ROBERT W. HIGGINS v. KATHY MUSSO HIGGINS n/k/a KATHY P. MUSSO , 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 12045 ( 2017 )


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  •         DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    ROBERT W. HIGGINS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    KATHY MUSSO HIGGINS n/k/a KATHY P. MUSSO,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D16-69
    [August 23, 2017]
    Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth
    Judicial Circuit, Martin County; Laurie E. Buchanan, Judge; L.T. Case
    No. 11000031DRAXMX.
    Troy William Klein of the Law Office of Troy W. Klein, West Palm
    Beach, for appellant.
    Benjamin T. Hodas of the Law Office of Benjamin T. Hodas, LLC, West
    Palm Beach; and Tara S. Pellegrino of Broad and Cassel LLP, West Palm
    Beach, for appellee.
    CIKLIN, J.
    This appeal and cross-appeal arise from an amended final judgment
    of dissolution of marriage. We agree with the former husband that the
    trial court erred by (1) failing to assign a value to a business which was
    deemed marital property, (2) including a dissipated asset in equitable
    distribution, and (3) failing to provide reasons for its finding that a boat
    was a marital asset. We also agree with the former wife that the trial
    court erred in designating as a marital asset all of the proceeds from the
    sale of a nonmarital property. We otherwise affirm.
    The only issues raised at trial and on appeal relate to equitable
    distribution.    We review a trial court’s determination of equitable
    distribution for an abuse of discretion. Kovalchick v. Kovalchick, 
    841 So. 2d 669
    , 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). “Distribution of marital assets and
    liabilities must be supported by factual findings in the judgment or order
    based on competent substantial evidence.” Bardowell v. Bardowell, 
    975 So. 2d 628
    , 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat.). “A
    trial court’s legal conclusion that an asset is marital or nonmarital is
    subject to de novo review.” Mondello v. Torres, 
    47 So. 3d 389
    , 392 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2010).
    For his first issue on appeal, the former husband argues that the trial
    court erred in awarding a marital asset, a business, to the former wife
    based on a finding that the business’s value is based on personal
    goodwill of the former wife and without assigning a value to the business
    (aside from the former wife’s goodwill). When there is evidence that a
    marital business has value aside from one spouse’s goodwill, the court
    must make a finding regarding that value for purposes of equitable
    distribution. See Niekamp v. Niekamp, 
    173 So. 3d 1106
    , 1108-09 (Fla.
    2d DCA 2015) (reversing and remanding to trial court to value marital
    property, excluding any goodwill attributable to one party, where there
    was evidence that the business had other assets).
    Although there was evidence that the business had tangible assets,
    the trial court inexplicably found that no such evidence was offered. The
    former wife acknowledges that the business is a marital asset, and she
    appropriately concedes that the asset has a value aside from her
    goodwill. 1 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to value
    the business for purposes of equitable distribution.
    The former husband next contends that the trial court erred in
    including the parties’ 2010 tax refund in its equitable distribution
    scheme when the refund was dissipated before trial and the trial court
    did not make a finding of misconduct. We agree. See Tradler v. Tradler,
    
    100 So. 3d 735
    , 740 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (recognizing that it is generally
    error to include assets in equitable distribution which have been
    dissipated during the dissolution proceedings in the absence of a finding
    of misconduct). Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial court to
    omit the tax refund from its equitable distribution analysis.
    The former husband’s final point on appeal relates to a boat that he
    purchased during the marriage to replace one he owned prior to the
    marriage. He argues that the trial court erred in treating the new boat as
    a marital asset. During trial, the former husband testified that he
    purchased the replacement boat using insurance proceeds he received
    after the premaritally-purchased boat was irreparably damaged. The
    former wife did not dispute that insurance proceeds related to the
    premarital boat were used to purchase the second boat. Instead, she
    testified that the former husband gifted her the new boat as a Christmas
    1   The parties dispute the specific value of the business’s assets.
    2
    gift.
    Nonmarital assets include “[a]ssets acquired . . . by either party prior
    to the marriage, and assets acquired . . . in exchange for such assets.” §
    61.075(6)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2011); see also Steiner v. Steiner, 
    746 So. 2d 1149
    , 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (recognizing that properties purchased
    during the marriage with proceeds from the sale of nonmarital property
    acquired before the marriage are nonmarital assets “to the extent that
    their purchase prices were paid with proceeds that are traceable” to the
    party’s sale of that premarital property).
    In deeming the new boat to be a marital asset, the trial court stated
    that the former husband “claims he used” insurance proceeds “to
    purchase the [new] boat,” and it further found that the boat was titled in
    the former husband’s name but currently in the former wife’s possession.
