Azalea Trace, Inc. v. Nora Matos and Arnold Eskin , 249 So. 3d 699 ( 2018 )


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  •           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-753
    _____________________________
    AZALEA TRACE, INC.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NORA MATOS and ARNOLD
    ESKIN,
    Appellees.
    ___________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
    Darlene F. Dickey, Judge.
    June 4, 2018
    PER CURIAM.
    Toward the end of her life, Pearl Eskin moved into Azalea
    Trace, a nursing home. She signed a residency contract, which
    required her to pay a substantial entrance fee. The agreement
    provided that if she died within a certain timeframe, Azalea Trace
    would refund a portion of the entrance fee. Mrs. Eskin later signed
    an “Assignment of Reimbursement of Entrance Fee,” through
    which she assigned her refund rights to her children, appellees
    Nora Matos and Arnold Eskin. After Mrs. Eskin’s death triggered
    the refund obligation, Azalea Trace gave the children only a partial
    refund, asserting that it could offset certain amounts. The home
    said it provided discounted services to Mrs. Eskin before she died
    and that it could recoup the discounts from the refund. The
    children sued, seeking a full refund and alleging that the residency
    contract did not permit the offsets. The children prevailed at
    summary judgment, Azalea Trace appealed, and we affirmed
    (albeit without opinion), see Azalea Trace, Inc. v. Matos, 
    178 So. 3d 397
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (unpublished table decision).
    The case now comes to us again, the main issue this time being
    whether the children are entitled to prevailing-party attorney’s
    fees for the victory already won. The trial court held that they
    were, and it awarded the children approximately $27,000 for trial-
    court attorney’s fees, approximately $13,500 for appellate
    attorney’s fees, and approximately $18,300 in expert costs. We
    conclude it was error to award fees other than the appellate
    attorney’s fees and expert costs, so we reverse in part.
    I.
    Florida generally follows the American Rule, under which
    each side pays its own attorney’s fees. Johnson v. Omega Ins. Co.,
    
