Corry Mency v. State of Florida ( 2019 )


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  •           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D18-1993
    _____________________________
    CORRY MENCY,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County.
    David W. Fina, Judge.
    June 12, 2019
    PER CURIAM.
    In this appeal, the defendant raises two issues. First, he
    argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on the trial court’s
    failure to sustain his objections to questions asked by the State
    during its cross-examination. Second, he argues that he is entitled
    to a new self-defense immunity hearing under the Stand-Your-
    Ground statutes because the trial court failed to apply the proper
    burden of proof. With regards to the first issue, we find no
    reversible error. With regards to the second issue, the appellant
    makes two arguments, one of which was not properly preserved.
    At trial, the appellant essentially argued that the trial court
    needed to determine whether section 776.032(4) applied
    retroactively. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court
    failed to make that ruling. However, the trial court stated that
    regardless of who had the burden, the appellant was not entitled
    to immunity. This ruling implies that the trial court made a ruling
    under both standards. Because the trial court applied the correct
    standard, the trial court did not err. The appellant also argues
    that the trial court failed to assess the evidence presented by the
    defense when it ruled on his immunity claim. However, that issue
    was not properly preserved for appeal because the appellant failed
    to raise that issue to the trial court. See Rodriguez v. State, 
    609 So. 2d 493
    , 499 (Fla. 1992) (“It is well settled that the specific legal
    ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at trial and a
    claim different than that raised below will not be heard on
    appeal.”) Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s judgment and
    sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and LEWIS, J., concur; ROBERTS, J., concurs with
    written opinion.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    ROBERTS, J., concurring.
    I concur with the majority’s opinion, but write separately to
    address the issue of the defendant’s argument that he is entitled
    to a new self-defense immunity hearing. This Court has adopted
    the position that a defendant is entitled to a new self-defense
    immunity hearing when the trial court incorrectly applies section
    776.032, Florida Statutes. Aviles-Manfredy v. State, 
    44 Fla. L
    .
    Weekly D187 (Fla. 1st DCA January 7, 2019) (adopting the
    procedure that the trial court must hold a new Stand-Your-Ground
    hearing as stated in Martin v. State, 
    43 Fla. L
    . Weekly D1016 (Fla.
    2d DCA May 4, 2018)). However, the use of that procedure conflicts
    with the purpose of the immunity hearing, which is to provide a
    2
    defendant with a procedural mechanism that allows him to
    present his self-defense claim early rather than force him to wait
    until trial.
    Self-Defense
    Florida has long acknowledged the fundamental right of its
    citizens to use force to defend themselves or others. Art. I, § 8(a),
    Fla. Const. The essential elements of self-defense have largely
    remained the same; to wit, a person may use deadly force when it
    is reasonably necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
    harm to the person or to another person. § 776.012, Fla. Stat. Self-
    defense was and is an affirmative defense in which the one
    asserting self-defense is required to establish a prima facie case of
    the elements of the self-defense claim. The burden then rests on
    the State to establish that the claim is not justified “to the
    exclusion of every reasonable doubt,” which is consistent with the
    State’s burden in every criminal case. See § 90.302, Fla. Stat.;
    Grady v. State, 
    176 So. 431
    , 431 (Fla. 1937) (the burden of
    establishing a defendant’s guilt rests with the State). However,
    prior to 2005, the claim of self-defense could only be presented as
    an affirmative defense at trial.
    The Stand-Your-Ground Act
    In 2005, the Legislature strengthened the right to self-defense
    when it passed Chapter 2005-27, Laws of Florida. That bill
    changed the application of the law of self-defense in three major
    ways. First, it eliminated the duty to retreat when attacked
    outside the home before using lawful deadly force. Ch. 2005-27, §§
    2-3, Laws of Fla. Second, the bill created a presumption that a
    person had “reasonable fear of imminent . . . death or great bodily
    harm” if the person was attacked in his or her home or conveyance.
    Ch. 2005-27, § 1, Laws of Fla. Third, the bill provided immunity
    from “arrest, detaining in custody, charging or prosecuting” a
    person validly exercising his or her right to self-defense. Ch. 2005-
    27, § 4, Laws of Fla.
    Immunity from prosecution, the key issue in this case, was
    created by adding a new section to chapter 776, Florida Statutes,
    which reads as follows:
    3
    776.032 Immunity from Criminal prosecution and civil
    action for justifiable use of force. - -
    (1) A person who uses force as permitted in s. 776.012, s.
    776.013, or s.776.031 is justified in using such force and
    is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for
    the use of such force[.]
