Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed February 8, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D22-2146
Lower Tribunal No. 20-19229
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Luis A. Padron,
Petitioner,
vs.
Alysendrina Padron,
Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.
Kaplan Loebl, LLC, and Amanda B. Haberman and Liliana Loebl, for
petitioner.
Velegal PLLC, and Laline Concepcion-Veloso, for respondent.
Before EMAS, LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.
EMAS, J.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Luis A. Padron, Former Husband, filed a petition for writ of
prohibition, asserting that the trial court acted without continuing jurisdiction
in sua sponte vacating a portion of a final judgment of dissolution of
marriage. We agree and, for the reasons that follow, we quash the trial
court’s sua sponte vacatur order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The salient facts do not appear to be in dispute: The underlying matter
is a dissolution of marriage proceeding between the parties, who together
share three children. On September 20, 2022, the parties executed a Marital
Settlement Agreement and Parenting Plan (MSA). Two of the three children
were minors at the time of the MSA. Pursuant to the terms of the MSA, the
parties agreed to continue utilizing the appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) to
assist the parties in performing the agreed upon timesharing schedule.
Two days later, on September 22, 2022, the trial court entered a Final
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, which ratified, approved, and
incorporated the terms of the parties' MSA. In ratifying the MSA, the Final
Judgment provides: “The Court finds that the Agreement was executed
voluntarily by the parties, that it is fair and reasonable and that it is in the
best interest of the parties and their minor children."
2
Neither party sought rehearing, filed a notice of appeal, filed a
supplemental petition for modification, or moved to vacate or modify the final
judgment. However, on September 29, 2022, the GAL filed a request for a
case management conference, which stated merely: “Guardian ad Litem for
the minor children hereby requests that the Court set a case management
conference in this matter under Fla.Fam.L.R.12.200.” The request
contained no allegations and did not provide any factual or legal basis for the
request. No other pleading, motion or other paper was filed by either party.
On October 21, 2022, twenty-nine days after entry of the final judgment
and more than three weeks after the GAL’s request, the trial court held a
hearing. The record contains no transcript of that hearing; however, on that
same day, the trial court entered a “Uniform Order Setting Non-Jury Trial” for
March 6 and a separate order setting non-jury trial for March 7, 2023, as
well. On November 28, 2022 (more than sixty days after entry of the final
judgment) the trial court entered an order entitled “Temporary Vacating
Portion of Final Judgment Dealing with Children’s Issues.” The vacatur order
states, in its entirety: “The Court's Motion to partially vacate the portion of
the final judgment dealing with children issues is granted.”
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Former Husband requested a stay of the trial court proceedings
pending appeal, which the trial court denied. This petition for writ of
prohibition followed.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
It is apodictic that a “writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy to
prevent a trial court from proceeding in a cause over which it no longer has
jurisdiction.” Renovaship, Inc. v. Quatremain,
208 So. 3d 280, 282 n.1 (Fla.
3d DCA 2016) (citing English v. McCrary,
348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977) and
Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc.,
193 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)). The
writ is available to prevent the improper exercise not only of subject-matter
jurisdiction, but so-called “continuing jurisdiction” (also termed “case
jurisdiction” or “procedural jurisdiction”) as well. Renovaship,
208 So. 3d at
283 n. 6, 287 (discussing distinction between subject-matter and continuing
jurisdiction; and issuing writ of prohibition upon determination that “trial court
was without continuing jurisdiction to vacate the prior dismissal order and
reinstate the action”); Sanchez v. Sanchez,
285 So. 3d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA
2019). See also Stokes v. Jones,
319 So. 3d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
(“While prohibition is often used in cases where a court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction, it is also used where the lower court had subject
matter jurisdiction but no longer has jurisdiction over the case—sometimes
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referred to as ‘case jurisdiction’”); Baden v. Baden,
260 So. 3d 1108 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2018) (granting prohibition where trial court continued to exercise
jurisdiction over a trust case after plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed action);
Tobkin v. State,
777 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (granting
prohibition where complaint had been voluntarily dismissed, thereby
divesting the court of “case jurisdiction” to proceed on the matter); Wolfe v.
