Joshua Antwan Meeks v. State of Florida , 247 So. 3d 700 ( 2018 )


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  •          FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D16-4629
    _____________________________
    JOSHUA ANTWAN MEEKS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    ___________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
    Roberto Arias, Judge.
    May 25, 2018
    B.L. THOMAS, C.J.
    Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence admitted
    at trial which resulted in his convictions for armed robbery and
    attempted armed robbery. He does not challenge the sufficiency
    of the evidence of his conviction for aggravated fleeing and
    eluding, but that evidence is a significant part of the
    circumstantial evidence that formed the basis of the case at trial
    on the robbery charges. We hold that the State produced
    sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, and thus, the trial
    court correctly denied Appellant’s motion for judgment of
    acquittal.
    Facts
    At trial, one victim testified that after eating dinner with
    friends at a restaurant on January 24, 2013, one of her friends
    wanted to show her a car she had rented, a white Chevrolet
    Impala, parked outside the restaurant. While the two women
    stood by the car, a man approached and asked if the car belonged
    to them. The man then demanded the women’s purses and keys;
    when they refused, the man said he wasn’t kidding, and produced
    a handgun. The victim testified that the man was about 5’10”
    tall, wearing a long, dark bluish-grey “nicer type hoodie jacket,”
    baggy blue jeans, and athletic shoes. She testified the gun was a
    silver snub-nosed gun with a black handle, and that the gun
    recovered from Appellant’s possession and admitted into evidence
    was very similar to the gun she saw the night of the robbery.
    The victim further testified that the man approached her
    friend, and attempted to grab her friend’s purse. She testified
    that the man grabbed her friend’s purse, who then dropped her
    keys, and the man grabbed the keys and drove away in the
    Impala with the purse. She then ran into the restaurant and
    used the phone to call 911, telling the 911 operator that she and
    her friend had been robbed at gunpoint by a male wearing a blue
    “letterman” jacket. The victims did resist the robbery.
    Jerrod Robertson testified that he had known Appellant for
    two to eight months before the crimes, and he identified
    Appellant at trial. Robertson testified that Appellant frequently
    wore a blue letterman jacket with his name on it, on top of a
    hooded plaid-striped jacket.         Robertson testified that on
    January 25, 2013, he was at his brother’s house when Appellant
    arrived in a white Impala with one other person. Robertson
    testified that he got in the car to go to the beach with Appellant,
    and when he asked Appellant where he got the car, Appellant
    said “Don’t worry about it” and “None of your business.”
    Robertson testified that he assumed the car was a rental, because
    it had a “no smoking” sticker inside of it. Robertson testified that
    Appellant picked up a man named Julius Williams, who rode in
    the Impala with Robertson and Appellant.
    Robertson testified that every time he saw Appellant,
    Appellant had carried a firearm. Robertson described Appellant’s
    firearm as a silver or chrome revolver with a black handle, and
    testified that Appellant had the gun with him that day.
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    Robertson testified that while Appellant was driving to an
    uncle’s house to pick up some money, Appellant ran a red light
    and struck a station wagon, damaging the front bumper of the
    Impala. Appellant then stopped at a store and removed the front
    bumper that was hanging off of the car. When they drove into a
    residential subdivision, a police car pulled up behind and began
    following them. When Appellant pulled out of the subdivision,
    the police car turned on its lights and sirens, and Appellant
    accelerated to flee the police car, driving through another red
    light and fleeing from the police car at 90-100 miles per hour.
    Robertson said Appellant pulled into what he presumed was
    Appellant’s mother’s neighborhood, and he and Appellant both
    jumped out of the car. The Impala then rolled into a retention
    pond.
    Robertson said he jumped out of the car, because he was sure
    the car was stolen, as the police had no other reason to pursue
    the car. Robertson testified that he fled behind a house, jumped
    a fence and was running on a highway when police apprehended
    him. After looking at a still shot of the restaurant’s video footage