    Sections 776.012, 776.013, and 776.031 are the general self-
    defense statutes that may be asserted at trial and would have only
    been allowed to be asserted at trial without the immunity provided
    by section 776.032. Most of the case law refers to this immunity
    as “Stand-Your-Ground immunity,” but this is a misnomer because
    the immunity applies to all self-defense cases, not just ones in
    which standing one’s ground is an element. That is why a better
    label is “self-defense immunity.” In fact, the statutes refer to it as
    “self-defense immunity.” See § 776.032(4), Fla. Stat. In the
    whereas clauses for Chapter 2005-27, Laws of Florida, the
    Legislature found “that it is proper for law abiding people to
    protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders and
    attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in
    defense of themselves and others . . . .” The important thing to
    remember for our analysis is that the entire purpose of this
    immunity is to provide a mechanism by which a person who is
    asserting lawful self-defense may have the defense heard early in
    the process to avoid the time and expense of a trial.
    Until 2017, section 776.032 did not specify how this immunity
    from arrest, detention, charging, or prosecution was to be
    effectuated. In Dennis v. State, 
    51 So. 3d 456
    (Fla. 2010), the
    supreme court adopted a procedure from Peterson v. State, 
    983 So. 2d
    27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), that required the trial court to hold an
    evidentiary hearing when self-defense immunity was alleged to
    determine whether that person used “force as permitted is s.
    776.012, s. 776.013 or s. 776.031.” Dennis quoted from the section
    of Peterson in which the First District said that the burden of proof
    in the self-defense immunity hearing was on the defendant by a
    preponderance of the evidence, but never adopted this standard.
    
    Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 459-60
    .
    Bretherick v. State
    4
    Subsequently in Bretherick v. State, 
    170 So. 3d 766
    , 779 (Fla.
    2015), the supreme court held that at the self-defense immunity
    hearing, the defendant was required to prove he or she was
    entitled to the immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. In a
    dissent joined by Justice Polston, Justice Canady argued that the
    burden should be on the State to rebut the prima facie showing of
    self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id. at 779-80
    (Canady, J.,
    dissenting). He accused the majority of not recognizing that,
    The factual question raised by the assertion of Stand
    Your Ground immunity in a pretrial evidentiary hearing
    is the same as the factual question raised by a Stand Your
    Ground Defense presented at trial: whether the evidence
    establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defendant’s conduct was not justified under the governing
    statutory standard.
    
    Id. at 779.
    Justice Canady stated that the “State does not dispute that a
    defendant presenting a Stand Your Ground defense can only be
    convicted if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defense does not apply.” 
    Id. He further
    reasoned,
    There is no reason to believe that the Legislature
    intended for a defendant to be denied immunity and
    subjected to a trial when that defendant would be entitled
    to acquittal at trial on the basis of a Stand Your Ground
    defense.
    
    Id. at 780.
    Chapter 2017-72, Laws of Florida
    Subsequent to Bretherick, the Legislature added another
    subsection to section 776.032:
    (4) In a criminal prosecution, once a prima facie claim of
    self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution has
    been raised by the defendant in a pretrial immunity
    hearing, the burden of proof by clear and convincing
    evidence is on the party seeking to overcome the
    5
    immunity from       criminal       prosecution   provided   in
    subsection (1).
    Ch. 2017-72, Laws of Fla. According to Senator Rob Bradley, the
    sponsor of Senate Bill 128, which became 2017-72, “[t]his bill
    corrects the error of the Bretherick decision.” Fla. Sen. Comm. on
    Rules, recording of proceedings (Feb. 9, 2017) (Tallahassee)
    (Statement            of        Sen.          Rob          Bradley)
    (https//thefloridachannel.org/videos/2917-senate-rules-
    committee/).
    Since section 776.032(4) was enacted, the district courts have
    been split on whether subsection four applies to crimes committed
    prior to its adoption. See Commander v. State, 
    246 So. 3d 1303
    ,
    1304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (Mem.) (finding the statute procedural
    and that it applies retroactively); Martin v. State, 
    43 Fla. L
    .
    Weekly D1016 (Fla. 2d DCA May 4, 2018), review pending, No.
    SC18-789 (same); Fuller v. State, 
    257 So. 3d 521
    , 536-38 (Fla. 5th
    DCA 2018) (same); Love v. State, 
    247 So. 3d 609
    , 611-12 (Fla. 3d
    DCA 2018), review granted, No. SC18-747 (finding the statute
    substantive and does not apply retroactively); Hight v. State, 
    253 So. 3d 1137
    , 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), review pending, No. SC18-
    1653 (same).
