VIRGINIA GIUFFRE v. BRADLEY J. EDWARDS , 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 12473 ( 2017 )


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  •         DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    VIRGINIA GIUFFRE,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BRADLEY J. EDWARDS, PAUL G. CASSELL, and ALAN DERSHOWITZ,
    Appellees.
    No. 4D16-1847
    [August 30, 2017]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Thomas Lynch, Judge; L.T. Case No. 15-000072 CACE
    (05).
    Sigrid S. McCawley of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale,
    and Jon L. Mills, Miami, for appellant.
    Bruce S. Rogow and Tara A. Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort
    Lauderdale; and Richard A. Simpson of Wiley Rein LLP, Washington,
    D.C., for appellee Alan Dershowitz.
    CIKLIN, J.
    Virginia Giuffre, a nonparty below, appeals an order granting
    defendant Alan Dershowitz’s motion to strike her various motions for
    sanctions. The order on appeal was entered following a voluntary
    dismissal of the case. In the order, the trial court held that it lacked
    jurisdiction to consider Giuffre’s previously filed motions for sanctions
    because the matter had been voluntarily dismissed and further that
    Giuffre lacked standing to file the motions for sanctions to begin with.
    We agree with Giuffre’s contention that the trial court erred in
    determining that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the sanctions
    motions. We affirm, however, the trial court’s correct conclusion that
    Giuffre lacked standing.
    This appeal arises from a defamation action. In an action prior to the
    defamation action, Attorneys Edwards and Cassell represented Giuffre,
    and Dershowitz represented Jeffrey Epstein.        In the action below,
    Giuffre’s attorneys asserted a defamation claim against Dershowitz based
    on statements Dershowitz made in the prior action. Dershowitz asserted
    a counterclaim for defamation based on the attorneys’ statements in the
    prior action that Dershowitz personally perpetrated criminal acts against
    Giuffre.
    Giuffre’s participation in discovery was compelled in the defamation
    action insofar as Dershowitz issued a subpoena for her deposition. As an
    apparent consequence, Giuffre’s counsel was present for some
    proceedings in the defamation action, including Dershowitz’s deposition.
    At his deposition, Dershowitz sought to reveal communications between
    himself and Attorney Boies, who also represented Giuffre. Giuffre
    objected multiple times and contended those were confidential settlement
    communications. Giuffre and Dershowitz agreed to raise the issue with
    the trial court.
    Dershowitz then moved in limine to overrule Giuffre’s objections,
    contending the contested communications were not settlement
    communications. To his motion, he attached an affidavit outlining his
    meetings and conversations with Boies.
    The same day that the motion in limine was filed, Giuffre filed an
    emergency motion to seal the affidavit, alleging that the statements
    therein were confidential settlement negotiations and alleging that
    Dershowitz was aware of Giuffre’s ongoing objection to the revelation of
    the communications at issue. Shortly thereafter, The New York Times
    published an article that included some of the contents of the affidavit.
    Thereupon, Giuffre moved to strike the affidavit and Dershowitz’s
    pleadings and moved to impose sanctions against Dershowitz.
    At a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted the emergency
    motion to seal the affidavit, but reserved ruling on the motion for
    sanctions against Dershowitz (and on the underlying motion in limine).
    Dershowitz’s deposition continued approximately one month later, at
    which point he gave testimony that, according to Giuffre’s allegations,
    again described confidential settlement negotiations with Giuffre’s
    counsel. Giuffre’s counsel at the deposition objected and then filed a
    supplemental motion to strike and for further sanctions based on the
    deposition testimony, alleging that Dershowitz violated the order sealing
    the affidavit. Dershowitz moved to strike Giuffre’s sanctions motions.
    Thereafter, the parties to the lawsuit filed a stipulation of dismissal
    with prejudice. At the hearing on Dershowitz’s motion to strike, he
    contended the court was divested of jurisdiction when the parties filed
    2
    the stipulation of dismissal, and, regardless, Giuffre was a nonparty and
    lacked standing in the proceedings. The trial court agreed and entered
    an order concluding, “Even if defendant Dershowitz willfully violated this
    Court’s order, the Court has no jurisdiction to consider the motion for
    sanctions, and further, [Giuffre] lacks standing in this case.”
