Scotty Rhoden v. State of Florida ( 2022 )


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  •           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D21-2714
    _____________________________
    SCOTTY RHODEN,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Baker County.
    Mark W. Moseley, Judge.
    September 21, 2022
    PER CURIAM.
    Appellant, Scotty Rhoden, in his official capacity as the Sheriff
    of Baker County, appeals the trial court’s Order Granting Petition
    for Writ of Mandamus in favor of Appellee, the State of Florida.
    The parties stipulated below that Donald Shrowder, who is not a
    party to these proceedings, was convicted of battery and sentenced
    to serve sixty days in the Baker County Jail. Sheriff Rhoden
    released Shrowder from jail under electronic monitored
    supervision after he had served only four days of his sixty-day jail
    sentence, instructing him to remain on electronic monitoring at his
    home or at his place of employment for sixty days. The parties
    further stipulated that the Sheriff had released Shrowder on
    electronic monitoring without court authorization and in the
    absence of an administrative order within the Eighth Judicial
    Circuit that would have allowed the release. The trial court
    granted the State’s ensuing mandamus petition and directed the
    Sheriff to return Shrowder from electronic monitored release to the
    custody of the jail so he could serve the sixty-day jail sentence the
    court had imposed. The order was stayed pending this appeal.
    We affirm the trial court’s order granting the petition for writ
    of mandamus because the Sheriff, as a constitutional officer within
    the executive branch of government, had a ministerial duty to
    implement the sentence imposed by the court. Cf. Pearson v.
    Moore, 
    767 So. 2d 1235
    , 1238–39 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), approved
    and remanded, 
    789 So. 2d 316
     (Fla. 2001) (stating that sentencing
    “is an exclusively judicial function” that is the “power, obligation,
    and prerogative of the courts” and that the Department of
    Corrections “is an executive branch agency charged with faithfully
    implementing sentences imposed by the courts” and “lacks the
    power . . . to add or delete sentencing conditions”); Chandler v. Fla.
    Dep’t of Corr., 
    308 So. 3d 219
    , 219–20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“DOC’s
    ministerial duty is to implement those [unambiguous] sentences
    as written.” (citation omitted)).
    AFFIRMED.
    LEWIS, TANENBAUM, and LONG, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Cord Byrd, Atlantic Beach, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee; Brian S. Kramer,
    State Attorney, Gainesville, for Appellee.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-2714

Filed Date: 9/21/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2022