STATE OF FLORIDA v. DOMINIQUE WRIGHT , 260 So. 3d 1076 ( 2018 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellant,
    v.
    DOMINIQUE WRIGHT,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D18-856
    [December 5, 2018]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; Barry M. Cohen, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2008CF004966BMB.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L.
    Melear, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
    appellant.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant
    Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    PER CURIAM.
    The State of Florida appeals from an order on resentencing of a juvenile,
    in which the trial court declined to impose a mandatory minimum
    sentence for discharging a firearm, ruling that it would be contrary to
    individualized consideration required by U.S. Supreme Court cases. The
    court declared section 775.087, Florida Statutes, the statute requiring a
    mandatory minimum, unconstitutional as applied to the appellee. In
    Martinez v. State, ___ So. 3d ___, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D2280 (Fla. 4th DCA
    Oct. 10, 2018), we held that the imposition of mandatory minimum
    sentences on juveniles does not violate Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    (2010) and Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
     (2012). See also Young v. State,
    
    219 So. 3d 206
     (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). We thus reverse the trial court’s
    order and appellee’s sentence.
    In his answer brief, appellee contends that section 921.1401, Florida
    Statutes, requiring individualized sentencing consideration for juveniles
    and periodic reviews, supersedes section 775.087, requiring mandatory
    minimum penalties. We disagree and align ourselves with the reasoning
    in Montgomery v. State, 
    230 So. 3d 1256
     (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), which
    harmonized the two statutes:
    Reading the juvenile sentencing statutes and the 10–20–Life
    statute in pari materia, the following sentencing scheme
    emerges for nonhomicide juvenile offenders. Under section
    775.082(3), the court must provide a nonhomicide juvenile
    offender, who is convicted of certain serious offenses, an
    individualized sentencing hearing.        If the nonhomicide
    juvenile offender is sentenced to more than twenty years, the
    court must provide a judicial review after twenty years,
    pursuant to section 921.1402(2)(d), to afford him or her a
    meaningful opportunity to obtain early release. However, if
    the nonhomicide juvenile offender, in the course of
    committing certain enumerated felonies, discharged a firearm
    and as the result of the discharge, inflicted death or great
    bodily harm, the juvenile must be sentenced to a twenty-five-
    year mandatory minimum. § 775.087(2), Fla. Stat. (2012).
    Nonetheless, he or she would still be entitled to a twenty-year
    statutory review of his or her sentence under section
    921.1402(2)(d) with the possibility of early release. See
    generally Gridine v. State, 
    175 So. 3d 672
    , 675 (Fla. 2015)
    (reversing juvenile nonhomicide offender’s aggregate seventy-
    year sentence with twenty-five-year mandatory minimum
    because it failed to provide defendant with judicial review, and
    thereby, meaningful opportunity for future release). At that
    judicial review, after considering the enumerated factors of
    section 921.1402(6) along with any other factor it deems
    appropriate to review the juvenile’s sentence, the sentencing
    court is authorized to modify the sentence and impose a term
    of probation of at least five years if the court determines
    modification is warranted. § 921.1402(7), Fla. Stat. (2014).
    Id. at 1262-63.
    Thus, after the individualized sentencing proceeding, the trial court is
    required to impose the mandatory minimum sentence under section
    775.087. However, the juvenile is still entitled to review after twenty years,
    when the sentence may be modified in accordance with the statutory
    process.
    Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
    GERBER, C.J., WARNER and FORST, JJ., concur.
    *         *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-0856

Citation Numbers: 260 So. 3d 1076

Filed Date: 12/5/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/5/2018