Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed May 19, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D21-66
Lower Tribunal Nos. 19-16549CC and 19-291AP
________________
F.Y.E.S. Holdings, Inc.,
Appellant,
vs.
House Golden Rule, LLC and Paul Quevedo,
Appellees.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the County Court for Miami-
Dade County, Christina Marie DiRaimondo, Judge.
Navarro │ McKown and Luis F. Navarro, for appellant.
Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP, Michael Diaz, Jr., George Diaz, Roland Potts,
and Ta'Ronce Stowes, for appellee House Golden Rule, LLC.
Before FERNANDEZ, HENDON, and BOKOR, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, J.
F.Y.E.S. Holdings, Inc. (“FYES”) appeals a county court order denying
FYES’s verified motion to intervene and for additional relief. Because the
county court abused its discretion denying intervention, we reverse the order
and remand the case to the county court for further proceedings.
On April 18, 2019, non-party Jelnaz Capital, Inc. (“Jelnaz”) executed a
quit-claim deed conveying its interest in the subject property located at
10015 N.W. 46th Street, Unit 203-4, Doral, Florida 33178 to FYES. This quit-
claim deed was recorded on April 22, 2019 in OR Book 31411, Page 2463-
2464 of Miami-Dade County Public Records.
FYES claims that on April 30, 2019, Eddy Salloum, allegedly on behalf
of Jelnaz, attempted to fraudulently transfer title to the subject property to
plaintiff/appellee, House Golden Rule, LLC (“HGR”). FYES contends that
because it believed the property had already been conveyed to FYES, the
conveyance from Salloum to HGR was void.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2019, HGR filed a quiet title action in Miami-
Dade Circuit Court against FYES and its principal, Jerry Collado, regarding
the subject property (circuit court case number 2019-14237-CA-10). Its
Amended Complaint was filed on July 19, 2019, adding an individual, Aldofo
Leon Varon, as a defendant.
2
HGR then claimed that defendant, Paul Quevedo (“Quevedo”), failed
to pay the rent due for June 15, 2019 in the amount of $1,950.00 on the
subject condominium unit. On June 19, 2019, Quevedo filed a letter with the
Clerk of the Court stating he did not know who to pay the rent to, as the
property had an open case number (case number 2019-014237 CA 01) in
the circuit court. He requested that the clerk accept the payment of rent for
June 15 to July 15, 2019. Quevedo attached a copy of his lease with one
Qara Enterprises, Inc., as well as an addendum to the contract evidencing a
transfer of ownership from Qara to Jelnaz.
On June 28, 2019, a written demand for payment giving Quevedo
three-day notice pursuant to section 83.56(3), Florida Statutes (2019), was
personally served on Quevedo, as well as emailed to him, by HGR. On July
15, 2019, HGR filed an eviction action in county court against Quevedo
regarding the same subject condominium unit.
On July 22, 2019, Quevedo filed his Notice of Depositing Rent into the
Court Registry. That same day, Quevedo filed a motion to dismiss complaint
and motion for attorney’s fees.
On August 26, 2019, HGR filed a Motion for Final Judgment of Eviction.
The next day, Quevedo filed his Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Final Judgment of Eviction. In that reply, Quevedo argued that HGR was not
3
the legal owner of the subject property, as the attached exhibits
demonstrated. He further argued that HGR was attempting to get a final
judgment in the eviction action and a writ of possession judgment from the
county court so that it could use it in the circuit court quiet title action and
gain possession of the property in this matter.
FYES then filed a Verified Emergency Motion to Intervene and for
Additional Relief on August 27, 2019. FYES believed HGR had no ownership
interest in the property, HGR was not entitled to any rent money from
Quevedo, and HGR did not have standing in the eviction against Quevedo.
On October 9, 2019, HGR and Quevedo entered into an Agreed
Stipulation of Dismissal. Also, on October 9, 2019, FYES filed its Objection
to and Alternatively, Motion to Set Aside Stipulation for Dismissal. FYES
claimed that the stipulation for dismissal was an attempt by HGR to cover up
the fact that the complaint for eviction was a fallacy. FYES alleged that after
receipt of process, Quevedo filed a motion to dismiss asserting that FYES
was the legal owner of the property. FYES contended that HGR filed a
motion for final judgment of eviction seeking a default judgment of eviction
against Quevedo for failure to pay rents into the court registry as required by
section 83.60(2). FYES then alleged that, in response, FYES filed its reply
asserting that HGR is not the legal owner of the property and thus had no
4
standing to seek a judgment of eviction and that Quevedo had since
relinquished the property. When FYES became aware of the instant action,
it moved to intervene. On October 10, 2019, the trial court entered its Agreed
Order of Dismissal dismissing HGR’s complaint against Quevedo with
prejudice.
On October 15, 2019, the trial court granted FYES’s motion to set aside
the agreed stipulation for dismissal and entered its Order Vacating Agreed
Order of Dismissal. That same day, the county court denied FYES’s motion
to intervene and for additional relief as moot. The trial court stated in its
order that the issue was moot because the matter had been voluntarily
dismissed by HGR and Quevedo on October 10, 2019; that even if not moot,
intervention was not appropriate because FYES was bound by the stipulation
of dismissal; that the record was void of a section 83.56(3) three-day notice
from FYES; and that “FYES Holdings cannot selectively decide to, on the
one hand, take House Golden Rule’s three-day notice of eviction as its own,
and on the other hand ignore House Golden Rule’s Agreed Stipulation of
Dismissal with Quevedo.” FYES then appealed.
