OMEGA TITLE NAPLES, L L C D/B/A DUNN TITLE v. ROGER BUTSCHKY ( 2021 )


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  •              DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    OMEGA TITLE NAPLES, LLC, d/b/a Dunn Title and SCOTT
    DASCANI,
    Petitioners,
    v.
    ROGER BUTSCHKY and SHERYL LYNN BUTSCHKY,
    Respondents.
    No. 2D19-1151
    September 10, 2021
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
    Petitioners' motion for written opinion is granted. The prior
    opinion dated November 20, 2019, is withdrawn, and the attached
    opinion is issued in its place. No further motions for rehearing will
    be entertained.
    I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A
    TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.
    MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL, CLERK
    DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    OMEGA TITLE NAPLES, LLC, d/b/a Dunn Title and SCOTT
    DASCANI,
    Petitioners,
    v.
    ROGER BUTSCHKY and SHERYL LYNN BUTSCHKY,
    Respondents.
    No. 2D19-1151
    September 10, 2021
    Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Collier County;
    Elizabeth V. Krier, Judge.
    Roy D. Wasson of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, and
    Leland W. Wilson of McCullough Legal Services, LLC, Fort Myers,
    for Petitioners.
    Kimberly L. Boldt and Ryan C. Tyler of Boldt Law Firm, Boca Raton,
    and Michael Petruccelli of Petruccelli Law, Fort Lauderdale, for
    Respondents.
    PER CURIAM.
    Omega Title Naples, LLC, and its CEO, Scott Dascani, seek
    certiorari review of an order granting Roger and Sheryl Butschky
    leave to amend their complaint to add a claim for punitive damages.
    We dismiss the petition.
    The underlying proceeding arose after fraudsters allegedly
    deceived Omega Title into wiring the proceeds of the sale of the
    Butschkys' home to a different bank account number than the one
    the Butschkys had provided. After conducting several depositions,
    the Butschkys sought leave to amend their complaint to add a
    claim for punitive damages. Following a hearing, the trial court
    granted the motion. However, neither the court's oral ruling nor its
    written order stated its basis for granting the Butschkys' motion; in
    both rulings the court simply stated that the motion was granted.
    Omega Title now argues in this petition for writ of certiorari
    that the trial court erred in granting the motion without making
    affirmative findings that the Butschkys had alleged a reasonable
    basis for punitive damages. The rationale for this argument begins
    with section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides that
    "no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a
    reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the
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    claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of
    such damages." Citing a line of cases beginning with the Fourth
    District's decision in Henn v. Sandler, 
    589 So. 2d 1334
     (Fla. 4th
    DCA 1991), Omega Title contends that a trial court must expressly
    make an affirmative finding on the record that the statutory
    standard has been met. On that point, the Henn court stated that
    it "read[s] section 768.72 as creating a positive legal right in a party
    not to be subjected to financial worth discovery until the trial court
    has first made an affirmative finding that there is a reasonable
    evidentiary basis for the punitive damages claim to go to the jury."
    
    Id. at 1335
    ; see also Petri Positive Pest Control, Inc. v. CCM Condo.
    Ass'n, 
    174 So. 3d 1122
    , 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (following Henn).
    This view has since been adopted by the Third District in Key West
    Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Doherty, 
    619 So. 2d 367
    , 369 (Fla. 3d DCA
    1993), and by the Fifth District in Varnedore v. Copeland, 
    210 So. 3d 741
    , 747–48 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
    Since we issued our initial order summarily denying Omega
    Title's petition, our court has undertaken a similar approach to the
    one taken by the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts. We have held
    that when a trial court determines that a plaintiff has presented
    3
    sufficient evidence to support a claim for punitive damages "the trial
    court must identify the admissible evidence proffered by the
    plaintiff on the record within the order and/or articulate on the
    record how the evidence supports a reasonable basis to believe the
    claimant can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
    recovery of punitive damages is warranted." E. Bay NC, LLC v.
    Reddish, 
    306 So. 3d 1225
    , 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). We explained
    the reasoning behind this policy as follows:
    Absent oral findings in the record which
    establish entitlement to plead punitive
    damages, a boilerplate order that parrots the
    provisions of the statute without identifying
    the admissible evidence adduced at the
    evidentiary hearing is insufficient. Such an
    order renders the appellate court unable to
    identify what, if any, admissible evidence was
    relied upon to make the determination.
    Identifying the evidence within the order will
    enable an appellate court to better determine
    procedural compliance with the statute.
    
