ABA INTERIOR INC. v. THE OWEN GROUP CORP. ( 2022 )


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  •            DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    ABA INTERIOR INC.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    THE OWEN GROUP CORP.,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D21-874
    [February 9, 2022]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Nicholas Richard Lopane, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    CACE19023431.
    Karen E. Berger and Yasir Billoo of International Law Partners, LLP,
    Hollywood, for appellant.
    Michael J. Friedman and Michael R. Billings of Friedman Legal, Boca
    Raton, for appellee.
    KLINGENSMITH, J.
    ABA Interior, Inc., a subcontractor, appeals the trial court’s final
    summary judgment in favor of the general contractor, The Owen Group
    Corp. ABA asserts the trial court erred when it granted partial summary
    judgment and found it materially breached the subcontract with Owen.
    ABA also argues that the trial court erred when it found that Palm Beach
    County law precluded it from participating in litigation related to its
    unlicensed work. We agree with ABA in part and reverse.
    Owen and ABA contracted for the interior improvement of a commercial
    project in Palm Beach County. Section 11.1(d) of their agreement required
    subcontractors to comply “with all Federal, State, and local laws and
    ordinances” relating to construction. ABA completed the project with the
    help of other sub-subcontractors. Owen made payments to ABA until it
    discovered that ABA failed to obtain the necessary Palm Beach County
    licenses and stopped further payments.
    Ultimately, ABA sued for breach of contract in Broward County. Owen
    alleged as an affirmative defense that ABA failed to obtain the required
    Palm Beach County licenses and counterclaimed for reimbursement of all
    prior payments made to ABA, claiming ABA materially breached the
    contract by engaging in unlicensed contracting.
    Owen moved for partial summary judgment as to ABA’s claims. Owen
    argued that Palm Beach County law precluded ABA from participating in
    litigation related to its unlicensed work and that ABA breached the
    contract first by failing to obtain the required licensure. In response, ABA
    argued that the State of Florida did not require a license to perform the
    work contemplated by the contract and the work, therefore, was not
    unlicensed.
    The trial court granted Owen’s motion, finding that ABA did not have
    the required certificates of competency for specialty contracting and was
    therefore unable to act as a litigant under (1) Special Act of Palm Beach
    County, amending Chapter 67-1876, Laws of Florida, as amended, and (2)
    the Codes of Laws and Ordinances Relating to Palm Beach County
    Government, Section 7, Article II. The trial court deferred ruling on
    whether the failure to obtain local licensure was a breach of contract.
    Following that ruling, Owen once again moved for partial summary
    judgment, alleging that at the time of contracting and during its work on
    the Project, ABA was unlicensed and thereby breached the contract. The
    trial court also granted this motion, finding that ABA committed a
    preceding and material breach of the construction subcontract by failing
    to obtain the requisite licensure to perform work on the project and that
    such breach was not waived by Owen. This appeal followed.
    “Review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo.” Gomez v.
    Fradin, 
    41 So. 3d 1068
    , 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). “Further, where the
    question involves interpretation of a statute, it is subject to de novo
    review.” Brown v. City of Vero Beach, 
    64 So. 3d 172
    , 174 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2011) (emphasis omitted).
    “Municipal ordinances are subject to the same rules of construction as
    are state statutes.” Rinker Materials Corp. v. City of North Miami, 
    286 So. 2d 552
    , 553 (Fla. 1973). “When the language of the statute is clear and
    unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no
    occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and
    construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”
    Valencia Rsrv. Homeowners Ass’n v. Boynton Beach Assocs., XIX, LLLP,
    
    278 So. 3d 714
    , 717 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v.
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    McRainey, 
    137 So. 157
    , 159 (Fla. 1931)). “However, a literal interpretation
    of the statutory language need not be given if doing so would lead to an
    unreasonable or absurd result.” Brown v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp.,
    
