DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
ELLIOTT DAVID DANIELS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 2D21-702
September 9, 2022
Appeal from the County Court for Sarasota County; Erika N.
Quartermaine, Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Daniel Muller,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laurie Benoit-
Knox, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Elliott David Daniels appeals a final judgment and sentences
for a misdemeanor count of DUI pursuant to section 316.193,
Florida Statutes (2019), and a misdemeanor count of refusal to
submit to testing pursuant to section 316.1939(1). We conclude
that the trial court did not err in finding that the law enforcement
officers who initially interacted with Daniels had reasonable
suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation and, therefore, that the
trial court properly denied Daniels' motion to suppress. However,
while we affirm Daniels' judgment and sentences, we write to
explain our reasoning due to the unique facts in this case.
BACKGROUND
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on April 13, 2020, a citizen
informant (CI) contacted 911 to report finding Daniels asleep in his
truck with the lights on. A video, which was admitted by
stipulation, reflects that the truck was parked in a business
parking lot but was situated within the entrance/exit and facing
outwards as if Daniels was preparing to pull out onto the adjacent
road.
Initially, at least two deputies with the Sarasota County
Sheriff's Office responded to the scene. Those deputies called for an
ambulance to have EMS conduct a welfare check, a point that
Daniels does not dispute. However, Deputy Dustin Bell—the State's
lone witness at the suppression hearing—testified that at some
2
point, the deputies at the scene called for him to come to the scene
"for a possible DUI."
Deputy Bell testified that he arrived within ten minutes of the
first deputies but by that time, the EMS technicians had already
arrived, determined that Daniels was not having any medical
issues, and left the scene. Deputy Bell first spoke with the CI who
had called 911. Deputy Bell testified that the CI suggested that
Daniels might be intoxicated. And indeed, the video reflects that
the CI told Deputy Bell that when he first encountered Daniels,
Daniels was slumped over in his seat with his seatbelt on; the CI
believed that Daniels had either had a medical incident or that he
was drunk. The video also reflects that the CI told Deputy Bell that
once he saw Daniels' fingers move, he [the CI] believed that Daniels
was likely intoxicated.
Deputy Bell then made contact with Daniels who was already
awake and outside of his vehicle, having already been checked and
cleared by the initial EMS technicians. Deputy Bell told Daniels
that he was with the sheriff's office, that he worked with the DUI
unit, and that he was there "to make sure that there is not an
instance of DUI occurring." Deputy Bell noticed that Daniels
3
appeared lethargic and had bloodshot, watery eyes. Daniels
explained that he had been working in the sun all day and was
extremely tired, which resulted in him pulling into the parking lot to
sleep. Daniels also told Deputy Bell that he was diabetic,
prompting Deputy Bell to call for EMS to return to conduct a blood
sugar check. Once EMS returned, the technicians conducted the
blood sugar check and determined that it was normal. Based on
the fact that Daniels had been medically cleared, Deputy Bell
suspected that Daniels was intoxicated. Deputy Bell obtained
consent from Daniels to conduct field sobriety tests, which Daniels
failed. Daniels was then arrested.
Daniels filed a motion to suppress arguing that he should have
been released once the first EMS technicians medically cleared him.
He contended that nothing at that time provided reasonable
suspicion for an investigative stop. At the suppression hearing,
Daniels further argued that merely sleeping in a legally parked
vehicle could not provide reasonable suspicion. He noted that he
had not committed a traffic violation and that Deputy Bell admitted
he had not smelled any alcohol or drugs during the incident.
4
Ultimately, the trial court entered an order denying Daniels'
motion, concluding that "during the course of a welfare check[,] law
enforcement developed reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI
investigation," citing Dermio v. State,
112 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA
2013). Daniels subsequently entered a plea of nolo contendere,
reserving his right to appeal the denial of the dispositive
suppression motion. The trial court adjudicated him guilty and
sentenced him to twelve months' probation on both charges with
various DUI conditions, a $500 fine, revocation of his driver's
license for six months, fifty hours of community service, and court
costs.
ANALYSIS
We employ a mixed standard of review for orders denying
suppression motions. We give deference to a trial court's factual
findings if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence,
Dermio,
112 So. 3d at 555, but we review the legal conclusions de
novo, State v. Teamer,
151 So. 3d 421, 425 (Fla. 2014).
Daniels does not dispute that based on the condition in which
the CI found him, the first law enforcement officers that arrived
were justified in conducting a welfare check. Case law clearly
5
provides that law enforcement may conduct such checks when
necessary and that they do not rise to the level of an
unconstitutional stop or seizure. Dermio,
112 So. 3d at 555 ("It is
well recognized that police officers may conduct welfare checks and
that such checks are considered consensual encounters that do not
involve constitutional implications." (citing Greider v. State, 977 So.
