STATE OF FLORIDA v. T. A. K. ( 2018 )


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  •                NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    STATE OF FLORIDA,                            )
    )
    Appellant,                      )
    )
    v.                                           )        Case No. 2D17-549
    )
    T.A.K.,                                      )
    )
    Appellee.                       )
    )
    Opinion filed March 23, 2018.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas
    County; Patrice W. Moore, Judge.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
    Tallahassee, and Kiersten E. Jensen,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
    Appellant.
    Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender,
    and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public
    Defender, Tampa, for Appellee.
    LaROSE, Chief Judge.
    The State appeals an order dismissing T.A.K.'s delinquency case due to
    the expiration of an earlier imposed probationary term. We have jurisdiction. See Fla.
    R. App. P. 9.145(c)(1)(A). We affirm.
    Background Facts
    T.A.K. pleaded guilty to the delinquent act of battery. The trial court
    withheld adjudication of delinquency and placed T.A.K. on six months' probation. The
    probationary term was to end on October 28, 2016. On September 15, 2016, the State
    filed an unsworn "Notice of violation of court order," stating that T.A.K. had failed to
    comply with his probationary requirements. The State wanted the trial court to hold
    T.A.K. in contempt for his "fail[ure] to comply with multiple sanctions required by his
    case manager." The notice specified no material facts underlying the State's request.
    The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 25, 2016.
    T.A.K. was present for that hearing before Judge Moore. However, the parties were
    unable to proceed because defense counsel represented that he might have a conflict
    of interest. Consequently, the trial court rescheduled the hearing to October 27, 2016.
    On October 26, the State filed an unsworn petition seeking to revoke T.A.K.'s probation.
    T.A.K. did not appear at the October 27 hearing. The State stated that, if
    T.A.K. were present, it was prepared to proceed on the revocation of probation.
    Nevertheless, because of the approaching October 28 expiration of T.A.K.'s
    probationary term, the State asked the trial court to extend its jurisdiction beyond
    October 28. The trial court (Judge Coleman) agreed. Judge Coleman reasoned that
    T.A.K.'s probationary term had been tolled by the State's filing of the October 26
    petition. He also concluded that tolling occurred because the revocation proceeding
    began at the October 27 hearing, prior to the termination date.
    On January 27, 2017, T.A.K. filed a motion to dismiss the petition due to
    the expiration of jurisdiction. Following a February 2, 2017, hearing, the trial court
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    (Judge Moore) granted the motion, despite Judge Coleman's earlier ruling to extend
    jurisdiction.
    State's Argument
    The State raises two arguments. First, the State contends that it properly
    filed the petition and that revocation proceedings were initiated before the October 28
    expiration of probation. Thus, according to the State, the trial court retained jurisdiction.
    Second, the State argues that the trial court impermissibly considered T.A.K.'s motion to
    dismiss, as it was in actuality an untimely motion for rehearing. See Fla. R. Juv. P.
    8.130(b)(1) (requiring a motion for rehearing "be made within 10 days of the entry of the
    order being challenged"). We reject the second argument without further comment. We
    reject the first argument, too; however, we write to explain why tolling did not apply. In
    doing so, we address the manner in which the State purported to initiate probation
    revocation proceedings against T.A.K.
    Analysis
    There is no tolling provision applicable to juvenile probation violation
    proceedings. See T.L.H. v. State, 
    93 So. 3d 396
    , 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ("We agree
    with the decision of the Fifth District that there is no provision in either the statutes or
    the rules governing juvenile delinquency proceedings that allows for tolling of probation
    upon the filing of an affidavit and the issuance of a warrant." (citing K.L.T. v. State, 
    65 So. 3d 102
     (Fla. 5th DCA 2011))); see also X.G. v. State, 
    106 So. 3d 90
    , 91 n.1 (Fla. 2d
    DCA 2013) ("X.G.'s probation was set to expire . . . on August 11, 2011, and even
    though the affidavit/petition was filed in July 2011, there is no tolling provision applicable
    to juvenile probation proceedings." (first citing R.H. v. State, 
    93 So. 3d 1166
    , 1167 (Fla.
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    2d DCA 2012); then citing T.L.H., 
    93 So. 3d at 398-99
    )). Consequently, whether the
    probation violation proceedings were initiated prior to the expiration of T.A.K.'s probation
    is of no moment. And, of course, we cannot rewrite the juvenile rules or statutes to suit
    the State.1 See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 
    789 So. 2d 320
    , 324
    (Fla. 2001) ("Under fundamental principles of separation of powers, courts cannot
    judicially alter the wording of statutes where the Legislature clearly has not done so.").
    We now address the process by which the State pursued T.A.K.'s alleged
    probation violations. Upon a probation violation, "the [Department of Juvenile Justice]
    or the state attorney may bring the child before the court on a petition alleging a
    violation of the program." § 985.439(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). We have not hesitated to
    reverse orders revoking a juvenile's probation absent a filed petition. See R.H., 
    93 So. 3d at 1167
     ("Because section 985.439(1)(b) and [Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure]
    8.120(a)(3) both require either the State or the DJJ to file a petition alleging a violation
    of juvenile probation before revocation proceedings can occur and because no petition
    was filed in this case, we conclude that R.H.'s probation expired prior to the revocation
    hearing."); T.L.H., 
    93 So. 3d at 398-99
     (holding that, in the absence of a violation
    petition, the complaint filed by the arresting officer was insufficient to initiate revocation
    proceedings). Here, the state attorney filed a petition.
