SYMONE JUSTINE BENT v. STATE OF FLORIDA , 257 So. 3d 501 ( 2018 )


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  •            DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    SYMONE JUSTINE BENT,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3885
    [October 24, 2018]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Timothy L. Bailey, Judge; L.T. Case No. 16-005429
    CF10A.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Narine N. Austin, Assistant
    Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber,
    Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    LEVINE, J.
    May an officer, based on information provided by store employees,
    handcuff an appellant on suspicion of shoplifting although the shoplifting
    did not occur in the officer’s presence? Because the legislature enacted
    section 812.015(3)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides that law
    enforcement may detain based on probable cause developed from a store
    employee’s report of suspected shoplifting, we answer in the affirmative.
    Accordingly, we affirm. 1
    A Wal-Mart loss prevention employee observed appellant taking
    merchandise from the shelves and placing it into her cart without looking
    at the prices. Appellant paid for only some of the merchandise and then
    attempted to leave the store. Based on this behavior, the loss prevention
    associate stopped appellant on suspicion of shoplifting and detained her
    in a back office before calling police. Police subsequently arrived and,
    1   We find the other issues raised by appellant to be without merit.
    based on the information relayed to them by store employees, handcuffed
    appellant while the loss prevention associate searched her purse and cart
    for stolen merchandise. At trial, appellant sought to suppress the
    merchandise found, alleging that her detention by police violated the
    Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion.
    In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a mixed
    standard of review.      While we defer to the trial court’s factual
    determinations, we review de novo whether the application of the law to
    the facts establishes a basis for the trial court’s findings regarding
    reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Lee v. State, 
    868 So. 2d 577
    , 579
    (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
    The issue on appeal is governed by section 812.015, Florida Statutes
    (2016). That statute provides, in relevant part:
    A law enforcement officer . . . who has probable cause to
    believe that a retail theft . . . has been committed by a person
    and, in the case of retail or farm theft, that the property can
    be recovered by taking the offender into custody may, for the
    purpose of attempting to effect such recovery or for
    prosecution, take the offender into custody and detain the
    offender in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of
    time.
    § 812.015(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). This, of course, is an exception to the
    general rule that an officer normally may effect a warrantless arrest only
    for a misdemeanor that occurs in his or her presence. See § 901.15(1),
    Fla. Stat.
    In State v. Lord, 
    150 So. 3d 260
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the First District
    addressed similar facts under the same statute. There, a Wal-Mart asset-
    protection employee called police to report “a shoplifting incident in which
    a person had stolen spark plugs and had left the store.” 
    Id. at 261
    . Upon
    arriving at the store, police officers located the customer’s vehicle based
    on a description by the employee. 
    Id.
     The officers followed the vehicle,
    eventually stopping it, handcuffing the occupants, and searching for the
    allegedly stolen spark plugs. 
    Id.
     The First District held that the officers’
    stop of the vehicle was authorized by section 812.015, Florida Statutes,
    because the officers had received information on the suspected shoplifting
    from the Wal-Mart employee. 
    Id. at 262
    .
    The Third District has similarly held that information furnished to an
    officer by a store employee who has witnessed shoplifting may give rise to
    2
    probable cause. Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 
    396 So. 2d 1164
    , 1167 (Fla.
    3d DCA 1981). There, as in this case, a store employee observed
    suspicious behavior by the appellant that the employee concluded was
    indicative of shoplifting. 
    Id. at 1166
    . After detaining the appellant in the
    store’s security office, the store employee called police to report the
    suspected shoplifting. 
    Id.
     An officer arrived, questioned the appellant and
    charged him with shoplifting. 
    Id.
     The Third District concluded that the
    officer had acted appropriately, noting that for the purposes of a section
    812.015 detention or arrest, “[f]irst hand knowledge by an officer is not
    required; the receipt of information from someone who it seems reasonable
    to believe is telling the truth is adequate.” 
    Id. at 1167
    .
    The instant case is comparable to Lord and Weissman. Appellant was
    observed and detained by a store employee who, based on his training in
    loss prevention, believed she might be shoplifting. Based on the dispatch
    call and information provided to the officer by the store employees when
    he arrived on the scene, the officer developed probable cause. See 
    id.
    (observing that “first hand knowledge” is not necessary to meet section
    812.015’s probable cause requirement). The officer could have reasonably
    concluded that the loss prevention employee was reliable in his conclusion
    that appellant had attempted to steal merchandise from the store.
    Therefore, the officer could handcuff appellant for the purpose of
    attempting to effect a recovery of the merchandise. See § 812.015(3)(a),
    Fla. Stat. We affirm.
    Affirmed.
    GERBER, C.J., and KLINGENSMITH, J., concur.
    *         *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-3885

Citation Numbers: 257 So. 3d 501

Filed Date: 10/24/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/24/2018