Venice L. Endsley v. Broward County, Finance and Administrative Services Department, Revenue Collections Division Lori Parrish, as Broward County Property Appraiser , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 4528 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    VENICE L. ENDSLEY,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BROWARD COUNTY, FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
    DEPARTMENT, REVENUE COLLECTIONS DIVISION; LORI PARRISH,
    as Broward County Property Appraiser, et al.,
    Appellees.
    No. 4D14-3997
    [March 23, 2016]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Mily Rodriguez-Powell, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE-06-
    016764.
    Marie A. Borland and Robert E. V. Kelley, Jr. of Hill, Ward & Henderson,
    P.A., Tampa, for appellant.
    Michael W. Moskowitz and Scott M. Zaslav of Moskowitz, Mandell,
    Salim & Simowitz, P.A, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Lori Parrish, as
    Broward County Property Appraiser.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Robert P. Elson, Assistant
    Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee Marshall Stranburg, as
    Executive Director of the State of Florida Department of Revenue.
    FORST, J.
    Appellant Venice Endsley brought a suit against the Broward County
    Property Appraiser after it removed her homestead tax exemption due to
    the fact that her then-husband was receiving a residency-based tax
    exemption for his out-of-state residence during the same time period.
    Appellant now appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of the
    County and the Property Appraiser, arguing that the pertinent Florida
    Constitution provision limiting family units to one homestead exemption
    does not apply when the second exemption is for an out-of-state residence.
    As set forth below, we disagree with Appellant’s arguments and affirm the
    trial court’s entry of summary judgment.
    Factual Background
    Appellant and her husband were married in 1944 and remained in an
    intact, congenial marriage until the husband’s death in 2007. Appellant
    and her husband comingled their finances throughout this time period
    and jointly owned two properties, located in Florida and Indiana, until
    1986. That year, Appellant transferred her interest in the Indiana property
    to her husband, leaving the property entirely in his name. Husband,
    meanwhile, transferred all interest in the Florida property to Appellant.
    The Florida property has been Appellant’s permanent residence since this
    time and she received a homestead exemption on her property taxes for
    this property from 1986 through 2006. Her husband likewise received a
    residency-based property tax exemption on the Indiana property
    throughout the same time frame.
    In August 2006, the Broward County Property Appraiser learned that
    Appellant and her husband were each receiving a residency-based tax
    exemption. Upon this discovery, the Appraiser removed Appellant’s
    exemption on the Florida property for tax years 1996-2005.              The
    Appraiser’s action was based on Article VII, Section 6(b) of the Florida
    Constitution, which provides that “[n]ot more than one exemption shall be
    allowed any individual or family unit . . . .” Appellant’s husband cancelled
    his Indiana exemption in 2006 and Appellant was granted a homestead
    exemption on the Florida property again in 2007. However, as a result of
    the cancellation of the Florida exemption, the Appraiser reset the value of
    Appellant’s Florida property to its market value, rather than the lower
    value under the “Save Our Homes” provision in Article VII, section 4(d) of
    the Florida Constitution.
    Appellant filed an action in the lower court seeking a refund of the
    additional tax monies she was forced to pay for tax years 2002-2005, an
    order requiring the Appraiser to grant a homestead exemption for tax year
    2006, and an order requiring the Appraiser to revalue the Florida property
    under the Save Our Homes valuation scheme for years 2007 onward.
    Appellant also sought a declaration that section 196.031(5), Florida
    Statutes, was unconstitutional. The parties filed competing motions for
    summary judgment. The trial court granted the Appraiser’s motion,
    concluding that Appellant and Husband were a single family unit and
    could not claim separate homestead exemptions.
    Legal Background
    The law is well-settled that a harmonious family unit, even if living
    2
    apart, cannot claim more than one homestead exemption in the State of
    Florida. See Brklacic v. Parrish, 
    149 So. 3d 85
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); cf.
    Wells v. Haldeos, 
    48 So. 3d 85
    , 88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding spouses
    that “have no financial connection with and do not provide benefits,
    income, or support to each other,” yet are still technically married, can
    establish separate “family units” when their lives are sufficiently
    attenuated, and both spouses can receive homestead exemptions for their
    separate primary residences, including one out-of-state residence). Here,
    like in Brklacic (and unlike in Haldeos), Appellant and her husband were
    happily married, but declared two separate permanent residences. In
    Brklacic, the two residences that had received homestead exemptions were
    both in Florida, albeit different counties. Brklacic, 149 So. 3d at 86. By
    contrast, in the instant case, Appellant received an exemption for her
    residence in Florida while her husband received an exemption for his out-
    of-state residence. Appellant argues that Article VII, Section 6(b) does not
    apply to this situation and is limited to situations, like Brklacic, where both
    residences are in Florida.