    of the robbery, Robertson identified Appellant as the robber,
    because the robber was wearing the same letterman jacket that
    he had always seen Appellant wear, and which had a name
    printed on the chest.
    Officer Tamara Hardin of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office
    testified that on January 26, 2013, she was flagged down by a
    citizen who saw a hit and run. Officer Hardin observed a white
    four-door vehicle with front-end damage at a gas station. Hardin
    testified that she called the car’s tag number into dispatch and
    began following it, but waited to activate her lights and siren
    until other police units arrived. The tag number of the vehicle
    with front-end damage came back as a vehicle involved in a
    carjacking. When another officer came to assist her, Officer
    Hardin turned on her lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop;
    the car did not stop, but pulled out of the subdivision they were
    in, and ran around several cars to make a left turn into traffic
    against a red light. Hardin was at this point able to identify the
    car as a Chevy Impala. Hardin said she pursued the car into a
    subdivision, and found the vehicle stopped next to a pond. One
    3
    male, later identified as Julius Williams, was standing next to
    the car and was immediately detained.
    Officer Hardin testified that a resident of the subdivision
    said she saw someone jump her fence, and officers “set up a
    perimeter” around the rear area of the subdivision. Hardin
    testified that officers eventually detained the other two people
    who had fled from the Impala.
    The testimony of Kurt Zamor, formerly of the Jacksonville
    Sheriff’s Office, was perpetuated, and a video of his testimony
    was played at trial. * Zamor testified that he went to the
    subdivision where Appellant was eventually detained in response
    to a call from Officer Hardin, and when he arrived, the Impala
    was already heading into the retention pond. He saw someone
    later identified as Appellant walking on the sidewalk about 800-
    1,000 feet from the retention pond, and he rolled down his car
    window and asked to speak to Appellant. Zamor asked if he
    could pat Appellant down, and while patting him down, Zamor
    felt a hard object which he believed to be a weapon; he
    handcuffed Appellant and took a gun from Appellant, which was
    the same gun introduced into evidence.           Zamor arrested
    Appellant for possession of a concealed firearm without a license.
    After the State rested, Appellant moved for judgment of
    acquittal. Appellant argued that the State failed to prove
    identity on the charges of armed robbery and attempted armed
    robbery, as one of the two alleged victims did not testify at trial
    and the witness who testified she was a victim of the robbery
    could not identify the man who robbed her. The trial court
    denied the motion. The jury found Appellant guilty of armed
    robbery, attempted armed robbery, and fleeing or attempting to
    elude law enforcement.
    * Zamor was on leave without pay from the United Nations,
    where he worked as a police advisor, due to pending federal
    criminal charges for selling firearms without a license.
    4
    Analysis
    In Florida, appellate courts must apply a “special standard of
    review” regarding criminal convictions based solely on
    circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s identity. Knight v.
    State, 
    186 So. 2d 1005
    , 1009-10. (Fla. 2016) (Knight II). In
    Knight II, the supreme court rejected the view that the special
    standard of review should be reconsidered and abandoned:
    This Court has described the circumstantial evidence
    standard as follows: “[w]here the only proof of guilt is
    circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence
    may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be sustained
    unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence.” Jaramillo v. State, 
    417 So. 2d 257
    , 257 (Fla. 1982). The standard applies upon
    appellate review, 
    id., and when
    a trial judge rules on a
    motion for judgment of acquittal, State v. Law, 
    559 So. 2d 187
    , 188 (Fla. 1989). In the instant opinion, the
    Fifth District engaged in a lengthy discussion about why
    this Court should reconsider use of this standard in
    Florida. 
    Knight, 107 So. 3d at 455-62
    . However, we find
    that discussion and the rationale raised by the State to
    be unpersuasive. Accordingly, we uphold the continued
    use of the standard in Florida. Having done so, we next
    address the certified conflict issue by clarifying when
    the standard applies.
    