FYES argues that its motion to intervene is not moot because the trial
court entered an order setting aside the joint stipulation for settlement. FYES
further contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene
5
because the rule governing intervention does not require the court to
consider the ultimate outcome of the case. We agree.
An order denying a motion to intervene is final as to the movant and
appealable by the movant. Adhin v. First Horizon Home Loans,
44 So. 3d
1245, 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Appellate courts review an order denying
a motion to intervene under an abuse of discretion standard. De Sousa v. JP
Morgan Chase, N.A.,
170 So. 3d 928, 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). “If, however,
reasonable people could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the
trial court, then it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion.” Seven
Hills, Inc. v. Bentley,
848 So. 2d 345, 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
First, FYES’s motion to intervene is not moot because the county court
entered an order setting aside HGR and Quevedo’s joint stipulation for
settlement. HGR argues that FYES “invited error” in seeking intervention in
the proceedings below. There is no support for HGR’s argument. As the
record indicates, on October 10, 2019, HGR and Quevedo entered into an
Agreed Stipulation to dismiss the eviction action. The record also indicates
that the county court set aside this stipulation on October 15, 2019. Thus,
the eviction action is still active. Accordingly, FYES’s motion to intervene is
not moot, as there is still an action pending before the county court in which
FYES may intervene.
6
Additionally, in its order on appeal, the county court ruled that even if
the motion was not moot, the motion would still have been denied because
“[a]n intervenor is bound by the record made at the time he intervenes and
must take the suit as he finds it. See State Tr. Realty, LLC v. Deutsche Bank
Nat. Tr. Co. Americas,
207 So. 3d 923, 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).” The trial
court was correct that the law in Florida is that an intervenor takes the record
as the intervenor finds it, and FYES has conceded this point. But in this case,
the record indicates that the county court set aside the stipulation of
dismissal, so in effect, the case has not been dismissed. Furthermore, the
record indicates that a three-day notice of eviction was served on Quevedo
by HGR. FYES takes the record as it finds it which means Quevedo was
served with a three-day notice, and all conditions precedent have been met
for the eviction action under section 83.56(2), Florida Statues (2019).
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion on this basis.
Secondly, FYES argues that the trial court erred in denying FYES’s
motion to intervene because the rule governing intervention does not require
the court to consider the ultimate outcome of the case. Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.230 states, “Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation
may at any time be permitted to assert a right by intervention, but the
intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety
7
of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its
discretion.” In Weiss v. Courshon,
618 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), this
Court stated:
Rule 1.230 allows intervention to occur at any time. The rule
provides that “the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in
recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless
otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.” The rule simply
means that the intervenor takes the case as he or she finds it,
unless the court orders otherwise. It does not mean that
dismissal of [one of the plaintiff’s] claim ousts the court of
jurisdiction or requires dismissal of the claims of [the other
plaintiffs/intervenors].
Id. at 258. Thus, this Court recognized that although dismissing the initial
plaintiff’s complaint may be warranted, it does not control the issue of
whether an intervenor’s motion to intervene should be granted, as is the
situation in the case before us. In addition, the Florida Supreme Court in
Miracle House Corporation v. Haige,
96 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1957) held:
‘It has generally been held that the interest which will entitle a
person to intervene under this provision must be in the matter in
litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the
intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and
effect of the judgment. In other words, the interest must be that
created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or
a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which
is the subject of litigation.’
Id. at 418. Here, FYES’s claim of ownership is of “direct and immediate
character.” Furthermore, in the similar or related county court case on appeal
to this court, case number 3D21-67, House Golden Rules, LLC et al. v.
8
F.Y.E.S. Holdings, Inc., (Fla. 3d DCA March 17, 2021), this Court per curiam
affirmed the county court’s order in that eviction case in which the county
court found that FYES’s quit claim deed was recorded first in time with
regards to another property, located at 10065 N.W. 46th Street, Unit 305,
Doral, Florida, 33178, under the same circumstances as in the case before
us and involving the same parties.
In that case, on April 18, 2019, Jelnaz executed a quit-claim deed
conveying its interest in the property located at 10065 N.W. 46th Street, Unit
305, Doral, Florida 33178 to FYES.
Id. This quit-claim deed was also
recorded on April 22, 2019 in OR Book 31411, Page 2465-2466 of Miami-
Dade County Public Records.
Id. In the action in the circuit court to quiet title
to the subject property in the case before us, HGR has also sought to quiet
title to the Unit 305 property, as well. As a result of this Court’s per curiam
affirmance in case number 3D21-67, FYES was the record owner and title
holder of the subject property in that case, pursuant to section 83.43(3),
Florida Statutes (2019), because FYES’s quit-claim deed was recorded first
in time. Although the county court in that case was addressing a different
condominium unit, the facts are identical as far as the parties involved and
the quit-claim deed dates, as well as the April 30, 2019 transfer of title that
HGR attempted with Jelnaz, after FYES already had title to the property.
9
Thus, in the case before us, FYES’s quit-claim deed was also recorded first
in time with regard to the Unit 203-4 condominium property.
As FYES accurately points out in its Initial Brief, “[W]ithout intervention,
it is clear that [FYES] will be prejudiced by way of any judgment entered
without is participation in the case. Namely, [FYES] will be deprived of its
right to rents to which it is entitled under the terms of the Lease with Appellee
Quevedo.” Thus, HGR’s contention that Quevedo adequately represented
FYES’s interests in the action is inaccurate.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
FYES’s motion to intervene. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s order on
appeal and remand the matter back to the county court so that FYES is
allowed to intervene and for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
10