    However, that is not the end. Rule 8.120(a)(2) provides in pertinent part
    as follows: "Any proceeding alleging a violation shall be initiated by the filing of a sworn
    1Interestingly,  in early January 2017, T.A.K.'s juvenile probation officer
    filed a written recommendation "to withdraw[] the contempt of court" because
    "jurisdiction was lost for the battery case." Apparently, the State did not heed this
    advice.
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    affidavit of the material facts supporting the allegation(s). The affidavit shall be
    executed by the child’s juvenile probation officer or other person having actual
    knowledge of the facts." See also T.L.H., 
    93 So. 3d at 398
     ("Florida Rule of Juvenile
    Procedure 8.120, dealing with revocation of juvenile probation, provides that a
    proceeding alleging a violation of probation shall be initiated by the filing of a sworn
    affidavit executed by the child's juvenile probation officer 'or other person having the
    actual knowledge of the facts.' " (quoting Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.120(a)(2))); M.T. v. State, 
    805 So. 2d 898
    , 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("With regard to juveniles, any proceeding alleging
    a violation of probation shall be initiated by the filing of a sworn affidavit of the material
    facts supporting the allegations." (citing Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.120(a)(2))). Rule 8.120 also
    specifies that "[w]hen revocation proceedings are sought by the state attorney . . . the
    proceedings shall be initiated by the filing of a petition alleging violation of juvenile
    probation. The petition shall incorporate and reference the affidavit described in
    subdivision (a)(2)." Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.120(a)(3) (emphasis added).
    The State's petition neither incorporated nor referenced the required
    affidavit. And for good reason. Our record reflects that no such affidavit was ever filed.
    Accordingly, the State's effort to initiate revocation proceedings against T.A.K. never
    really started, despite its seeming knowledge for more than a month that T.A.K. was
    allegedly in violation of probation. Cf. T.L.H. 
    93 So. 3d at 399
     ("Both the DJJ and the
    State had over thirty days in which to file a petition, attach the complaint filed by the
    deputy sheriff, and have it served on the child (whose location was known), before the
    expiration of his probation. Neither took that action and . . . none of the statutory and
    rule requirements governing juvenile violation of probation proceedings had been met.").
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    T.A.K.'s case is analogous to D.T.M. v. State, 
    46 So. 3d 623
     (Fla. 5th DCA
    2010). In D.T.M., the Fifth District granted the juvenile's habeas petition and ordered
    that the juvenile be released from commitment and reinstated to probation.2 
    Id. at 624
    .
    The court reasoned that "[t]he plain language of rule 8.120 requires a sworn affidavit";
    and because none had been filed, the trial court improperly found that he was in
    violation of his probation. 
    Id. at 623-24
    .
    Similar to D.T.M., we see no affidavit in our record. We are faced with an
    unsworn notice and an unsworn petition. As noted earlier, the affidavit must be
    executed by either "the child’s juvenile probation officer or other person having actual
    knowledge of the facts." Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.120(a)(2). That did not happen.
    Further, the State's contention that its initiation of the probation revocation
    proceedings on October 27 tolled expiration of T.A.K.'s probation bears closer scrutiny.
    The State insists that tolling occurred because it had "filed a violation of probation
    petition on October 26th and was ready to proceed on the petition at the revocation
    hearing scheduled for October 27th."
    Be that as it may, as noted earlier, there is no tolling applicable here.
    Moreover, we emphasize that the State failed to file an accompanying affidavit. "Among
    the minimal requirements of due process in a revocation proceeding is written notice of
    the alleged violation." M.T., 
    805 So. 2d at
    899 (citing Burton v. State, 
    651 So. 2d 793
    (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)). In M.T., this court reversed the order revoking the juvenile's
    2The   D.T.M. court stated that "[t]his order is without prejudice to the
    initiation of a proper revocation hearing." Id. at 624. The juvenile's probation had not
    yet expired at the time the D.T.M. opinion issued. In contrast, T.A.K.'s probation
    termination date expired prior to entry of the order now on appeal.
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    probation, concluding that in the absence of a properly filed affidavit under rule
    8.120(a)(2), "the appellant did not receive proper notice of the claimed violation that was
    to serve as the basis for the revocation of his community control, he was not afforded
    due process." Id. (citing State v. Spratling, 
    336 So. 2d 361
     (Fla. 1976)). Similarly, due
    to the State's failure to file an affidavit, T.A.K. lacked adequate notice of the claimed
    violations. We will not, in this case, sacrifice due process for the sake of equitable
    tolling in favor of the State. Cf. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 
    790 So. 2d 1071
    ,
    1076 n.11 (Fla. 2001) ("Equitable tolling, which involves no misconduct on the part of
    the defendant, may delay the running of the limitations period based on the plaintiff's
    blameless ignorance and the lack of prejudice to the defendant." (citing Machules v.
    Dep't of Admin., 
    523 So. 2d 1132
     (Fla. 1988))).
    Conclusion
    Because the State failed to follow the mandated process through which
    T.A.K. could be brought before the trial court to answer for the alleged probation
    violations, T.A.K.'s probationary term expired on October 28. Therefore, the trial court
    properly dismissed the State's petition for violation of probation.
    Affirmed.
    KHOUZAM and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.
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