R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Evers ( 2017 )


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  •               NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,             )
    )
    )
    Appellant,                    )
    )
    v.                                         )      Case No. 2D16-1603
    )
    CINDY EVERS, as Personal                   )
    Representative of the Estate of Jacqueline )
    Loyd,                                      )
    )
    Appellee.                     )
    )
    Opinion filed September 15, 2017.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for
    Hillsborough County; Emmett L. Battles,
    Judge.
    Gregory G. Katsas and John M. Gore of
    Jones Day, Washington, D.C. (withdrew
    after briefing); John M. Walker of Jones
    Day, Atlanta, Georgia; Troy A. Fuhrman
    and Marie A. Borland of Hill, Ward &
    Henderson, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Hendrick Uiterwyk of Abrahamson
    & Uiterwyk, Tampa; Michael J.
    Trentalange of Trentalange & Kelley,
    P.A., Tampa; Celene H. Humphries,
    Maegen P. Luke, and Thomas Seider of
    Brannock & Humphries, Tampa, for
    Appellee.
    MORRIS, Judge.
    R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (R.J. Reynolds) appeals a second
    amended final judgment entered in favor of Cindy Evers, in her capacity as personal
    representative of the Estate of Jacqueline Loyd. Evers' wrongful death action was
    predicated on claims that Loyd was an Engle1 class member and that Loyd's lung
    cancer was, at least in part, caused by R.J. Reynolds and Lorillard Tobacco Company
    (for whom R.J. Reynolds is the successor in interest).
    In bifurcated proceedings, a jury determined that Evers was entitled to
    both noneconomic compensatory damages and punitive damages (as against R.J.
    Reynolds only). The trial court subsequently directed a verdict in favor of R.J. Reynolds
    on certain claims, and as a result, the punitive damages award was vacated and the
    compensatory damages award was reduced. Evers appealed and R.J. Reynolds cross-
    appealed. See Evers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
    195 So. 3d 1139
     (Fla. 2d DCA
    2015).
    In the first appeal, we reversed the directed verdict, thereby reinstating the
    punitive damages award. 
    Id. at 1141
    . However, we declined to reach certain issues
    pertaining to the punitive damages award because those issues had not been ruled on
    by the trial court. 
    Id.
     at 1141 n.2. On remand, the trial court entered the second
    amended final judgment, finding that the pre-1999 version of the punitive damages
    statute applied and that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting a punitive
    damages award in excess of the statutory cap. The trial court also concluded that the
    action was based on an intentional tort making the compensatory damages award
    1Engle   v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 
    945 So. 2d 1246
     (Fla. 2006).
    -2-
    ineligible for a comparative fault reduction. Finally, upon Evers' motion, the trial court
    concluded that interest on the judgment accrued from May 15, 2013, the date of the
    original judgment.
    Although R.J. Reynolds raises numerous arguments on appeal, the issue
    of whether the compensatory damages award must be reduced by the percentage of
    Loyd's comparative fault is controlled by our recent opinion in Philip Morris USA Inc. v.
    Boatright, 
    217 So. 3d 166
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), appeal filed, SC17-894 (Fla. May 12,
    2017). Therefore we will not address it further. However, as in Boatright, we certify
    conflict with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Schoeff, 
    178 So. 3d 487
     (Fla. 4th DCA
    2015), review granted, No. SC15-2233, 
    2016 WL 3127698
     (Fla. May 26, 2016), and the
    line of cases relying on it2 to the extent that they hold that the core of these types of
    actions are grounded in negligence and that the comparative fault statute is applicable
    to reduce the verdict by the smoker's comparative fault. R.J. Reynolds also asks this
    court to revisit two arguments raised in the prior appeal regarding improper closing
    arguments made by Evers' counsel and the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction
    on a conspiracy claim. We decline to do so. R.J. Reynolds also argues that allowing
    res judicata to apply to the phase I Engle findings3 violates R.J. Reynolds' due process
    2PhilipMorris USA Inc. v. McKeever, 
    207 So. 3d 907
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2017);
    R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Grossman, 
    211 So. 3d 221
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), appeals
    filed, SC17-688 (Fla. Apr. 13, 2017) and SC17-706 (Fla. Apr. 18, 2017); R.J. Reynolds
    Tobacco Co. v. Calloway, 
    201 So. 3d 753
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), review denied, No.