    200 So. 3d 1207
    , 1214 (Fla. 2016). Courts can order losing parties
    to pay victors’ fees, though, if there is a contractual or statutory
    basis for doing so. 
    Id. at 1214-15.
    Below, the children asserted two
    statutory bases to justify a fee award. First, they sought fees under
    section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2013), Florida’s offer-of-judgment
    statute. But Azalea Trace argued that the children’s offer-of-
    judgment was invalid, and the children ultimately disclaimed
    reliance on that statute. Cf. TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 
    663 So. 2d
    606, 612 (Fla. 1995) (holding that under section 768.79, a trial
    court can deny an award of attorney’s fees if the qualifying offer
    was not made in good faith). This left the children (and now leaves
    us) with just one asserted basis for fees: section 57.105(7), Florida
    Statutes, which is the focus of this appeal.
    Under section 57.105(7), when a contract provides prevailing-
    party fees for one party, the court may allow prevailing-party fees
    for the opposing party, even if the contract does not explicitly
    provide for them. In other words, the statute serves “to statutorily
    transform a unilateral attorney’s fees contract provision into a
    reciprocal provision.” Bank of New York Mellon Tr. Co., N.A. v.
    Fitzgerald, 
    215 So. 3d 116
    , 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); accord Fla.
    Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Red Rd. Residential, LLC, 
    197 So. 3d 1112
    ,
    1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[N]otwithstanding that the contractual
    fee provision is one-sided, entitling only one of the contract’s
    2
    parties to prevailing party fees, by operation of law section
    57.105(7) bestows on the other party to the contract the same
    entitlement to prevailing party fees.”).
    The trial court awarded fees under this provision, concluding
    that the assignment document included a prevailing-party fee
    provision that would have allowed Azalea Trace to recover fees
    from the children had it prevailed. Thus, the trial court reasoned,
    section 57.105(7) made that provision reciprocal and allowed the
    children to recover fees from Azalea Trace. On appeal, Azalea
    Trace argues that it cannot be liable under section 57.105(7)
    because it was not a “party” to the assignment. We review this
    issue de novo. See BOLD MLP, LLP v. Smith, 
    201 So. 3d 1261
    ,
    1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
    II.
    We first consider the children’s argument that—right or
    wrong—the fee issue was already decided in the earlier appeal.
    Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, issues of law actually decided
    on appeal govern the rest of the proceedings, including subsequent
    appeals. Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 
    801 So. 2d 101
    , 105 (Fla.
    2001). So if we decided in the earlier appeal that the assignment
    and section 57.105(7) authorized a fee award, we would stick to
    that now, absent some showing of manifest injustice, see 
    id. at 106
    (noting manifest-injustice exception).
    Our unpublished order granting fees in the earlier appeal
    explained that the children moved for appellate attorney’s fees
    “pursuant to either section 768.79 [the offer-of-judgment statute]
    or section 57.105(7).” (emphasis added). The order then said,
    without elaboration, that “Appellees’ motion is granted.” For
    whatever reason, we did not specify the basis on which we granted
    appellate attorney’s fees. As a result, there is no way for us now to
    conclude that this order actually decided the issue now before us—
    whether section 57.105(7) authorized an award. Our order might
    have turned on section 57.105(7), but it might have turned on the
    offer-of-judgment statute, a statute no longer at issue. To the
    extent the lower court awarded fees based on our earlier,
    unchallenged order, that award can stand. But to the extent the
    lower court awarded fees for work in the trial court, law of the case
    will not help us, and we must decide the issue independently.
    3
    III.
    Florida law is clear that no person can claim fees under
    section 57.105(7) unless that person is a “party” to the contract
    that includes the fee provision. See Nationstar Mortg. LLC v.
    Glass, 
    219 So. 3d 896
    , 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“The plain
    language of section 57.105(7) has two requirements. First, the
    party must have prevailed. Second, the party had to be a party to
    the contract containing the fee provision.”); Fla. Cmty. Bank, 
    N.A., 197 So. 3d at 1115
    (“As section 57.105(7) plainly requires, to gain
    the benefit of its substantive entitlement to prevailing party fees,
    the party seeking the benefit of reciprocity must be a party to the
    contract containing the fee provision.”); see also Bank of New York
    Mellon Tr. Co., 
    N.A., 215 So. 3d at 119
    (“Because section 57.105(7)
    shifts the responsibility for attorney’s fees, it is in derogation of
    common law and must be strictly construed.”). Because we agree
    with Azalea Trace that it was not a party to the assignment, we
    reverse the fee award.
    The assignment document itself opens by saying it “is made”
    by Mrs. Eskin and the children. It recited that Mrs. Eskin
    “desire[d]” that any reimbursement of her entrance fee “be
    assigned to and become the property of the” children. It also made
    clear that the assignment would not modify or otherwise affect the
    underlying resident agreement: “The Resident/Assignor [Mrs.
    Eskin] and the Assignee [the children] further acknowledge and
    agree that this assignment is intended to be a separate agreement
    between the Resident/Assignor and the Assignee, and it is not
    intended to be, nor is it an amendment to the Residency Contract.”
    (emphasis added). Then, on the signature page—and under the
    line “the parties hereunto subscribe their names”—Mrs. Eskin and
    the children signed.
    To be sure, the assignment accounted for Azalea Trace’s
    involvement. The assignment had the parties “acknowledge that
    such assignment is subject to approval of Azalea Trace, Inc., in its
    sole discretion,” and it included a line (not on the parties’ signature
    page) where Azalea Trace’s executive director “approve[d] the
    forgoing assignment.” The assignment even reflected the parties’
    agreement to provide certain benefits to Azalea Trace, most
    notably the fee provision at the heart of this appeal: Mrs. Eskin
    4
    and the children “agree[d] to indemnify and hold Azalea Trace, Inc.
    harmless from any claims which may be brought and any costs or
    expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, which may be
    incurred by Azalea Trace, Inc. as a result of or otherwise in
    connection with the assignment.” But the parties’ intent to benefit
    a third party does not make the beneficiary a party to the contract.
    See Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Ctr., LLC, 
    203 So. 3d 146
    ,
    149 (Fla. 2016).
    Because Azalea Trace was not a party to the assignment, it
    cannot be held accountable for attorney’s fees under section
    57.105(7), and we reverse the trial court’s award of $27,072 in trial
    attorney’s fees. However, we reject Azalea Trace’s arguments that
    the court committed reversible error in calculating and awarding
    appellate attorney’s fees and expert costs, and we therefore affirm
    those portions of the order.
    AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
    JAY, WINSOR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Patrick Dervishi of the Shir Law Group, P.A., Boca Raton, for
    Appellant.
    Samuel W. Bearman of the Law Office of Samuel W. Bearman,
    L.C., Pensacola, for Appellees.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-0753

Citation Numbers: 249 So. 3d 699

Filed Date: 6/4/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/4/2018