STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. STAND UP MRI OF BOCA RATON, P.A. A/A/O MIKE RAMAZIO ( 2021 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STAND UP MRI OF BOCA RATON, P.A. a/a/o MIKE RAMAZIO,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D21-310
    [May 26, 2021]
    Appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; Reginald Roy Corlew, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 2016SC8713
    and 2019AP150.
    Tracy T. Segal of Akerman LLP, West Palm Beach, and Marcy Levine
    Aldrich and Nancy A. Copperthwaite of Akerman LLP, Miami, for appellant.
    Virginia M. Best and Johanna M. Menendez of Best & Menendez,
    Miami, for appellee.
    PER CURIAM.
    In this personal injury protection (“PIP”) case, State Farm Mutual
    Automobile Insurance Company appeals a final summary judgment
    entered in favor of the plaintiff below, Stand-Up MRI of Boca Raton a/a/o
    Mike Ramazio (“Stand Up MRI”). We reverse, holding that the PIP statute
    does not preclude State Farm’s method of calculating reimbursement.
    Mike Ramazio had an automobile insurance policy with State Farm that
    provided mandatory PIP coverage. In June 2013, Ramazio was injured in
    an automobile accident. On June 30, 2013, Stand-Up MRI performed
    three MRIs on Ramazio in exchange for an assignment of Ramazio’s PIP
    benefits. Stand-Up MRI billed State Farm a total of $4,800 ($1,600 for
    each MRI). State Farm paid a total of $2,551.16 for the three MRIs—
    $1,258.02 on one, $663.03 on the second, and $630.11 on the third. State
    Farm’s payment was based upon 200% of the 2007 Medicare Part B fee
    schedule and application of the Medicare Multiple Procedure Payment
    Reduction (“MPPR”).
    Stand-Up MRI wrote State Farm, objecting to the MPPR reductions and
    demanding additional payment, claiming that it was owed an additional
    $779.16—$375.91 on one MRI and $403.25 for the other. Stand-Up MRI
    did not challenge the $1,258.02 reimbursement.
    When State Farm failed to make additional payment, Stand-Up MRI, as
    assignee of Ramazio, filed a breach of contract action against State Farm,
    seeking unpaid PIP benefits under the Florida PIP statute and Ramazio’s
    insurance policy. State Farm answered the complaint and denied liability.
    The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
    After a summary judgment hearing, the trial court denied State Farm’s
    motion and granted Stand Up MRI’s motion. The court ruled that section
    627.736(5)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2013), creates a floor for reimbursing
    benefits under a PIP claim. The court subsequently entered final judgment
    in favor of Stand Up MRI for $779.16 plus interest.
    The PIP Statute Did Not Preclude State Farm’s Method of
    Reimbursing the Three MRIs That Were Conducted on the Same Day
    Resolution of this case requires application of relevant portions of
    Florida’s PIP statute as well as State Farm’s policy. Before proceeding to
    the merits of the case, we first discuss the pertinent sections of Florida’s
    PIP statute and State Farm’s policy.
    1. Florida’s PIP Statute
    Florida’s Motor Vehicle No-Fault law provides for PIP benefits. See §
    627.736, Fla. Stat. (2013). Over the years, the legislature has amended
    the PIP statute multiple times, with substantial amendments occurring in
    2012.
    In 2012, the legislature added language allowing insurers to apply
    Medicare coding policies and payment methodologies to determine
    reimbursement amounts:
    3. Subparagraph 1. does not allow the insurer to apply any
    limitation on the number of treatments or other utilization
    limits that apply under Medicare or workers’ compensation.