    SC16-1937, 
    2017 WL 1023712
     (Fla. Mar. 16, 2017).
    3In Engle, the Florida Supreme Court approved various findings relating to
    tobacco companies' liability to Engle-progeny plaintiffs. These findings include: (1) "that
    smoking cigarettes causes" many specifically listed diseases and conditions; (2) "that
    nicotine in cigarettes is addictive"; (3) "that the defendants placed cigarettes on the
    market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous"; (4) "that the defendants
    concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or available knowing
    -3-
    rights, but it acknowledges that issue has already been determined by case law, and it
    wishes to preserve the issue for further review. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas,
    
    110 So. 3d 419
    , 436 (Fla. 2013) (holding that the acceptance of the Engle findings as
    res judicata does not violate an Engle defendant's right to due process).
    Instead, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects, and we
    write only to address the issues of the application of the pre-1999 version of the punitive
    damages statute and the evidence offered in support thereof and the award of interest
    dating back to the date of the original final judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    Evers sued R.J. Reynolds in 2007, alleging that her mother had been a
    member of the class prospectively certified in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
    945 So. 2d 1246
     (Fla. 2006). The Engle class comprised all Florida residents who, as of November
    21, 1996, suffered or had died from diseases caused by an addiction to cigarettes. See
    
    id. at 1274
    . Evers' amended complaint alleged claims of negligence, strict liability,
    fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment. Prior to
    trial, the trial court ruled that Evers could only seek punitive damages on her claims for
    concealment and conspiracy.
    that the material was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning
    the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both"; (5) "that the
    defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of
    cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would
    rely on this information to their detriment"; (6) "that all of the defendants sold or supplied
    cigarettes that were defective"; (7) "that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes
    that, at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to representations of fact made by
    said defendants"; and (8) "that all of the defendants were negligent." 
    945 So. 2d at 1276-77
    .
    -4-
    At the end of the first phase of the trial, the jury determined that Loyd was
    an Engle class member and that Evers was entitled to recover on all of her claims. The
    jury allocated thirty-one percent of the fault to Loyd, sixty percent to R.J. Reynolds, and
    nine percent to Lorillard, and the jury awarded $2,950,000 to Evers for noneconomic
    compensatory damages. At the end of the second phase of the trial, the jury awarded
    $12,360,024 in punitive damages as they related to Evers' conspiracy and concealment
    claims. The trial court subsequently directed a verdict in R.J. Reynolds' favor on the
    concealment and conspiracy claims, thereby vacating the punitive damages award.
    The trial court also reduced the compensatory damages award to $2,035,500 to reflect
    the jury's allocation of comparative fault.
    After this court reversed the directed verdict on appeal and the case was
    remanded, Evers moved for entry of judgment in the full amount of the jury's
    compensatory and punitive damages amounts. R.J. Reynolds opposed the motion,
    arguing in relevant part that the post-1999 statutory cap on punitive damages applied to
    this case.4 Ultimately, the trial court entered the second amended final judgment,
    awarding Evers the original compensatory and punitive damages award amounts. After
    Evers filed a subsequent motion to amend, the trial court awarded interest accruing
    from the date of the original final judgment.
    ANALYSIS
    I. The trial court properly applied section 768.73(1)(a) and (b), Florida
    Statutes (1995), to the punitive damages award.
    4R.J.
    Reynolds also argued below that the compensatory damages award
    should be reduced based on Lloyd's comparative fault, an argument that we will not
    address as explained previously herein.
    -5-
    We first address R.J. Reynolds' argument that the jury's punitive damages
    award should be capped at an amount that is three times the compensatory damages
    award amount. R.J. Reynolds contends that the post-1999 version of section 768.73 is
    applicable because Evers' wrongful death action is based on Loyd's death in 2007. See
    Ch. 99-225, § 23(5), at 1418, Laws of Fla. (explaining that 1999 amendments apply only
    to "all causes of action arising after the effective date of this act," which was October 1,
    1999). And R.J. Reynolds argues that in order to exceed the statutory cap pursuant to
    the post-1999 version, the jury was required to make findings regarding certain
    aggravating circumstances, which did not occur in this case. In the alternative, R.J.
