Zavion Alahad v. State of Florida ( 2023 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC2021-1450
____________
ZAVION ALAHAD,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
June 1, 2023
LABARGA, J.
We have for review the decision of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Alahad v. State, 326 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). In
Alahad, the district court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Zavion
Alahad’s motion to suppress eyewitness identifications resulting
from an out-of-court police procedure, and in doing so, applied the
abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court’s ruling on
the eyewitness’s out-of-court identification. Id. at 1143. Alahad
expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of this Court in
Walton v. State, 208 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2016), and with a decision of
another district court in McWilliams v. State, 306 So. 3d 131 (Fla.
3d DCA 2020); in each of the conflict cases the court applied a
de novo standard of review to trial court rulings on the same issue.
Moreover, as we will explain, this Court’s Walton decision was itself
inconsistent with previous decisions of our Court on the conflict
question. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the proper
standard of review is abuse of discretion review. We also agree with
the Fourth District’s analysis of the merits under that standard.
Consequently, we approve Alahad; clarify our Court’s inconsistent
case law in this area; and disapprove McWilliams to the extent that
it applied de novo review to trial court rulings on motions to
suppress out-of-court identifications.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Alahad was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted
robbery with a firearm. Alahad, 326 So. 3d at 1143. Alahad had
been outside a convenience store around noon when Loretta
Matthews, the eyewitness, arrived with her boyfriend, the victim.
While Matthews waited in her car, the victim exited the store and
was confronted by Alahad. Matthews first saw the victim and
-2-
Alahad when they were ten to fifteen feet away from the car. Alahad
grabbed the victim and demanded his money, and during the
struggle the two reached the hood of the car. The victim fell on his
back, and Alahad shot and killed him. Alahad ran from the scene.
Matthews told police that the shooter was “a black male,
approximately 5 [feet] 10 [inches], 125 pounds, skinny, in his
twenties or younger, and [] wearing a gray sweatshirt”; that she “got
a good look at” the shooter’s face; and that if she saw the shooter
again, she would be able to fully identify him. Id. at 1144. She also
showed police the area where she saw the shooter run. Later that
afternoon, a woman reported to police that Alahad, whom she
identified by name, had run through her yard with a firearm and
was currently in a nearby apartment.
At the apartment, police found Alahad and several other men.
Alahad and Adrian Nixon, one of the other men, both matched
Matthews’s description. Alahad was “a black male, 5 [feet]
9 [inches], seventeen years old, and weighed 150 pounds.” Id.
Nixon was “twenty-five years old, 5 [feet] 8 [inches] or 5 [feet]
9 [inches], and very thin but muscular.” Id. Both also had facial
markings. Nixon had two teardrop tattoos on the right side of his
-3-
face, and Alahad had a “teardrop-shaped birthmark or scar” in the
same place. Id.
About three hours after the shooting, the police contacted
Matthews and arranged to conduct a show-up, explaining that they
would show her “a guy from [her] description.” Id. (alteration in
original). 1 Because of the identifying information from the woman
who reported Alahad running through her yard, Alahad was the
only person shown to Matthews at the show-up. Matthews
identified Alahad as the shooter from approximately thirty feet
away. She stated that she was “pretty positive” Alahad was the
shooter, and when asked if she was one hundred percent sure, she
replied “yes.” Id.
Claiming a violation of his due process rights, Alahad moved
before trial to suppress Matthews’s out-of-court identification at the
show-up and any in-court identification by her. Alahad argued that
the identifications resulted from an unnecessarily suggestive show-
1. In a show-up procedure, “the police take a witness, shortly
after the commission of an observed crime, to where the police are
detaining the suspect, in order to give them an opportunity to make
an identification.” Walker v. State, 776 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2000).
-4-
up that gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification. At the suppression hearing, Matthews testified
about her view during the shooting and what police told her before
the show-up:
When the shooter first approached the victim near
[Matthews’s] passenger door, [she] “couldn’t really see the
face too much then but [she] saw clothes until they
[moved] around the car.” When he ran up to the victim,
the shooter had the hoodie covering his hair, and she
initially only saw him from the side. She saw the
shooter’s face when the victim fell to the ground. She
saw his whole face “straight”; he was facing the untinted
front window of her car. She explained that, when the
shooter fired the gun, “I sat back in the seat and
observed what was -- what should be my next move. I
was scared to -- it happened so fast that my first thought
really was to pay attention to who was doing this to him
and I paid attention to the face.” She estimated that she
saw his face for three or four minutes, “[p]robably more,”
but she was not sure. It was “[n]ot just a piece, not just
the side,” but “the whole face,” and she “concentrated on
it.”
