Ramsey v. Dewitt Excavating , 248 So. 3d 1270 ( 2018 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
KIMBERLY M. RAMSEY AND
DELMAS RAMSEY, JR., AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE ESTATE OF DELMAS RAMSEY, III,
Appellants,
v. Case No. 5D17-311
DEWITT EXCAVATING, INC. AND
DAVID E. GUBBINS, SR.,
Appellees.
________________________________/
Opinion filed June 15, 2018
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Lake County,
Mark J. Hill, Judge.
Andrew B. Greenlee, of Andrew B.
Greenlee, P.A., Sanford and Michael B.
Scoma, of Scoma Law Firm, Clermont, for
Appellants.
Sharon C. Degnan and Sebastian C. Mejia,
of Kubicki Draper, Orlando, for Appellees.
PALMER, J.
Kimberly and Delmas Ramsey, Jr., as personal representatives of the Estate of
Delmas Ramsey, III (their deceased son), appeal the final summary judgment entered by
the trial court, ruling that workers' compensation immunity barred their liability claims
against David Gubbins and DeWitt Excavating, Inc. (DeWitt). We affirm as to DeWitt, but
reverse as to Gubbins.
The industrial accident resulting in Ramsey's death took place while Ramsey was
working for DeWitt and with Gubbins, a fellow employee. The parents' complaint alleged
that Gubbins and DeWitt were liable for operating a cement-mixing pug mill while Ramsey
was still inside of the mixing box, causing his death. DeWitt and Gubbins filed a motion
seeking the entry of summary judgment in their favor, arguing that the parents' wrongful
death claims were barred by workers' compensation immunity. The court granted the
motion, and this appeal followed.
The party moving for summary judgment
bears the burden of establishing that, based on the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions,
affidavits, and other material as would be admissible in
evidence on file, there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary
judgment evidence must be considered in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and if the record raises the
possibility of any genuine issue of material fact or even the
slightest doubt that an issue might exist, summary judgment
is improper.
Penton Bus. Media Holdings, LLC v. Orange County, 236 So. 3d 495, 497 (Fla. 5th DCA
2018) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A final order entering a
summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach,
L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000).
In R.L. Haines Construction, LLC v. Santamaria, we summarized the law relating
to workers' compensation immunity, explaining that "employers in compliance with the
Workers' Compensation Law are immune from their employees' common law negligence
actions for damages arising from work-related injuries." 161 So. 3d 528, 530 (Fla. 5th
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DCA 2014) (citing Bakerman v. Bombay Co., 961 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2007)). However,
section 440.11(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2013) creates an exception to workers'
compensation immunity as to employers and employees acting in furtherance of the
employer's business. The statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:
440.11 Exclusiveness of liability.—
(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in s. 440.10 shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability . . . except as
follows:
....
(b) When an employer commits an intentional tort that
causes the injury or death of the employee. For purposes
of this paragraph, an employer's actions shall be deemed to
constitute an intentional tort and not an accident only when
the employee proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that:
....
2. The employer engaged in conduct that the employer knew,
based on prior similar accidents or on explicit warnings
specifically identifying a known danger, was virtually certain to
result in injury or death to the employee, and the employee
was not aware of the risk because the danger was not
apparent and the employer deliberately concealed or
misrepresented the danger so as to prevent the employee
from exercising informed judgment about whether to perform
the work.
The same immunities from liability enjoyed by an employer
shall extend as well to each employee of the employer when
the employee is acting in furtherance of the employer's
business and the injured employee is entitled to receive
benefits under this statute. Such fellow-employee
immunities shall not be applicable to an employee who
acts, with respect to a fellow employee, with willful and
wanton disregard or . . . with gross negligence when such
acts result in injury or death or such acts proximately cause
such injury or death . . . .
§ 440.11(1)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added).
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Not finding these statutory exceptions applicable, the trial court ruled that the
parents' wrongful death claims were barred by immunity. The parents contend that the
trial court erred in so ruling, asserting first that the record contains genuine issues of
material fact as to whether DeWitt (through Gubbins) committed an intentional tort
causing Ramsey's death. We disagree.
