Tyrone Williams v. State of Florida , 189 So. 3d 288 ( 2016 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
TYRONE WILLIAMS, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D15-5716
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed April 12, 2016.
An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Mark W. Moseley, Judge.
Tyrone Williams, pro se, Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
LEWIS, J.
Appellant, Tyrone Williams, appeals the denial of his motion to correct
illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). For
the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order denying relief and certify conflict
with the Fifth District’s opinion in Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2014).
Appellant was convicted of sexual battery by use of force not likely to cause
serious personal injury, a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years’
imprisonment. §§ 775.082(3)(c); 794.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). Appellant was
sentenced to life imprisonment as a dangerous sexual felony offender (“DSFO”)
pursuant to section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (2009). Appellant contends that his
life sentence as a DSFO 1 is illegal. He relies on Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d
462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), which held that pursuant to section 794.0115(6), where
the minimum mandatory required by section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (2009),
exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by section 775.082(3)(c), the trial court
is limited to imposing a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory, and a life sentence
is not authorized. However, based upon the plain language of section 794.0115,
we disagree with the Fifth District’s holding in Wilkerson. See Williams v. State,
121 So. 3d 524, 530 (Fla. 2013) (noting that the plain and ordinary meaning of the
words of a statute must control and that when a statute is clear, a court need not
look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of
statutory construction to ascertain intent).
Section 794.0115(2), Florida Statutes (2009), states that a DSFO “must be
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years imprisonment up to, and
including, life imprisonment.” Section 794.0115(6) mandates that if the minimum
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Appellant does not challenge his DSFO designation.
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mandatory term of section 794.0115 exceeds the statutory maximum authorized by
section 775.082, the minimum mandatory term must be imposed. The plain
language of the statute makes the DSFO minimum mandatory sentence any term
between twenty-five years and life in prison, as the statute specifically states that
the minimum mandatory is “25 years imprisonment up to, and including, life
imprisonment.” § 794.0115(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). There is no
restriction on the length of the minimum mandatory that may be imposed, other
than that it must be between twenty-five years and life. Thus, a minimum
mandatory life sentence is authorized by section 794.0115 regardless of the
statutory maximum of the crime.
This Court has read a similar “25 to life” provision, section 775.087(2)(a)3.,
Florida Statutes, to permit the imposition of a life sentence for a second-degree
felony. In Flowers v. State, 69 So. 3d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), this Court
held that pursuant to the 10-20-life statute, which requires a minimum mandatory
term of “not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in
prison” when a defendant discharges a firearm and causes great bodily harm or
death, the trial court could impose any minimum mandatory term between twenty-
five years and life for a defendant convicted of a second-degree felony. This Court
specifically rejected the argument that section 775.087(2)(a)3. limits the minimum
mandatory period to twenty-five years for a second-degree felony. Id. This
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Court’s reasoning in Flowers applies to section 794.0115 as well. Appellant’s
minimum mandatory life sentence as a dangerous sexual felony offender is legal as
it is specifically authorized by section 794.0115. We recognize that this holding
conflicts with the Fifth District’s opinion in Wilkerson, and we certify conflict with
that decision.
AFFIRMED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.
THOMAS, J., CONCURS; MAKAR, J., CONCURS WITH OPINION.
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MAKAR, J., concurring.
I concur fully, noting that the Fifth District’s decision in Wilkerson v. State,
143 So. 3d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), cannot stand unless our supreme court
revisits and changes course from its decision in Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d
740, 750 (Fla. 2010), whose holding our court applied to validate the trial court’s
discretionary imposition of a “minimum mandatory life term” in Flowers v. State,
69 So. 3d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Reasonable alternative interpretations
of the sentencing statutes at issue in these cases exist, resulting in the 4-3 decision
in Mendenhall as well as the interpretive conflict between this case and Wilkerson
(which did not mention Mendenhall). Absent resolution of the conflict, trial judges
across Florida will lack uniform guidance on their sentencing discretion resulting
in geographically incongruous results as a comparison of this case with Wilkerson
demonstrates.
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