Librada Gonzalez Izaguirre v. Beach Walk Resort/Travelers Insurance ( 2019 )


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  •          FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D18-1990
    _____________________________
    LIBRADA GONZALEZ IZAGUIRRE,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BEACH WALK
    RESORT/TRAVELERS INSURANCE,
    Appellees.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.
    Geraldine B. Hogan, Judge.
    Date of Accident: April 30, 2016.
    May 16, 2019
    PER CURIAM.
    Izaguirre, a workers’ compensation claimant, appeals the
    order denying benefits. The Judge of Compensation Claims
    (“JCC”) denied benefits after striking Izaguirre’s independent
    medical examiner (“IME”) report. As authority, the JCC relied on
    section 440.13(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), which requires
    parties selecting IMEs to notify all parties within fifteen days of
    the examination. “Failure to timely provide such notification shall
    preclude the requesting party from submitting the findings of such
    IME in a proceeding before a [JCC].” § 440.13(5)(a), Fla. Stat.
    (2015) (emphasis added.) Izaguirre concedes that she did not
    provide timely notice, but she argues exclusion of the evidence
    under this provision is directory, not mandatory. Thus, she argues
    the JCC erred by failing to address the discretionary factors, such
    as prejudice to the opposing party, which typically must be
    considered whenever evidence is excluded based on untimely
    disclosure. See, e.g., Med. Logistics, Inc. v. Marchines, 
    911 So. 2d 823
    , 824-25 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
    We reject Izaguirre’s characterization of the exclusionary
    language in section 440.13(5)(a), as merely directory. Based on its
    plain and ordinary meaning, the word “shall” in a statute usually
    has a mandatory connotation. See Steinbrecher v. Better Constr.
    Co., 
    587 So. 2d 492
    , 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). And, where the use
    of the word “shall” is accompanied by a penalty for failure to
    comply, a reading of the statute “leads inevitably to the conclusion
    that the provision is not amenable to an exercise of discretion.” 
    Id. (holding penalty
    for late payment of compensation is mandatory
    where statute states such penalty “shall be paid”); see also Palm
    Springs General Hosp. v. Cabrera, 
    698 So. 2d 1352
    , 1356 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 1997) (“The statutory language provides no support for the
    view that the statute is directory only, or that evaluation by expert
    medical advisors is to be left to the discretion of the judges of
    compensation claims”). Thus, because the Claimant failed to
    provide the statutorily required notice, the JCC was required to
    exclude the IME testimony.
    AFFIRMED.
    LEWIS, WINSOR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    2
    Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for
    Appellant.
    Steven H. Preston of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfeld & Stein, P.A.,
    Miami, for Appellees.
    3