JORGE CASTILLO v. STATE OF FLORIDA , 244 So. 3d 1098 ( 2018 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    JORGE CASTILLO,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D16-1452
    [April 18, 2018]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Elizabeth Scherer, Judge; L.T. Case No. 13007022
    CF10A.
    Jonathan Smulevich and Ronald S. Lowy of Lowy and Cook, P.A.,
    Miami, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers,
    Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    GERBER, C.J.
    The defendant raises several arguments following his open guilty plea
    to multiple counts arising from his multimillion dollar enterprise of
    trafficking contraband prescription drugs. Based on the state’s concession
    of error on two of the defendant’s arguments, we reverse the defendant’s
    conviction on one count, and remand for resentencing on another count.
    On the defendant’s remaining arguments relating to his alleged lack of
    competency to enter the plea, we affirm. We write primarily to address the
    competency arguments.
    Procedural History
    A nine-count information charged the defendant and five others with
    several crimes. The defendant was charged in eight of the nine counts:
    trafficking in contraband drugs (count one), conspiracy to traffic
    contraband prescription drugs (count two), organized scheme to defraud
    (count three), and five counts of money laundering (counts five through
    nine). The defendant was not charged in count four.
    1. The Plea Colloquy
    The defendant entered an open guilty plea to the eight counts with
    which he was charged. During the circuit court’s plea colloquy, the
    following exchange occurred:
    COURT: Are you currently under the influence of any alcohol,
    drugs, or prescription medication?
    DEFENDANT: Yes.
    COURT: Okay. What do you take, sir?
    DEFENDANT: I’m taking a prescription for my mental health
    for brain contusions. . . .
    COURT: . . . Have you been diagnosed with a mental illness?
    DEFENDANT: I have an accident in 2011 where I hit my head
    . . . . After that, I was in a coma. And a lot of problems come
    after that to me.
    COURT: Okay. Has a doctor diagnosed you with something
    specific?
    DEFENDANT: . . . I have depression, I been having a lot of
    problems. I been seeing a psychologist, a psychiatrist.
    ....
    COURT: How do you feel today?
    ....
    DEFENDANT: Since I have the accident, I have a lot of
    problems. I get confused. I need to see my doctor about it. I
    no see my doctor for three years, my neurologist.
    ....
    COURT: Okay. What I’m trying to figure out is if you can
    make an intelligent and knowing waiver of your rights. And
    based upon your answers, I can’t make that finding because I
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    don’t understand your answers. So the question is how do
    you feel today?
    DEFENDANT: Feel fine.
    COURT: Okay. Are any symptoms of mental illness, any of
    your depression or any of those symptoms affecting you
    today?
    DEFENDANT: No.
    COURT: . . . Is your medication controlling your symptoms?
    DEFENDANT: Yes.
    COURT: And are you able to communicate with your lawyer?
    DEFENDANT: Yes.
    COURT: Are you able to understand me when I speak to you?
    DEFENDANT: Yes.
    COURT: And any trouble concentrating?
    DEFENDANT: A lot.
    ....
    COURT: Okay. So what is the trouble, sir?
    ....
    DEFENDANT: I don’t function the same as before. I have a
    lot of seizures all the time, every day, several times a day.
    ....
    DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you understand what’s going on
    now?
    DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
    DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you understand the judge?
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    DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand.
    ....
    COURT: Have you had a seizure today?
    DEFENDANT: Not that I know of. No, I’m fine.
    ....
    COURT (to defense counsel): Do you have any issues about
    his competency?
    DEFENSE COUNSEL: Not today, no. I think he understands
    fully what’s going on today.
    COURT: Sir, I need you to pay attention to my questions and
    answer my questions specifically. Not about what happened
    in the past but about today. Are you having any trouble
    following along today?
    DEFENDANT: No.
    COURT: Are you having any trouble concentrating today?
    DEFENDANT: No.
    COURT: Are you taking your medication as prescribed by
    your doctor?
    DEFENDANT: Yes.
    COURT: And is the medication working for all that you know?
    DEFENDANT: Yes.
