Zane Paul Webber v. State of Florida, Dept. of Business etc. , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 11606 ( 2016 )


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  •                                       IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
    ZANE PAUL WEBBER ,                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    Petitioner,                     DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    v.                                    CASE NO. 1D16-1005
    STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPT.
    OF BUSINESS AND
    PROFESSIONAL
    REGULATION,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________/
    Opinion filed August 2, 2016.
    An appeal from an order from the Department of Business and Professional
    Regulation.
    Ken Lawson, Secretary.
    Daniel Villazon of Daniel Villazon, P.A., Orlando, for Petitioner.
    Marisa G. Button, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Chevonne T. Christian, Assistant
    General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM.
    Before us is Petitioner’s “Expedited Petition for Review of Order of
    Emergency Suspension of License, and Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.” We
    have jurisdiction. See Art. V, §4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 120.68(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015);
    Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(a).
    After evaluating only the face of the Order of Emergency Suspension as we
    must, since there was no hearing afforded Petitioner below, see Nath v. State,
    Department of Health, 
    100 So. 3d 1273
    , 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), we find its
    factual statements allegedly justifying the emergency suspension of Petitioner’s
    license to practice as a certified public accountant to be wholly insufficient to
    establish that Petitioner’s actions vis-a-vis the named client pose an “immediate
    serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare” as required by section
    120.60(6), Florida Statutes (2015). See also Bio-Med Plus, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of
    Health, 
    915 So. 2d 669
    , 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“Where, as here, no hearing was
    held prior to the entry of the emergency order, every element necessary to its validity
    must appear on the face of the order.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Specifically, Respondent’s order lacks any “particularized” allegations of fact
    demonstrating an immediate danger of continuing harm.              See St. Michael’s
    Academy, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Children & Families, 
    965 So. 2d 169
    , 172 (Fla. 3d
    DCA 2007); see also Bio-Med 
    Plus, 915 So. 2d at 672-73
    (holding “it is not enough
    for the [emergency suspension order] merely to allege statutory violations,” the
    allegations of continuing harm must be “particularized,” not “general and
    conclusory” or related to stale actions).
    2
    Furthermore, the order is not “‘narrowly tailored to be fair’” to Petitioner, and
    Respondent has not convincingly shown why less restrictive alternatives short of
    emergency suspension of Petitioner’s license were not utilized. 
    Nath, 100 So. 3d at 1276
    (quoting Kaplan v. State, Dep’t of Health, 
    45 So. 3d 19
    , 21 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2010)). As we stressed in Nath:
    The summary procedure authorized by statute permits the Department
    to deprive licensees of a property interest prior to giving them full due
    process. Bearing that in mind, we have held that agencies employing
    the procedure must “explain why less harsh remedies . . . would have
    been insufficient to stop the harm alleged.”
    
    Id. (quoting Preferred
    RV, Inc. v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 
    869 So. 2d 713
    , 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)). Respondent’s claim that it does not have
    sufficient options at its disposal to ensure Petitioner does not engage in the same
    conduct of “victimizing citizens of the State during the pendency of this action” was
    neither expressed in the order nor substantiated by Respondent.∗ Id.; Bio-Med 
    Plus, 915 So. 2d at 674
    .
    To the extent the Order of Emergency Suspension fails to demonstrate on its
    face an immediate and recurring threat to the public and the license suspension is
    ∗
    Even more troubling is Respondent’s acknowledgment in its answer brief that the allegations in
    its order concerning potential criminal charges to be filed against Petitioner were, in fact, a mere
    “scrivener’s error” it did not rely upon in arriving at its ultimate decision to suspend Petitioner’s
    license. The language in paragraph 28 of the order would belie that assertion. There it states that
    “the likelihood of continued illegal conduct by [Petitioner] demonstrates the immediate suspension
    of his CPA license is necessary to protect the public.”
    3
    not a narrowly tailored remedy, we conclude the action taken by Respondent failed
    to afford Petitioner the due process protection our state and federal constitutions
    demand. See § 120.60(6)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat (2015). Consequently, we QUASH the
    Order of Emergency Suspension of License. See 
    Kaplan, 45 So. 3d at 21
    (citing Bio-
    Med 
    Plus, 915 So. 2d at 669
    ).
    We also deny Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner’s
    request should have been by separate motion. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b)(2). The
    “‘failure to file a motion for attorney’s fees in accordance with Florida Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 9.400(b) is a proper basis for the denial of fees on
    appeal.’” McCreary v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 
    758 So. 2d 692
    , 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (quoting Salley v. City of St. Petersburg, 
    511 So. 2d 975
    , 977 (Fla. 1987)); see also Green v. Sun Harbor Homeowner’s Ass’n,
    Inc., 
    685 So. 2d 23
    , 26 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (noting that “at the appellate level,
    if a party seeking appellate attorney’s fees requests appellate attorney’s fees in its
    brief, but fails to ask for attorney’s fees by separate motion, that party will not be
    entitled to appellate attorney’s fees”) (emphasis added), quashed on other grounds,
    
    730 So. 2d 1261
    (Fla. 1998); ACD Corp. of Fla. v. Walker, 
    413 So. 2d 33
    , 33 (Fla.
    1st DCA 1981); Melweb Signs, Inc. v. Wright, 
    394 So. 2d 475
    , 477 (Fla. 1st DCA
    1981).
    4
    ROWE, KELSEY, and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.
    5