[She] testified that, prior to the show-up, the law
enforcement officers told her that they found someone
who matched the description that she gave, and she
initially denied that the officers told her that they found
him in the area where she said he went. However, after
being confronted with her prior deposition testimony, she
stated that the officers told her that they found him in
the area to which she said the shooter ran.
Id. at 1145 (several alterations in original).
-5-
Two of the detectives involved in the show-up, Detective
Almanzar and Detective Novak, testified at the suppression hearing.
Detective Novak testified that he may have told Matthews that the
suspect matched her description, and Detective Almanzar testified
that he did tell her this information. However, Detective Novak
testified that he did not tell Matthews that Alahad was found in the
area where she said the shooter ran, and Detective Almanzar
testified that he did not recall doing so.
Matthews further testified that at the show-up, the suspect
stood with an officer on each side of him. She also stated that she
could not remember whether he was wearing handcuffs. Detective
Almanzar testified that she did not hesitate when she identified the
suspect as the shooter, and that she stated that she believed the
shooter had a tear-shaped tattoo under his right eye. In her
testimony, Matthews admitted making this statement at the show-
up; she did not tell it to police in her initial description. The trial
court denied the motion to suppress. 2
2. The trial court did not reach the inquiry for the in-court
identification because it found the out-of-court identification
admissible.
-6-
On appeal to the Fourth District, Alahad raised multiple
issues, including that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress Matthews’s out-of-court identification. In setting forth the
standard of review applicable to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, the district court stated that “appellate courts must
accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s
determination of the historical facts, but must independently review
mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine the
constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 1146 (quoting Walton, 208 So. 3d at 65(citation omitted)).
However, despite setting forth this mixed standard of review,
the district court further stated that “[t]he decision to admit a
pre-trial identification is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and the decision should be overturned only upon a showing of
abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Walker v. State, 776 So. 2d 943,
945 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)).
Although it noted that the trial court’s determination was
“likely a close call,” the district court affirmed “[d]ue to the abuse of
discretion standard of review.” Id. at 1147. Alahad argued that the
-7-
show-up was unnecessarily suggestive because (1) Alahad “was in
handcuffs and flanked by two officers,” (2) police told Matthews that
Alahad matched her description and that he was found in the area
she saw him run to, and (3) Alahad was the only person included in
the show-up even though Nixon also matched Matthews’s
description. Id. at 1146-47.
The district court rejected Alahad’s first argument, stating that
standing alone, the presence of officers or handcuffs is not enough
to make a show-up unnecessarily suggestive. See id. at 1147 (citing
State v. Jackson, 744 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)).
Declining to hold that “no reasonable judge would rule otherwise,”
the district court held on Alahad’s second argument that the show-
up was not unnecessarily suggestive from the police’s statement
that the suspect matched Matthews’s description. Id. at 1147-48.
The district court reasoned that the statement that Alahad
“matche[d] the description” was vaguer than the statements police
made in cases where courts found procedures unnecessarily
suggestive. Id. at 1147 (citing Anderson v. State, 946 So. 2d 579,
582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Smith v. State, 362 So. 2d 417, 418-19
(Fla. 1st DCA 1978)).
-8-
Noting that Alahad’s third argument presented “the most
troubling fact,” the district court still held that “[r]easonable minds
could differ” as to whether the police’s failure to include Nixon in
the show-up rendered the procedure unnecessarily suggestive. Id.However, the district court reasoned that the neighbor’s report
identifying Alahad by name gave police a basis to focus on him for
the show-up. Id. at 1148. Because it concluded that the show-up
was not unnecessarily suggestive under the abuse of discretion
standard of review, the district court did not reach the second part
of the out-of-court identification analysis—whether the
unnecessarily suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id. (citing Davis v. State,
207 So. 3d 177, 207 (Fla. 2016)). 3
Our review follows.
