled.” Carpenter, 
    228 So. 3d at 541-42
    .
    Extending this newfangled principle, the Carpenter Court
    disagreed that the good-faith exception applied to the warrantless
    search of a cellphone incident to arrest, despite binding Florida
    appellate court precedent authorizing that practice at the time of
    said search. 
    Id.
     25 Relying on that decision and the U.S. Supreme
    25. The Carpenter Court seemingly limited its decision’s scope
    by claiming that the officers should not have relied on a case in the
    pipeline for review at this Court. See Carpenter, 
    228 So. 3d at 541
    (“The First District’s certified question to this Court only furthers
    the notion that the officers in Carpenter’s case should not have
    relied on Smallwood [v. State, 
    61 So. 3d 448
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)]
    - 51 -
    Court’s holding in its 2018 Carpenter case, Carpenter v. United
    States, 
    138 S. Ct. 2206
    , 2221 (2018) (holding that the State must
    obtain a warrant to access a suspect’s historical CSLI data), Mr.
    Figueroa-Sanabria claims his CSLI data evidence should have been
    excluded because of the change in the law. 
    Id.
     In effect, Mr.
    Figueroa-Sanabria claims the State should have known not to rely
    on two binding appellate decisions authorizing a non-warrant
    request for CSLI data at the time of the search because the law was
    “unsettled” when the search was done.
    But this Court’s Carpenter opinion improperly relied on
    Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Davis. Rather than rely
    on the concurrence’s attempt to limit the majority opinion’s
    as being the final controlling judicial precedent in this area of
    constitutional law while the case was certified to this Court for final
    decision.”). But there is no principled grounding for that limitation,
    which is why Mr. Figueroa-Sanabria can raise a colorable argument
    here. 
    Id.
     (“The ‘conscientious police work’ discussed
    in Davis requires that officers not engage in warrantless searches
    unless clearly authorized by law . . . . Thus, if the law on a
    particular issue is still developing, it is not reasonable for officers to
    rely on questionable decisions in pipeline cases to justify
    warrantless searches . . . .”). Justice Sotomayor identified no such
    limitation on the “unsettledness” of a precedent in her concurrence.
    In any event, Carpenter should be rejected regardless of the
    decision’s intended scope.
    - 52 -
    applicability, the Carpenter Court should have applied the Davis
    majority opinion’s reasoning. The majority there announced a
    different rule than the one the Carpenter Court employed: “Evidence
    obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on
    binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Davis,
    
    564 U.S. at 241
    ; see also Carpenter, 
    228 So. 3d at 544
     (Lawson, J.,
    dissenting) (“There is simply no way that reliance on binding legal
    precedent—whether well-settled or not—can be cast as police
    misconduct, much less ‘flagrant’ police misconduct.”). The Davis
    majority reasoned that the proper balance between deterring police
    misconduct and the hefty cost inflicted by the exclusionary rule was
    to apply the good-faith exception when the police rely on binding
    precedent:
    About all that exclusion would deter in this case is
    conscientious police work. Responsible law enforcement
    officers will take care to learn what is required of them
    under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform
    their conduct to these rules. But by the same token,
    when binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes
    a particular police practice, well-trained officers will and
    should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and
    public-safety responsibilities. An officer who conducts a
    search in reliance on binding appellate precedent does no
    more than act as a reasonable officer would and should
    act under the circumstances. The deterrent effect of
    - 53 -
    exclusion in such a case can only be to discourage the
    officer from doing his duty.
    That is not the kind of deterrence the exclusionary
    rule seeks to foster. We have stated before, and we
    reaffirm today, that the harsh sanction of exclusion
    should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law
    enforcement activity. Evidence obtained during a search
    conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is
    not subject to the exclusionary rule.
