Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 29, 2017.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D16-2706
Lower Tribunal No. 14-30116
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Fist Construction, Inc.,
Appellant,
vs.
Santos Obando,
Appellee.
An Appeal from non-final orders from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Samantha Ruiz-Cohen, Judge.
Conroy Simberg and Diane H. Tutt (Hollywood), for appellant.
Wasson & Associates, Chartered, and Annabel C. Majewski; DLD Lawyers
and Frank L. Labrador, for appellee.
Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SUAREZ and SALTER, JJ.
SALTER, J.
Fist Construction, Inc. (“Fist Construction”), appeals a partial summary
judgment in favor of an injured laborer (plaintiff below), Santos Obando,
precluding Fist Construction from relying on its affirmative defense of workers’
compensation immunity. We have jurisdiction to review the order under Florida
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(v).
Another defendant in the action below was the general contractor for a
residential construction project in Homestead, Florida. Yet another defendant was
subcontracted to perform roofing work at the project, and that subcontractor further
subcontracted with Fist Construction to perform some or all of that work. A
foreman and supervisor for Fist Construction, Hector Lopez (also a defendant
below), hired Mr. Obando as a laborer1 to perform part of the roofing work that
had been subcontracted to Fist Construction.
Mr. Obando alleges that he was injured while performing roof work at the
project in January 2014. Through counsel, Mr. Obando filed petitions for workers’
compensation claims with the general contractor and the prime roofing
subcontractor (not Fist Construction), but these claims were denied on the basis
that Mr. Obando was not an employee of either of those companies at the time of
1 There was deposition testimony in the record, a part of the summary judgment
evidence, that Mr. Lopez hired and paid Mr. Obando in cash as an independent
contract laborer, and that Mr. Lopez received the funds for those payments from
Fist Construction. Mr. Obando contends that Fist Construction was not his
“employer” for purposes of the workers’ compensation statutes.
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the accident. Following the denial, Mr. Obando filed circuit court tort claims
against the general contractor, the prime roofing subcontractor and its principal,
Fist Construction, and Mr. Lopez.
Several months after Mr. Obando commenced his lawsuit, the prime roofing
contractor’s attorney contacted a claims adjuster for Fist Construction’s workers’
compensation carrier and notified her that Mr. Obando had been injured, with
“multiple employers involved.” Mr. Obando testified that he had no knowledge of,
or contact with, Fist Construction (only with Mr. Lopez), and the owner of Fist
Construction initially provided a letter on behalf of the company disclaiming any
knowledge of Mr. Obando:
This firm has no knowledge of who this person is, as he has never
been employed by us. There never been [sic] an application for
employment filed under that name with this Company. So, we have
no records to produce or forward to anyone.
Subsequently, however, Mr. Obando submitted a petition for workers’
compensation benefits to Fist Construction’s workers’ compensation carrier. In its
response to the petition, the carrier agreed to pay Mr. Obando’s medical bills and
expenses from the hospital emergency room “once they have been submitted and
reviewed,” and to authorize additional treatment at a health center.
Fist Construction asserted workers’ compensation immunity as an
affirmative defense to Mr. Obando’s second amended complaint, and each party
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on that issue. The trial court granted
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Mr. Obando’s motion, which argued that Fist Construction’s words and actions
had waived the immunity defense under such cases as Ocean Reef Club v.
Wilczewski,
99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), and Timmeny v. Tropical Botanicals
Corp.,
615 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Fist Construction’s appeal from that
order followed.
Analysis
On this record of subcontracts, handshake agreements, and a laborer hired
for cash by the supervisor of a subcontractor (rather than the subcontractor itself),
the identity of the “statutory employer” and related questions of estoppel and
waiver involve disputed facts inappropriate for summary judgment. In the present
case, it cannot be said that the facts are “so crystallized that nothing remains but
questions of law.” Moore v. Morris,
475 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1985). Critical
facts which are not in dispute include these: Mr. Obando’s injury occurred in the
course and scope of his work on the residential roofing project; Mr. Obando’s
compensation and direction came via Fist Construction and its supervisor; Fist
Construction had in force a policy of workers’ compensation insurance; and that
insurer accepted Mr. Obando’s claim as compensable and provided benefits
following the identification of the insured entity and the submission of a petition
for workers’ compensation benefits.
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Any penalty accruing because of Fist Construction’s delay in reporting Mr.
Obando’s claim in this case is an issue for consideration within the statutory
administrative process applicable to workers’ compensation claims. And an initial
denial of liability or benefits does not automatically estop an employer from
asserting workers’ compensation immunity. Fly & Form, Inc. v. Marquez,
19 So.
3d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
The primary case advanced by Mr. Obando’s counsel before the trial court,
Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski,
99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), is
distinguishable. In that case, the workers’ compensation insurer denied two
employees’ claims based on a position that the employees’ illnesses did not occur
during the course and scope of employment. “The claims also were denied
because the statute of limitations had run.”
Id. at 2. In the employees’ subsequent
civil action, the employer took the opposite position, contending that the alleged
injuries were work-related and that the employer was immune from suit. The trial
court correctly denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment on grounds of
workers’ compensation immunity, and this Court affirmed.
Similarly, Mr. Obando’s counsel urged the trial court to grant the motion for
partial summary judgment on grounds of estoppel based on Timmeny v. Tropical
Botanicals Corp.,
615 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). That case also involved a
different set of controlling facts than the case at hand. The estoppel in Timmeny
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was imposed because the employer failed to notify the employee claimant of
possible coverage, but then attempted to invoke the statute of limitations as a
defense when the employee filed a lawsuit. The First District held that estoppel
applied because the employer had the same knowledge as the claimant regarding
the possible cause and compensability of the injury or disease, but failed to provide
the employee with information regarding the potentially compensable nature of the
claim.
In the present case, the claims were not denied by the carrier once the
parties’ investigation identified the employer and carrier. The owner of Fist
Construction initially denied knowing Mr. Obando or having any records regarding
him, but there was never a denial that Mr. Obando’s injury was work-related, that
Fist Construction’s foreman at the time hired and paid Mr. Obando, and that Fist
Construction had workers’ compensation insurance in place. The statute of
limitations was not an issue addressed in Mr. Obando’s motion for summary
judgment.
For these reasons, we reverse the partial summary judgment order and the
trial court’s determination that, as a matter of law, Fist Construction could not
assert workers’ compensation immunity. We remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
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