IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
ALAN D. TAYLOR,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D18-295
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed June 8, 2018
3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Putnam County,
Scott C. Dupont, Judge.
Alan D. Taylor, Daytona Beach, pro se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Rebecca Roark Wall,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
LAMBERT, J.
Alan D. Taylor appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief
filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Taylor’s sole ground for relief
asserted in his motion was that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convey to him
the State’s favorable plea offer. Because this claim was not sufficiently pleaded, we
reverse the postconviction court’s order and remand to allow Taylor an opportunity to
amend his motion.
In 2004, following a jury trial, Taylor was convicted of planting a hoax bomb and
robbery. He was sentenced to serve fifteen years in prison on each count, with the
sentences running concurrently on each count, but consecutively to a lengthy prison
sentence that Taylor was serving out of Alachua County. Taylor’s convictions and
sentences were affirmed on direct appeal without opinion. See Taylor v. State,
923 So.
2d 1184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
In June 2017, Taylor filed the present motion alleging that in August 2015, he first
became aware of a plea offer made by the State to his counsel shortly before trial in which
the State offered to resolve the case with Taylor serving a thirteen-year prison sentence
on count one, to run concurrently with his Alachua County prison sentence, and serving
two years in prison on count two, consecutively to his prison sentence from Alachua
County. Taylor averred that his counsel never informed him about this plea offer “at any
time before, during, or after trial.”
The postconviction court ordered the State to respond to Taylor’s motion, which it
did. The State asserted that Taylor’s motion was untimely under rule 3.850 because it
was filed more than two years after his judgment and sentence became final and Taylor
could not show under the rule 3.850(b)(1) newly discovered fact exception to this two-
year filing requirement that he could not have discovered the aforementioned plea offer
by the exercise of due diligence. In denying Taylor’s motion, the court agreed with the
State that Taylor “was less than diligent in his untimely pursuit.”
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REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
COHEN, C.J., and EDWARDS, J., concur.
3.850(f)(5). Otherwise, an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the motion, including
determining whether Taylor exercised due diligence in discovering the plea offer. The
present order had no record attachments. Second, the court’s indication in its denial order
that Taylor essentially failed to establish under Wright v. State,
857 So. 2d 861 (Fla.
2003), that “the newly discovered evidence is of such a nature as to probably produce an
acquittal” has no application here as Taylor’s “newly discovered” claim is based upon an
allegedly undisclosed plea offer. See Petit-Homme v. State,
205 So. 3d 848, 849 (Fla.
4th DCA 2016) (reversing a summary denial of a newly discovered plea offer claim and
remanding for further proceedings to address whether the defendant could have learned
of the offer within the two-year time limit of rule 3.850).
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REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
COHEN, C.J., and EDWARDS, J., concur.
3.850(f)(5). Otherwise, an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the motion, including
determining whether Taylor exercised due diligence in discovering the plea offer. The
present order had no record attachments. Second, the court’s indication in its denial order
that Taylor essentially failed to establish under Wright v. State,
857 So. 2d 861 (Fla.
2003), that “the newly discovered evidence is of such a nature as to probably produce an
acquittal” has no application here as Taylor’s “newly discovered” claim is based upon an
allegedly undisclosed plea offer. See Petit-Homme v. State,
205 So. 3d 848, 849 (Fla.
4th DCA 2016) (reversing a summary denial of a newly discovered plea offer claim and
remanding for further proceedings to address whether the defendant could have learned
of the offer within the two-year time limit of rule 3.850).
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