ANALYSIS
This case requires us to clarify the proper standard of review
for trial court rulings on motions to suppress out-of-court
identifications made during police procedures. In doing so, we
3. Without discussion, the district court also affirmed
Alahad’s other arguments on appeal.
-9-
review the Fourth District’s decision de novo. See Van v. Schmidt,
122 So. 3d 243, 252 (Fla. 2013) (stating that whether the district
court applied the proper standard of review “present[ed] a pure
question of law”).
Previously, we have applied two different standards to trial
court rulings on out-of-court identifications. In some earlier
decisions, we applied abuse of discretion review. See Thomas v.
State, 748 So. 2d 970, 981 (Fla. 1999); Gorby v. State, 630 So. 2d
544, 546 (Fla. 1993); Hayes v. State, 581 So. 2d 121, 125 (Fla.
1991). In more recent decisions, we applied a mixed standard of
review; we gave a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s
factual findings but reviewed the ultimate question of law de novo.
See Walton, 208 So. 3d at 65; Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495,
517 (Fla. 2005).4 Our precedent therefore reveals that while we
have been consistently deferential to the trial court’s factual
4. De novo review is independent review of the application of
the law to the facts. See Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 606 (Fla.
2001) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-98
(1996)). Under abuse of discretion review, “[i]f reasonable [people]
could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court,
then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of
an abuse of discretion.” Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197,
1203 (Fla. 1980).
- 10 -
findings regarding an out-of-court identification, we have not firmly
espoused how Florida appellate courts should review application of
the law to those facts.
We conclude that abuse of discretion review is the proper
standard of review because here, the application of the law to fact is
a determination of the ultimate reliability of a piece of evidence—the
out-of-court identification. We reach this conclusion after
summarizing the general law on out-of-court identifications,
examining the nature of the trial court’s ruling, and considering the
conflict cases. We also agree with the Fourth District that in the
present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the out-of-court identification.
I. General Law on Out-of-Court Identifications
To determine whether an out-of-court identification made
during a police procedure should be suppressed, the trial court
conducts a two-prong test: “(1) [D]id the police employ an
unnecessarily suggestive procedure in obtaining an out-of-court
identification; (2) if so, considering all the circumstances, did the
suggestive procedure give rise to a substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification[?]” Grant v. State, 390 So. 2d 341, 343
- 11 -
(Fla. 1980) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977)).
If on balance the corrupting effect of the suggestive procedure
outweighs the reliability of the identification, then there is a
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Manson
v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977). In that instance, the
out-of-court identification should be suppressed. See id.Across different types of police procedures, there is no bright-
line rule to determine whether the procedure was unnecessarily
suggestive. A line-up or photograph spread can be unnecessarily
suggestive depending on its composition. Way v. State, 502 So. 2d
1321, 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Moreover, a show-up “is
inherently suggestive because a witness is presented with only one
suspect for identification.” Perez v. State, 648 So. 2d 715, 719 (Fla.
1995). However, a show-up “[is] not unnecessarily suggestive
unless the police aggravate the suggestiveness of the confrontation.”
State v. Jackson, 744 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (citing
Johnson v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1987)).
To determine whether an unnecessarily suggestive procedure
gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,
the trial court considers the following:
- 12 -
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at
the time of the crime, [2] the witness’ degree of attention,
[3] the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the
criminal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation.
Grant, 390 So. 2d at 343 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-
200 (1972)).
This Court has stated that “[t]he primary evil to be avoided in
the introduction of an out-of-court identification is a very
substantial likelihood of misidentification” and that “[a]n
impermissibly suggestive identification procedure is one that
creates the danger of misidentification so great that it violates due
process.” Walton, 208 So. 3d at 65 (citing Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 386 (1968)). An out-of-court identification resulting
from an unnecessarily suggestive procedure “is not per se
inadmissible, but may be introduced into evidence if found to be
reliable and based upon the witness’ independent recall.” Edwards
v. State, 538 So. 2d 440, 442 n.5 (Fla. 1989). If it concludes that
the procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive, then the trial court
does not need to move to the second prong of the test. Fitzpatrick,
900 So. 2d at 518.
- 13 -
In sum, an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is
impermissibly suggestive if the resulting out-of-court identification
is unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. 5 Reliability “is
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification
testimony . . . .” Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
II. The Nature of the Trial Court’s Ruling
This Court has stated that “[s]uppression issues are
extraordinarily rich in diversity and run the gamut from (1) pure
questions of fact, to (2) mixed questions of law and fact, to (3) pure
questions of law” and that “the proper standard of review depends
on the nature of the ruling in each case.” State v. Glatzmayer, 789
So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001).