2d 789, 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008))); Taylor v. State,
326 So. 3d 115,
117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (noting that welfare checks fall under the
"community caretaking doctrine" and explaining that they can be
deemed lawful as long as they are "totally [divorced] from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the
violation of a criminal statute" (quoting Cady v. Dombroski,
413
U.S. 433, 441 (1973))), disagreed with on other grounds by State v.
Fernandez,
335 So. 3d 784 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022); cf. State v. Baez,
894 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 2004) (involving issue of continued
detention after appellant voluntarily provided his driver's license
but classifying initial encounter which began with a welfare check
as "consensual" in nature).
However, once a police officer's concern for the welfare of the
person has been satisfied, a continued detention is not permissible
6
unless the police officer has reasonable suspicion that the person
has committed or is committing a crime. See Greider,
977 So. 2d at
792-93 (explaining that an investigatory stop must be based on a
well-founded suspicion of criminal activity that is based on more
than a mere hunch and further concluding that where the officer's
concern for the appellant's safety had been dispelled and where the
officer admitted that he did not think any criminal activity had
occurred, the officer lacked authority to detain the appellant
further); Bozeman v. State,
603 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
(holding that where the appellant had been slumped over his
steering wheel and woke up mumbling but where he passed
sobriety tests and the law enforcement officer determined that he
was fit to drive, "his continued detention and warrantless search
were illegal"); Taylor, 326 So. 3d at 118 ("Without any reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is or was afoot, the welfare check
should end when the need for it ends."); cf. Baez, 894 So. 2d at 117
(concluding that where the appellant was found in a "suspicious
condition" slumped over the steering wheel in his van near a dimly
lit, normally abandoned warehouse area, which was not an area he
should have normally been in, the law enforcement officer had
7
sufficient reasonable suspicion to further detain the appellant and
run a computer check of his license, which the appellant had
voluntarily provided).
Here, Daniel argues that once the concern for his health had
been dispelled by the first EMS technicians, he should have been
released. He asserts that his continued detention for purposes of a
DUI investigation was not supported by any reasonable suspicion
that a crime had occurred prior to Deputy Bell's arrival. He further
argues that any reasonable suspicion that developed after Deputy
Bell physically observed him could not justify the initial detention.
Had Daniels been discovered by the CI parked in a regular
parking spot, asleep, with the headlights on, we would have been
constrained to reverse absent additional factors that could lead to
reasonable suspicion. This is so even if the engine had been
running. Cf. Danielewicz v. State,
730 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. 2d DCA
1999) (concluding that where the appellant was parked in a legal
parking spot, with the headlights on and his engine running but
where the law enforcement officer observed no traffic infraction, had
no reason to believe there was any mechanical problem with the
vehicle, and did not testify that he was concerned for the appellant's
8
personal health, the investigative stop was not based on reasonable
suspicion); Delorenzo v. State,
921 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA
2006) (concluding that where the law enforcement officer observed
the appellant sleeping in his legally parked vehicle in a public
parking lot with the engine running but where the officer did not
testify to any observation suggesting that the appellant was either
ill or under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, there
was no reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop). This
court has similarly concluded that being stopped near or partially
on the road does not, by itself, give rise to reasonable suspicion of
criminal conduct. See Bent v. State,
310 So. 3d 470, 471-72 (Fla.
2d DCA 2020).
Yet, when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists,
the totality of the circumstances must be considered from the
"standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer." Teamer, 151
So. 3d at 426 (first citing United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981); and then quoting Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690,
696 (1996)). Notably, " '[i]nnocent behavior will frequently provide
the basis' for reasonable suspicion."
Id. (quoting United States v.
Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989)). And officers may detain
9
individuals to resolve ambiguities about suspicious yet lawful or
innocent behavior,
id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 125
(2000)), because "[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular
conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts,"
id. (quoting
Sokolow,
490 U.S. at 10).
Because Deputy Bell was the State's only witness, we do not
know what the CI told the 911 operator, what the CI told the first
law enforcement officers on the scene, what the first EMS
technicians might have said, or if there were any other factors
observed by the first law enforcement officers that suggested to
them that Daniels might have been intoxicated. And what the CI
told Deputy Bell is irrelevant because it does not bear on whether
reasonable suspicion had developed prior to Deputy Bell's arrival.
We do not find the trial court's reliance on Dermio persuasive
because in that case, we explained in detail the facts that provided
the basis for a welfare check, and we concluded that the concern for
the appellant's welfare had not subsided prior to the development of
reasonable suspicion.