    The Second District Court of Appeal considered a family claiming
    residency-based tax benefits in multiple states in Wells v. Vallier, 
    773 So. 2d 1197
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The court concluded that the couple was
    “entitled to receive a homestead tax exemption [in Florida] despite the fact
    that they also received a residency-based property tax credit in the State
    of New Hampshire,” because the couple were “permanent residents of . . .
    Florida.” Id. at 1198.
    In 2001, the Legislature added a new provision to section 196.031,
    Florida Statutes, which addressed the ability of persons to claim
    homestead exemptions in multiple states. Section 196.031(6), Florida
    Statutes (2002), stated:
    A person who is receiving or claiming the benefit of an ad
    valorem tax exemption or a tax credit in another state where
    permanent residency is required as a basis for the granting of
    that ad valorem tax exemption or tax credit is not entitled to
    the homestead exemption provided by this section. This
    subsection does not apply to a person who has the legal or
    equitable title to real estate in Florida and maintains thereon
    the permanent residence of another legally or naturally
    dependent upon the owner.
    The Staff Analysis for the bill altering this section specifically mentioned
    the Second District’s ruling in Vallier as contradictory to the new statutory
    language. Fla. Staff Analysis, S.B. 1642 (April 5, 2001). This provision
    3
    was moved to section 196.031(5) effective January 29, 2008. § 196.031(5),
    Fla. Stat. (2008).
    Analysis
    “The determination of a statute’s constitutionality and the
    interpretation of a constitutional provision are both questions of law
    reviewed de novo.” Garcia v. Andonie, 
    101 So. 3d 339
    , 343 (Fla. 2012).
    “Legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory
    construction analysis.” Bautista v. State, 
    863 So.2d 1180
    , 1185 (Fla.
    2003). When construing a statute or constitutional provision, we should
    first look to the plain meaning of the words used; “[w]hen the language of
    the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite
    meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory
    interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and
    obvious meaning.” Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 
    840 So. 2d 998
    ,
    1000 (Fla. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 
    450 So. 2d 217
    , 219 (Fla. 1984)).
    In the context of tax laws, the Florida Supreme Court has held
    “[a]lthough taxing statutes are strictly construed against a taxing
    authority, exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer.” Dep’t
    of Revenue v. Anderson, 
    403 So. 2d 397
    , 399 (Fla. 1981); Parrish v. Pier
    Club Apts., LLC, 
    900 So. 2d 683
    , 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“[S]tatutes
    providing for an exemption from ad valorem tax are to be strictly
    construed, and any ambiguity is to be resolved against the taxpayer and
    against exemption.” (citation omitted)).
    Our initial task is to determine the extent of the homestead exemption
    provided by the Florida Constitution. That document states, in relevant
    part:
    Every person who has the legal or equitable title to real estate
    and maintains thereon the permanent residence of the owner,
    or another legally or naturally dependent upon the owner,
    shall be exempt from taxation thereon, . . . upon
    establishment of right thereto in the manner prescribed by
    law.
    Art. VII, § (6)(a), Fla. Const. This broad grant of homestead exemptions is
    limited by the next subsection, which states that “[n]ot more than one
    exemption shall be allowed any individual or family unit or with respect to
    any residential unit.” Art. VII, § (6)(b).
    4
    The trial court found that the plain language of the provision meant
    that only one homestead exemption was allowed, regardless of location.
    We agree. The meaning of the Constitution’s command that “not more
    than one exemption shall be allowed any individual or family unit” appears
    clear on the face of the document. Faced with such unambiguous
    language, we have no need to turn to complex analysis or employ canons
    of construction. Nor are we inclined, as Appellant suggests, to rewrite the
    Constitution to add new terms to this provision. The courts, after all, exist
    not to re-draft the laws of this State, but rather to interpret what has been
    given to us by those tasked with that responsibility. Here, the chosen
    language is clear, as is our reading of it.
    The Second District’s opinion in Vallier is not inapposite. In that case,
    the court wasn’t focused on Article VII, section 6(b)’s “[n]ot more than one
    exemption” rule. Instead, it solely dealt with Article VII, section 6(a)’s
    limitation of exemptions to “the permanent residence” of the party seeking
    the exemption. It does not appear that there was a section 6(b) issue in
    that case, as the property owners were merely receiving “a $100 per year
    residency-based property tax credit” for their “summer home” in New
    Hampshire. Vallier, 773 So. 2d at 1198 (emphasis added).