    An insurer that applies the allowable payment limitations of
    subparagraph 1. must reimburse a provider who lawfully
    provided care or treatment under the scope of his or her
    license, regardless of whether such provider is entitled to
    2
    reimbursement under Medicare due to restrictions or
    limitations on the types or discipline of health care providers
    who may be reimbursed for particular procedures or
    procedure codes. However, subparagraph 1. does not prohibit
    an insurer from using the Medicare coding policies and
    payment methodologies of the federal Centers for Medicare
    and Medicaid Services, including applicable modifiers, to
    determine the appropriate amount of reimbursement for
    medical services, supplies, or care if the coding policy or
    payment methodology does not constitute a utilization limit.
    § 627.736(5)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2013). The legislature also added a notice
    provision requiring that insurers notify their policyholders at the time of
    issuance or renewal of the insurer’s election to limit payment pursuant to
    the schedule of maximum charges:
    5. Effective July 1, 2012, an insurer may limit payment as
    authorized by this paragraph only if the insurance policy
    includes a notice at the time of issuance or renewal that the
    insurer may limit payment pursuant to the schedule of
    charges specified in this paragraph. A policy form approved
    by the office satisfies this requirement. If a provider submits
    a charge for an amount less than the amount allowed under
    subparagraph 1., the insurer must pay the amount of the
    charge submitted.
    § 627.736(5)(a)5., Fla. Stat. (2013).
    2. State Farm’s Policy
    The policy at issue in this case—policy booklet form 9810A— provides
    in pertinent part:
    No-Fault Coverage
    Insuring Agreement
    We will pay in accordance with the No-Fault Act properly
    billed and documented reasonable charges for bodily injury
    to an insured caused by an accident resulting from the
    ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as follows:
    2. Medical Expenses
    3
    We will pay 80% of properly billed and documented medical
    expenses, but only if that insured receives initial services and
    care from a provider described in A. below within 14 days after
    the motor vehicle accident that caused bodily injury to that
    insured.
    ***
    Limits
    3. We will not pay any charge that the No-Fault Act does not
    require us to pay, or the amount of any charge that exceeds
    the amount the No-Fault Act allows to be charged.
    4. The most we will pay for each injured insured as a result
    of any one accident is $10,000 for all combined Medical
    Expenses, Income Loss, and Replacement Services Loss
    described in the Insuring Agreement of this policy’s No-Fault
    Coverage.
    ***
    We will limit payment of Medical Expenses described in the
    Insuring Agreement of this policy’s No-Fault coverage to 80%
    of a properly billed and documented reasonable charge, but
    in no event will we pay more than 80% of the following No-
    Fault Act “schedule of maximum charges” including the use
    of Medicare coding policies and payment methodologies of the
    federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, including
    applicable modifiers:
    ***
    (f) For all other medical services, supplies, and care, 200
    percent of the allowable amount under:
    (I) The participating physicians fee schedule of Medicare Part
    B, except as provided in sub-sub-subparagraphs (II) and (III).
    ***
    For purposes of the above, the applicable fee schedule or
    payment limitation under Medicare is the fee schedule or
    payment limitation in effect on March 1 of the year in which
    the services, supplies, or care is rendered and for the area in
    which such services, supplies, or care is rendered, and the
    applicable fee schedule or payment limitation applies
    4
    throughout the remainder of that year, notwithstanding any
    subsequent change made to the fee schedule or payment
    limitation, except that it will not be less than the allowable
    amount under the applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for
    2007 for medical services, supplies, and care subject to
    Medicare Part B.
    3. State Farm’s Reimbursement to Stand-Up MRI
    In this case, State Farm applied the MPPR to reduce the reimbursement
    amount paid to Stand-Up MRI. “MPPR is basically a payment methodology
    used by the Medicare program to reduce payment for medical services
    when two or more services have been rendered on the same day, to the
    same patient, by the same physician, in the same session.” State Farm
    Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Millennium Radiology, LLC, 27 Fla. L. Weekly Supp.
    998a, 
    2019 WL 8301181
    , at *2 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Feb. 8, 2019). The
    rationale behind the MPPR is that “[p]erforming all services in one session
    reduces time, labor, and general costs associated with performing multiple
    procedures.” 