    The court proceeded to explain the remainder of a standard plea
    colloquy, and for each explanation, the defendant indicated he understood
    the plea and its consequences. The court then accepted the defendant’s
    guilty pleas as knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
    2. The Sentencing Hearing
    4
    At the sentencing hearing, the defendant moved for a downward
    departure, primarily pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(d), Florida Statutes
    (2015) (“The defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder
    that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical
    disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment.”). In support, the
    defendant presented the testimony of the neurologist who treated him for
    thirteen months after his injury in 2011. In the first few months after the
    injury, the defendant was confused and not acting normally. During later
    visits, the defendant was having difficulty with cognition and
    concentration. Over the next several months, the defendant’s condition
    did not improve. According to the neurologist, the defendant “acted almost
    like a lobotomized patient. He was passive, confused, forgetting things.
    Just walked like a robot.” The neurologist testified that the defendant
    needed regular neurological visits and regular psychiatric medications for
    his behavior. When defense counsel asked the neurologist if the defendant
    was capable of repeating the behavior underlying the charged crimes, the
    neurologist responded, “Well, certainly, at the time, thirteen month period
    I last saw him, from late 2011 to the end of 2012, absolutely not. He was
    simple, confused. He was not able to do anything sophisticated. He was
    very impaired neurologically, incompetent.”
    In response to the neurologist’s testimony, the state presented several
    witnesses. A Department of Corrections senior physician testified that he
    had reviewed the defendant’s medical records, and did not see any medical
    requirement which could not be addressed by the Department’s health
    care system. One of the law enforcement officers who investigated the
    defendant’s crimes testified that the defendant’s contraband prescription
    drug enterprise generated $28 million before the defendant’s injury, and
    another $15 million after the injury. Another law enforcement officer
    testified that he interviewed the defendant for several hours after the
    defendant was arrested, and the defendant did not appear confused, but
    instead was clear as to the facts about the crimes. Finally, the defendant’s
    ex-wife testified that although the defendant had some physical effects
    from his injury, he stopped going to doctor visits, and continued with his
    crimes, including an attempt to expand his enterprise into Puerto Rico.
    During closing arguments, defense counsel relied on the neurologist’s
    testimony about having treated the defendant. The state relied upon its
    witnesses’ testimony that the defendant’s criminal conduct continued well
    after the defendant recovered from his injury.
    The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion for downward
    departure. The court recognized that although it could depart from the
    minimum guidelines sentence, the court found it should not depart,
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    mentioning that the defendant had not seen the neurologist for three years
    and that his crimes occurred both before and after his injury.
    The court then adjudicated the defendant guilty, and sentenced the
    defendant to twenty-five years in prison, on each of counts one through
    nine, to run concurrent with each other. The court rendered this decision
    even though the defendant was not charged in count four, and even
    though a twenty-five year sentence exceeded the defendant’s maximum
    possible sentence on count two.
    The Appeal
    This appeal followed. The defendant raises four arguments, none of
    which was argued to the circuit court: (1) he was improperly convicted
    and sentenced on count four when he was not charged in count four; (2)
    he was given an illegal sentence on count two; (3) the circuit court erred
    in failing to conduct a competency hearing; and (4) the defendant’s plea
    was not voluntary because he was incompetent at the time of the plea.
    1. The Defendant’s First Two Arguments
    On the defendant’s first argument, the state properly concedes that the
    defendant was improperly convicted and sentenced on count four when he
    was not charged in count four. See Jaimes v. State, 
    51 So. 3d 445
    , 448
    (Fla. 2010) (“It is a fundamental principle of due process that a defendant
    may not be convicted of a crime that has not been charged by the state.”);
    Powell v. State, 
    174 So. 3d 498
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“A conviction of an
    uncharged crime can be raised at any time as it is a denial of due
    process.”). Therefore, we reverse the defendant’s conviction on count four,
    and remand for the circuit court to correct the judgment by vacating the
    defendant’s conviction and sentence on count four.
    On the defendant’s second argument, the state properly concedes that
    the defendant was given an illegal sentence on count two. Count two
    charged the defendant with conspiracy to traffic in contraband
    prescription drugs, a second degree felony. Under section 775.082(3)(d),
    Florida Statutes (2013), the maximum sentence for a second degree felony
    is fifteen years. However, the defendant’s lowest permissible sentence
    under the code was 237.45 months, or 19.78 years, and under section
    921.0024(2), Florida Statutes, (2013), “[i]f the lowest permissible sentence
    under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s.