Three elements must be proved to establish the intentional tort exception to
worker's compensation immunity, and the failure to prove any one of the elements will
prevent the exception from applying. Gorham v. Zachry Indus., 105 So. 3d 629, 633 (Fla.
4th DCA 2013). The elements are:
1) employer knowledge of a known danger . . . based upon
prior similar accidents or explicit warnings specifically
identifying the danger that was virtually certain to cause injury
or death to the employee;
2) the employee was not aware of the danger . . . because it
was not apparent; and
3) deliberate concealment or misrepresentation by the
employer . . . preventing employee from exercising informed
judgment as to whether to perform the work.
Id. Here, the trial court properly ruled that the record contains no evidence indicating that
Ramsey was not aware of the danger involved in cleaning the pug mill, holding that "the
record evidence establishes it would be impossible for [Ramsey] to be unaware of the
risks of injury from the pug mill because such danger was readily apparent especially
since he had worked in or around the machine many times in the past" and "there are
some types of machines that are so obviously inherently dangerous that the danger would
be obvious to anyone working in the vicinity [and] the pug mill is just such a machine."
Accordingly, summary judgment was properly entered in favor of DeWitt. See Vallejos v.
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Lan Cargo S.A., 116 So. 3d 545, 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); List Indus. v. Dalien, 107 So.
3d 470, 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
The parents also assert that the trial court erred when it entered summary
judgment in favor of Gubbins on their gross negligence claim, arguing that the record
does not demonstrate that they cannot overcome his defense of workers' compensation
immunity. We agree.
In order to establish that Gubbins acted with gross negligence when he turned on
the pug mill while Ramsey was still inside, the parents were required to present evidence
as to each of the following three elements:
1) circumstances constituting an imminent or clear and
present danger amounting to a more than normal or usual
peril [;]
2) knowledge or awareness of the imminent danger on the
part of . . . [Gubbins;] and
3) an act or omission [on the part of Gubbins] that evinces a
conscious disregard of the consequences.
Vallejos, 116 So. 3d at 552; accord Pyjek v. ValleyCrest Landscape Dev., Inc., 116 So.
3d 475, 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). When viewed in the light most favorable to the parents,
the evidence of record indicated that Gubbins directed Ramsey into the pug mill for
cleaning and later activated the pug mill without utilizing any of the safety systems or the
"thumbs up" signal system normally utilized by the pug mill workers or otherwise checking
to see if Ramsey was still inside. If a jury so found, Gubbins could be determined to have
been grossly negligent. See Boston ex rel. Estate of Jackson v. Publix Super Mkt., Inc.,
112 So. 3d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering
summary judgment against the parents on their gross negligence claim.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.
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Lan Cargo S.A., 116 So. 3d 545, 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); List Indus. v. Dalien, 107 So.
3d 470, 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
The parents also assert that the trial court erred when it entered summary
judgment in favor of Gubbins on their gross negligence claim, arguing that the record
does not demonstrate that they cannot overcome his defense of workers' compensation
immunity. We agree.
In order to establish that Gubbins acted with gross negligence when he turned on
the pug mill while Ramsey was still inside, the parents were required to present evidence
as to each of the following three elements:
1) circumstances constituting an imminent or clear and
present danger amounting to a more than normal or usual
peril [;]
2) knowledge or awareness of the imminent danger on the
part of . . . [Gubbins;] and
3) an act or omission [on the part of Gubbins] that evinces a
conscious disregard of the consequences.
Vallejos, 116 So. 3d at 552; accord Pyjek v. ValleyCrest Landscape Dev., Inc., 116 So.
3d 475, 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). When viewed in the light most favorable to the parents,
the evidence of record indicated that Gubbins directed Ramsey into the pug mill for
cleaning and later activated the pug mill without utilizing any of the safety systems or the
"thumbs up" signal system normally utilized by the pug mill workers or otherwise checking
to see if Ramsey was still inside. If a jury so found, Gubbins could be determined to have
been grossly negligent. See Boston ex rel. Estate of Jackson v. Publix Super Mkt., Inc.,
112 So. 3d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering
summary judgment against the parents on their gross negligence claim.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.
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