    Id.
    The trial court's oral and written orders in this case did not
    make any findings of fact or otherwise state the basis on which it
    granted the Butschkys' motion. However, we find this error to be
    essentially harmless. As we stated in Reddish, the purpose of
    4
    specific findings is to enable appellate review to ensure that the trial
    court complied with the procedural requirements of section 768.72.
    See generally Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 
    658 So. 2d 518
    , 520
    (Fla. 1995) (holding that certiorari is available to review whether the
    trial court has followed the procedures set forth in section 768.72,
    "but not so broad as to encompass review of the sufficiency of the
    evidence considered in that inquiry"); Beverly Health & Rehab.
    Servs., Inc. v. Meeks, 
    778 So. 2d 322
    , 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    (noting that "Globe Newspaper gives us the power in a certiorari
    proceeding to enforce the procedures associated with section
    768.72" and stating that "the trial court's decision withstands our
    standard of review [on certiorari] so long as the decision is
    consistent with the statute and the court has satisfied the
    requirements of due process"). In this case we can discern from the
    record that the court followed all applicable procedures and applied
    the correct standard in granting the Butchskys' motion. As a
    result, the failure to make express findings was harmless.
    Petition dismissed.
    KELLY and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
    NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs with opinion.
    5
    NORTHCUTT, J., Concurring.
    I concur in the dismissal of Omega Title's petition, but I write
    separately to express disagreement with the growing chorus of
    cases, starting with Henn v. Sandler, 
    589 So. 2d 1334
     (Fla. 4th DCA
    1991), and continuing through E. Bay NC, LLC v. Reddish, 
    306 So. 3d 1225
    , 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), holding that a trial court must
    make express findings when granting leave to add a claim for
    punitive damages.
    Neither the applicable statute nor the associated rule of
    procedure require a court to announce specific findings beyond
    granting or denying a plaintiff's motion to add a punitive damages
    claim. See § 768.72(1), Fla. Stat. (2018); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(f).
    The First District recently addressed this issue in Watt v. Lo, 
    302 So. 3d 1021
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), and recognized that the statute
    and rule simply do not compel the affirmative finding that Henn and
    its progeny have required:
    [N]othing in the plain language of section
    768.72(1) requires a trial court to make
    express or affirmative findings when
    determining whether to permit a claimant to
    assert a punitive damages claim. All that is
    required is that the claimant make the
    necessary showing based on evidence in the
    6
    record or proffered by the claimant. § 768.72,
    Fla. Stat. Then, as stated in Globe Newspaper,
    the trial court must make a "determination"
    that the claimant made the necessary
    evidentiary showing.
    Id. at 1024–25 (footnote omitted).
    I agree with the First District's reading of the law. Absent a
    statutory requirement or other compelling reason, findings of fact
    simply are not a necessary component of a judgment or order. See,
    e.g., New Nautical Coatings, Inc. v. Scoggin, 
    731 So. 2d 145
    , 146
    (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ("Because the trial court made no specific
    findings of fact in the final judgment, this court must 'accept the
    facts to be those shown by that evidence most favorable' to
    Scoggins, the prevailing party." (quoting S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
    Broward Cnty., 
    665 So. 2d 272
    , 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995))); Town of
    Jupiter v. Alexander, 
    747 So. 2d 395
    , 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    (refusing to reverse a judgment due to a lack of factual findings and
    noting that "[w]here [findings] are absent, the appellate court must
    determine whether, based upon the record, the proper analysis
    would have produced the result reached by the trial court").
    Further, knowing the facts upon which the trial court relied
    when granting leave to amend would be of little benefit in the
    7
    narrow certiorari review that we conduct here. As explained in
    Globe Newspaper, we are limited to reviewing procedural matters
    and cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
    plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. See 
    658 So. 2d at 520
    .
    Thus, findings of fact regarding the evidence presented ordinarily
    would not further our review in any meaningful way.
    In sum, I agree that the lack of findings of facts in this case
    does not warrant certiorari relief even under the caselaw that
    requires them. But I do not believe that such findings were
    required in the first place.
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