    Reynolds argues that even if the pre-1999 version of the statute applied, the same
    three-to-one cap applied unless Evers proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
    award was not excessive, and R.J. Reynolds asserts that she failed to do so.
    "Typically, the applicable version of a statute is the one 'in effect when the
    cause of action arose.' " R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Allen, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D491,
    D493 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 24, 2017), (first quoting D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 
    863 So. 2d 311
    , 314 n.9 (Fla. 2003); and then citing §§ 768.72(4) & 768.73(5), Fla. Stat.), reh'g
    granted (June 15, 2017).5 And "[i]n many wrongful death actions, the cause of action
    accrues on the date of a decedent's death." Id. (citing Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
    5R.J. Reynolds filed a notice of supplemental authority in this appeal
    informing this court that its motion for rehearing en banc filed in Allen has been granted.
    While we acknowledge that the disposition of Allen could change on en banc review, we
    also note that the motion filed in Allen raised more than one issue. Thus it is also
    possible that the resolution of the issue of which version of the punitive damages statute
    is applicable could remain the same. Moreover, as of the date of this opinion, Allen and
    the holdings contained therein remain good law.
    -6-
    MacDonald, 
    645 So. 2d 1057
     (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)). "However, Engle-progeny cases
    are different." 
    Id.
     (citing Engle, 
    945 So. 2d 1246
    ).
    In order for a case to qualify as an Engle-progeny case, "a plaintiff's (or
    plaintiff's decedent's) 'symptoms of a tobacco-related disease or medical condition' must
    have manifested by November 21, 1996." 
    Id.
     (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
    Ciccone, 
    190 So. 3d 1028
    , 1030 (Fla. 2016)). Here, Evers' amended complaint alleged
    that Loyd suffered from or was diagnosed with one or more of the diseases enumerated
    in Engle on or before November 21, 1996. And there is no dispute that the jury
    determined that Loyd was an Engle class member. Thus, Evers, as the personal
    representative of Loyd's estate, "qualified for the res judicata benefits of the Engle
    class." Id.; see also Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 
    833 So. 2d 109
    , 118 (Fla.
    2002) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Meehan, 
    523 So. 2d 141
    , 147 (Fla. 1988), for the
    proposition that "[a] wrongful death action is derivative of the injured person's right,
    while living, to recover for personal injury"); Schoeff, 178 So. 3d at 492 n.3 (concluding,
    in an Engle-progeny case, that plaintiff's cause of action in a wrongful death case
    accrued in 1994 when her husband was diagnosed with lung cancer).
    Although it was Evers who sought damages in this case—rather than
    Loyd—Evers' wrongful death action, like all Engle-progeny complaints, relates back to
    the 1994 Engle class-action complaint. Consequently, "the applicable statutory law
    [regarding punitive damages] also relates back to the Engle class." Allen, 42 Fla. L.
    Weekly at D493. This is because "a claim for punitive damages is not a separate, free-
    standing cause of action," but is instead "actually dependent on the underlying cause of
    action." Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
    187 So. 3d 1219
    , 1229-30 (Fla. 2016).
    -7-
    To the extent that R.J. Reynolds' argument could be construed to suggest that the post-
    1999 version of the statute applies because Evers filed an independent wrongful death
    action rather than amending a prior personal injury action brought by Loyd herself, we
    do not agree. Cf. 
    id., at 1222
     (involving Engle-progeny wrongful death action brought
    by widow many years after her husband's death wherein the court recognized widow's
    right to seek punitive damages); Schoeff, 178 So. 3d at 488-89 (involving an Engle-
    progeny wrongful death action brought by widow based on her husband's death from
    lung cancer caused by his addiction to cigarettes). While Evers did not file the wrongful
    death action until 2007 when Loyd died, her right to do so was based on Loyd's status
    as an Engle class member, i.e., Loyd's manifestation of a tobacco-related disease or
    medical condition prior to November 21, 1996. See Toombs, 
    833 So. 2d at 118
    .