    Davis, 
    564 U.S. at 241
     (internal citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    Yet even in the face of the Davis majority opinion’s holding
    that reliance on precedent constitutes good-faith for purposes of the
    exception, the Carpenter Court and Mr. Figueroa-Sanabria argue
    that his historical CSLI must be excluded. Instead of following the
    Davis decision, Mr. Figueroa-Sanabria and the Carpenter decision
    demand that the State question binding authority and act as a kind
    of constitutional spiritual medium, using some presupposed
    clairvoyance to determine the future “settledness” of the law out of
    the ether. See generally Carpenter, 
    228 So. 3d at 541-42
    . Rather
    than foisting this unwieldy burden of prophecy on law enforcement,
    the U.S. Supreme Court correctly concluded that suppressing
    evidence in this context diverges from the foundation and principles
    of the exclusionary rule. Davis, 
    564 U.S. at 241
     (“An officer who
    - 54 -
    conducts a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent does
    no more than “ ‘ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act’
    under the circumstances.”) (alteration in original). We should do so
    as well.
    Compounding this constitutional error, the Carpenter Court
    ignored limitations on our discretion in the text of the Florida
    Constitution. Under the conformity clause, “[t]he right of the people
    to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
    unreasonable searches and seizures” is to “be construed in
    conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States
    Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
    Court.” Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. (emphasis added).26 By ignoring
    26. Notably, the conformity clause of article one, section
    twelve was adopted in part to bring Florida’s exclusionary rule
    jurisprudence in line with the federal good-faith exception. William
    A. Buzzett & Deborah K. Kearney, Commentary to 1982 Amendment,
    25A, Fla. Stat. Ann., art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. (2020). (“In response,
    the governor, attorney general, state prosecutors, and the law
    enforcement community supported a joint resolution in the 1982
    Regular Session, which would have engrossed a good faith
    exception onto the constitutional exclusionary rule.”); see
    Carpenter, 
    228 So. 3d at
    543 n.3 (Lawson, J., dissenting) (“The
    commentary to the 1982 amendment states that the amendment
    was necessary to modify the exclusionary rule [in Florida] and to
    allow adherence by the Florida courts to the good faith exception
    adopted by the federal courts.”) (alteration in original) (quoting
    - 55 -
    this clause—as Justice Lawson correctly argued in his dissent—the
    Carpenter Court exercised discretion it did not have to reject the
    Davis majority’s application of the good-faith exception. See
    Carpenter, 
    228 So. 3d at 542-45
     (Lawson, J., dissenting) (“Clearly,
    we are bound by the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth
    Amendment jurisprudence, including the majority opinion in Davis
    v. United States.”). Though our Court might find an alternative
    interpretation of the Fourth Amendment alluring, we cannot shrug
    off the strictures of binding constitutional provisions when it suits
    us. See Soca v. State, 
    673 So. 2d 24
    , 27 (Fla. 1996). “[W]e are
    bound to follow the interpretations of the United States Supreme
    Court with respect to the Fourth Amendment and provide to Florida
    citizens no greater protection than those interpretations.” 
    Id.
    As a result of these choices, the Carpenter Court created a gulf
    between our precedent and the Davis majority opinion that muddies
    the waters of the good-faith exception and violates the conformity
    clause. When the State is considering whether they must seek a
    Crain v. State, 
    914 So. 2d 1015
    , 1022-23 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (en
    banc)).
    - 56 -
    warrant, prosecutors and the police should not have to scry a
    crystal ball, consult a Ouija board, or conduct a group tarot card
    reading to intuit the law’s metaphysical finality before making their
    choice. Hanging this burden of prophecy around the State’s neck
    fails to accomplish the goals or purposes of the exclusionary rule as
    explained in the Davis majority opinion. And as Justice Lawson
    explained then, Carpenter flouts the Florida Constitution by
    disregarding the conformity clause. Because the decision was both
    misguided and unconstitutional, I urge overruling Carpenter and
    bringing our precedent in line with the United States and Florida
    Constitutions.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,
    Pat Siracusa, Judge – Case No. 522013CF006490XXXXNO
    Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin,
    Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
    for Appellant
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy
    A. Freeland, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
    for Appellee
    - 57 -