    Presentation of Self-Defense Claims
    There are two ways for a criminal defendant to vindicate his
    right to self-defense after he loses his self-defense immunity
    hearing. First, if the defendant wants to avoid proceeding to trial,
    he may file a petition for writ of prohibition with the appropriate
    district court of appeal. Second, the defendant may go to trial and
    raise his or her self-defense claim.
    With regard to a writ of prohibition, the district courts of
    appeal and the Florida Supreme Court have held that a petition
    for writ of prohibition is the appropriate method to freeze the
    proceedings in place so a review of the self-defense immunity
    ruling may be performed. See Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 
    360 So. 2d 745
    ,
    747 (Fla. 1977) (appropriate procedure to challenge a trial court’s
    authority to continue prosecution is through a petition for writ of
    prohibition); Rosario v. State, 
    165 So. 3d 852
    , 854-55 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2015) (Because a writ of prohibition stops the trial court from
    6
    continuing to prosecute a defendant who should be immune from
    prosecution, it is the preferred method to challenge a denial of
    motion to dismiss that has occurred after or without an evidentiary
    hearing.); Little v. State, 
    111 So. 3d 214
    , 216 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
    (petition for writ of prohibition is the appropriate mechanism to
    challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss based on a self-defense
    immunity statute); Joseph v. State, 
    103 So. 3d 227
    , 229 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2012) (same). A defendant does not lose his right to present
    his self-defense immunity claim to the jury by filing a petition for
    writ of prohibition, nor does he lose his right to present the issue
    to the jury after an unsuccessful petition for writ of prohibition.
    State v. Chavers, 
    230 So. 3d 35
    , 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
    With regard to presenting the claim of self-defense at trial, the
    standard has always been that the State is required to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, after a showing of
    a prima facie claim of self-defense, did not act in lawful self-
    defense. At trial, the finder of fact has always applied the correct
    standard whether our state courts were operating under
    Bretherick or the subsequently enacted section 776.032(4). This
    presentation of the self-defense claim at trial moots and subsumes
    any previous error that occurred at the immunity hearing.
    This Case
    In this case, the defendant’s self-defense immunity hearing
    was contemporaneous with his trial, meaning that while there was
    no separate immunity hearing, the defendant was allowed to move
    for immunity to be imposed based on the evidence adduced at trial.
    At the close of the State’s case, and again at the close of evidence,
    the defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him based on
    his self-defense immunity claim. Each time the defendant moved
    to dismiss the charges, he argued that the change in the statute
    was procedural and applied retroactively. The State argued that
    the change in the statute was substantive and did not apply
    retroactively. The State also argued that regardless of who had
    the burden of proof, the defendant was not entitled to a dismissal
    based on the evidence. Since the trial court did not have a district
    court of appeal decision to follow, each time it ruled on the
    defendant’s motion, it stated that regardless of which party bore
    7
    the burden, it thought that the defendant’s self-defense claim was
    a question to be resolved by the jury.
    After the evidence was closed and the trial court ruled on all
    of the defendant’s motions, it properly instructed the jury with
    regards to the defendant’s self-defense claim using the standard
    jury instructions. The trial court properly instructed the jury on
    what constituted justifiable homicide and justifiable use of deadly
    force. It instructed the jury that the State had the burden to prove
    that the defendant committed the crime, that the defendant did
    not have to present any evidence or prove anything, that if the jury
    had any reasonable doubt, it should find the defendant not guilty,
    and that if the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
    the defendant was not justified in using deadly force, it should find
    him guilty if all the elements of the crime had been proved. Since
    jurors are presumed to follow the law as explained to them, the
    defendant’s jury properly evaluated his self-defense claim. Davis
    v. State, 
    121 So. 3d 462
    , 492 (Fla. 2013).
    On appeal, the defendant argues that because the trial court
    stated the defendant’s self-defense claim was a question for the
    jury, the trial court failed to apply the correct standard of proof
    under section 776.032. Even if the trial court failed to apply the
    correct standard, the defendant would not be entitled to another
    self-defense immunity hearing, but for this Court’s holding in
    Aviles-Manfredy, because he went to trial and his self-defense
    immunity claim was fully and properly litigated.
    I believe that we erred in adopting the holding of Martin in
    Aviles-Manfredy. Because the defendant did not preserve his
    argument that he was entitled to a new self-defense immunity
    hearing under Martin and Aviles-Manfredy, this is not an
    appropriate case for this Court to revisit Aviles-Manfredy en banc.
    Nevertheless, since the supreme court has granted review in
    Martin and Love, I expect that the law of self-defense immunity
    will soon be clarified.
    _____________________________
    8
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis,
    Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    9