LACIE SHEWMAKER v. JAMES SHEWMAKER, I I I ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •               NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    LACIE SHEWMAKER,                 )
    )
    Appellant,            )
    )
    v.                               )                   Case No. 2D18-4604
    )
    JAMES SHEWMAKER, III,            )
    )
    Appellee.             )
    ________________________________ )
    Opinion filed November 1, 2019.
    Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130
    from the Circuit Court for Lee County;
    John S. Carlin, Judge.
    Roy W. Foxall of Roy W. Foxall, P.A.,
    Fort Myers, for Appellant.
    Sarah Martin Oquendo of Coleman,
    Hazzard, Taylor, Klaus, Doupé &
    Diaz, PA, Naples, for Appellee.
    NORTHCUTT, Judge.
    Lacie Shewmaker appeals the order denying her Florida Family Law Rule
    of Procedure 12.540 motion to set aside the default judgment dissolving her marriage to
    James Shewmaker. We affirm the denial of the motion except with respect to parenting
    and child support issues.
    Ms. Shewmaker was defaulted in the parties' divorce proceeding and did
    not attend the final hearing. She later filed a motion for relief from the final default
    judgment that made only a conclusory assertion that she had meritorious positions
    regarding time-sharing and equitable distribution. As such, under traditional principles
    applicable to such motions, Ms. Shewmaker's motion was insufficient to warrant relief
    from the default judgment. See Geer v. Jacobsen, 
    880 So. 2d 717
    , 721 (Fla. 2d DCA
    2004); Westinghouse Elevator Co. v. DFS Const. Co., 
    438 So. 2d 125
    , 126 (Fla. 2d
    DCA 1983).
    However, it is well-settled in Florida that where, as here, a divorcing
    couple has a minor child, a court cannot enter a default final judgment without allowing
    the defaulting parent an opportunity to present evidence on issues related to the child:
    Generally, a decision to deny relief from a default
    judgment lies within the discretion of the trial court. Longo v.
    Longo, 
    576 So. 2d 402
    , 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Leinberger
    v. Leinberger, 
    455 So. 2d 1140
    , 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984);
    Duckworth v. Duckworth, 
    414 So. 2d 562
    , 563 (Fla. 3d DCA
    1982). Under most circumstances, a party seeking relief
    from a default judgment must demonstrate excusable
    neglect, a meritorious defense, and that the party acted with
    due diligence. Andrade v. Andrade, 
    720 So. 2d 551
    , 552
    (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Burke v. Reyes, 
    687 So. 2d 929
    , 929
    (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
    We have recognized, however, that the "best interest
    of the child" standard precludes a determination of child
    custody based on a parent's default. See Seibert v. Seibert,
    
    436 So. 2d 1104
    , 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see also
    Begens v. Begens, 
    617 So. 2d 360
    , 361 (Fla. 4th DCA
    1993); Barnett v. Barnett, 
    718 So. 2d 302
    , 304 (Fla. 2d DCA
    1998); Andrews v. Andrews, 
    624 So. 2d 391
    , 392 (Fla. 2d
    DCA 1993); Sloan v. Sloan, 
    604 So. 2d 862
    , 863 (Fla. 2d
    DCA 1992); 
    Longo, 576 So. 2d at 403
    ; Dellavecchia v.
    Dellavecchia, 
    547 So. 2d 287
    , 28[8] (Fla. 2d DCA 1989);
    
    Duckworth, 414 So. 2d at 563
    ; Doane v. Doane, 
    279 So. 2d 46
    , 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). In making a determination on
    -2-
    child custody according to the best interests of the child
    "guidepost," the court should have the benefit of the
    testimony of both parents. Dellavecchia, 547 So. 2d at 28[8]
    (holding that, despite the mother's default, the issue of
    custody should be re-evaluated by the trial court on remand).
    Armstrong v. Panzarino, 
    812 So. 2d 512
    , 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Thus, it was error to
    deny Ms. Shewmaker's motion for relief from the judgment in this regard. Although Ms.
    Shewmaker has not asserted this specific argument on appeal, the importance of
    courts' responsibilities to safeguard the best interests of children compels us to address
    it sua sponte. See Rhines v. Rhines, 
    483 So. 2d 4
    , 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
    Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the final judgment concerning
    parenting and child support and remand for a new final hearing on those issues. The
    court also may, in its discretion, revisit any aspect of the dissolution judgment, including
    the distribution of marital assets, if it determines that the best interests of the child
    require such action. See 
    Dellavecchia, 547 So. 2d at 288
    .
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
    KHOUZAM, C.J., and KELLY, J., Concur.
    -3-