CUSTOM DESIGN EXP, INC. v. SYNERGY RENTS, L L C ( 2021 )


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  •             DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    CUSTOM DESIGN EXPO, INC., a Florida corporation, and
    YOGMATIE SINGH,
    Appellants,
    v.
    SYNERGY RENTS, INC., a Florida limited liability company, and
    F.I.R.E. RESOURCES, INC., a Florida corporation,
    Appellees.
    No. 2D20-1316
    September 10, 2021
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County; John Radabaugh,
    Judge.
    Marc D. Peltzman of Law Office of Marc D. Peltzman, P.A., Orlando,
    for Appellants.
    Brian A. Leung, Victor W. Holcomb, and Steven R. DiOssi of
    Holcomb & Leung, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee Synergy Rents, Inc.
    No appearance for Appellee F.I.R.E. Resources, Inc.
    SLEET, Judge.
    Custom Design Expo, Inc., and its principal Yogmatie Singh
    challenge the trial court's final summary judgment entered against
    them and in favor of Synergy Rents, Inc., in Synergy's action for
    breach of contract and open account filed against them.1 Because
    the affidavit in opposition to Synergy's summary judgment motion
    was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, we
    affirm.
    Custom Design is a contractor that was hired by F.I.R.E.
    Resources, Inc., to clear, grade, and prepare undeveloped lots for
    vertical development. Custom Design contracted with Synergy to
    rent construction equipment for that job. In its complaint below,
    Synergy alleged that it had a contract with Custom Design for the
    rental of construction equipment on open account, that Custom
    Design failed to pay all amounts due and owing on the contract,
    that Singh signed a personal guaranty to be personally liable for
    amounts due pursuant to the contract, and that $81,875.43 due on
    the contract remained unpaid.
    1Appellee F.I.R.E. Resources, Inc., was named as a defendant
    below in a separate count for construction lien but makes no
    appearance in this appeal.
    2
    Custom Design and Singh filed an answer to the complaint,
    and Synergy subsequently moved for summary judgment on only
    the counts brought against them.
    In support of the motion, Synergy filed with the trial court the
    affidavit of its credit manager, Lynn Idleman, in which she averred
    that Custom Design had executed a written application for credit
    with Synergy for the purpose of renting service equipment on open
    account and that the application contained a personal guaranty on
    the debt signed by Singh. A copy of the application, including the
    personal guaranty with Singh's signature, was attached to the
    affidavit. The credit application also included language that
    indicated that the application was a contract and that in exchange
    for the extension of credit, the applicant agreed to make payment
    pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Idleman stated in the
    affidavit that Custom Design rented equipment pursuant to the
    credit application contract, "fail[ed] and/or refus[ed] to pay for the
    rental equipment" in full, and owed Synergy the unpaid amount of
    $81,875.43 plus prejudgment interest. Copies of twenty-two
    invoices supporting that amount were also attached to the affidavit,
    3
    and Idleman averred that they were "true and correct copies of the
    outstanding invoices."
    The only evidence filed in opposition to the summary judgment
    motion was the affidavit of F.I.R.E. president Shane Merali.2 In that
    affidavit, Merali stated the following:
    5. F.I.R.E. RESOURCES, INC. takes issue with 3 invoices
    presented in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
    2  In its answer brief before this court, Synergy points out that
    "[t]he affidavit was filed not by Custom Design and Singh but by
    Shane Merali, who is not a party to the case and is the President of
    the property owner, F.I.R.E." We first note that Synergy is incorrect
    in its contention that the affidavit was filed with the court by Merali
    individually. The notice of filing attached to Merali's affidavit
    stated, "Defendant, F.I.R.E. Resources, Inc., by and through
    undersigned counsel hereby files the attached Affidavit of Shane
    Merali in connection with the Motion [for] Summary Judgment
    currently scheduled for hearing." As such, the affidavit was filed on
    behalf of F.I.R.E., which—contrary to Synergy's assertion—was a
    party defendant to the action below as count one of Synergy's
    amended complaint was a count for construction lien against
    defendant F.I.R.E. as the owner of the property.
    Furthermore, F.I.R.E. had standing to oppose the motion
    seeking summary judgment against its codefendants because the
    construction lien count against F.I.R.E was based on the breach of
    contract and open account allegations against Custom Design and
    Singh. Cf. Crowell v. Kaufmann, 
    845 So. 2d 325
    , 327 (Fla. 2d DCA
    2003) ("[T]he summary judgment in favor of [Dr. Crowell's
    codefendant] Dr. Kaufmann exonerates [Dr. Kaufmann] from fault.
    Because the trial court determined as a matter of law that Dr.
    Kaufmann was not at fault, Dr. Crowell would not have been
    entitled to place him on the verdict form [as a defendant pursuant
    to Fabre v. Marin, 
    623 So. 2d 1182
     (Fla. 1993)]. Accordingly, Dr.
    Crowell had standing to oppose Dr. Kaufmann's motion for
    summary judgment . . . ." (citations omitted)).