    Accordingly, because Evers was entitled to the res judicata effect of the
    Engle class, her cause of action was not controlled by the 1999 amendment to the
    punitive damages statute. Indeed, "[a]pplication of the post-1999 amendments to the
    punitive damages statute to [Evers'] claim[s] would impair those substantive rights."
    Allen, 42 Fla. L. Weekly at D493 (citing Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Mancusi, 
    632 So. 2d 1352
    ,
    1358 (Fla. 1994)).
    II. R.J. Reynolds waived the issue of applying a three-to-one cap under
    the pre-1999 version of the statute, but even if the cap applied, Evers met her burden of
    proving that the punitive damages award was not excessive.
    Having determined that the trial court properly applied the 1995 version of
    section 768.73(1)(a) and (b), we must next address R.J. Reynolds' contention that even
    under the pre-1999 version of the statute, there was a three-to-one cap that could not
    be exceeded unless Evers established by clear and convincing evidence that the award
    -8-
    was not excessive in light of the facts and circumstances that were presented to the
    jury. R.J. Reynolds contends that Evers failed to meet her burden.
    The first problem with this argument is that it is procedurally barred. R.J.
    Reynolds did not specifically argue that the pre-1999 version of the statute imposed a
    cap on the punitive damages award amount until the February 1, 2016, hearing on
    Evers' motion to enter final judgment, which occurred after this court reversed the
    original final judgment and remanded the case to the trial court. Indeed, Evers
    objected, and the trial court below questioned the propriety of R.J. Reynolds' raising the
    issue so late. However, in an abundance of caution, Evers asked the trial court to rule
    on the merits of the issue for purposes of appellate review in the event that this court
    deemed the argument properly raised. The trial court ultimately concluded that Evers
    met her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the award was not
    excessive.
    We agree with Evers that R.J. Reynolds should have raised this issue in
    its motion for remittitur, which must be served within ten days after the jury verdict. See
    Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. of Conn. v. Sealey, 
    810 So. 2d 988
    , 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
    (recognizing that motion for remittitur must be served within ten days after return of jury
    verdict). But nowhere in R.J. Reynolds' motion for new trial, which included the request
    for a remittitur, did it argue that under the pre-1999 version of the statute, a three-to-one
    cap applied.
    Although R.J. Reynolds argues in its reply that it presented evidence and
    arguments on this issue to the jury, it has failed to point to any specific document within
    the voluminous record that supports that assertion. Further, we are not persuaded that
    -9-
    R.J. Reynolds sufficiently preserved the issue by making brief references in its briefs
    filed in the prior appeal and on remand to the trial court to cases that applied the pre-
    1999 statutory cap.
    However, even if this claim was properly addressed on the merits, R.J.
    Reynolds is not entitled to relief. The cap under the pre-1999 version of the statute can
    only be exceeded if the plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
    award was not excessive. We generally review a trial court's award of punitive
    damages for abuse of discretion. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 
    749 So. 2d 483
    , 488 (Fla. 1999). But we conduct de novo review of a trial court's
    determination as to whether a punitive damage award violates due process. See Engle,
    
    945 So. 2d at 1263
    . As part of the due process analysis, we must determine whether
    there is a reasonable relationship between the compensatory damages award and the
    punitive damages award, which includes consideration of the defendant's conduct and
    harm to the plaintiff. 
    Id.
     at 1264-65 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
    
    538 U.S. 408
    , 424-26 (2003)).
    In arguing that Evers failed to meet her burden of proving that the punitive
    damages award was not excessive, R.J. Reynolds argues that the trial court improperly
    relied upon Evers' mischaracterizations of the Engle findings and failed to explain how
    any of its findings regarding the punitive damages were related to the facts of Evers'
    case. R.J. Reynolds also contends the award was erroneous because: (1) it [R.J.
    Reynolds] is subject to cumulative awards against it for the same conduct, (2) a punitive
    award above the cap is unnecessary for punishment or deterrence, (3) the conduct that
    - 10 -
    served as the basis for the award happened decades ago and could not possibly recur,
    and (4) the trial court ignored substantial mitigating evidence.
