EDWARD STODDARD v. STATE OF FLORIDA , 253 So. 3d 759 ( 2018 )

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
EDWARD KEITH STODDARD, )
DOC #R11760, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D17-5103
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
___________________________________)
Opinion filed August 22, 2018.
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P.
9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for
Pasco County; Susan G. Barthle, Judge.
Edward Keith Stoddard, pro se.
PER CURIAM.
Edward Stoddard appeals the order summarily denying his motion filed
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm without comment the
portions of the order that summarily deny grounds two through ten of Mr. Stoddard's
motion, but we reverse the portion of the order that summarily denies ground one and
remand for further proceedings.
The State charged Mr. Stoddard with first-degree murder after he shot a
man in 2008. A jury found him guilty of second-degree murder, and the trial court
sentenced him as a prison releasee reoffender to life imprisonment with a twenty-five-
year minimum mandatory term for his discharge of a firearm. Mr. Stoddard appealed
his judgment and sentence, and this court reversed because the manslaughter
instruction given to his jury constituted fundamental error under State v. Montgomery,
39 So. 3d 252, 259 (Fla. 2010). Stoddard v. State, 100 So. 3d 18, 19 (Fla. 2d DCA
2011). A second jury found Mr. Stoddard guilty of second-degree murder, and the trial
court again sentenced him as a prison releasee reoffender to life imprisonment with a
twenty-five-year minimum mandatory term. Mr. Stoddard appealed that judgment and
sentence, which this court affirmed without a written opinion. Stoddard v. State, 200 So.
3d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (table decision).
Mr. Stoddard then filed a motion under rule 3.850, asserting in ground one
that his trial counsel gave him incorrect advice. He claims that his attorney advised him
that the State had to "refile" a notice of intent to seek a prison releasee reoffender
sentence for his second trial and that because the State failed to do so, the trial court
had discretion to impose a sentence less than life imprisonment if he was again
convicted of second-degree murder.1 Mr. Stoddard further asserts that he relied on this
advice when he rejected the State's plea offer of imprisonment for twenty-five years.
The postconviction court did not address the legal sufficiency of this claim, instead
1Unlike the violent career criminal and habitual offender sentencing
enhancements in section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2007), section 775.082(9) does not
require the State to provide written notice before seeking a prison releasee reoffender
sentence. See Akers v. State, 890 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ("We have
analyzed the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act and have found no requirement therein
that a defendant be given written notice of the state's intent to seek enhanced penalties
as a prison releasee reoffender."). Thus, Mr. Stoddard’s claim is that his trial counsel
advised him that the State had to "refile" a notice that, in fact, it never had to file in the
first place.
-2-
ruling that it was conclusively refuted by the State's June 9, 2008, notice that Mr.
Stoddard qualified as a prison releasee reoffender, the prison releasee reoffender
sentence imposed after his first conviction, and trial counsel's statements at the second
sentencing hearing that the postconviction court interpreted as an agreement that Mr.
Stoddard qualified as a prison releasee reoffender.
While the postconviction court's attachments reflect that Mr. Stoddard was
aware that he qualified as a prison releasee reoffender, the attachments do not
conclusively refute Mr. Stoddard's claim that his trial counsel incorrectly advised him
before his retrial that if he was again convicted of second-degree murder, the court
would have discretion to impose a sentence less than life imprisonment because the
State did not "refile" a notice of intent to seek prison releasee reoffender sentencing.
We note that in the context of a plea agreement, prejudice "is determined based upon a
consideration of the circumstances as viewed at the time of the offer and what would
have been done with proper and adequate advice." Alcorn v. State, 121 So. 3d 419,
432 (Fla. 2013).
However, we also note that although Mr. Stoddard pleaded facts that
support a cognizable claim for relief, see Steel v. State, 684 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1996) ("A claim that misinformation supplied by counsel induced a defendant to
reject a favorable plea offer can constitute actionable ineffective assistance of
counsel."), he did not sufficiently plead that he was prejudiced by his counsel's advice
pursuant to the requirements set forth in Alcorn. 121 So. 3d at 430. Because the
postconviction court did not address the legal sufficiency of Mr. Stoddard's motion but
instead ruled that this claim was conclusively refuted by the record, it did not enter a
-3-
nonfinal order granting Mr. Stoddard sixty days to amend this insufficiently pleaded
claim. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(2) ("If the motion is insufficient on its face, and the
motion is timely filed under this rule, the court shall enter a nonfinal, nonappealable
order allowing the defendant 60 days to amend the motion.").
Accordingly, we reverse only the portion of the postconviction court's order
that summarily denies ground one of Mr. Stoddard's motion and remand for the
postconviction court to strike this claim and to grant Mr. Stoddard sixty days to amend.
If Mr. Stoddard does file a facially sufficient claim, the postconviction court shall
determine if the case files and records conclusively refute it. If they do not, the
postconviction court shall hold an evidentiary hearing on ground one only. In all other
respects, we affirm the postconviction court's order.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
SILBERMAN, LUCAS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
-4-