Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 7, 2015.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D15-133
Lower Tribunal No. 12-12300
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Kaitlin Liptak Cozzo,
Appellant,
vs.
Samuel Charles Cozzo,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara Areces,
Judge.
Hoffman & Hoffman and Kimberly L. Boldt, Teresa Abood Hoffman and
Maggie A. Berryman, for appellant.
Samuel C. Cozzo, in proper person.
Before WELLS, SHEPHERD and LOGUE, JJ.
SHEPHERD, J.
Kaitlin Liptak Cozzo, the former wife below, appeals from an order denying
her request for attorney’s fees in proceedings commenced by her former husband,
Samuel Charles Cozzo, soon after the parties’ dissolution of marriage. Because the
record reveals sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney’s fees, we
reverse.
The parties’ marriage was dissolved on February 19, 2013, at which time the
trial court ratified the parties’ mediated settlement agreement providing for the
parenting and support of their two minor children. Approximately four months
later, Samuel Charles Cozzo filed motions seeking to enforce the parties’ parenting
plan and to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children.1 The former wife
subsequently moved for attorney’s fees based on the disparity between the parties’
financial status, her need, and the former husband’s ability to pay. The trial court
proceeded to hold two evidentiary hearings to determine the reasonableness of the
requested fees.
At the initial hearing, the former wife presented the testimony of an attorney
fee expert, who, after reviewing the services performed by the former wife’s
attorney, opined that the attorney’s fees incurred were reasonable. At the second
hearing, counsel for former wife presented the testimony of her firm’s records
custodian, through whom the trial court admitted the invoice time sheets, detailing
1 The former husband also filed other motions which are not relevant to this appeal.
2
the work performed. At the conclusion of this evidence, the former husband
argued the evidence presented was insufficient to prove the former wife’s claim for
attorney’s fees and moved for a directed verdict.2 The former husband insisted the
attorney who performed the legal services in question had to testify directly. The
trial court agreed and entered the order appealed from denying the motion for
attorney’s fees.
Florida law requires a party seeking attorney’s fees to provide proof (a)
“detailing the nature and extent of the services performed and … [(b)] expert
testimony regarding the reasonableness of the fees.” Trumbull Ins. Co. v.
Wolentarski,
2 So. 3d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (quoting Morton v.
Heathcock,
913 So. 2d 662, 669 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)); see also, Saussy v. Saussy,
560 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (applying this evidentiary standard in a
dissolution case). Where a party has provided sufficient, admissible proof of these
two components, no court has further mandated direct testimony from the attorney
who performed the services.
Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the former wife’s motion for
attorney’s fees, and remand for entry of an award of fees in accordance with the
evidence presented.
2In a bench trial, the motion is properly one for involuntary dismissal. Fla. R. Civ.
P. 1.420(b); Valdes v. Assoc. I.N.E.D., H.M.O., Inc.,
667 So. 2d 856, n.1 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1996).
3
Reverse and remanded.
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