Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed February 16, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D22-0249
Lower Tribunal No. F21-16623
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Michael Arslanian,
Petitioner,
vs.
Daniel Junior, et al.,
Respondents.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Deborah Prager, Assistant
Public Defender, for petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant
Attorney General, for respondent The State of Florida.
Before SCALES, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Petitioner, Michael Arslanian, seeks relief in habeas corpus,
contending his motion for bond modification was denied without adequate
regard for his financial circumstances. For the reasons that follow, we deny
the petition.
BACKGROUND
After Arslanian was alleged to have discharged a firearm from a
vehicle, striking an occupied residence, a first appearance judge found
probable cause for shooting a deadly missile, discharging a firearm from a
vehicle, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The judge set a
standard bond in the amount of $22,500.
At arraignment, the State filed a felony information charging Arslanian
with the first two counts only, and the bond remained unchanged. Arslanian
subsequently filed a written motion for a bond modification, seeking release
on electronic monitoring to a residential substance abuse and mental health
treatment facility. In the motion, he alleged that although he had strong
community ties and did not pose a risk of flight, he had no savings or source
of income to apply to the payment of the bond.
The trial judge convened a hearing, at the outset of which he stated he
had reviewed the modification motion. During the hearing, the defense
asserted that Arslanian’s indigency and community ties weighed in favor of
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supervised release, while the State argued that the circumstances of the
crime, including the allegation Arslanian uploaded video footage of the
shooting to his Instagram page, and an extensive criminal history warranted
standard bond. After the parties presented their respective arguments, the
trial court denied the motion, finding Arslanian posed a flight risk and danger
to the community. The defense then requested to elicit testimony from
Arslanian regarding his economic circumstances. The trial court granted the
request, but no further argument was had. The instant petition ensued.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In these proceedings, Arslanian relies upon a line of authority
espousing the proposition that the failure by the trial court to explicitly
address a defendant’s financial resources in considering a requested bond
reduction merits relief in habeas corpus. See Sylvester v. State,
175 So. 3d
813, 814 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); Yearby v. State,
306 So. 3d 1141, 1443 (Fla.
3d DCA 2020). We begin our analysis by examining the relevant
constitutional and statutory directives relating to pretrial release.
Although a trial court has broad discretion in determining release
conditions, article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution provides,
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption is great, every person charged with a crime or
violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to
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pretrial release on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of
release can reasonably protect the community from risk of
physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at
trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused
may be detained.
See also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131(a). In determining what constitutes
“reasonable conditions” in any given case, we have previously held that “in
order to make a bond determination and exercise its discretion, the trial court
must take evidence and make findings on the statutory factors for setting
conditions for pretrial release.” Diaz v. Junior, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D2352,
D2352 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 3, 2021). As pertinent here, among those statutory
factors the trial court is required to consider are: “[t]he defendant’s family
ties, length of residence in the community, employment history, financial
resources, and mental condition.” § 903.046(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2021); see
also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131(b)(3). Consideration of financial resources is of
particular importance, as this court has previously observed “excessive
bond, depending on the financial resources of the defendant, is tantamount
to no bond at all.” Camara v. State,
916 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
In the instant case, Arslanian correctly contends the trial court failed to
explicitly address his lack of financial resources in denying the modification
motion. The notion, however, that the trial court did not consider his financial
resources is dispelled by the record before us. Of initial note, the trial judge
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commenced the hearing by indicating he had reviewed the motion for
modification of release conditions. The judge then repeated “I have read the
motion.” Detailed within the motion were the economic circumstances
purportedly precipitating the request for modification. Moreover, the trial
court did not issue any ruling until after Arslanian argued he was indigent
and lacked sufficient financial resources to satisfy a cash bail.
Further, unlike the cases cited in support of habeas relief, here,
Arslanian did not seek a reduction in bail. Instead, he only sought
nonmonetary release. In furtherance of his position, he argued he had no
resources available to pay any amount of bail. The logical inference to be
drawn from this argument is that bail in any amount would have been
excessive.
In Knight v. State,
213 So. 3d 1019 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), our sister
court addressed an analogous habeas petition. There, the First District Court
of Appeal considered whether bail in the amount of $250,000 was excessive
for a defendant with only $10,000 in available funds. Although the trial court
had failed to render factual findings, the appellate court nonetheless denied
habeas relief, cogently reasoning:
Knight cannot satisfy her burden by just showing that $250,000
is excessive; she must also show that any amount over $10,000
would be excessive. This is because she has maintained
throughout the case that she could afford no more than $10,000.
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Her counsel acknowledged at oral argument that any higher
amount would leave her in precisely the same situation she now
faces—held based on her inability to satisfy the monetary
condition. Therefore, unless we conclude that the trial court must
set bail at $10,000 or less—a conclusion we cannot accept—
ordering a reduced bail would be “at most an idle gesture.”
Knight,
213 So. 3d at 1021 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ex parte Smith,
193
So. 431, 435 (1940)).
Drawing upon the logic advanced in Knight, we reject the proposition
that where a defendant lacks sufficient financial resources to satisfy cash
bail, a trial court is required to impose nonmonetary release conditions. This
would render the remaining statutory factors superfluous and divest the trial
court of any meaningful discretion in determining reasonable release
conditions.
Finally, it bears note that it was not until the trial court rendered ruling
that Arslanian sought to supplement the record with financial testimony.
Despite the fact he was allowed full access to the record, Arslanian made no
further argument and did not raise any deficiency in the ruling below.
“Although [his] habeas petition falls within this court’s original jurisdiction,
[Arslanian] is not excused from the requirement that [he] first raise his
argument below.” Id. at 1022. By affording “the trial court an opportunity to
resolve the issues,” this requirement obviates any need for our intervention.
Id.
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Accordingly, we conclude that relief in habeas corpus does not lie, and
we therefore deny the petition.
Petition denied.
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