    In the trial court's order, it explicitly states that it "reviewed the record," and
    attached to Evers' supplemental memorandum in support of her second amended
    motion for entry of judgment were trial testimony excerpts that included expert opinion
    on how Loyd was personally affected. Thus it is clear to this court that the trial court
    had before it the record evidence presented at trial, including a portion that Evers
    submitted specifically in support of her argument that she was entitled to the punitive
    damages as awarded by the jury. In light of the voluminous trial record, we are not
    surprised that the trial court elected not to detail all of the factual evidence upon which it
    relied nor are we convinced that the summary reference to a review of the record
    indicates that the trial court failed to consider anything other than Evers' arguments or
    that it ignored R.J. Reynolds' mitigating evidence. R.J. Reynolds takes issue with the
    trial court's failure to identify the conduct that the trial court determined was
    "exceptionally egregious, targeted, lacking in confusion, and substantial," arguing that In
    re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases 89-1), 
    575 So. 2d 194
    , 196 (Fla. 1991),
    defines "clear and convincing evidence" as "precise" and "explicit." But the Florida
    Supreme Court's use of such a definition does not equate to a requirement that a trial
    court explicitly list the factual evidence upon which it relied.
    The fact that the trial court paraphrased the Engle findings and cited to
    them as part of the clear and convincing evidence supporting the punitive damages
    award does not change the result. Notably, in listing the paraphrased findings, the trial
    court stated that the evidence upon which it relied was not limited to those findings.
    - 11 -
    While there is no res judicata effect of the Engle findings as applied to claims for
    punitive damages, Soffer, 187 So. 3d at 1227, there is nothing prohibiting a trial court's
    use of the findings as a frame of reference when deciding whether a plaintiff has proven
    his or her individual punitive damages.
    R.J. Reynolds also argues that the trial court erroneously shifted the
    burden of proof to it based on the trial court's finding that R.J. Reynolds failed to refute
    Evers' evidence. However, we do not agree with that interpretation. Rather, we
    conclude that that finding was merely one factor supporting the trial court's conclusion
    that Evers' presented clear and convincing evidence to establish that the punitive
    damages award was not excessive. Indeed, in other contexts, both the Florida
    Supreme Court and this court have referred to evidence being "clear and convincing"
    where unrebutted testimony was presented. See, e.g., Conahan v. State, 
    118 So. 3d 718
    , 733 (Fla. 2013); Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. L. McC., 
    820 So. 2d 1064
    ,
    1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ("The record reflects that the evidence presented . . . was
    generally unrebutted and met the clear and convincing standard.").
    Based on the fact that the trial court had the trial record before it, including
    testimony that linked R.J. Reynolds' conduct to the harm suffered by Loyd, and based
    on the trial court's acknowledgement that it reviewed the record and did not limit itself to
    consideration of the Engle findings, we cannot say that no reasonable judge would have
    reached the same conclusion as the trial judge in this case. See Canakaris v.
    Canakaris, 
    382 So. 2d 1197
    , 1203 (Fla. 1980). Nor can we say that the punitive
    damages award was so excessive so as to violate due process where it is clear to this
    court that it was based "upon the facts and circumstances of [R.J. Reynolds'] conduct
    - 12 -
    and the harm to [Loyd]." Engle, 
    945 So. 2d at 1265
    . Consequently, we conclude that
    the trial court properly determined that the punitive damages award was not excessive
    under the 1995 version of section 768.73 and that clear and convincing evidence
    supported a punitive damages award in excess of the statutory cap.6
    III. The trial court properly awarded interest accruing from the date of the
    original judgment.
    Finally, R.J. Reynolds argues that the trial court erred in awarding interest
    on the judgment from the date of the original final judgment entered on May 15, 2013.
    R.J. Reynolds argues that interest can only be awarded from the date of a first judgment
    where the original judgment is merely modified on appeal, rather than reversed. R.J.
    Reynolds notes that this court, in the initial appeal, declined to reach certain issues
    regarding the punitive damages award because the trial court had not ruled on them.
    R.J. Reynolds also notes that in the prior appeal, this court did not address R.J.