    32 So. 3d 661
    , 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
    Article 11.1(d) of the construction subcontract between the parties
    required ABA to comply with all local laws, ordinances, and licensing:
    Comply with all Federal, State, and local laws and ordinances
    relating to construction of buildings or structures, give
    adequate notices relating to the work to the proper
    authorities, and secure and pay for all necessary licenses or
    permits to carry on the work as described in the Contract
    Documents applicable to this Subcontract.
    Florida state law provides that “if a state license is not required for the
    scope of work to be performed under the contract, the individual
    performing that work is not considered unlicensed.” § 489.128(1)(a), Fla.
    Stat. (2019). That said, Palm Beach County Code section 7-17(b)(2) makes
    it unlawful for a person who is required but failed to possess a certificate
    of competency “to hold himself/herself out as a contractor, whether as a
    plaintiff, defendant or witness in any court in this county.”
    ABA argues that the plain reading of Palm Beach County Code section
    7-17(b)(2) bans ABA from litigating only in Palm Beach County and that it
    is free to litigate in Broward County. We disagree. ABA’s reading of the
    Palm Beach County Code would make it so that section 7-17(b)(2) could
    never be enforced outside of Palm Beach County, even when Palm Beach
    County law applies. If a contract has a venue provision outside of Palm
    Beach County, as is the case here, a party that falsely holds itself out as
    possessing a required certificate of competency would effectively face no
    consequence. This would be an unreasonable result. See Nationscredit
    Fin. Servs. Corp., 
    32 So. 3d at 663
    .
    Palm Beach County’s ordinance required Palm Beach County licensure,
    not licensure in other counties, for the specialty work contracted and
    performed in Palm Beach County. The trial court found no dispute that
    ABA failed to acquire a certificate of competency from Palm Beach County,
    which precluded it from acting as a litigant under Palm Beach County law.
    See Palm Beach County Code § 7-17(b)(2). Therefore, the trial court was
    correct, in part, when it found that ABA was precluded from litigating by
    Palm Beach County law. See Gomez, 
    41 So. 3d at 1071
    . However, this
    ordinance applies only to bar unlicensed contractors from litigating claims
    involving work that requires additional licensure. ABA was still permitted
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    to prosecute or defend itself on claims that did not require this additional
    licensure.
    ABA’s written construction subcontract encompassed a variety of work,
    including acoustical ceiling work, flooring work, and millwork. ABA
    specifically claimed that some of the work performed, such as the flooring
    installation, did not necessarily require a specialty license from Palm
    Beach County. Although the trial court ruled in the second partial
    summary judgment that ABA failed to obtain the requisite licensure to
    perform work, the trial court did not expressly find that all of ABA’s work
    required a license. The trial court also did not determine whether ABA
    fulfilled its subcontract by engaging properly licensed sub-subcontractors
    to perform the work that required Palm Beach County licensure. Such
    unresolved factual issues preclude the entry of summary judgment. See
    Eco-Tradition, LLC v. Pennzoil-Quaker State Co., 
    137 So. 3d 495
    , 496 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2014) (“Summary judgment is improper unless the record
    demonstrates that there are no genuine issue as to any material fact and
    that the party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law.”).
    Additionally, the trial court did not expressly rule on whether ABA’s
    failure to obtain Palm Beach County licensure in compliance with all local
    laws and ordinances under Article 11.1(d) constituted a breach of the
    agreement that would negate any obligation for payment, even for the work
    that did not require such licensure. See Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. Pierce
    Goodwin Alexander & Linville, 
    137 So. 3d 1059
    , 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
    (quoting Madison Fund, Inc. v. Charter Co., 
    427 F. Supp. 597
    , 608 (S.D.N.Y.
    1977)) (finding that although damages should leave the injured party in
    the same position before the breach, the injured party is not entitled to “a
    position better than that which he would have occupied had the contract
    been performed”). Without such a finding in the lower court, we take no
    position on this issue and leave it for consideration on remand.
    For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s two partial summary
    judgments and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    Reversed and remanded.
    DAMOORGIAN and CIKLIN JJ., concur.
    *         *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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