    Our determination of the Constitutional issue effectively decides the
    case in the Property Appraiser’s favor. Nonetheless, we also consider
    Appellant’s argument that section 196.031(5) unconstitutionally limits the
    class of persons entitled to a homestead tax exemption. “There is a strong
    presumption that a statute is constitutionally valid, and all reasonable
    doubts about the statute’s validity must be resolved in favor of
    constitutionality.” Parkerson v. State, 
    163 So. 3d 683
    , 688 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2015) (quoting State v. Catalano, 
    104 So. 3d 1069
    , 1075 (Fla. 2012)). “As
    a result, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears a
    heavy burden of establishing its invalidity.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Montgomery v.
    State, 
    69 So. 3d 1023
    , 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)).
    Section 196.031(5) states:
    A person who is receiving or claiming the benefit of an ad
    valorem tax exemption or a tax credit in another state where
    permanent residency is required as a basis for the granting of
    that ad valorem tax exemption or tax credit is not entitled to
    the homestead exemption provided by this section.
    § 196.031(5).    Appellant argues this language adds a substantive
    requirement to the homestead scheme laid out in Article VII, section 6 of
    the Florida Constitution.
    5
    “[A]lthough the Legislature is permitted to enact laws regulating ‘the
    manner’ of establishing the right to the constitutional homestead tax
    exemption, it cannot substantively alter or materially limit the class of
    individuals entitled to the exemption under the plain language of the
    constitution.” Andonie, 
    101 So. 3d at 345
    . In Andonie, the Florida
    Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a homestead exemption
    statute providing that the property owner must reside on the property to
    be entitled to a homestead exemption.1 The Court held the residency
    requirement was “inconsistent with the requirements of the constitution”
    and “substantively limit[ed] and narrow[ed] the class of property owners
    and taxpayers eligible for the ad valorem tax exemption under the plain
    language of the Florida Constitution.” 
    Id. at 345
    .
    The current case is distinguishable from Andonie. Unlike the limitation
    placed on the homestead exemption in that case, the statutory restriction
    here is grounded in the language of the constitutional provision, namely
    Article VII, section 6(b).
    As stated above, the statute prevents “a person who is receiving or
    claiming the benefit of an ad valorem tax exemption or a tax credit in
    another state where permanent residency is required as a basis for the
    granting of that ad valorem tax exemption” from also claiming a Florida
    homestead exemption. § 196.031(5). In this case, although Appellant’s
    husband was responsible for claiming the Indiana tax exemption,2
    Appellant still “received . . . the benefit” of this exemption by virtue of the
    commingling of funds with her husband. The reduction in the overall tax
    liability owed by the couple in the State of Indiana directly provided
    1 “Every person who, on January 1, has the legal title or beneficial title in equity
    to real property in this state and who resides thereon and in good faith makes the
    same his or her permanent residence, or the permanent residence of another or
    others legally or naturally dependent upon such person, is entitled to an
    exemption . . . .” § 196.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added).
    2 Appellant did not argue in her initial brief that the tax exemption that her late
    husband received from Indiana was something other than the “ad valorem tax
    exemption or a tax credit” contemplated by the Florida statute at issue, or that
    “permanent residency” was not required in Indiana “as a basis for the granting of
    that ad valorem tax exemption or tax credit.” In fact, the initial brief accepts as
    “fact that [Appellant’s] husband applied for and received a residency-based
    exemption in Indiana while in an ‘intact’ marriage with [Appellant] . . . .” We
    therefore base our analysis on the assumption that the statute applies to the
    instant case.
    6
    Appellant with an economic benefit, bringing her within the purview of
    section 196.031(5).
    Finally, we hold that Appellant is not entitled to have her property
    revalued under the “Save Our Homes” provision found in Article VII,
    section 4(d) of the Florida Constitution. That provision limits the growth
    of assessed value for property tax purposes, but applies only to properties
    that qualify as a homestead under Article VII, section 6. Art. VII, § 4(d),
    Fla. Const. Article VII, section 4(d)(6) states that “[i]n the event of a
    termination of homestead status, the property shall be assessed as
    provided by general law.” Because Appellant’s property lost its homestead
    status during tax years 2002-2006, she likewise lost the protections of the
    Save Our Homes provision.
    Conclusion
    Appellant’s receipt of multiple homestead exemptions is specifically
    prohibited by the language of Article VII, section 6(b) of the Florida
    Constitution and section 196.031(5), which echoes the Constitutional
    prohibition. Because Appellant benefitted from homestead exemptions
    both in and out of the State of Florida during the time period at issue, the
    trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Property
    Appraiser.
    Affirmed.
    MAY, J. and SCHER, ROSEMARIE, Associate Judge, concur.
    *         *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    7