    Id.
    The MPPR provides that the service with the highest practice expense
    will be reimbursed at 100% and then any other services will be reimbursed
    at 50%. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare Learning
    Network, MLN Matters, No. MM8206 (Apr. 1, 2013), available at
    https://www.cms.gov/outreach-and-education/medicare-learning-
    network-mln/mlnmattersarticles/downloads/MM8206.pdf;             Fakhoury
    Med. & Chiro. Ctr., PLLC v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 27 Fla. L. Weekly
    Supp. 289a (Marion Cty. Ct. June 22, 2018).
    Here, the trial court determined that regardless of whether State Farm
    was permitted to use the MPPR to reduce the reimbursement amount paid
    to Stand-Up MRI, it could not reimburse less than the allowable amount
    under the 2007 Medicare Part B schedule because both section
    627.736(5)(a)2. and the policy at issue created a floor for reimbursing PIP
    benefits.
    Neither the statute nor the policy at issue support such a conclusion.
    “It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that legislative
    intent is the ‘polestar’ that guides this Court’s interpretation.” Borden v.
    E.-European Ins. Co., 
    921 So. 2d 587
    , 595 (Fla. 2006). “We endeavor to
    construe statutes to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” 
    Id.
     “To
    discern legislative intent, we look ‘primarily’ to the actual language used
    in the statute.” 
    Id.
     “When the language of the statute is clear and
    5
    unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no
    occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and
    construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”
    Valencia Reserve Homeowners Ass’n v. Boynton Beach Assocs., XIX, LLLP,
    
    278 So. 3d 714
    , 717 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citation omitted). “The court
    must give effect to all parts of the statute and avoid readings that would
    render a part thereof meaningless, and it must read all parts of a statute
    together in order to achieve a consistent whole.” Coastal Creek Condo.
    Ass’n v. Fla. Tr. Servs. LLC, 
    275 So. 3d 836
    , 838–39 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019),
    review denied, SC19-1391, 
    2019 WL 6249333
     (Fla. Nov. 22, 2019).
    Section 627.736(5)(a)1. (“subparagraph 1”) identifies different formulas
    for determining reimbursement under the schedule of maximum charges
    depending on the type of provider and the nature of the services. For the
    MRIs here at issue, the applicable portion of the schedule of maximum
    charges is section 627.736(5)(a)1.f.(I), Florida Statutes (2013), which
    requires insurers to pay 80% of 200% of the allowable amount under the
    participating physicians fee schedule of Medicare Part B:
    1. The insurer may limit reimbursement to 80 percent of the
    following schedule of maximum charges:
    ***
    f. For all other medical services, supplies, and care, 200
    percent of the allowable amount under:
    (I) The participating physicians fee schedule of Medicare Part
    B, except as provided in sub-sub-subparagraphs (II) and (III).
    § 627.736(5)(a)1.f.(I), Fla. Stat. (2013).
    Section 627.736(5)(a)2. (“subparagraph 2”) addresses what fee
    schedule should be used when determining the allowable amount
    referenced in subparagraph 1:
    For purposes of subparagraph 1., the applicable fee schedule
    or payment limitation under Medicare is the fee schedule or
    payment limitation in effect on March 1 of the year in which
    the services, supplies, or care is rendered and for the area in
    which such services, supplies, or care is rendered, and the
    applicable fee schedule or payment limitation applies
    throughout the remainder of that year, notwithstanding any
    subsequent change made to the fee schedule or payment
    6
    limitation, except that it may not be less than the allowable
    amount under the applicable schedule of Medicare Part B for
    2007 for medical services, supplies, and care subject to
    Medicare Part B.
    § 627.736(5)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added).
    Finally, section 627.736(5)(a)3. (“subparagraph 3”) provides that
    insurers can use Medicare coding policies and payment methodologies,
    including applicable modifiers, to determine the appropriate amount of
    reimbursement:
    Subparagraph 1. does not allow the insurer to apply any
    limitation on the number of treatments or other utilization
    limits that apply under Medicare or workers’ compensation.