    4
    and supporting affidavit. The first disputed invoice is
    #5008-0010. This invoice is in the amount of $4,931.26,
    for a 2 week rental period. The rental period, however,
    for this equipment was supposed to be 1 week. This
    invoice therefore represents an overcharge of at least
    $2,465.00, plus the interest accrued on the overcharge.
    6. The second disputed invoice is #5111-0006. This
    invoice is in the amount of $3,116.25, for a 2 week rental
    period. The rental period, however, for this equipment
    was supposed to be 1 week. This invoice therefore
    represents an overcharge of at least $1,558.12, plus the
    interest accrued on the overcharge.
    7. The third disputed invoice is #41119-002. This
    invoice, for a 4 week rental, in the amount of $1,900.00,
    does not accurately reflect the amount of time for which
    the equipment was on-site at Tuscany Preserve.
    Following a hearing, the trial court entered summary
    judgment in favor of Synergy and directed Custom Design and
    Singh to pay $81,875.43 plus interest and court costs.
    On appeal, Custom Design and Singh argue that this was
    error because Merali's affidavit established a genuine issue of
    material fact as to the amount due. Synergy, however, maintains
    that the affidavit only "asserted mere conclusions without any
    basis" and thus was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of
    material fact to preclude summary judgment. We agree with
    Synergy that Merali's affidavit did not establish a genuine issue of
    5
    material fact and conclude that Custom Design and Singh have not
    met their burden on appeal of proving reversible error.
    Summary judgment "must be rendered immediately if the
    pleadings and summary judgment evidence on file show that there
    is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
    party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fla. R. Civ. P.
    1.510(c) (2020).3 "A movant for summary judgment has the initial
    burden of demonstrating the nonexistence of any genuine issue of
    material fact. But once he tenders competent evidence to support
    his motion, the opposing party must come forward with
    counterevidence sufficient to reveal a genuine issue." Rooker v.
    Ford Motor Co., 
    100 So. 3d 1229
    , 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting
    Landers v. Milton, 
    370 So. 2d 368
    , 370 (Fla. 1979)). Summary
    judgment evidence includes "any affidavits, answers to
    interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and other material as
    would be admissible in evidence." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(b).
    "Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made on personal
    3 Rule 1.510 was amended effective May 1, 2021. The prior
    version of the rule is applicable here because it was in effect when
    Merali's affidavit was made and when the trial court ruled on
    Synergy's summary judgment motion. But our disposition of this
    case would be the same under either version of the rule.
    6
    knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in
    evidence, and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
    to testify to the matters stated therein." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e).
    Here, Synergy tendered competent admissible evidence to
    support its motion. Idleman's affidavit along with the attached
    credit application contract and invoices established that the parties
    had a contract for the rental of equipment on open account, that
    Custom Design breached that contract by failing to pay $81,875.43
    due on the account, and that Singh had signed a personal guaranty
    on the account.4
    As such, the burden shifted to the nonmovants to provide
    counterevidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact. See
    Rooker, 
    100 So. 3d at 1231
    . The only evidence presented in
    opposition of summary judgment was Merali's affidavit. In that
    affidavit, Merali averred that he was the corporate president for
    F.I.R.E., that he was "the individual with F.I.R.E. . . . with the most
    knowledge of equipment rental at issue," that he "was on-site
    managing and supervising development activities at Tuscany
    4On appeal, Custom Design and Singh do not challenge the
    admissibility of any of Synergy's summary judgment evidence.
    7
    Preserve multiple days each week during the rental period," and
    that the equipment rented "was used, exclusively during the lease
    period, for construction for site improvements at Tuscany Preserve."
    Merali also challenged the correctness of three of the twenty-
    two invoices attached to Idleman's affidavit. As to two of the
    invoices, Merali asserted that they were for two-week rental periods
    but that "[t]he rental period . . . was supposed to be 1 week." It is
    undisputed, however, that neither Merali nor F.I.R.E. was a party to
    the credit application contract. Additionally, Merali does not assert
    that he had any direct relationship or entered into any agreements
    with Synergy. The written contract does not indicate the rental
    periods, but the invoices indicate that the equipment was all
    ordered by Arnold Singh, and nothing in Merali's affidavit
    contradicts that fact. As such, Merali did not have personal
    knowledge of any agreements between Synergy and Custom Design
    and Singh, and any information he could offer regarding those
    agreements—including how long the rental periods were "supposed
    to be"—would necessarily have to be inadmissible hearsay.
    But hearsay cannot form the basis in an affidavit for
    establishing a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude
    8
    summary judgment. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e) ("Supporting and
    opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge [and]
    must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.");
    Johns v. Dannels, 
    186 So. 3d 620
    , 622 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ("The
    personal knowledge requirement found in rule 1.510(e) is meant to
    prevent the trial court from relying on hearsay when deciding a
    motion for summary judgment."); Fla. Dep't of Fin. Servs. v.
