NICHOLAS P. SANDELIER v. STATE OF FLORIDA ( 2018 )


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  •           DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    NICHOLAS P. SANDELIER,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D16-3695
    [February 28, 2018]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
    Martin County; Lawrence Michael Mirman, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    432016CF000487A.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Patrick B. Burke, Assistant
    Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber,
    Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    MAY, J.
    The defendant appeals an order on direct criminal contempt. He argues
    the trial court erred in: (1) improperly classifying his failure to appear as
    direct contempt; (2) failing to comply with the procedural requirements for
    indirect contempt proceedings; and (3) failing to make sufficient findings
    in the judgment. We agree with him on his first two arguments and
    reverse.
    When the defendant failed to appear at a court hearing, the trial court
    issued a bench warrant and estreated his bond. The defendant moved to
    recall the bench warrant and set aside the bond estreature. At the hearing
    on his motion, the following occurred:
    THE COURT: All right, [defendant], it is my practice to
    concurrently hold a contempt hearing because of failure to
    appear is considered direct contempt if it’s willful; at the same
    time we hear the issue about recalling the bench warrant
    since the issue is overlapping meaning if I hold you in
    contempt, I can sentence you independently to six months in
    the county jail at the same time I hold you without bond in
    that regard, so, just so you’re aware of that, so, I will notice
    you that that’s what we’re doing at this time. Did you want to
    talk to your lawyer about that or do you understand that?
    (TRANSCRIBER NOTE: Pause)
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We’re ready, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: You’re ready to go forward? All right, so, at this
    time I will be conducting a contempt hearing at the same time
    we issue the - we address the issue of recalling the bench
    warrant and setting aside the estreature. If you raise your
    right hand, [defendant], the clerk will swear you.
    The court then asked the defendant why he should not be held in
    contempt for failing to appear. The defendant explained there had been a
    misunderstanding. He showed up to court at 1:30 p.m. on September 28,
    2016, only to discover the hearing was set the day before.
    The defendant testified that he called the court clerk and his bondsman
    to confirm the court date on the morning of September 27. His bondsman
    told him the court date was September 28, and the clerk told him the
    hearing was at 1:30 p.m. The defendant also told the court he had a
    problem with a truck in the middle of the state that needed to be moved.
    The court asked the defendant why the truck was relevant to his failure
    to appear. The defendant replied he did not know, but later said it was
    why he should not be held in contempt. The State advised the court that
    the defendant had nine prior felony convictions (seven from his juvenile
    record) and five prior failures to appear.
    The defendant again explained he was provided the wrong date from
    his bondsman. He also advised his mother was in court and could
    corroborate his testimony. The court replied “I can’t hear what he said
    from you; if you need to call [the bondsman] as a witness, he needs to be
    here now, period, and he is not, so, if you want to call the mother, call the
    mother.” The defendant’s mother then gave corroborating testimony.
    After the parties concluded their arguments, the following occurred:
    THE COURT: [Defendant] I don’t believe you, period, end of
    story, so, I find you in contempt. On the issue of contempt as
    2
    far as your punishment is concerned, you have the
    opportunity to present mitigating evidence, you did by your
    testimony, your calling witnesses as far as what your sentence
    should be.    Do you wish to present any evidence on
    mitigation?
    (TRANSCRIBER NOTE: Pause)
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor, we’re just asking for
    leniency in that matter.
    ....
    THE COURT: Having found you in contempt, [defendant], I
    will adjudicate you guilty of contempt and sentence you to 159
    days in the county jail as punishment for the contempt. Your
    request to vacate the bench warrant and set aside the
    estreature is denied. You have 30 days to appeal the issue of
    the finding of the contempt in this matter, you have the right
    to an attorney and appeal in that regard. Thank you.
    The court entered a judgment and sentence on direct criminal contempt,
    from which the defendant now appeals.
    We review contempt orders for an abuse of discretion. Napoli v. Napoli,
    
    142 So. 3d 953
    , 954–55 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
    Our supreme court has held that a party who is ordered by the trial
    court to appear at a scheduled hearing, but fails to do so, must be found
    in indirect criminal contempt, rather than in direct criminal contempt.
    State v. Diaz de la Portilla, 
    177 So. 3d 965
    , 972 (Fla. 2015). The State
    agrees and so do we. The trial court erred in finding the defendant guilty
    of direct criminal contempt.
    The defendant next argues the trial court failed to comply with
    numerous provisions of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840. The
    State suggests the defendant waived this argument. See Rader v. State,
    