    An insurer that applies the allowable payment limitations of
    subparagraph 1. must reimburse a provider who lawfully
    provided care or treatment under the scope of his or her
    license, regardless of whether such provider is entitled to
    reimbursement under Medicare due to restrictions or
    limitations on the types or discipline of health care providers
    who may be reimbursed for particular procedures or
    procedure codes. However, subparagraph 1. does not prohibit
    an insurer from using the Medicare coding policies and
    payment methodologies of the federal Centers for Medicare and
    Medicaid services, including applicable modifiers, to determine
    the appropriate amount of reimbursement for medical services,
    supplies, or care if the coding policy or payment methodology
    does not constitute a utilization limit.
    § 627.736(5)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added).
    As written, subparagraph 2 does not modify or limit subparagraph 3,
    or vice versa, but instead they each separately address subparagraph 1.
    Subparagraph 2 focuses on what fee schedule should be used when
    determining the allowable amount referenced in subparagraph 1.
    Contrary to the county court’s conclusion below, subparagraph 2 does not
    establish a “floor” for reimbursing PIP benefits. Instead, subparagraph 2
    provides that the allowable amount in the 2007 Medicare Part B fee
    schedule must be used when it is higher than the applicable year’s
    Medicare Part B fee schedule’s allowable amount. After determining which
    fee schedule should be used pursuant to subparagraph 2, subparagraph
    3 then provides that insurers can use Medicare coding policies and
    payment methodologies when determining the reimbursement amount.
    7
    There is no language in subparagraph 3 stating, or suggesting, that
    subparagraph 2 creates a limitation or restriction in the reimbursement
    amount.
    As State Farm argues, the schedule of maximum charges is simply a
    base rate that may be adjusted downwards by applying Medicare coding
    policies and payment methodologies, such as the MPPR, to determine the
    appropriate amount of reimbursement.           “[W]hile [subparagraph 2]
    establishes that the allowable amount in the 2007 Medicare Part B fee
    schedule must be used when it is higher than the applicable year’s
    Medicare Part B fee schedule’s allowable amount, [subparagraph 3]
    permits that allowable amount to then be reduced by the applicable and
    permissible Medicare coding policies and CMS payment methodologies
    when determining the amount of reimbursement for the claim.” State
    Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pan Am Diagnostic Servs. Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly
    Supp. 466b, 
    2018 WL 10626018
    , at *3 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 2018);
    see also Fountains Therapy Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 27
    Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 755a (Broward Cty. Ct. Oct. 7, 2019) (“Subparagraph
    (2) clarifies what fee schedule should be used when determining the
    allowable amount referenced in subparagraph (1). Subparagraph (3)
    makes it clear that insurers can use Medicare coding policies and CMS
    payment methodologies when determining the reimbursement amount.”).
    Stand-Up MRI asserts that State Farm’s interpretation would rewrite
    the plain language of the statute to “excise subparagraph 2 when
    subparagraph 3 applies” and violate various canons of statutory
    construction.      However, State Farm’s interpretation allows the
    subparagraphs to be read in harmony with one another, whereas the
    interpretation adopted by the trial court would rob subparagraph 3 of
    meaning. “Statutory construction requires that all subparagraphs must
    be given meaning, and if the Legislature had wanted the 2007 schedule of
    Medicare Part B to always be the floor for reimbursement, they could have
    added the same sentence from subparagraph 2 in all of the remaining
    subparagraphs (where it is absent).” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pan
    Am Diagnostic Servs. Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 466b, 
    2018 WL 10626018
    , at *3 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 2018). See also Fountains
    Therapy Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 27 Fla. L. Weekly Supp.