    775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed.” The
    twenty-five year sentence on count two exceeded the sentence required by
    the code of 237.45 months, or 19.78 years. Therefore, we reverse the
    6
    sentence on count two, and remand for the circuit court to impose the
    correct sentence required by the code of 237.45 months, or 19.78 years,
    on count two.
    2. The Defendant’s Third and Fourth Arguments
    We conclude the defendant’s third and fourth arguments, that the
    circuit court erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing, and that
    the defendant’s plea was not voluntary, lack merit. We first address our
    jurisdiction before turning to the merits.
    a. Jurisdiction
    In Dortch v. State, ___ So. 3d ____ (Fla. 4th DCA April 11, 2018), we
    recently held:
    [T]o raise the issue of a failure to comply with Florida Rules
    of Criminal Procedure 3.210-212 on direct appeal, it is not
    necessary that a defendant first file a motion to withdraw plea
    under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(2)(A) in cases
    where the trial court has reasonable grounds to believe the
    defendant is incompetent and has ordered an examination.
    Indeed, the rules mandate a hearing and an order under such
    circumstances.      This is true regardless of whether the
    defendant has previously been declared incompetent. This
    mandate does not apply however if the trial court had no
    reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent.
    To require a criminal defendant, who may be incompetent,
    to file a motion to withdraw a plea before raising the issue on
    appeal is unwarranted.       If a defendant is incompetent,
    confining him to post-conviction relief, without the assistance
    of counsel, is not a remedy designed to do justice.
    ___ So. 3d at ___ (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Dortch receded from
    previous cases in which we held, for example, that “[a]lthough a trial
    court’s failure to order a competency hearing on its own motion when it
    reasonably appears necessary constitutes an abuse of discretion, we do
    not deem such error ‘fundamental’ so as to obviate the need for filing a
    motion to withdraw in the trial court before attacking the voluntariness of
    the plea on appeal.” Burns v. State, 
    884 So. 2d 1010
    , 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2004) (footnote omitted). Thus, even though the defendant did not raise
    this issue to the circuit court by objection or by the filing of a motion to
    7
    withdraw his plea, we have jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s
    arguments.
    b. Merits
    We now consider the merits of the defendant’s arguments. As we
    indicated in Dortch, the test of whether a court errs in not conducting a
    competency hearing turns on whether the court, at a material stage of the
    proceeding, had a reasonable ground to believe the defendant was not
    mentally competent to proceed. This test arises from the plain language
    of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b):
    If, at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, the court
    . . . has a reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is
    not mentally competent to proceed, the court shall immediately
    enter its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the
    defendant’s mental condition, which shall be held no later
    than 20 days after the date of the filing of the motion, and may
    order the defendant to be examined by no more than 3
    experts, as needed, prior to the date of the hearing.
    Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b) (emphasis added). A “material stage of the
    proceeding” includes “entry of a plea” and “sentencing.” Fla. R. Crim. P.
    3.210(a)(1). The test for whether a defendant is competent is “whether [the
    defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with [the defendant’s]
    lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether
    [the defendant] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
    proceedings against [the defendant].” Peede v. State, 
    955 So. 2d 480
    , 488
    (Fla. 2007).
    We review the circuit court’s decision not to hold a competency hearing
    for an abuse of discretion. See Kelly v. State, 
    797 So. 2d 1278
    , 1280 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2001) (the “standard of review of a trial court’s decision regarding
    whether to hold a competency hearing is abuse of discretion”). Further, “a
    trial court does not err when it does not conduct an inquiry concerning
    the defendant’s mental competency . . . where no showing of mental
    incompetency was made and no request by the defendant for such an
    inquiry was made.” Campo v. State, 
    24 So. 3d 735
    , 736 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2009).
    Here, we find no abuse of discretion. Our review of the record indicates
    the circuit court did not have a reasonable ground to believe the defendant
    was incompetent before accepting the defendant’s plea or sentencing the
    8
    defendant. We would go further to say that competent substantial
    evidence existed that the defendant was competent at both stages.
