TIMOTHY T. BAKER v. STATE OF FLORIDA , 250 So. 3d 122 ( 2018 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    TIMOTHY T. BAKER,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3331
    [June 27, 2018]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; Samantha Schosberg Feuer, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    502016CF008356AXXXMB.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Timothy Wang, Assistant
    Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman,
    Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    DAMOORGIAN, J.
    Appellant, Timothy Baker, appeals his judgment and sentence for one
    count of felon in possession of a firearm and one count of possession of
    cocaine. Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial and/or
    sentencing hearing because: 1) the State improperly introduced evidence
    that the vehicle he occupied at the time of his arrest was stolen; 2) the
    prosecutor improperly bolstered the credibility of the arresting officer
    during closing argument; and 3) the court relied on impermissible factors
    when imposing its sentence. We affirm on these issues. Appellant also
    appeals the portion of his sentence imposing a public defender fee of $200.
    On this issue, the State properly concedes error and we reverse and
    remand.
    Appellant was charged with one count of felon in possession of a
    firearm, one count of grand theft auto, and one count of possession of
    cocaine after he was found sleeping in a stolen vehicle with crack cocaine
    and a gun near his person. Pursuant to Appellant’s request, the felon in
    possession charge was severed and tried independently. The jury found
    Appellant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After a careful
    review of the record, we hold that no reversible error occurred during the
    trial.
    In anticipation of sentencing, the State filed a written sentencing
    memorandum wherein it argued that, based on the fact Appellant acquired
    twelve felony and nine misdemeanor convictions by the age of twenty-
    three, the maximum sentence of ten years for the felon in possession of a
    firearm conviction was appropriate. In its memorandum and again at the
    sentencing hearing, the State represented that Appellant was released
    from prison for the offense of being a delinquent in possession of a firearm
    a mere forty-seven days before he was arrested in the instant case. A prior
    conviction for delinquent in possession of a firearm was reflected on
    Appellant’s scoresheet and Appellant’s counsel agreed that his scoresheet
    was accurate. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court
    sentenced Appellant to ten years in prison with a three-year minimum
    mandatory on the felon in possession charge. In doing so, the court
    reasoned:
    [T]he severity of the offense increases with the length and
    nature of the offender’s prior record. Now you, know, twelve
    prior convictions included the most recent conviction . . .
    where the defendant served eighteen months in the
    Department of Corrections for a delinquent in possession of a
    firearm. . . . And that was forty-seven days—he was released
    forty-seven days before the date of the offense in the case. So,
    you know, obviously I’ve taken his prior record into
    consideration, as well as the severity of the primary offense.
    In conjunction with this sentence, the court also entered a $100 public
    defender fee lien. Thereafter, the State nolle prossed the grand theft auto
    charge and Appellant pled guilty to the remaining possession of cocaine
    charge. The court sentenced Appellant to time served on the possession
    of cocaine charge and entered another $100 public defender fee lien.
    On appeal, Appellant argues that this Court should remand for
    resentencing because the State did not offer any proof substantiating its
    claim that Appellant was recently released from prison for the offense of
    being a delinquent in possession of a firearm. Appellant cites to no
    authority establishing that the State must offer proof of a defendant’s prior
    release date when the underlying conviction is not in dispute and the
    release date is not being used to prove eligibility for an enhanced sentence.
    Indeed, it was entirely proper for the State to advise the court about
    Appellant’s undisputed criminal history. See § 921.002(1)(d), Fla. Stat.
    2
    (2017) (providing that under the Criminal Punishment Code, “[t]he severity
    of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender’s prior
    record”). Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to resentencing.
    With regard to the public defender fees, section 938.29 of the Florida
    Statutes (2017) governs attorney’s fee liability for a criminal defendant who
    receives assistance from the public defender’s office. For cases involving
    a felony, sub-section 938.29(1)(a) provides that “fees and costs shall be set
    . . . at no less than $100 per case.” A court may impose a higher fee, but
    “there must be evidence of the higher fees or costs and the trial court must
    make factual findings thereon. Also in the event of higher fees, the
    defendant must be notified of his right to a hearing to contest the fees.”
    Alexis v. State, 
    211 So. 3d 81
    , 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
    Here, the court imposed a total of $200 in public defender fees in the
    same case without evidence supporting that amount, without making any
    factual findings as to the amount, and without informing Appellant of his
    right to challenge the fees. Therefore, we are compelled to reverse and
    remand for the trial court to either vacate the second $100 fee lien or “to
    hold a hearing with proper notice to obtain evidence in support of a public
    defender fee in an amount greater than the statutory minimum.” 
    Id.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
    KUNTZ, J., and FAHNESTOCK, FABIENNE, Associate Judge, concur.
    *        *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-3331

Citation Numbers: 250 So. 3d 122

Filed Date: 6/27/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/27/2018