112 So. 3d at 553-54, 556-57. Here,
however, it is clear that the initial welfare check had been
10
completed prior to Deputy Bell's arrival. Thus in determining
whether the trial court was correct that reasonable suspicion had
developed prior to Deputy Bell's arrival, we must focus on the
undisputed facts that the first law enforcement officers were aware
of: the location of Daniels' truck, the manner in which it was found,
and the fact that Daniels was found sleeping in it.
Daniels does not dispute that he had been observed by the CI
asleep in his truck with the headlights on in the entrance/exit of a
business parking lot. Although Daniels contends that the video
does not clearly indicate how far his truck was from a stop sign or
the width of the driveway in which his truck was parked, we do not
find such facts necessary to our disposition. The odd location of
the truck and the direction that the truck was facing along with the
fact that the headlights were still on is not supportive of Daniels'
explanation that he had pulled over to sleep. The video clearly
reflects that Daniels was not parked in a parking spot; he was
parked in the entrance/exit to the parking lot. Daniels' truck was
also facing outward as if he was about to pull out onto the adjacent
road. This is not a typical location that a driver would park his or
her vehicle if he or she wanted to sleep. The time of the incident
11
also makes Daniels' explanation less plausible. Daniels was
discovered at 8:30 p.m. with his headlights still on. Certainly,
during daylight hours, it is conceivable that a driver might forget to
turn his or her headlights off when parking his or her vehicle. But
at nighttime, when the headlights illuminate the area in front of a
vehicle, it is much less likely that a driver would forget to turn them
off. These known facts are part of the totality of the circumstances
that must be considered from the "standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer." Teamer, 151 So. 3d at 426 (quoting
Ornelas,
517 U.S. at 696).
Thus at the time the first law enforcement officers arrived,
there were only three possible explanations for the way in which
Daniels and his truck were found: (1) a medical incident occurred,
(2) he was under the influence of something, or (3) he was really
tired and had pulled into the parking lot to sleep. But as we
already explained, the known facts made Daniels' explanation much
less plausible. While it is unknown whether Deputy Bell was called
to the scene at the same time as the first EMS technicians, we do
know that he was called "for a possible DUI." Thus the first officers
must have believed that if Daniels had not had a medical incident,
12
then it was likely that he was intoxicated. The two most plausible
reasons for the location of the truck and the manner in which both
the truck and Daniels were found were not mutually exclusive.
Both could exist at the same time. The fact that one of the possible
reasons had been dispelled before Deputy Bell arrived (i.e., that
Daniels had had some sort of medical incident) does not mean that
reasonable suspicion did not exist. Rather, it merely strengthened
the only other reasonable possibility: that Daniels was under the
influence of something.
We conclude that even if the known facts involved potentially
lawful or innocent conduct, they did, at the very least, result in an
ambiguous situation under the totality of the circumstances. Thus
the officers were permitted to detain him to resolve any ambiguities.
See Teamer, 151 So. 3d at 426.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Daniels' motion to
suppress.
KHOUZAM and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
MORRIS, C.J., Concurs specially with opinion.
MORRIS, Chief Judge, Specially concurring.
13
This is a very close case, and while I am ultimately in
agreement with affirming the judgment and sentences based on the
unique facts, I write separately to address what I view as
deficiencies in the State's evidence. I am bothered by the State's
failure to call as witnesses the CI, the 911 operator who took the
CI's phone call, the first law enforcement officers who responded to
the scene and who spoke to the CI, and the first EMS technicians.
Calling any one of these witnesses might have provided additional
facts that could have more strongly supported a finding of
reasonable suspicion to justify Daniels' continued detention once he
had been medically cleared prior to Deputy Bell's arrival. For
example, the CI and the first law enforcement officers on scene
could have testified about their initial observations of Daniels and
why they suspected Daniels was under the influence of something,
the 911 operator could have testified about why he or she
dispatched law enforcement to the scene rather than just EMS, and
the EMS technicians could have provided testimony about whether
they observed anything that indicated that Daniels might be under
the influence. Because what the CI told Deputy Bell could not
supply the reasonable suspicion needed to detain Daniels prior to
14
Deputy Bell's arrival, any available evidence that the State had or
could have obtained relating to the initial encounter might have
served to better bolster its case.
The absence of such evidence does not require a reversal here
due to our determination that the location of the truck and the
manner in which both Daniels and his truck were found created at
least an ambiguous situation for which his continued detention was
lawful. However, in cases such as this—involving a lapse of time
and continued detention prior to a DUI investigation—the State
would be wise to submit the strongest evidence possible to justify
the detention. Otherwise the State risks having a conviction
overturned.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
15