    Id. Justice Canady
    concurred in result, stating:
    As Judge [now Justice] Lawson cogently explains, the
    special standard of review is both confusing and
    misleading. See Knight v. State, 
    107 So. 3d 449
    , 456-61
    (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). It is a striking and inexplicable
    anomaly that we have rejected the reasonable-
    hypothesis-of-innocence jury instruction but have
    nonetheless retained the special standard of review. I
    agree with Judge Lawson that this anomaly in our
    jurisprudence should be corrected by eliminating the
    special standard of review.
    
    Id. at 1013.
                                    5
    This unique standard of review was rejected by the United
    States Supreme Court sixty-four years ago in Holland v. United
    States:
    The petitioners assail the refusal of the trial judge to
    instruct that where the Government's evidence is
    circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every
    reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. There is
    some support for this type of instruction in the lower
    court decisions, but the better rule is that where the
    jury is properly instructed on the standards for
    reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on
    circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect.
    Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no
    different from testimonial evidence. Admittedly,
    circumstantial evidence may in some cases point to a
    wholly incorrect result. Yet this is equally true of
    testimonial evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked to
    weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to
    guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous
    inference. In both, the jury must use its experience with
    people and events in weighing the probabilities. If the
    jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can
    require no more.
    
    348 U.S. 121
    , 139-40 (1954) (emphasis added; citations omitted).
    In Knight v. State, 
    107 So. 3d 449
    , 456-58 (Fla. 5th DCA
    2013) (Knight I), the Fifth District noted that most states now
    have rejected the special rule, as have all federal courts since
    1982. And in Florida, no special jury instruction is given to
    require juries to apply more strict scrutiny to circumstantial
    evidence, as both Justice Canady and the Fifth District noted in
    Knight I, observing that Florida was only one of three states to
    take the “somewhat discordant” view that a special appellate
    standard of review applies to circumstantial criminal convictions,
    but a jury cannot be instructed to apply a different evaluation of
    circumstantial evidence. 
    Id. at 456-57.
    We are bound to apply the special standard as required by
    Knight II. And in applying that standard here, we hold that the
    6
    State presented sufficient evidence to the jury to affirm the
    judgment of guilt.
    In State v. Law, the supreme court, in reversing this court in
    a case where it held the circumstantial evidence was not
    sufficient, stated:
    Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no
    matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a
    conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is
    inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of
    innocence. The question of whether the evidence fails to
    exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the
    jury to determine, and where there is substantial,
    competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will
    not reverse.
    
    559 So. 2d 187
    , 188 (Fla. 1989) (citations omitted; emphasis
    added). In addition to this guidance, we know we must view all
    the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, guilt, and
    draw every reasonable inference in favor of the state, the
    prevailing party. Lynch v. State, 
    293 So. 2d 44
    , 45 (Fla. 1974).
    Applying these rules here, cognizant that the testimony of
    the witness identifying Appellant’s image from the crime
    videography could lead us to reject the “special standard of
    review,” but assuming arguendo that the special standard of
    review applicable to circumstantial criminal convictions must be
    utilized, we conclude that the following provides “substantial,
    competent evidence to support the jury verdict,” as delineated by
    Law:
    1. The victim’s stolen rental car was driven by Appellant,
    soon after the robbery, who led the police on a high-speed chase;
    2. The Appellant drove the stolen car into his mother’s
    neighborhood;
    3. The gun removed from Appellant’s possession was the
    gun used during the crime; and
    7
    4. Appellant was identified by witness Robertson, who was
    a passenger in the stolen car, as the person in the robbery video.
    Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes, defines robbery as
    follows:
    “Robbery” means the taking of money or other property
    which may be the subject of larceny from the person or
    custody of another, with intent to either permanently or
    temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the
    money or other property, when in the course of the
    taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or
    putting in fear.
    Section 812.13(2)(a) adds an element for armed robbery: “If in
    the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a
    firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of
    the first degree, punishable . . . as provided in s. 775.082,
    s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.” “[T]o prove attempted armed robbery,
    the State must show: (1) the formation of an intent to commit the
    crime of robbery; (2) the commission of some physical act in
    furtherance of the robbery; and (3) the use of a firearm.” Franqui
    v. State, 
    699 So. 2d 1312
    , 1317 (Fla. 1997). “In the context of
    attempted armed robbery, ‘intent may be proved by considering
    the conduct of the accused and his colleagues before, during, and
    after the alleged attempt along with any other relevant
    circumstances.’” Grant v. State, 
    138 So. 3d 1079
    , 1083 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2014) (quoting 
    Franqui, 699 So. 2d at 1317
    ). Here, the
    security footage from the restaurant showed a man grabbing at
    and eventually taking a purse and car from two women at
    gunpoint, thus establishing that the man in the video committed
    all the elements of robbery and attempted robbery.
    As also held in Lynch, when evidence adequately supports
    two conflicting theories, it is the appellate court’s duty to review
    the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing theory.
    Johnson v. State, 
    660 So. 2d 637
    , 642 (Fla. 1995). “The testimony
    of a single witness, even if uncorroborated and contradicted by
    other State witnesses, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” I.R.
    v. State, 
    385 So. 2d 686
    , 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
    8
    Here, there is ample circumstantial evidence that excludes
    any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that is, that Appellant
    was not the perpetrator. In fact, the “hypothesis” that Appellant
    is not the perpetrator is quite unreasonable. Adding all the facts
    together, and all reasonable interferences drawn therefrom, we
    hold the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to uphold
    Appellant’s convictions and the judgment below.
    Thus, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
    JAY and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Maria Ines Suber, Assistant
    Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Heather Flanagan Ross,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    9