    It is unclear from these findings why the trial court designated the boat
    as a marital asset. The former wife argues that the trial court made a
    credibility determination and believed her, but the court did not make
    any findings relating to the former wife’s testimony that the former
    husband gifted her the new boat. This lack of findings makes review
    impossible. For that reason, we must reverse and remand for the trial
    court to either make factual findings that support designation of the new
    boat as a marital asset or amend the equitable distribution scheme. See
    § 61.075(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (requiring trial court, with respect to equitable
    distribution, to make “[a]ny other findings necessary to advise the parties
    or the reviewing court of the trial court’s rationale for the distribution of
    marital assets and allocation of liabilities”).
    The former wife raises two issues in her cross-appeal. We affirm on
    one issue and decline to further address it, but we reverse with respect to
    her claim that the trial court erred in treating as a marital asset all of the
    proceeds from the sale of nonmarital real property.
    The former wife was divorced before marrying the former husband.
    She and her ex-husband owned what she calls the Bittern Street
    property. Her parents loaned her $100,000 to buy out her ex-husband’s
    interest in the property.    There was conflicting evidence regarding
    whether her parents held a mortgage on the property. Transcripts of
    depositions and a pre-trial hearing were entered into evidence. During
    one deposition, the former wife testified that on the date she married the
    former husband, her parents held a mortgage on the property. She could
    not recall whether she made monthly mortgage payments to her parents.
    In another deposition, she again confirmed that her parents held a
    mortgage on the property during the parties’ marriage. She testified that
    3
    she did not make monthly mortgage payments and that the entire loan
    was paid off with proceeds from the sale of the Bittern Street property.
    During a pre-trial hearing, the former wife testified that the property
    carried a mortgage on the date the parties married, and that she used
    her income during the parties’ marriage to make mortgage and tax
    payments on the property.
    At trial, the former wife testified that she borrowed $119,000 from her
    parents and that her parents did not ever have a mortgage on the
    property. She introduced into evidence a claim of lien filed by her
    mother, which reflects that the former wife borrowed $455,000 to
    “purchase, renovate, and repair [the] dwelling,” and that the loan was “to
    be repaid upon sale and closing of [the Bittern Street property].”
    According to the former wife, she did not borrow that amount from her
    parents; rather, that amount represented the value of the property when
    the former wife divorced her ex-husband.             The former wife also
    introduced a release of claim purported to be signed by her mother in
    2000.
    The evidence also showed the following. The former wife used marital
    funds to repair the property from damage it suffered during two
    hurricanes. She replaced the roof, removed a screen enclosure and
    wallpaper, painted damaged ceilings, and installed new carpeting in a
    portion of the home. Some of the repairs were paid for using insurance
    proceeds.
    The parties took out a home equity line of credit utilizing the equity in
    the Bittern Street property. They used funds from the line of credit to
    construct the marital home. Subsequently, they took out a “construction
    loan” utilizing the marital home as security and used those funds to
    satisfy the line of credit. The Bittern Street property sold during the
    marriage for $1,050,000. The amount remaining on the mortgage held
    by the former wife’s parents was satisfied with proceeds from the sale.
    The former wife then deposited proceeds from the sale into a bank
    account. 2
    According to the former wife, the property depreciated in value during
    the marriage. It was worth $450,000 when the former wife and her ex-
    husband divorced, and any appreciation in the property’s value occurred
    before the former wife married the former husband. According to the
    former husband, the former wife told him at some point that the property
    2The trial court did not find, and the former husband does not argue on appeal,
    that the funds were commingled with marital funds in the bank account.
    4
    was worth $1,000,000 when the parties were married.
    The trial court found that all of the proceeds from the sale constituted
    a marital asset. The trial court provided the following reasons for
    designating the proceeds as a marital asset: (1) the former wife used
    marital funds to pay down the mortgage and make repairs to the
    property; (2) the former wife had the burden to establish whether any
    part of the enhanced value is exempt from distribution and failed to meet
    her burden; (3) the equity in the Bittern Street property was used to
    obtain a line of credit, the funds from which were used to construct the
    marital home; and (4) the parties took out a loan using the marital home
    as security and used loan funds to satisfy the line of credit. Based on
    these factors, the trial court found that the “parties absolutely, positively
    commingled these assets,” and “[a]s such, the value of the Bittern home
    is a marital asset.”