    Associated Indus. Ins. Co., 
    868 So. 2d 600
    , 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
    ("The purpose of the personal knowledge requirement is to prevent
    the trial court from relying on hearsay when ruling on a motion for
    summary judgment . . . and to ensure that there is an admissible
    evidentiary basis for the case rather than mere supposition or
    belief." (quoting Pawlik v. Barnett Bank of Columbia Cnty., 
    528 So. 2d 965
    , 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988))). " 'An affidavit . . . may not be
    based on factual conclusions or conclusions of law.' 'A factual
    predicate for the testimony is required, just as it would be required
    at trial.' " Rodriguez v. Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
    290 So. 3d 560
    ,
    563-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citations omitted) (first quoting Fla.
    Dep't of Fin. Servs., 
    868 So. 2d at 602,
     and then quoting Johns, 186
    So. 3d at 622).
    9
    As to the third invoice, in his affidavit, Merali asserts that
    invoice number 41119-002, "for a 4 week rental, in the amount of
    $1,900.00, does not accurately reflect the amount of time for which
    the equipment was on site at Tuscany Preserve." Again, we
    conclude that this statement by Merali is insufficient to create a
    genuine issue of material fact.
    The invoice in question was one of four invoices attached to
    Idleman's affidavit that deal with the same piece of equipment, a
    forklift with the serial number 0160085723. All four invoices
    indicate that the date the forklift was rented out was May 3, 2018.
    The first invoice, number 41119-001, charges for the period from
    May 3 to May 31, 2018. The second invoice, the one that Merali
    challenges in his affidavit, charges for the period from May 31 to
    June 28, 2018. The third invoice, number 41119-003, charges for
    the period from June 28 to July 26, 2018, and invoice 41119-004
    charges for the period from July 26 to August 1, 2018, and
    indicates that the forklift was returned to Synergy on August 1,
    2018. Thus, the invoices, along with Idleman's affidavit, establish
    the material fact that Custom Design had possession of Synergy's
    10
    forklift from May 3 until August 1, 2018, and owed payment to
    Synergy for that time period.
    This fact is not refuted by Merali's statement in his affidavit
    that invoice number 41119-002 "does not accurately reflect the
    amount of time" that this forklift was on site at Tuscany Preserve.
    First, Synergy's summary judgment evidence does not suggest that
    the forklift was only on site at Tuscany Preserve for the four-week
    period from May 31 to June 28, 2018. Rather, the evidence
    established that the forklift was on site for a total of three months—
    an amount of time not accurately reflected by invoice 41119-002
    alone. As such, Merali's affidavit does not conflict with Synergy's
    summary judgment evidence; both parties agree that invoice 41119-
    002 does not accurately reflect the amount of time that particular
    forklift was on site at Tuscany Preserve.
    Second, even if we were to read Merali's affidavit to state that
    that particular forklift was on site during that four-week period for
    an amount of time less than four weeks—something that the plain
    language of the affidavit does not say—Merali in no way refutes the
    other invoices directed at the rental of this forklift or contradicts the
    date the equipment was first rented out or the date it was returned
    11
    to Synergy. As such, his affidavit would only create a question of
    fact as to whether Custom Design used the equipment during that
    four-week period exclusively at Tuscany Preserve.
    Such would not preclude summary judgment of the breach of
    contract and open account allegations as the location where the
    equipment was used is not a material fact as to those counts. To
    preclude summary judgment, "the 'issue' must be one of material
    fact. Issues of nonmaterial facts are irrelevant to the summary
    judgment determination." Cont'l Concrete, Inc. v. Lakes at La Paz III
    Ltd. P'ship, 
    758 So. 2d 1214
    , 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). "A material
    fact, for summary judgment purposes, is a fact that is essential to
    the resolution of the legal questions raised in the case." 
    Id.
     Here,
    although the question of where the equipment was used may be a
    material fact as to the construction lien count against F.I.R.E., it is
    not a material fact in the determination of whether Custom Design
    and Singh took possession of Synergy's rental equipment pursuant
    to their contract with Synergy and failed to pay the cost of the
    rental in accordance with their contractual obligation.5
    5 Our conclusion as to this issue is not changed by the fact
    that Merali also averred in his affidavit that the equipment "was
    used, exclusively during the lease period, for construction of site
    12
    For the reasons discussed, Merali's affidavit did not establish
    that a genuine issue of material fact remained. As such, the trial
    court did not err in entering summary judgment against Custom
    Design and Singh and in favor of Synergy.
    Affirmed.
    ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, J., Concurs.
    ATKINSON, J., Dissents.
    improvements at Tuscany Preserve" because his affidavit does not
    establish that he "is competent to testify to th[at] matter." See Fla.
    R. Civ. P. 1.510(e). He stated in his affidavit that he was on site at
    Tuscany Preserve only "multiple days each week" during the rental
    period. He did not, however, aver that he was present at Tuscany
    Preserve every day during the rental period. He cannot attest to
    what occurred at Tuscany Preserve or where the equipment was on
    days that he was not present.
    13