JEROMY RODGERS v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST, etc. , 256 So. 3d 885 ( 2018 )


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  •         DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    JEROMY RODGERS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as
    Trustee, for The WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through
    Certificates, Series 2004-AR12,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D18-82
    [September 26, 2018]
    Appeal of non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
    Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Joel T. Lazarus, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    CACE-08-041839.
    Rashida M. Overby, Tamarac, for appellant.
    Allison Morat of Pearson Bitman LLP, Maitland, for appellee.
    CONNER, J.
    In this appeal of a post-judgment non-final order, the issue is whether
    the trial court erred in not vacating a final judgment of foreclosure after it
    was established that there was an error in the legal description of the
    property in the final judgment.           Because the appellant has not
    demonstrated an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s order
    denying the motion to vacate the final judgment.
    Background
    Deutsche Bank filed suit to foreclose a mortgage on real property owned
    by the appellant. The real property, which is the subject of the foreclosure
    proceeding, is described by a metes and bounds legal description. There
    is no dispute that the mortgage and foreclosure complaint properly
    described the real property. Following a nonjury trial, a final judgment of
    foreclosure was entered, containing scrivener’s errors in the legal
    description of the property. In two instances capital “O”s were used in
    degree calls, instead of zeros. Additionally, one of the description calls in
    the final judgment erroneously states “8.1º,” rather than “81º.”
    The errors in the legal description contained in the final judgment were
    carried forward in the advertising for the foreclosure sale, as well as the
    certificate of title issued subsequent to the sale. Deutsche Bank was the
    highest bidder at the sale. Within a few days after the sale and prior to
    the issuance of the certificate of title, Deutsche Bank moved to amend the
    final judgment to correct the scrivener’s errors, but the motion was never
    set for hearing. The scrivener’s errors were carried forward into the
    certificate of title issued to and recorded by Deutsche Bank. A few months
    later, the appellant moved to vacate the final judgment pursuant to Florida
    Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), contending that in addition to vacating
    the final judgment, the case should be dismissed once the judgment was
    vacated. The appellant alleged three grounds in support of the motion: (1)
    the case was not at issue when it proceeded to a final hearing; (2) the
    plaintiff was an unregistered trust doing business in Florida; and (3) the
    error in the legal description in the final judgment required that the final
    judgment be vacated and the foreclosure process “must begin anew.”
    The trial court denied the appellant’s motion, without elaboration. The
    appellant gave notice of appeal.
    Appellate Analysis
    On appeal, the sole issue the appellant raises is error in not vacating
    the final judgment. The appellant does not contend on appeal that the
    trial court erred in denying his request that the case be dismissed or failing
    to grant his motion on the other two grounds asserted below. Thus, those
    issues raised below are abandoned. Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distribs.,
    Inc., 
    442 So. 2d 958
    , 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (“When points, positions,
    facts and supporting authorities are omitted from the brief, a court is
    entitled to believe that such are waived, abandoned, or deemed . . . to be
    unworthy.”).
    An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment filed pursuant to
    rule 1.540(b) is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Adams v. Estate
    of Henderson, 
    155 So. 3d 485
    , 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). However, if the
    facts are not in dispute, and the trial court’s decision is based on a pure
    question of law, then review is de novo. Cornelius v. Holzman, 
    193 So. 3d 1029
    , 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
    A final judgment of foreclosure which contains an inaccurate legal
    description for the subject property can be vacated pursuant to rule
    1.540(b). Id. at 1032. As the inaccurate legal description renders the
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    judgment voidable, as opposed to void, relief must be sought within one
    year after the final judgment is entered. Id. In this case, the motion was
    timely filed.
    On appeal, the appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his
    motion to vacate because the scrivener’s errors were substantive and
    rendered the final judgment voidable.
    In Caddy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
    198 So. 3d 1149
     (Fla. 4th DCA
    2016), we determined that the trial court erred in denying the mortgagor’s
    motion to vacate the final judgment which contained a single numerical
    error in the deed description that was carried into the amended complaint
    and consent judgment, even though the correct legal description was used
    in the advertisement for the sale. 
    Id. at 1150
    . We concluded that,
    “[b]ecause the erroneous legal description was discovered after the final
    judgment and foreclosure sale, the court could not simply correct the legal
    description in the judgment and certificate of title. ‘Rather, reformation
    required vacating the final judgment, judicial sale, and issuance of title.’”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Sanchez, 
    187 So. 3d 341
    , 343 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2016)).
    Unlike the situation in Caddy, here, the error did not occur prior to the
    entry of the final judgment; instead the error first occurred upon the entry
    of the judgment itself. This factual distinction makes principles of law
    discussed in Caddy and the cases cited therein inapplicable. The situation
    in this case is arguably more in line with the case law discussing errors
    covered by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(a), rather than rule
    1.540(b).
    Rule 1.540(a) provides:
    (a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, decrees,
    or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from
    oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any
    time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and
    after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
    pendency of an appeal such mistakes may be so corrected
    before the record on appeal is docketed in the appellate court,
    and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
    with leave of the appellate court.
    (emphasis added). Florida courts have construed “clerical mistakes” to
    include “only errors or mistakes arising from an accidental slip or
    omission, and not errors or mistakes in the substance of what is decided
    by the judgment or order, the latter of which must be corrected pursuant
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    to Rule 1.540(b).” Lorant v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 
    162 So. 3d 244
    , 245 (Fla.
    1st DCA 2015) (quoting Freeman v. Sanders, 
    562 So. 2d 834
    , 835 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 1990)); see Town of Hialeah Gardens v. Hendry, 
    376 So. 2d 1162
    ,
    1164 (Fla. 1979) (quoting Keller v. Belcher, 
    256 So. 2d 561
    , 563 (Fla. 3d
    DCA 1971)). As we have said, “Rule [1.540(a)] limits relief to those seeking
    to correct errors or misprisions that result from an accidental slip or
    omission.” McKibbin v. Fujarek, 
    385 So. 2d 724
    , 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
    In this case, the appellant has not furnished us with a transcript of the
    hearing on his rule 1.540(b) motion. “An appellant has the burden to
    present a record that will overcome the presumption of the correctness of
    the trial court’s findings.” Zarate v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 
    81 So. 3d 556
    , 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). As noted above, Deutsche Bank filed a
    motion to amend the final judgment due to scrivener’s errors. That motion
    does not cite any authority and has not been ruled upon by the trial court.
    However, it appears likely that the trial court denied the appellant’s motion
    out of concern that the more proper remedy for the situation is an
    amendment of the final judgment. Thus, on this record, we cannot
    conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
    appellant’s rule 1.540(b) motion. We take no position on whether rule
    1.540(a) relief is appropriate.
    Affirmed.
    WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
    *        *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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