    Marital assets include “[t]he enhancement in value and appreciation
    of nonmarital assets resulting either from the efforts of either party
    during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of
    marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or both.”                  §
    61.075(6)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. Additionally, an increase in the equity value
    of property is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. Somasca
    v. Somasca, 
    171 So. 3d 780
    , 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). “However,
    improvements or expenditures of marital funds to a nonmarital asset
    does not transform the entire asset into a marital asset; rather, it is only
    the ‘enhancement in value and appreciation’ which becomes a marital
    asset.” Martin v. Martin, 
    923 So. 2d 1236
    , 1238-39 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    (quoting Strickland v. Strickland, 
    670 So. 2d 142
    , 143 (Fla. 1st DCA
    1996)).
    The party asserting entitlement to an increase in the value of
    nonmarital property has the burden of proving the enhancement.
    Robertson v. Robertson, 
    78 So. 3d 76
    , 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Once a
    party establishes that marital labor or funds were used to enhance the
    nonmarital property’s value, the burden shifts to the other party to show
    that some, if any, portion of the enhanced value is exempt from equitable
    distribution. Yitzhari v. Yitzhari, 
    906 So. 2d 1250
    , 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2005).
    “[T]o make an award for the enhancement in value and appreciation of
    a nonmarital asset, the court must make specific findings as to the value
    of such enhancement and appreciation during the marriage, as well as
    which portion of that enhanced value is attributable to marital funds and
    labor.” Martin, 
    923 So. 2d at 1239
    . “When improvements are made to
    5
    real property, the court should make findings regarding the current value
    of the property and the value of the property prior to the marital
    enhancements. The court should then make findings regarding the
    amount of the appreciation that was attributable to the marital
    enhancements.” Hall v. Hall, 
    962 So. 2d 404
    , 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    (citations omitted).
    Here, there was scant evidence regarding the enhanced value of the
    Bittern Street property.    The former wife testified that the value
    depreciated between the parties’ marriage and the date the property was
    sold. The former husband testified that the former wife told him the
    property was worth $1 million when the parties married. The property
    sold for $1,050,000. Additionally, although any increase in equity due to
    mortgage payments made by the former wife using marital funds would
    be subject to equitable distribution, there was no evidence as to the
    amount by which the equity increased.
    Instead of taking additional evidence and making the required
    findings as to enhanced value, the trial court designated as a marital
    asset all of the proceeds from the sale of the Bittern Street property. On
    remand, after taking additional evidence, the trial court must make
    findings as to the enhanced value of the property, including any increase
    in equity that is due to the former wife’s use of marital funds to pay down
    the mortgage held by her parents. See 
    id. at 406
     (observing that on
    remand, trial court “may take additional evidence if necessary to
    determine the value of the marital asset”). After taking additional
    evidence, if the trial court finds that the former husband has established
    the amount of increase in value and equity from the date of marriage to
    the sale date, the former wife will then have the burden of showing that
    any portion of those respective increases were not due to marital
    contribution.
    The trial court’s finding of commingling was also based on the use of
    the Bittern Street property to obtain a line of credit from which funds
    were used to construct the marital home, and the use of marital funds to
    satisfy that line of credit. We agree with the former wife that the use of
    her nonmarital property to obtain the line of credit was not, standing
    alone, reason to deem the proceeds of the sale of the Bittern Street
    property a marital asset. See Fashingbauer v. Fashingbauer, 
    19 So. 3d 401
    , 402 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (finding that husband’s use of nonmarital
    property to obtain a line of credit used to purchase marital property did
    not transform nonmarital property into marital property). We also agree
    6
    that the use of marital funds to satisfy a marital debt 3 secured by the
    nonmarital property did not transform the entire value of the Bittern
    Street property into a marital asset. Nor do we find, under these
    circumstances, that all of the factors considered by the trial court, taken
    together, constituted a commingling of marital and nonmarital assets. It
    is not apparent to us that the Bittern Street property lost its nonmarital
    character. Instead, it simply appears that the former husband is entitled
    to a share of any enhanced value and equity in the property. The
    amount of the enhancement and the share to which the former husband
    is entitled remains to be determined.
    The former wife also argues that the trial court erred in finding there
    was a mortgage on the property. We find that the trial court did not err
    in rejecting the former wife’s contention that there was no mortgage on
    the property where there was a conflict in the evidence on this point.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
    remand. On remand, the trial court must make additional findings
    regarding the boat. After taking additional evidence, it must make the
    required findings regarding any enhanced overall and equity value in the
    Bittern Street property. The trial court shall further amend the final
    judgment consistent with this opinion and modify the equitable
    distribution scheme to the extent necessary.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
    proceedings.
    DAMOORGIAN, J., and HANZMAN, MICHAEL A., Associate Judge, concur.
    *         *        *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    3 The former husband does not dispute the former wife’s contention that the
    line of credit was a marital debt.
    7