The issue of whether to suppress an out-of-court identification
presents a mixed question of law and fact because the two-prong
test requires application of the law to historical facts. See Walton,
208 So. 3d at 65 (treating the trial court’s ruling on the issue as a
5. We recognize that some courts have used interchangeably
the terms “unnecessarily” and “impermissibly” when referring to the
first prong. See Johnson, 817 F.2d at 729 (“Under these
circumstances, Jordan’s out-of-court identification was not
unreliable even if it had been impermissibly suggestive . . . .”).
- 14 -
mixed question of law and fact); Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598,
606 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-15
(1995)) (stating that an ultimate determination involving application
of the law to the historical facts presents a mixed question of law
and fact).
Historical facts, or factual findings, address “scene- and
action-setting questions.” See Connor, 803 So. 2d at 606 (quoting
Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112-15). In other words, historical facts
define “who did what, when or where, how or why.” U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Village at Lakeridge,
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966 (2018) (citing Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111,
116). For the unnecessarily suggestive prong, the historical facts
may include any relevant circumstances of the procedure; the
existence of any exigent circumstances, how police presented the
suspect, and what police said to the eyewitness before and during
the procedure are likely factual findings. For the substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification prong, the historical facts
may include circumstances of the eyewitness’s observation such as
how close the eyewitness was to the suspect at the time of the
crime; the angle at which the eyewitness viewed the suspect; the
- 15 -
eyewitness’s description of the suspect; the suspect’s actual
physical characteristics; and any other relevant circumstances.
The ultimate determination for the trial court is a mixed
question of law and fact, see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597
(1982), which involves application of a legal rule to certain historical
facts, see United States v. Constant, 814 F.3d 570, 576 (1st Cir.
2016). Although mixed questions of law and fact are often reviewed
under the mixed standard of review, not all mixed questions should
be reviewed under that standard. See U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967(“Mixed questions are not all alike.”).
Indeed, we review some mixed questions under the mixed
standard and others for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Johnson v.
State, 969 So. 2d 938, 946 (Fla. 2007) (stating that the validity of a
challenge for cause “is a mixed question of law and fact, on which a
trial court’s ruling will be overturned only for ‘manifest error.’
‘Manifest error’ is tantamount to an abuse of discretion.”) (citations
omitted); Connor, 803 So. 2d at 608 (holding that the mixed
standard of review applies to mixed questions “that ultimately
determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment and, by extension, article I, section 9 of the
- 16 -
Florida Constitution”); Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1031-32
(Fla. 1999) (holding that the mixed standard of review applies to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d
7, 22 (Fla. 1959) (stating that the competency of a challenged juror
is a question “of mixed law and fact to be determined by the trial
judge in his discretion”). And on the mixed question before us, the
federal circuits are divided; some apply abuse of discretion review to
the application of law to fact while others apply de novo review to at
least part of the application. See, e.g., Constant, 814 F.3d at 576-
77 (abuse of discretion review); Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893,
895-97 (11th Cir. 1988) (clearly erroneous review for the
unnecessarily suggestive prong and de novo review for the ultimate
reliability determination). Therefore, we must clarify the proper
standard of review for this mixed question given the nature of the
ruling.
We conclude that out-of-court identification suppression is
chiefly about reliability—a determination that belongs in the trial
court. Notably, we ask, “[W]hich kind of court ([trial] or appellate) is
better suited to resolve [the mixed question]?” U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct.
at 966. To start, the two-prong test for ruling on an out-of-court
- 17 -
identification is analytically similar to the balancing test for ruling
on the admissibility of evidence under section 90.403, Florida
Statutes (2022). We review section 90.403 rulings for abuse of
discretion. Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1124 (Fla. 2009);
Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 648 (Fla. 2000).
In a section 90.403 analysis, the trial court excludes relevant
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” § 90.403, Fla. Stat. Just as the
trial court determines under section 90.403 whether the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, the trial court determines under the out-of-court
identification test whether the reliability of the identification is
outweighed by its corrupting effect. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114(“Against these [reliability] factors is to be weighed the corrupting
effect of the suggestive identification itself.”).
