Deno v. State , 230 So. 3d 611 ( 2017 )

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
ANGELA STACEY DENO, )
DOC #Y07534, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D16-567
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
)
Opinion filed November 17, 2017.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee
County; J. Frank Porter, Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender,
and Timothy J. Ferreri, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Katherine Coombs
Cline, Assistant Attorney General,
Tampa, for Appellee.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
Angela Stacey Deno entered a negotiated no-contest plea to introducing
contraband into a county detention facility. She timely appeals her judgment and
sentence and argues that the trial court erred in denying her dispositive motion to
suppress evidence. We disagree and affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
Lee County Sheriff's Sergeant George Mingione conducted a lawful traffic
stop of a vehicle that had a defective taillight and lacked a rear bumper. James Russell
was driving the vehicle, and Deno was in the front passenger seat. At the time, Deno
had an outstanding arrest warrant for a probation violation. Sergeant Mingione
explained the reason for the stop and asked Russell and Deno for identification, which
he typically did as a matter of course both for his own edification and so that he could
check for outstanding warrants. Russell provided the requested information, but Deno
told Sergeant Mingione that her name was Mindy Deno. When Sergeant Mingione ran
that name through the system, the photograph that it brought up was plainly of someone
else.
Sergeant Mingione returned to the vehicle, asked Deno to step out, and
asked her about the photograph. Deno claimed that she had lost 140 pounds, but
Sergeant Mingione still did not believe that she was the woman in the picture because
they had different facial features. Consequently, Sergeant Mingione asked Deno to
provide a fingerprint for his portable scanner. After she had obliged and he had run the
results through a fingerprint database, Sergeant Mingione ascertained her true identity
and discovered her outstanding warrant for the probation violation. When Sergeant
Mingione confronted Deno with this information, she explained that she had provided a
false name because she knew about the outstanding warrant and did not want to go to
jail.
Deno was then arrested not only on the outstanding warrant but also for
providing a false name to a law enforcement officer, see § 901.36(1), Fla. Stat. (2014),
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and she was taken to the Lee County Jail. While Deno was changing into her jail
uniform, a deputy saw a small baggie containing what appeared to be crack cocaine fall
from her pants. Consequently, Deno was also charged in a separate case with
introducing contraband into a county detention facility. See § 951.22, Fla. Stat. (2014).
Deno moved to suppress all of the evidence against her based on what
she contended was an illegal arrest for providing false information to a law enforcement
officer. Specifically, Deno argued, as she argues on appeal, that she had been neither
under arrest nor lawfully detained when she had provided the false name, and,
therefore, Sergeant Mingione, as a matter of law, could not have had reasonable
suspicion that she had violated section 901.36(1). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied her motion.
Analysis
In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we
will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact as long as competent, substantial
evidence supports those findings, but we review its application of law to those facts de
novo. State v. Godard, 202 So. 3d 144, 145-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
Section 901.36(1) provides, "It is unlawful for a person who has been
arrested or lawfully detained by a law enforcement officer to give a false name, or
otherwise falsely identify himself or herself in any way, to the law enforcement officer or
any county jail personnel." (Emphasis added.) Although both Deno and the State
assert that Sergeant Mingione's request for Deno's identification occurred during a
consensual encounter (with their arguments, of course, diverging from there), Deno, as
the passenger in a vehicle subject to a valid traffic stop, was lawfully detained at that
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point. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (holding that lawful traffic
stop subjects not only driver but also passenger to seizure under Fourth Amendment);
see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) ("A lawful roadside stop begins
when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary
seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the
duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to
control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave.");
Presley v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S817, S819-21 (Fla. Sept. 20, 2017) (discussing
Brendlin and Johnson, holding that officers may prevent passengers from leaving traffic
stop without running afoul of Fourth Amendment as long as detention is only for
duration reasonably necessary to complete purpose of traffic stop, and disapproving
prior case law to contrary).1 Moreover, had Deno responded truthfully to Sergeant
Mingione's request at the outset, the request would not have extended the duration of
the stop and, therefore, did not lead to an unlawful detention. See Johnson, 555 U.S. at
333 ("An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop,
this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a
lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
stop.").
1
Opinions construing as a consensual encounter a law enforcement
officer's request for identification from a passenger during a lawful traffic stop predate
Brendlin and Johnson. See, e.g., State v. Galicia, 948 So. 2d 983, 984-85 (Fla. 2d DCA
2007); Cooks v. State, 901 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Morrow v. State, 848
So. 2d 1290, 1292-93 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); State v. Gonzalez, 919 So. 2d 702, 703-04
(Fla. 5th DCA 2006). The only exception is Teart v. State, 26 So. 3d 644, 645-46 (Fla.
1st DCA 2010), but Teart, an appeal from the summary denial of a motion for
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, simply relied on
Cooks.
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Because Deno was lawfully arrested for providing a false name to a law
enforcement officer, the trial court did not err in denying her motion to suppress
evidence.
Affirmed.
SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
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