Reidel E. Armas v. State ( 2018 )


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  •          IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FIFTH DISTRICT
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    REIDEL EUGENIO ARMAS,
    Appellant,
    v.                                                     Case No. 5D17-1528
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    ________________________________/
    Opinion filed June 29, 2018
    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    for St. Johns County,
    Howard M. Maltz, Judge.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Ali L.
    Hansen, Assistant Public Defender,
    Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
    Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire,
    Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
    Beach, for Appellee.
    LAMBERT, J.
    The issue that we resolve in this case is whether Appellant was placed in double
    jeopardy, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
    I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution, when he was tried and convicted upon an
    information charging him with one count of possession of cannabis in an amount
    exceeding 20 grams with the intent to sell or deliver and a second count of manufacturing
    cannabis, each being a third-degree felony in violation of section 893.13(1)(a), Florida
    Statutes (2015). For the following reasons, we conclude that no double jeopardy violation
    occurred, and we therefore affirm Appellant’s convictions.
    The pertinent facts of this case are undisputed.        During a single search of
    Appellant’s residence, law enforcement confiscated thirty-one cannabis plants from a
    bedroom and approximately one kilogram of finished, dried loose-leaf cannabis,
    packaged into six or seven plastic bags, inside a duffle bag located on the kitchen counter.
    Further, the cannabis found in the duffle bag came from the plants found in the bedroom.
    Appellant was convicted after trial of possession of cannabis with intent to sell,
    manufacture, 1 or deliver and separately for manufacturing of cannabis.
    Appellant argues that his dual convictions here violate double jeopardy principles
    because each “is predicated on indistinct conduct occurring during a single criminal
    episode” with the conduct being Appellant’s “possession of marijuana plants and
    packaged product.” The double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions
    prohibit the imposition of multiple punishments for the same criminal offense but do not
    prohibit multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same criminal
    transaction or episode if the Legislature intended to authorize separate punishments.
    Roughton v. State, 
    185 So. 3d 1207
    , 1209 (Fla. 2016) (citing Valdes v. State, 
    3 So. 3d 1067
    , 1069 (Fla. 2009)). The Florida Legislature did so when it enacted section
    775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), which provides, in pertinent part, that a person
    1The record does not show that count one of the information was ever amended
    from possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver to possession with intent to sell,
    manufacture, or deliver. There is also no record explanation or indication why the word
    “manufacture” was included in the jury instruction and verdict form on this count.
    Nevertheless, this inclusion is not significant to our analysis.
    2
    The dispositive question here is whether under section 775.021(4)(a) and without
    regard to the accusatory pleading or proof at trial, possession of cannabis with intent to
    sell, manufacture, or deliver and manufacturing of cannabis are separate offenses when
    they arose out of the same criminal transaction and are charged under the same statute.
    In Anderson v. State, 
    447 So. 2d 236
    (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the First District Court of
    Appeal held that convictions for both the manufacture of cannabis and the possession of
    the same cannabis did not violate double jeopardy because “the crime of ‘manufacture’
    does not require proof of 
    possession.” 447 So. 2d at 239-40
    . Subsequently to Anderson,
    the Florida Supreme Court held in State v. McCloud, 
    577 So. 2d 939
    (Fla. 1991), that
    there is no double jeopardy violation for the crimes of sale of cocaine and possession (or
    possession with intent to sell) of the same quantum of cocaine, rejecting the argument
    that section 775.021(4)(b) prohibits dual convictions and sentences for possession and
    sale of cocaine based on the same act because each offense contains an element that
    the other does 
    not. 577 So. 2d at 940-41
    . Shortly thereafter, the court applied the same
    analysis in holding that separate convictions and sentences for possession of a controlled
    substance and delivery of the same controlled substance 3 did not violate double jeopardy.
    Davis v. State, 
    581 So. 2d 893
    , 894 (Fla. 1991).
    Appellant was charged with violating section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2015),
    which provides, in pertinent part, that “a person may not sell, manufacture, or deliver, or
    possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.” We agree
    with the First District that there is no double jeopardy violation for possession of cannabis
    3 The two crimes occurred when the defendant handed an undercover agent one
    piece of crack cocaine.
    4
    The dispositive question here is whether under section 775.021(4)(a) and without
    regard to the accusatory pleading or proof at trial, possession of cannabis with intent to
    sell, manufacture, or deliver and manufacturing of cannabis are separate offenses when
    they arose out of the same criminal transaction and are charged under the same statute.
    In Anderson v. State, 
    447 So. 2d 236
    (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the First District Court of
    Appeal held that convictions for both the manufacture of cannabis and the possession of
    the same cannabis did not violate double jeopardy because “the crime of ‘manufacture’
    does not require proof of 
    possession.” 447 So. 2d at 239-40
    . Subsequently to Anderson,
    the Florida Supreme Court held in State v. McCloud, 
    577 So. 2d 939
    (Fla. 1991), that
    there is no double jeopardy violation for the crimes of sale of cocaine and possession (or
    possession with intent to sell) of the same quantum of cocaine, rejecting the argument
    that section 775.021(4)(b) prohibits dual convictions and sentences for possession and
    sale of cocaine based on the same act because each offense contains an element that
    the other does 
    not. 577 So. 2d at 940-41
    . Shortly thereafter, the court applied the same
    analysis in holding that separate convictions and sentences for possession of a controlled
    substance and delivery of the same controlled substance 3 did not violate double jeopardy.