    571 So. 2d 556
     (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Here, the defendant did not
    specifically use the word “waive.” But, after being put on notice of the trial
    court’s intention to conduct a contempt hearing, the defendant appears to
    have agreed to proceed with the hearing. Nevertheless, we do not find a
    knowing, intelligent waiver to have occurred here.
    3
    “Only an express waiver will suffice to estop the aggrieved party from
    challenging the adjudication on appeal.” Reins v. Johnson, 
    604 So. 2d 911
    , 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (citing Persoff, 589 So. 2d at 1007). We
    disagree that the defendant waived the arguments now made. He clearly
    asked about having the bondsman testify on his behalf, but had no time
    in which to do so.
    Given the proverbial “rock and the hard place” in which the defendant
    was situated, it is not surprising he felt pressured into going forward with
    this impromptu hearing. See, e.g., Gratz v. State, 
    84 So. 3d 1219
    , 1221
    n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Given the limited choices of trial dates afforded
    the defense, and defense counsel’s immediate clarification of his readiness
    and articulated reasons why a continuance was necessary, we reject the
    State’s waiver argument.”).
    Indirect criminal contempt proceedings require strict adherence to rule
    3.840. Levey v. D’Angelo, 
    819 So. 2d 864
    , 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
    Failure to comply with the procedural requirements of rule 3.840
    constitutes fundamental error. Baker v. Green, 
    732 So. 2d 6
    , 7 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 1999). A party’s failure to raise the issue of noncompliance with rule
    3.840 will not bar full consideration of the issue on appeal. Persoff v.
    Persoff, 
    589 So. 2d 1007
    , 1008-09 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
    Indirect criminal contempt is a proceeding in which the individual is
    protected by the full panoply of due process rights. Martin v. State, 
    743 So. 2d 591
    , 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). This court has reversed an indirect
    criminal contempt charge where the defendant was not provided formal
    written notice of the charge. Martinez v. State, 
    976 So. 2d 1222
    , 1223 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2008).
    Other districts have reached similar conclusions. See Maloy v. Judd,
    
    209 So. 3d 581
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (holding the trial court failed to comply
    with rule 3.840 by failing to issue a written order to show cause); J-II
    Investments, Inc. v. Leon County, 
    21 So. 3d 86
    , 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
    (holding rule 3.840 requires the trial court to issue an order to show
    cause); De Castro v. De Castro, 
    957 So. 2d 1258
    , 1260 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
    (reversing for failure to issue show cause order).
    Our supreme court has interpreted Rule 3.840 to
    require[] that the court issue an order to show cause with
    reasonable time allowed for preparation of the defense and
    further provides that the defendant is “entitled to be
    represented by counsel, have compulsory process for the
    4
    attendance of witnesses, and testify in his or her own
    defense.” These necessary procedures for indirect criminal
    contempt proceedings were not followed in this case.
    Plank v. State, 
    190 So. 3d 594
    , 607 (Fla. 2016) (emphasis added) (internal
    citations omitted). The court erred in expediting the process without
    providing the defendant with a rule to show cause.
    Rule 3.840 also requires a reasonable time to prepare a defense “after
    service of the order on the defendant.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.840. We have
    held that a two-day notice is insufficient time to prepare and defend
    against an indirect criminal contempt charge. Korn v. Korn, 
    180 So. 3d 1122
    , 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); see also Russ v. State, 
    622 So. 2d 501
    ,
    502 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (holding two days insufficient); Goral v. State, 
    553 So. 2d 1282
    , 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding two “actual working days
    notice” insufficient).
    Here, the defendant received notice of the contempt hearing only
    moments before the final hearing took place. At the hearing, the defendant
    argued that his bail bondsman provided him the wrong date. The trial
    court suggested the defendant needed to have the witness present “now.”
    The defendant was not provided with a reasonable time to prepare his
    defense.
    In short, the trial court erred in failing to provide the defendant with
    notice, a reasonable time to prepare his defense, and compulsory process
    for the attendance of witnesses. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.840; Baker, 
    732 So. 2d at 7
    . We therefore reverse and remand the case. 1
    Reversed and remanded.
    WARNER and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
    *         *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    1 We find no merit in the defendant’s last argument that the trial court failed to
    provide sufficient findings. Written findings of fact, setting forth the basis for
    indirect criminal contempt, are not required where oral findings are made on the
    record. Gidden v. State, 
    613 So. 2d 457
    , 458 (Fla. 1993).
    5