LAW OFFICES OF KRAVITZ & GUERRA, P.A., etc. v. CECILIA BRANNON ( 2022 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed February 9, 2022.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D21-1294
    Lower Tribunal No. 21-6627
    ________________
    Law Offices of Kravitz & Guerra, P.A., etc.,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Cecilia Brannon, et al.,
    Appellees.
    An Appeal from non-final orders from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
    County, Jose M. Rodriguez, Judge.
    Law Offices of Kravitz & Guerra, P.A., Genilde E. Guerra and Edith E.
    Sheeks, for appellant.
    EPGD Attorneys at Law, P.A., and Joanna Andrade Lehmann, for
    appellees.
    Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.
    GORDO, J.
    Law Offices of Kravitz & Guerra, P.A. appeals a nonfinal order denying
    its motion for temporary injunction against Cecilia Brannon f/k/a Leidimar
    Brannon, Elite Resources and Solutions LLC and Real Confidential Business
    Services LLC d/b/a RCB Services. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P.
    9.130(a)(3)(B).
    “The standard of review of trial court orders on requests for temporary
    injunctions is a hybrid. To the extent the trial court’s order is based on factual
    findings, we will not reverse unless the trial court abused its discretion;
    however, any legal conclusions are subject to de novo review.” Quirch Foods
    LLC v. Broce, 
    314 So. 3d 327
    , 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting Fla. High
    Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Rosenberg, 
    117 So. 3d 825
    , 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013));
    see also Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Florigrown, LLC, 
    317 So. 3d 1101
    , 1110 (Fla.
    2021) (“We review a trial court’s factual findings on the[ ] elements [of a claim
    for a temporary injunction] for competent, substantial evidence, and we
    review its legal conclusions de novo. To the extent the decision to enter a
    temporary injunction involves an exercise of discretion, we defer to the trial
    court unless it has abused its discretion.” (citation omitted)); Briceño v.
    Bryden Invs., Ltd., 
    973 So. 2d 614
    , 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“A trial court
    has wide discretion to grant or deny a temporary injunction and an appellate
    court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless the party
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    challenging the grant or denial clearly shows an abuse of that discretion.”
    (quoting Perry & Co. v. First Sec. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 
    654 So. 2d 671
    ,
    671 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995))); Atomic Tattoos, LLC v. Morgan, 
    45 So. 3d 63
    , 64
    (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“An appellant who challenges the trial court’s order on
    a motion for temporary injunction has a heavy burden; the trial court’s ruling
    is presumed to be correct and can only be reversed where it is clear the court
    abused its discretion.”).
    Kravitz & Guerra failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying a temporary injunction against Brannon, Elite
    Resources and RCB Services, for violating a non-compete and non-
    solicitation restrictive covenant of an employment agreement between
    Kravitz & Guerra and Brannon. Contrary to their contentions on appeal,
    competent, substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s
    finding that the restrictive covenants were not violated as Brannon provided
    accounting services to former clients of Miami Best Accountants; a non-party
    to the employment agreement and not a party to this lawsuit.              See §
    542.335(1)(f)(1)–(2), Fla. Stat.; Tusa v. Roffe, 
    791 So. 2d 512
    , 514 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2001) (finding that a third-party beneficiary’s claim failed under section
    542.335 as there was no “contractual privity” and the agreement “[did] not
    identify Tusa as a third-party beneficiary or state that the restrictive covenant
    3
    was intended for Tusa’s benefit.”). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
    order.
    Affirmed.
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