    Reynolds' argument concerning the application of comparative fault to the
    compensatory damages award, despite its request that this court do so. Based on
    those assertions, R.J. Reynolds contends that further judicial labor was required below
    and, therefore, that interest should have been awarded from the date of the second
    amended final judgment.
    We review de novo a trial court's decision regarding judgment interest.
    See Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 
    65 So. 3d 22
    , 34 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
    6We  note that R.J. Reynolds also made the argument that under both the
    pre-1999 or post-1999 versions of section 768.73, Florida Statutes, the three-to-one cap
    on punitive damages should be measured by the compensatory award as reduced for
    comparative fault. However, because this court has recently rejected the argument that
    a compensatory award should be reduced in that manner, this argument too fails. See
    Boatright, 
    217 So. 3d at 171-72
    .
    - 13 -
    Generally, interest on a money judgment begins accruing on the date of
    judgment. See § 55.03(3), Fla. Stat. (2012); Amerace Corp. v. Stallings, 
    823 So. 2d 110
    , 114 (Fla. 2002); Shoemaker v. Sliger, 
    187 So. 3d 863
    , 865 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
    Where a party appeals a final judgment and only the amount of the award is modified
    after the appeal, the accrual date for interest does not change and the interest accrues
    from the date of the original judgment as modified. See Shoemaker, 
    187 So. 3d at
    865-
    66; St. Cloud Utils. v. Moore, 
    355 So. 2d 446
    , 447-48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
    R.J. Reynolds relies heavily on Guy v. Kight, 
    431 So. 2d 653
    , 656 (Fla. 5th
    DCA 1983), arguing that our reversal in the first appeal necessarily required further
    judicial labor below, thereby requiring that any award of interest had to accrue from the
    date of the second amended final judgment. But Kight does not control this case.
    Admittedly, this court "reversed" the original final judgment in the prior
    appeal. See Evers, 195 So. 3d at 1140-41. However, the effect of our reversal was to
    reverse the directed verdict on the concealment and conspiracy claims, reinstate the
    jury verdicts on those claims, and reinstate the punitive damages award (which was tied
    only to those two claims). Id. In doing so, we declined to address "certain issues"
    related to the punitive damages award because they had not yet been addressed by the
    trial court due to the entry of the directed verdict (which nullified the punitive damages
    award). Id. at 1141 n.2.
    However, R.J. Reynolds asserts that those "certain issues" were the
    arguments concerning the applicability of the statutory cap and the reduction for
    comparative fault. Notably, those issues only relate to the amount of the final judgment.
    While the trial court had to decide whether the damage awards were subject to
    - 14 -
    reduction based either on comparative fault or due to a statutory cap, the underlying jury
    verdicts—entered in favor of Evers—were not disturbed. Even if R.J. Reynolds had
    prevailed on the comparative fault and statutory cap arguments below, the only
    difference between the original final judgment and the second amended final judgment
    would have been the amount. The fact that we used the word "reversed" in the prior
    appeal is not dispositive because our reversal only extended to the amount of the award
    and otherwise amounted to an affirmance in all other respects. See Moore, 
    355 So. 2d at
    448 n.1 (explaining that interest should run from the date of the original judgment
    because although the appellate court had previously reversed the trial court judgment
    based on the improper application of comparative negligence and directed the trial court
    to enter a new judgment, the reversal only went to the amount of the award and
    otherwise acted as an affirmance on other issues (relying on Smith v. Goodpasture, 
    189 So. 2d 265
    , 267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966))). Accordingly, the trial court properly awarded
    interest accruing from the date of the original final judgment.
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court properly determined that the 1995 version of section 768.73
    applied to this case. Although we conclude that R.J. Reynolds waived its argument that
    the 1995 version of the statute still required imposition of a three-to-one cap on the
    punitive damages award, we alternatively hold that the trial court properly determined
    that clear and convincing evidence supported the punitive damages award that
    exceeded the cap and that the award was not excessive. Finally, we hold that the trial
    court properly awarded interest as accruing from the date of the original final judgment.
    Affirmed.
    - 15 -
    SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
    - 16 -