CHARLES JOHNSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA ( 2017 )


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  •         DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    CHARLES JOHNSON,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D16-2840
    [August 30, 2017]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
    Lucie County; James W. McCann, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    562007CF001396A.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Peggy Natale, Assistant Public
    Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    No brief filed for appellee.
    GERBER, C.J.
    The defendant appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion
    for return of property. The defendant argues the court erred in summarily
    denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing, because his motion
    was facially sufficient and his allegations were not refuted. We agree with
    the defendant’s argument. We reverse for an evidentiary hearing.
    Procedural History
    The defendant was convicted of burglary of a conveyance, first degree
    petit theft, criminal mischief over $200 but less than $1,000, driving while
    license suspended as a habitual offender, and possession of twenty grams
    or less of cannabis. The burglary, theft, and mischief charges arose from
    the defendant breaking into a woman’s car and stealing her purse out of
    the car. The defendant fled in a car which had been rented to the
    defendant’s girlfriend, but which he did not have permission to drive. The
    defendant later abandoned the rental car. The police recovered from the
    rental car the woman’s cell phone, purse, and items from her purse. The
    habitual offender and cannabis charges arose from the defendant’s driving
    away in the rental car, which contained marijuana. The defendant was
    not convicted of any crime related to using the rental car without
    permission.
    After the defendant served his sentence, he filed a motion for return of
    property. In the motion, the defendant alleged the police seized his
    personal property during his arrest, the property was not needed as
    evidence because he had served his sentence, and the property was not
    the fruit of criminal activity. The defendant alleged his property as: a
    Samsung cell phone; $15.00; four GPS systems; Cartier glasses; clothing;
    a red Cartier case; and “all other miscellaneous items not included in this
    motion.”
    The trial court issued an order seeking a response from the state and
    the police department which arrested the defendant.          The police
    department responded. In the response, the police department argued the
    defendant’s motion was legally insufficient:
    The defendant does not describe all of the property that he
    seeks the return of with specificity. He first references a
    Samsung cell phone, this is problematic given that the
    defendant was convicted of Burglary of a Conveyance and
    First Degree Petit Theft and a cell phone was listed as one of
    the stolen items in the State’s Information. . . . Additionally,
    the defendant claims rights to fifteen dollars in United States
    Currency, four GPS systems, Cartier glasses and case, and
    clothing. The defendant was in a rented car that his own
    girlfriend stated was taken without her consent. He then tried
    to abandon the car by giving the keys to an independent
    witness who just happened to be putting gas in her own car
    at the gas station the Defendant pulled into in an effort to
    evade law enforcement. . . . Lastly, the defendant claims rights
    to “all other miscellaneous items not included in this motion.”
    This is certainly legally insufficient as there is nothing specific
    about “miscellaneous” or addressing items not included in his
    motion and should be denied.
    While, the defendant asserts that the property is not the
    fruit of criminal activity, his convictions for Burglary of a
    Conveyance and First Degree Petit Theft suggest otherwise.
    The police department attached to its response its probable cause
    affidavit, inventory, incident report, and the state’s information. The
    probable cause affidavit stated that the defendant stole the victim’s purse,
    2
    which contained her cellular phone. The inventory listed, among other
    items recovered from the vehicle which the defendant was driving, various
    GPS devices, a Samsung phone, and eyeglasses in a case.
    However, the incident report alleged that the police recovered two
    cellular phones from the vehicle. According to the incident report, the
    police dialed a phone number on one of the phones, and the burglary
    victim’s husband answered. The incident report further alleged that the
    victim’s husband met with the police and identified that phone and the
    purse as belonging to the victim. According to the incident report, as the
    police transported the defendant to the jail, he asked the police to bring
    his phone with him. The incident report then stated: “[The defendant’s]
    phone was one of the two phones recovered from the [vehicle] during the
    initial investigation.” The incident report finally states that the police
    denied the defendant’s request and instead stored his phone as evidence.
    The trial court summarily denied, without an evidentiary hearing, the
    defendant’s motion to return property.
    This appeal followed. The defendant argues the court erred in
    summarily denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing, because
    his motion was facially sufficient and his allegations were not refuted.
    Neither the state nor the police department filed an answer brief.
    Our Review
    We agree with the defendant’s argument. The procedure for a
    defendant to move for a return of property was described in Bolden v. State,
    
    875 So. 2d 780
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), an opinion which we have cited with
    approval. Sanchez v. State, 
    174 So. 3d 439
    , 442-43 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
    In Bolden, our sister court described the procedure as follows:
    When the defendant seeks the return of seized property as
    the true owner, the applicable procedure is similar to the
    procedure for the consideration of a motion for postconviction
    relief. First, the defendant must file a facially sufficient
    motion for the return of property. To be facially sufficient, the
    motion must allege that the property at issue was his personal
    property, was not the fruit of criminal activity, and was not
    being held as evidence. Implicit in this standard is the
    requirement that the defendant must specifically identify
    property at issue. However, the defendant need not establish
    proof of ownership in order to allege a facially sufficient claim
    for the return of property.
    3
    If the trial court finds that a motion to return property is
    facially sufficient, it may order the State to respond by citing
    applicable case law and attaching portions of the record to
    refute the defendant’s contention that the property should be
    returned, after which the motion may be summarily denied.
    In the alternative, the trial court may hold an evidentiary
    hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court must first
    ascertain whether the property was confiscated by a law
    enforcement agency in connection with a criminal prosecution
    and whether the property is still in the agency’s possession.
    If the State can show that the property was entered into
    evidence or that the State intends to pursue forfeiture against
    the property, the defendant is not entitled to have the property
    returned. Similarly, the defendant is not entitled to have the
    property returned if the State intends in good faith to bring
    another criminal prosecution at which the items would be
    admissible in evidence. However, if the State is unable to
    connect the items to specific criminal activity, and no one else
    can be identified who can demonstrate a superior possessory
    interest in the property, it should be returned to [the
    defendant] or to such person(s) as he may designate.
    Id. at 782-83 (footnotes, citations, and quotation marks omitted).
    Here, the defendant’s motion was facially sufficient, except for his non-
    specific claim as to “all other miscellaneous items not included in [his]
    motion.” The defendant specifically identified the other property at issue
    and alleged the property was: his personal property; not the fruit of
    criminal activity; and not being held as evidence because he had served
    his sentence.
    The police department’s response and attachments do not refute the
    defendant’s allegations. The incident report stated that one phone
    belonged to the victim and the other phone belonged to the defendant. The
    police department’s response and attachments do not allege that the
    defendant’s phone, $15.00, four GPS systems, Cartier glasses and case,
    and clothing were: fruit of criminal activity; still being held as evidence;
    the subject of forfeiture proceedings; evidence to be admitted in another
    criminal prosecution; or subject to a superior possessory interest in the
    property. Bolden, 
    875 So. 2d at 782
    . Therefore, the trial court should
    have held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Bolden. 
    Id.
    4
    Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s order summarily
    denying, without an evidentiary hearing, the defendant’s motion for return
    of property, except for the defendant’s non-specific claim as to “all other
    miscellaneous items not included in [his] motion.” We remand for an
    evidentiary hearing pursuant to Bolden.
    Reversed and remanded for evidentiary hearing.
    LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.
    *         *        *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-2840

Filed Date: 8/30/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/30/2017