    755a (Broward Cty. Ct. Oct. 7, 2019) (“Had the legislature intended for
    insurers to only be permitted to use Medicare coding policies and CMS
    payment methodologies if the reimbursement amount equaled more than
    the allowable amount in Medicare Part B’s 2007 fee schedule [i.e.
    subsection (2) created a prohibition on subsection (3)], the legislature
    could have drafted a provision that specifically stated so.”). We read
    subparagraph 3 as permitting insurers to use Medicare coding policies and
    8
    payment methodologies, such as MPPR, to reduce the reimbursement
    amount for PIP benefits below the applicable amount under the 2007
    Medicare Part B schedule.
    Stand-Up MRI argued below—and the county court agreed—that State
    Farm’s insurance policy also incorporated a floor for reimbursing PIP
    benefits, even if the MPPR is applied. “When ‘interpreting an insurance
    contract,’ this Court is ‘bound by the plain meaning of the contract’s text.’”
    Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Virtual Imaging Servs., Inc., 
    141 So. 3d 147
    , 157 (Fla.
    2013) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, 
    70 So. 3d 566
    ,
    569 (Fla. 2011)). “If the language used in an insurance policy is plain and
    unambiguous, a court must interpret the policy in accordance with the
    plain meaning of the language used so as to give effect to the policy as it
    was written.” 
    Id.
     Any ambiguities are liberally construed in favor of the
    insured and strictly against the insurer as the drafter of the policy.
    Chandler v. Geico Indem. Co., 
    78 So. 3d 1293
    , 1300 (Fla. 2011).
    Although the policy language quoted above is formatted differently, it
    has the same effect as the language in section 627.736(5)(a). As Judge Di
    Pietro explained when interpreting identical policy language in Plantation
    Open MRI, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 25 Fla. L.
    Weekly Supp. 831a (Broward Cty. Ct. Nov. 3, 2017):
    [State Farm]’s policy states that it will not pay more than 80%
    of the schedule of maximum charges including the use of
    Medicare coding policies and payment methodologies of the
    federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. While
    [State Farm]’s policy contains a directive for which fee
    schedule must be used, the directive does not override [State
    Farm]’s ability to then reduce that fee schedule’s allowable
    amount through the use of Medicare coding policies and
    payment methodologies of the federal Centers for Medicare
    and Medicaid Services. Therefore, the Court finds that [State
    Farm]’s Policy Form 9810A permitted [State Farm] to
    reimburse Plaintiff below the 2007 Medicare Part B fee
    schedule through the application of MPPR.
    We conclude that neither the PIP statute, nor State Farm’s policy,
    prohibit State Farm from applying the MPPR to reduce the reimbursement
    to an amount less than the allowable amount of the 2007 Medicare Part B
    fee schedule.
    9
    State Farm’s Policy Provides Adequate Notice of Its Intent to Use
    Medicare Coding Policies and Payment Methodologies, Such As the
    MPPR
    Following the 2012 amendments to the PIP statute, section
    627.736(5)(a)5., Florida Statutes (2013), requires that insurers notify their
    insureds at the time of policy issuance or renewal of the insurer’s election
    to limit reimbursement pursuant to the fee schedules in the PIP statute:
    Effective July 1, 2012, an insurer may limit payment as
    authorized by this paragraph only if the insurance policy
    includes a notice at the time of issuance or renewal that the
    insurer may limit payment pursuant to the schedule of
    charges specified in this paragraph.
    The statute provides that “[a] policy form approved by the office [of
    Insurance Regulation] satisfies this requirement.” 
    Id.
    Stand-Up MRI acknowledges that the policy “seem[s] to have elected to
    utilize the permissive Medicare Part B fee schedule regarding the PIP
    schedule of maximum charges” but argues that the policy’s reference to
    “Medicare coding policies and payment methodologies” does not give
    sufficient notice of State Farm’s intent to apply the MPPR to reduce the
    reimbursement amount.
    We agree with those circuit courts sitting in their appellate capacity
    which have determined that State Farm’s policy language clearly and
    unambiguously elects the use of Medicare coding policies and payment
    methodologies, which include use of the MPPR, even if the policy does not
    specifically mention MPPR.