Newton,
310 So. 3d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Prohibition may be
appropriate where, as here, a trial court that had subject matter jurisdiction
attempts to exercise an unreserved power to adjudicate further substantive
matters when a case has definitively concluded").
And as we held in Ross v. Damas, 31 So. 3d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d DCA
2010), “after entry of a final judgment and expiration of time to file a motion
for rehearing or for a new trial, the trial court loses jurisdiction of the case . .
. unless jurisdiction was reserved to address that matter or the issue is
allowed to be considered post-judgment by statute or under a provision of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.”
While properly acknowledging the trial court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the post-judgment dissolution proceeding, Former Husband
contends that once the time had passed for rehearing or new trial under
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Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.530, 1 the trial court no longer had
continuing jurisdiction to enter an order sua sponte vacating the final
judgment (or a portion thereof) in the absence of a reservation of jurisdiction
in the final judgment, a supplemental petition for modification, or a pleading
that satisfied the narrow requirements of Florida Family Law Rules of
Procedure 12.540. We agree.
While Former Wife suggests that the trial court had the authority to
enter the sua sponte vacatur order based on “newly-discovered evidence,”
see rule 12.540(b)(5),2 neither the record nor the vacatur order contains any
1
Rule 12.530(b), which is modeled after Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.530, provides:
A motion for new trial or for rehearing must be served not later
than 15 days after the return of the verdict in a jury action or the
date of filing of the judgment in a non-jury action.
In addition, rule 12.530(d) provides:
Not later than 15 days after entry of judgment or within the time
of ruling on a timely motion for a rehearing or a new trial made
by a party, the court of its own initiative may order a rehearing or
a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a
rehearing or a new trial on motion of a party.
2
Rule 12.540(b)(2), which is modeled after Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.540(b)(2), provides:
On motion and on such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
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allegation, discussion or finding of the existence of any such evidence or that
this served as a basis for the vacatur order. Indeed, neither party filed any
pleading, motion or petition seeking to modify or vacate the final judgment. 3
Nor did the guardian ad litem do so, instead filing a one-sentence request
for a case management conference without any additional allegation or
***
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing.
...
3
Of course, the trial court possesses continuing jurisdiction to enforce its
own final judgment, including the incorporated MSA, see Paulucci v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp.,
842 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2003); Demorizi v. Demorizi,
851 So.
2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Kennedy v. Kennedy,
638 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1994), and to continue to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to a proper
reservation contained in the final judgment, see Selman v. Progressive Am.
Insur. Co.,
335 So. 3d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022); Miller v. Miller,
911 So. 2d
1274 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Encarnacion v. Encarnacion,
877 So. 2d 960 (Fla.
5th DCA 2004).
In addition, we recognize that in the context of dissolution of marriage cases,
a trial may exercise continuing jurisdiction in a considerable number of post-
judgment matters. For example, the trial court has the authority, pursuant to
sections 61.13 and 61.14, Florida Statutes (2022)—under certain
circumstances not present here—to modify the parenting plan of the child,
the terms and conditions of child support payments, and agreements or
orders regarding support, maintenance and alimony. However, the trial
court’s sua sponte vacatur order in the instant case did not fall within the
scope of any of the above categories, nor was the trial court’s order preceded
by the filing of a supplemental petition to modify the final judgment, see rule
12.110(h), or a motion for relief pursuant to rule 12.530 or rule 12.540.
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proffered basis for making such a request after final judgment had already
been entered.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court was without continuing jurisdiction at the time it
rendered its sua sponte post-judgment order vacating a portion of the final
judgment and setting this matter for nonjury trial, we grant the petition for writ
of prohibition and quash the sua sponte orders vacating a portion of the final
judgment and setting the cause for non-jury trial.
Petition granted and orders quashed.
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