    At no time did the defendant’s counsel request a competency hearing
    or even suggest that the defendant was incompetent. After the plea
    colloquy revealed that the defendant suffered a brain injury four years
    before entering the plea, the court thoroughly inquired whether that injury
    was affecting the defendant’s ability to understand the plea and its
    consequences. Although the defendant initially confused the inquiry by
    referring to his condition immediately after the injury, the defendant
    ultimately testified he understood the plea and its consequences when the
    court focused the defendant on his ability to understand everything at the
    time of the plea. When the court asked defense counsel whether defense
    counsel had any issues about the defendant’s competency, defense
    counsel candidly answered, “Not today, no. I think he understands fully
    what’s going on today.” Cf. Burns, 
    884 So. 2d at
    1014 n.1 (“Even if we
    were to pass on the merits of this case, we would be hard pressed to find
    an abuse of discretion where defense counsel advised the court that the
    defendant’s competency was not an issue and assured the court that the
    defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings had actually improved
    since the earlier court proceedings when he was found competent to
    proceed.”).
    The defendant’s reliance on his neurologist’s testimony, presented at
    the sentencing hearing in pursuit of a downward departure sentence, is
    unavailing as an attempt to show that the court had a reasonable ground
    to believe the defendant was incompetent before the court accepted the
    defendant’s plea, or when the court sentenced the defendant. We
    recognize the neurologist used certain comparisons to discuss the
    defendant’s condition in the months after the defendant’s injury – the
    defendant “acted almost like a lobotomized patient. He was passive,
    confused, forgetting things. Just walked like a robot.” We also recognize
    that the neurologist used the word “incompetent,” when testifying that the
    defendant “was simple, confused. He was not able to do anything
    sophisticated.    He was very impaired neurologically, incompetent.”
    However, the neurologist expressly testified that his observations were
    limited to the months immediately after the defendant’s injury, and that
    he had not treated the defendant in the three years before the defendant’s
    plea.
    Moreover, even if we were to accept the neurologist’s testimony about
    the defendant’s condition in the months after the defendant’s injury, the
    state’s evidence about the defendant’s condition in the years leading up to
    the plea and sentencing rebutted the defendant’s claim on appeal that he
    9
    was incompetent at the time of the plea or sentencing. One of the law
    enforcement officers who investigated the defendant’s crimes testified that
    the defendant’s contraband prescription drug enterprise generated $28
    million before the defendant’s injury, and another $15 million after the
    injury. Another law enforcement officer testified that he interviewed the
    defendant for several hours after the defendant was arrested, and the
    defendant did not appear confused, but instead was clear as to the facts
    about the crimes. Finally, the defendant’s ex-wife testified that although
    the defendant had some physical effects from his injury, he stopped going
    to doctor visits, and continued with his crimes, including an attempt to
    expand his enterprise into Puerto Rico.
    We do not accept the defendant’s oral argument that the mere fact the
    neurologist used the word “incompetent” during his testimony at the
    sentencing hearing should have been a per se basis for the circuit court to
    have found that it had a reasonable ground to believe the defendant was
    incompetent at the time of the plea or sentencing. Again, the neurologist’s
    testimony was limited to describing the defendant’s condition in the
    months after the defendant’s injury, not in the later three years leading up
    to the plea or at the time of the plea or sentencing. Also, it appears from
    the face of the neurologist’s testimony that his use of the term
    “incompetent” was not intended to describe the defendant’s ability to enter
    a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea in a legal context. Rather, the
    neurologist merely was trying to convey the defendant’s capabilities after
    the injury in a medical context. As such, the mere fact the neurologist
    used the word “incompetent” during his testimony did not provide a
    reasonable ground to believe that the defendant was not mentally
    competent to proceed at the time of the plea or sentencing.
    Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, we reverse the defendant’s conviction and
    sentence on count four and remand for correction of the judgment on
    count four, and reverse the defendant’s sentence on count two, and
    remand for the circuit court to impose the correct sentence required by the
    code of 237.45 months, or 19.78 years, on count two. Appellant need not
    be present for either action. See, e.g., Dougherty v. State, 
    785 So. 2d 1221
    ,
    1223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“The imposition of a sentence is a crucial stage
    at which the defendant is entitled to be present. . . . An exception is made
    in resentencing cases where all that is required on remand is a ministerial
    act of sentence correction.”). We affirm the defendant’s remaining
    convictions and sentences.
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    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for correction of
    judgment on count four and correction of sentence on count two.
    MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
    *         *      *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    11