    In State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Millennium Radiology, LLC,
    26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 871a, 
    2019 WL 8375937
     (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Jan.
    9, 2019), the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court, sitting in its appellate
    capacity, was faced with identical language in a State Farm insurance
    policy.   Recognizing there was no binding case law regarding the
    application of MPPR to PIP claims where the policy does not specifically
    mention the term “MPPR,” the court looked to a similar challenge to policy
    language in Orthopedic Specialists v. Allstate Insurance Company, 
    212 So. 3d 973
     (Fla. 2017). There, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the
    Allstate policy was clear and unambiguous in its election of the Medicare
    fee schedule, even though the policy did not specifically mention the term
    “Medicare” when it elected to utilize the Medicare fee schedule in the
    10
    payment of claims. Millennium, 26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 871a, 
    2019 WL 8375937
    , at *3 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Jan. 9, 2019).
    The Millennium court reasoned that “[i]f settled case law does not
    require an insurer to specify ‘Medicare’ in electing and notifying its insured
    of the use of the Medicare fee schedule, then it is presumably not required
    to specify the use of the term ‘MPPR’ in notifying the insured of the use of
    this particular Medicare payment methodology.” 
    Id.
     In determining that
    State Farm’s policy language provided adequate notice of State Farm’s
    intent to employ such a payment reduction, the Millennium court also
    noted that the policy tracked the language of the 2012 statutory
    amendment. 
    Id.
     1
    We hold that State Farm’s policy provided sufficient “notice” of its intent
    to utilize “Medicare coding policies and payment methodologies of the
    federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, including applicable
    modifiers,” such as the MPPR.
    1 Since Millennium was decided, Florida courts have continued to conclude that
    State Farm’s policy provides adequate notice under section 627.736(5)(a)5. See
    State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Millennium Radiology, LLC, 27 Fla. L. Weekly
    Supp. 998a, 
    2019 WL 8301181
    , at *1 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Feb. 8, 2019) (“This
    Appellate Court finds that the State Farm Policy clearly and unambiguously
    elects the use o[f] Medicare coding policies and payment methodologies, which
    includes utilization of the MPPR method.”); State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pan
    Am Diagnostic Servs., Inc., 
    2019 WL 8375936
    , at *3 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Mar. 1,
    2019) (“We find the plain language of State Farm’s Form 9810A PIP policy satisfies
    Virtual Imaging’s simple notice requirement and Form 9810A properly complies
    with the notice provision of section 627.736(5)(a)5, Florida Statutes (2012).”);
    State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pan Am Diagnostic Servs. Inc., 
    2018 WL 10626018
    , at *4 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 2018) (“[T]he unambiguous language
    of Form 9810A PIP policy states that State Farm will be using the fee schedule of
    maximum charges and CMS coding polices and payment methodologies including
    applicable modifiers [MPPR] to determine reimbursement. We find that State
    Farm's Form 9810A PIP policy properly complies with the notice provision of
    section 627.736(5)(a)5, Florida Statutes (2013)”). It is also worth noting that
    State Farm’s 9810A form policy has been approved by the Office of Insurance
    Regulation, which satisfies the notice requirement of section 627.736(5)(a)5. See
    State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pan Am Diagnostic Servs. Inc., 
    2018 WL 10626018
    , at *4 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 2018) (“State Farm satisfied the 2013
    statutory notice requirement of section 627.736(5)(a)5, Florida Statutes by having
    its Form 9810A PIP policy approved by the OIR. Thus, as a matter of law, State
    Farm’s Form 9810A policy complied with section 627.736(5)(a)5, Florida
    Statutes.”).
    11
    We reverse the summary final judgment and remand to the county
    court for the entry of a summary final judgment in favor of State Farm.
    GROSS, GERBER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.
    *        *        *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    12