    Davis v. State, 
    581 So. 2d 893
    , 894 (Fla. 1991).
    Appellant was charged with violating section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2015),
    which provides, in pertinent part, that “a person may not sell, manufacture, or deliver, or
    possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.” We agree
    with the First District that there is no double jeopardy violation for possession of cannabis
    3 The two crimes occurred when the defendant handed an undercover agent one
    piece of crack cocaine.
    4
    and manufacturing of cannabis because each offense contains an element that the other
    does not. 
    Anderson, 447 So. 2d at 239-40
    . Appellant provides no persuasive explanation
    for how his convictions for manufacturing of cannabis and possession with intent to sell,
    manufacture, or deliver the same cannabis can be a double jeopardy violation, yet there
    is no double jeopardy violation for the sale of cocaine and possession of the same cocaine
    in McCloud or the possession of cocaine and delivery of the same cocaine in Davis, nor
    can we discern any.
    Appellant separately argues that because he was charged with two violations of
    the same statute arising out of a single incident, the test to be applied in determining the
    existence of a double jeopardy violation is not the “same elements” test that is utilized
    under Blockburger when two separate statutes are being compared, but rather the
    “allowable unit of prosecution” test. See Guetzloe v. State, 
    980 So. 2d 1145
    (Fla. 5th
    DCA 2008); McKnight v. State, 
    906 So. 2d 368
    (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). This standard
    recognizes that double jeopardy is offended if multiple punishments are imposed for the
    same offense. 
    McKnight, 906 So. 2d at 371
    . In McKnight, the defendant was charged
    with two counts of first-degree vehicular homicide under section 782.071(1)(b), Florida
    Statutes (2001), for the death of two separate victims involved in a single accident. 
    Id. at 370.
    We held that the text of that specific statute, in conjunction with the State’s historic
    treatment of homicide crimes, made clear the Legislature’s intent that each victim
    constituted a separate allowable unit of prosecution and, therefore, the defendant’s
    separate convictions for vehicular homicide were not proscribed by double jeopardy
    principles. 
    Id. at 373-74.
    Subsequently, in Guetzloe, we held that one mass mailing by
    5
    the defendant in violation of Florida’s Electioneering Communication Statute 4 constituted
    only one “allowable unit of prosecution” that the legislature intended to punish and that
    double jeopardy barred multiple prosecutions for a single distribution of electioneering
    
    communications. 980 So. 2d at 1147-48
    .
    We distinguish both McKnight and Guetzloe because in those cases, we were
    addressing multiple violations of the same offense.      Here, Appellant’s two criminal
    offenses are distinguishable discrete acts that are not the same offense, even though
    both are charged under section 893.13(1)(a), because this statute proscribes alternative
    or separate forms of criminal conduct. As previously discussed, the Florida Supreme
    Court had no difficulty in applying the “separate offense” analysis under section
    775.021(4)(a) in McCloud, holding that there was no double jeopardy violation for
    convictions of the separate offenses of sale of cocaine and possession of the same
    cocaine, or in Davis, concluding that there was no double jeopardy violation for the
    delivery of cocaine and the possession of the same cocaine with the intent to sell or
    deliver because they were separate offenses. See also State v. Oliver, 
    581 So. 2d 1304
    ,
    1305 (Fla. 1991) (approving separate convictions for possession with intent to sell
    cocaine and sale of the same cocaine arising out of a single transaction). Moreover,
    under Roughton, our double jeopardy analysis pursuant to section 775.021(4) must “be
    conducted without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial, even
    where an alternative conduct statute is 
    implicated.” 185 So. 3d at 1211
    . Simply put,
    manufacturing of cannabis and possession of cannabis with intent to manufacture are
    4   § 106.1439, Fla. Stat. (2004).
    6
    separate offenses under section 775.021(4)(a), even though they have now been codified
    as crimes under the same subsection of section 893.13.
    Accordingly, we hold that Appellant’s dual convictions, even though arising out of
    the same criminal transaction or episode and involving the same cannabis, do not violate
    the prohibition against double jeopardy.     Additionally, none of the three exceptions
    contained in section 775.021(4)(b) is applicable here because neither of Appellant’s
    offenses is a lesser included offense of the other, they do not have identical elements of
    proof, and they are not degrees of the same offense. 5
    AFFIRMED.
    COHEN, C.J., and BERGER, J., concur.
    5  This exception under section 775.021(4)(b)2. prohibits a defendant from being
    punished for violating two or more degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.
    For example, the theft statute identifies three degrees of grand theft and two degrees of
    petit theft. See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005). The homicide statute identifies three degrees
    of murder, see 
    id. § 782.04,
    and the arson statute has two separate degrees. See 
    id. § 806.01;
    see also 
    Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1076
    (quoting State v. Paul, 
    934 So. 2d 1167
    , 1177-
    78 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., concurring)).
    7