The mixed question presented by a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress an out-of-court identification is properly subject
to the abuse of discretion standard of review, which respects the
trial court’s superior point of view. See Sims v. Brown, 574 So. 2d
131, 133 (Fla. 1991) (“The weighing of relevance versus prejudice or
- 18 -
confusion is best performed by the trial judge who is present and
best able to compare the two.”).
Moreover, whether the ruling involves “primarily legal or
factual work” indicates which court is better suited to answer the
mixed question. See U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967. Appellate courts
review de novo mixed questions that require legal clarification. Id.However, appellate courts typically review with deference mixed
questions that amount to factual findings—a task for trial courts.
See id. Examining each prong of the trial court’s out-of-court
identification analysis shows that here, the application of the law to
historical fact is primarily factual work.
A. Unnecessarily Suggestive
Although the phrase “unnecessarily suggestive” carries legal
overtones, the trial court’s determination on this prong is
essentially a factual inquiry. No clear rule exists for determining
whether an out-of-court identification procedure is “unnecessarily”
suggestive. 6 The trial court’s conclusion for this prong often turns
6. Some courts have listed exigency as a specific
consideration for show-ups. See, e.g., Amador v. Quarterman, 458
F.3d 397, 414 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[S]how ups often will not violate a
defendant’s due process rights when they are performed out of
- 19 -
on whether police did or did not take particular actions. For line-
ups and photograph spreads, the trial court analyzes how police
composed the line-up or spread. See Way, 502 So. 2d at 1323. For
show-ups, the trial court analyzes whether police aggravated the
inherent suggestiveness of the procedure. See Perez, 648 So. 2d at
719; Jackson, 744 So. 2d at 548. The trial court may also consider
the presence of any corroborating evidence. See Alahad, 326 So. 3d
at 1148 (“A neighbor identified the defendant by name, so law
enforcement had a legitimate basis to zero in on the defendant for a
show-up.”).
Because the trial court is better positioned to find facts, Salve
Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991), it is likewise
better positioned to conclude that a procedure was unnecessarily
suggestive. For example, unnecessary suggestiveness may turn on
whether police made a statement to the eyewitness that the suspect
in a show-up would match the eyewitness’s specific description.
See Anderson v. State, 946 So. 2d 579, 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
necessity or urgency . . . .”); McWilliams, 306 So. 3d at 135 (“The
record below remains undeveloped as to any emergent or exigent
circumstances that would necessitate the use of such a
procedure.”).
- 20 -
The trial court is better positioned than the appellate court to
determine whether the statement was or was not made, and if so,
how it was made.
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit held in Cikora that trial court
conclusions on this prong require deference. 840 F.2d at 895-96.
In Cikora, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the unnecessarily
suggestive prong from the “ultimate question” of constitutionality—
the question of reliability. Id. at 896 (quoting Sumner, 455 U.S. at
597). 7 Relying on Sumner, the federal circuit court treated the
unnecessarily suggestive prong as involving “questions of fact that
underlie this ultimate conclusion . . . .” Id. (quoting Sumner, 455
U.S. at 597).
For all these reasons, we believe that a trial court’s decision on
the unnecessarily suggestive prong of the inquiry should be
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
B. Substantial Likelihood of Irreparable Misidentification
If the trial court determines that a show-up is unnecessarily
suggestive, and thus, must reach the substantial likelihood of
7. The court stated that the ultimate conclusion was subject
to “plenary” (de novo) review. Id. at 895.
- 21 -
irreparable misidentification prong, the trial court must then
determine the overall reliability of the out-of-court identification.
See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972) (“We turn, then, to the
central question, whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’
the identification was reliable even though the confrontation
procedure was suggestive.”). On this prong, the trial court analyzes
the reliability factors to weigh the corrupting effect of the suggestive
procedure against the reliability of the identification. See Manson,
432 U.S. at 114-16. The trial court’s determination on the overall
weighing should receive deference not only because it is similar to a
section 90.403 weighing, but also because the assessment of the
reliability factors is primarily a factual analysis.
The reliability factors raise highly-specific questions of fact.
