Buitrago v. Feaster , 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 20926 ( 2014 )


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  •                NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    NELLY BUITRAGO and GUSTAVO                   )
    ZAPATA,                                      )
    )
    Appellants,                    )
    )
    v.                                           )          Case No. 2D14-47
    )
    BRIDGET FEASTER,                             )
    )
    Appellee.                      )
    )
    Opinion filed December 31, 2014.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas
    County; Mark I. Shames, Judge.
    Mark D. Tinker and Charles W. Hall of
    Banker Lopez Gassler, P.A., St. Petersburg,
    for Appellants.
    Robert E. Heyman of Heyman Law Firm,
    P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.
    VILLANTI, Judge.
    Nelly Buitrago and Gustavo Zapata appeal from the trial court's Order on
    Motions for Additur, Remittitur, and for New Trial, in which the court granted Bridget
    Feaster's motion for a new trial on future noneconomic damages and denied Appellants'
    motions for new trial on all issues. We affirm the denial of Appellants' motions without
    further discussion. However, we must reverse the portion of the court's order that
    granted Feaster's motion for new trial because the court's decision was based on an
    erroneous view of the law and therefore constitutes an abuse of discretion.
    Feaster was injured in a four-car collision caused by Zapata, who was
    driving Buitrago's truck. Following a lengthy trial, the jury ultimately found Buitrago and
    Zapata liable to Feaster and awarded Feaster $55,819.34 for past medical expenses,
    $450,000 in future medical damages, $442.40 for lost wages, $25,000 for past
    noneconomic damages, and nothing for future noneconomic damages. Feaster moved
    for a new trial, claiming that the evidence and verdict established that she was legally
    entitled to future noneconomic damages. In arguing her motion, Feaster relied on
    Allstate Insurance Co. v. Manasse, 
    681 So. 2d 779
    (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), for the
    proposition that the jury's finding of a permanent injury automatically entitled her to
    recover future noneconomic damages as a matter of law. After hearing the parties'
    arguments on the motion, the court apparently agreed and granted Feaster a new trial
    on the issue of future noneconomic damages.
    Because it was the sole argument raised at the hearing and the court
    granted Feaster's motion without making any specific findings,1 we are compelled to
    conclude that the court based its ruling on the argument that the jury must award future
    noneconomic damages as a matter of law when it finds that the plaintiff suffers a
    permanent injury. However, this view of the law was expressly rejected by the Florida
    Supreme Court when it held in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Manasse, 
    707 So. 2d 1110
    1
    The trial court's written order, devoid of any grounds for granting the new
    trial, would have required this court to remand in and of itself. See Fla. R. Civ. P.
    1.530(f); Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 
    359 So. 2d 430
    (Fla. 1978).
    -2-
    (Fla. 1998), that a verdict is not inadequate as a matter of law when the jury finds a
    plaintiff has suffered a permanent injury but does not award future intangible damages.
    The correct standard to apply in considering a motion for new trial based
    on an allegedly inadequate award of noneconomic damages is whether the verdict was
    against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Cloud v. Fallis, 
    110 So. 2d 669
    , 673
    (Fla. 1959). However, Feaster failed to argue this standard to the trial court, and the
    record makes it clear that the trial court did not consider the weight of the evidence in
    granting Feaster a new trial on noneconomic damages. The trial court then seemingly
    based its decision on an erroneous view of the law, and thus committed an abuse of
    discretion when it granted Feaster a new trial. See Tri-Pak Machinery, Inc. v.
    Hartshorn, 
    644 So. 2d 118
    (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). When, as here, "the appellate court
    cannot determine whether the trial court would have granted a new trial but for the error
    of law, . . . then the proper remedy is to remand the case to the trial court for
    reconsideration in light of the correct legal principles." Van v. Schmidt, 
    122 So. 3d 243
    ,
    260 (Fla. 2013). Accordingly, we must reverse the order granting Feaster a new trial on
    noneconomic damages.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    KELLY, J., and PLEUS, ROBERT J., JR., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, Concur.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2D14-47

Citation Numbers: 157 So. 3d 318, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 20926, 2014 WL 7494831

Judges: Villanti, Kelly, Pleus, Robert

Filed Date: 12/31/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024