    The Trial Court’s Continuing Jurisdiction
    Generally, a trial court’s determination on jurisdiction is reviewed de
    novo. See Sanchez v. Fernandez, 
    915 So. 2d 192
    , 192 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2005).
    A trial court’s jurisdiction ends with the termination of litigation.
    Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 
    484 So. 2d 1221
    , 1223 (Fla. 1986). Florida
    Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1) governs the voluntary dismissal of
    actions by parties and provides that an action is dismissed upon the
    filing of a joint stipulation of dismissal:
    [A]n action . . . may be dismissed by plaintiff without order of
    court (A) before trial by serving, or during trial by stating on
    the record, a notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing
    on motion for summary judgment, or if none is served or if
    the motion is denied, before retirement of the jury in a case
    tried before a jury or before submission of a nonjury case to
    the court for decision, or (B) by filing a stipulation of
    dismissal signed by all current parties to the action.
    Thus, the effect of a voluntary dismissal under rule 1.420(a) “is to remove
    completely from the court’s consideration the power to enter an order,
    equivalent in all respects to a deprivation of ‘jurisdiction’.” Randle-E.
    Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 
    360 So. 2d 68
    , 69 (Fla. 1978).
    Of course, there are numerous exceptions to this deprivation of
    jurisdiction, including those enumerated in Florida Rule of Civil
    Procedure 1.540 and jurisdiction to enforce a final judgment or
    stipulation of dismissal, Broadband Engineering, Inc. v. Quality RF
    Services, Inc., 
    450 So. 2d 600
    , 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
    Pertinent to the issue at hand, even after resolution of a lawsuit by
    way of final judgment or stipulation of dismissal, the trial court retains
    jurisdiction to resolve “collateral matters such as taxation of costs and
    prevailing party attorney’s fees.” See Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp.,
    
    651 So. 2d 701
    , 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). “A motion for sanctions
    seeking attorney’s fees and reasonable expenses as a result of discovery
    3
    abuses and alleged violations of court orders properly falls within the
    exception to the rule as an independent and collateral claim.” 
    Id.
    In Amlan, after final judgment had been entered, the plaintiffs moved
    for attorney’s fees as a sanction for the defendant’s misconduct in
    discovery. 
    Id. at 702
    . The trial court granted the motion and on appeal,
    this court affirmed, reasoning:
    An award of attorney’s fees and costs is ancillary to, and
    does not interfere with, the subject matter of the appeal, and
    thus, is incidental to the main adjudication. [McGurn v.
    Scott, 
    596 So. 2d 1042
    , 1044 (Fla. 1992)]. On the other
    hand, prejudgment interest, as an element of damages
    directly related to the main issues in controversy, is not
    properly considered after the entry of a final judgment. . . .
    Monetary sanctions for discovery abuses are not an
    element of damages, but constitute a collateral and
    independent claim for attorney’s fees and costs arising from
    litigation-related discovery abuses. . . . [A] motion for
    sanctions for pretrial discovery abuses filed after the entry of
    a final judgment may be appropriately considered by the trial
    court.
    Id. at 704.
    In addition to retaining jurisdiction over independent and collateral
    claims, it is axiomatic and inherent that a trial court retains jurisdiction
    to enforce its own orders, subject, of course, to review by courts of higher
    rank. See Erickson v. Erickson, 
    998 So. 2d 1182
    , 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2008); see also Cooter v. Hartmarx Corp., 
    496 U.S. 384
    , 396 (1990) (“A
    court may make an adjudication of contempt and impose a contempt
    sanction even after the action in which the contempt arose has been
    terminated.”); Pino v. Bank of N.Y., 
    121 So. 3d 23
    , 41 (Fla. 2013) (holding
    a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to resolve a pending motion for
    sanctions under section 57.105 regardless of a plaintiff’s voluntary
    dismissal of case); Whitby v. Infinity Radio, Inc., 
    961 So. 2d 349
    , 353 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2007) (finding that, after entry of final judgment, trial court
    retained ancillary jurisdiction to enforce contempt order that was entered
    prior to judgment).