The first two factors relate to the eyewitness’s observation at the
time of the crime. The first factor, the opportunity of the witness to
view the criminal at the time of the crime, may involve facts such as
the angle at which the witness viewed the criminal and how close
the two were to each other. See McWilliams, 306 So. 3d at 136
(determining that the witness had ample opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime when the two stood “face-to-face”
- 22 -
and there was no distance between them). The second factor, the
witness’s degree of attention, may involve facts such as the
interaction between the witness and the criminal and the lighting in
the space. See Fitzpatrick, 900 So. 2d at 518 (determining that the
witness had a sufficient degree of attention when he had a
conversation with the appellant in a well-lit room). For this factor,
the trial court may also consider the quality of the witness’s
memory. See Walton, 208 So. 3d at 66 (“Gillan’s hazy memory of
the incident does not give us confidence in her identification of
Walton.”).
The third factor, the accuracy of the witness’s prior description
of the criminal, is a comparison of historical facts; the trial court
compares what the witness told police with the suspect’s actual
physical characteristics. See McWilliams, 306 So. 3d at 136. The
last two factors relate to the identification procedure. The fourth
factor, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, involves the facts of what the witness said and how
the witness conveyed their statements. See id. (determining that
the witness showed certainty when she conveyed the identification
statement with a “visceral reaction” and repeated her assurance).
- 23 -
The fifth factor, the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation, is a basic historical fact. The trial court is
undoubtedly better-positioned than the appellate court to find the
above facts and any other relevant facts under the totality of the
circumstances approach.
In Constant, the First Circuit observed that in the context of
rulings on the admissibility of identification evidence, abuse of
discretion review is really “an assessment of ‘reasonableness’ in the
district court’s fact-bound application of the law.” 814 F.3d at
576. 8 The court aptly noted:
8. Constant involved an in-court identification. Id. The
standard of review that applies to suppression of out-of-court
identifications would apply equally to suppression of resulting in-
court identifications. After determining that the out-of-court
procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the trial court considers
whether a challenged in-court identification is “reliable and based
solely upon the witness’ independent recollection of the offender at
the time of the crime, uninfluenced by the intervening illegal
[procedure].” Edwards, 538 So. 2d at 442. This consideration is
essentially the substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification
prong. Although some Florida courts use seven slightly different
reliability factors for in-court identifications, see, e.g., State v.
Dorsey, 5 So. 3d 702, 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing Edwards, 538
So. 2d at 442), we have stated that these factors are “substantially
the same” as the five Neil factors for out-of-court identifications.
Edwards, 538 So. 2d at 443 n.6. The alternate Florida factors are:
- 24 -
All that remains unclear, in sum, is whether we ask
whether the district court’s application of law to fact was
reasonable, or whether we ask whether we would have
reached the same conclusion. We opt for the more
deferential formulation. Simply put, gauging the
reliability of a witness’s testimony in a case like this is
precisely the type of judgment that trial judges are both
well-equipped and well-positioned to make.
Id. at 576-77.
We agree with this reasoning. The ultimate application of the
law to fact on the second prong—the weighing of the corrupting
effect against the reliability factors—is both a primarily factual
analysis and one similar in nature to that of section 90.403
determinations. Abuse of discretion review of out-of-court
the prior opportunity the witness had to observe the
alleged criminal act; the existence of any discrepancy
between any pretrial [procedure] description and the
defendant’s actual description; any identification prior to
the [procedure] of another person; any identification by
picture of the defendant prior to the [procedure]; failure
to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; any time
lapse between the alleged act and the [] identification
[made during the procedure]; and any other factors
raised by the totality of the circumstances that bear upon
the likelihood that the witness’ in-court identification is
not tainted by the illegal [procedure].
Id. at 443.
- 25 -
identification rulings respects the trial court’s superior ability to
apply the law to the facts in this context.
III. Conflict Cases
We now turn to the express and direct conflict with Walton
and McWilliams. Although both decisions applied the mixed
standard of review, neither analyzed whether the mixed standard is
the appropriate standard of review for rulings on motions to
suppress out-of-court identifications.
