DENISE RIANO v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. ( 2022 )


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  •       Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed January 19, 2022.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    Nos. 3D20-1260 & 3D20-1473
    Lower Tribunal No. 14-30380
    ________________
    Denise Riano, et al.,
    Appellants,
    vs.
    Bank of America, N.A., et al.,
    Appellees.
    Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alan Fine,
    Judge.
    Jerome S. Reisman, P.A., and Jerome S. Reisman; J.T. Simons, P.A.,
    and Jeremy T. Simons (New Port Richey), for appellants.
    Liebler Gonzalez & Portuondo and Alan M. Pierce; Troutman Pepper
    Hamilton Sanders LLP, and Hallie S. Evans (Atlanta, GA), for appellees.
    Before EMAS, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    In this consolidated case, Denise Riano appeals from a final judgment
    rendered in favor of Bank of America, N.A. (the “Bank”), on her third-party
    claim for specific performance, and petitions for a writ of certiorari seeking
    review of an order granting Federal National Mortgage Association’s
    (“FNMA”) motion for final summary judgment on her counterclaim for specific
    performance. We affirm the appeal and dismiss the petition for writ of
    certiorari.
    In 2014, the Bank filed a one-count foreclosure complaint against
    Riano, alleging that it was the holder of the note and mortgage executed on
    August 17, 2005, and that there had been a default under the note and
    mortgage because the payment due April 1, 2010, and all subsequent
    payments, had not been made. After the Bank was no longer the servicer of
    the loan, FNMA was substituted as the party plaintiff and the Bank remained
    in the case as a third-party defendant. Riano’s Fourth Amended Answer,
    Affirmative Defenses, 3rd Party-Claims & Counterclaims relevantly alleged a
    claim for specific performance against counter-defendant FNMA and third-
    party defendant Bank. Riano’s claim for specific performance was based on
    her allegation that she and the Bank had entered into a permanent loan
    modification agreement in July 2009 under the federal government’s Home
    Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”). The trial court granted the
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    Bank’s and FNMA’s respective motions for summary judgment on Riano’s
    claim for specific performance.
    We affirm the final judgment in favor of the Bank on the basis that there
    is no independent cause of action for a lender’s failure to provide a loan
    modification agreement under HAMP, which, at its root, is what Riano seeks
    here. See Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 
    677 F.3d 1113
    , 1116 (11th Cir.
    2012) (holding that no private right of action exists to enforce lender
    compliance with HAMP); accord Bloch v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 
    755 F.3d 886
    , 889 n.3 (11th Cir. 2014); Nelson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 446 F. App’x
    158, 159 (11th Cir. 2011).
    As to Riano’s petition seeking certiorari review of the trial court’s order
    granting FNMA’s motion for summary judgment, we dismiss the petition for
    lack of jurisdiction. Because Riano does not argue a departure from the
    essential requirements of the law, much less irreparable harm, the petition
    must be dismissed. Fratangelo v. Olsen, 
    271 So. 3d 1051
    , 1054 (Fla. 3d
    DCA 2018) (“The threshold question that must first be addressed by this
    Court, before we may address the petition itself, is whether there is a
    showing of a material injury/irreparable harm that cannot be corrected on
    appeal. Only after irreparable harm has been established can an appellate
    court then review whether the petitioner has also shown a departure from
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    the essential requirements of law.” (citation omitted)). Relatedly, we note
    that Riano pled affirmative defenses to the foreclosure action, including an
    affirmative defense that the parties entered into a novation of the original
    loan when Riano fully performed her obligations under the modification offer
    and she was then notified that she qualified for a permanent loan
    modification. With that in mind, we emphasize that our affirmance of the final
    judgment in favor of the Bank is without prejudice to Riano asserting
    affirmative defenses in the still-pending foreclosure action by FNMA. See
    Consortion Trading Int’l, Ltd. v. Lowrance, 
    682 So. 2d 221
    , 222 (Fla. 3d DCA
    1996); Pavolini v. Williams, 
    915 So. 2d 251
    , 254 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005);
    Brenowitz v. Cent. Nat’l Bank, 
    597 So. 2d 340
    , 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
    Affirmed; petition dismissed.
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