    Giuffre’s sanctions motions were—by definition—“collateral” and
    “independent” matters. Her claims were ancillary to and did not interfere
    with the subject defamation claims between Dershowitz and Edwards
    4
    and Cassell or the dismissal of those claims. Consequently, the trial
    court retained jurisdiction to entertain the sanctions motions—and never
    lost it.
    The Nonparty’s Standing
    Despite the trial court’s error in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to
    enforce its previously entered orders, we nonetheless affirm due to the
    trial court’s accurate conclusion that Giuffre lacked standing. Standing
    is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. See Circle Villas Condo.
    Ass’n v. Circle Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 
    957 So. 2d 1207
    , 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2007).
    “Any litigant must demonstrate that he or she has standing to invoke
    the power of the court to determine the merits of an issue.” Vaughan v.
    First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 
    740 So. 2d 1216
    , 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
    “Standing depends on whether a party has a sufficient stake in a
    justiciable controversy, with a legally cognizable interest which would be
    affected by the outcome of the litigation.” Weiss v. Johansen, 
    898 So. 2d 1009
    , 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). “The interest cannot be conjectural or
    merely hypothetical[,]” 
    id.,
     nor can it be “indirect, inconsequential, or
    contingent,” Sweetwater Country Club Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Huskey Co.,
    
    613 So. 2d 936
    , 939 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
    The Florida Supreme Court has identified three minimal requirements
    for standing:
    There are three requirements that constitute the
    irreducible constitutional minimum for standing. First, a
    plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact, which is
    concrete, distinct and palpable, and actual or imminent.
    Second, a plaintiff must establish a causal connection
    between the injury and the conduct complained of. Third, a
    plaintiff must show a substantial likelihood that the
    requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.
    State v. J.P., 
    907 So. 2d 1101
    , 1113 n.4 (Fla. 2004) (citations and
    quotation marks omitted).
    Generally, a nonparty does not have standing to request relief from
    the court. Whiteside v. Sch. Bd. of Escambia Cty., 
    798 So. 2d 859
    , 859-
    60 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
    Persons who are not parties of record to a suit have no
    5
    standing therein which will enable them to take part in or
    control the proceedings. If they have occasion to ask relief in
    relation to the matters involved, they must either contrive to
    obtain the status of parties in such suit or they must
    institute an independent suit.
    Warshaw-Seattle, Inc. v. Clark, 
    85 So. 2d 623
    , 625 (Fla. 1955) (citation
    omitted). An exception to the general rule exists for situations involving
    discovery from a nonparty. See Whiteside, 798 So. 2d at 860; Fla. R. Civ.
    P. 1.410(c) (permitting the addressee of a subpoena to move to “quash or
    modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive”); Fla. R. Civ.
    P. 1.280(c) (permitting a nonparty to move for a protective order against
    discovery for protection from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
    undue burden or expense”).
    Consistent with the general rule, Giuffre did not have standing in the
    proceedings below, despite her feasible stake in the outcome of the
    proceedings. In accordance with J.P., Giuffre cannot meet the third of
    the minimum requirements. That is, that the requested relief will
    remedy the alleged injury. 1
    Consequently, the trial court did not err in concluding that Giuffre
    lacked standing and we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    TAYLOR and MAY, JJ., concur.
    *         *          *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    1 Giuffre alleges that Dershowitz violated his agreement to keep their settlement
    communications confidential and that his actions damaged her reputation. The
    relief she requested below included the striking of Dershowitz’s pleadings, or at
    least his affidavit, from the record, attorney’s fees and costs, and
    admonishment of Dershowitz against any further violations of his
    confidentiality obligations. Dershowitz’s claims and pleadings were effectively
    withdrawn when he stipulated to dismissal of the case, cf. Florida Rule of Civil
    Procedure 1.420(a)(1), so striking of the pleadings was no longer an available
    remedy. Further, attorney’s fees and costs and admonishment against future
    revelations are unlikely to remedy the injury of damage to Giuffre’s reputation,
    particularly considering the previous publication of the communications.
    6