In Walton, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of
attempted murder of a law enforcement officer with possession and
discharge of a firearm and two counts of attempted armed robbery
with possession of a firearm. 208 So. 3d at 63. The trial court had
denied the petitioner’s motion to suppress an out-of-court
identification made during a photograph array procedure. Id. The
First District affirmed the convictions without discussing the
identification suppression issue. Walton v. State, 106 So. 3d 522,
523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). On discretionary review, we stated that “a
trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of
law and fact that determines constitutional rights” and quoted the
mixed standard of review:
- 26 -
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, appellate courts must accord a presumption of
correctness to the trial court’s determination of the
historical facts, but must independently review mixed
questions of law and fact that ultimately determine the
constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. See Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608
(Fla. 2001); Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032
(Fla. 1999); Albritton v. State, 769 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2000).
Walton, 208 So. 3d at 65 (quoting Moody v. State, 842 So. 2d 754,
758 (Fla. 2003)).
We applied the mixed standard of review and held that the
out-of-court identification was unnecessarily suggestive and gave
rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id.
at 65-67.
In McWilliams, the appellant was convicted of three counts of
sexual battery, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of
aggravated assault. 306 So. 3d at 132. The trial court had denied
the appellant’s motion to suppress an out-of-court identification
made during a show-up. Id. at 133-34. The Third District
expressly acknowledged that the issue of whether an identification
procedure violates due process presents a mixed question of law
and fact. Id. at 134 (citing Sumner, 455 U.S. at 597). For the
- 27 -
standard of review, the district court stated it would “defer to [the]
trial court’s findings of fact as long as they are supported by
competent, substantial evidence, but . . . review de novo [the] . . .
application of the law to the historical facts.” Id. (alterations in
original) (quoting Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 414 (Fla. 2010)
(citing Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2007))).
The Third District applied the mixed standard of review and
held that the out-of-court identification was unnecessarily
suggestive but that it did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of
misidentification. Id. at 134-37.
Thus, Walton and McWilliams applied a mixed standard of
review, which conflicts with the more deferential abuse of discretion
standard employed in the decision below, without considering
possible distinctions in the out-of-court identification context. As
we have already said, the nature of the trial court’s ruling on this
type of evidence convinces us that abuse of discretion review is the
proper standard.
- 28 -
IV. Applying Abuse of Discretion Review to Alahad
We agree with the Fourth District that in the present case, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the out-of-court
identification.
On the first prong of the analysis, we conclude that reasonable
minds could differ as to whether the show-up procedure was
unnecessarily suggestive. As mentioned above, although a show-up
is inherently suggestive, Perez, 648 So. 2d at 719, it is
not unnecessarily suggestive unless police aggravate the
suggestiveness of the procedure. Jackson, 744 So. 2d at 548 (citing
Johnson, 817 F.2d at 726). We conclude that there is competent,
substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s
factual findings. For the first prong application of law to fact, we
agree with the Fourth District that it was reasonable for the trial
court to conclude that the procedure was not unnecessarily
suggestive. Presenting the suspect in handcuffs or with flanking
officers does not make the procedure unnecessarily suggestive. See
id. at 548 (stating that presenting the suspect in handcuffs was not
police conduct aggravating the suggestiveness of a show-up) (citing
Johnson, 817 F.2d at 729). Neither does a police officer’s general
- 29 -
statement to the eyewitness that the suspect matches the
eyewitness description. See Anderson, 946 So. 2d at 582(concluding that police aggravated the suggestiveness of the
procedure when they made a specific statement to the eyewitness
that the suspect had clothing fitting the description and had a
screwdriver, the weapon used).
Moreover, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that
police’s failure to present Nixon in the show-up did not make the
procedure unnecessarily suggestive when police had corroborating
evidence leading to Alahad. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 384-85 (1968) (stating that the “inconclusive clues” leading to
the suspects were one factor, among others, that did not make the
procedure unnecessarily suggestive).
Because we agree with the district court that the trial court
reasonably concluded that the show-up was not unnecessarily
suggestive, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in ending the inquiry and admitting Matthews’s out-of-court
identification.
- 30 -
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we approve Alahad, clarify our Court’s
inconsistent case law in this area, and disapprove McWilliams to the
extent that it applied de novo review to trial court rulings on out-of-
court identifications.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and
FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
SASSO, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District – Case No. 4D19-3438
(Broward County)
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Christine C. Geraghty,
Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm
Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and
David M. Costello, Assistant Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent
- 31 -