Boardwalk at Daytona Development, LLC v. Paspalakis , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 17366 ( 2016 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
BOARDWALK AT DAYTONA
DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D15-1944
PANORMITIS K. PASPALAKIS, ET AL.,
Appellees.
________________________________/
Opinion filed November 18, 2016
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Volusia County,
Dennis Craig , Judge.
David A. Monaco, John N. Bogdanoff, and
Christopher V. Carlyle, of The Carlyle
Appellate Law Firm, The Villages, for
Appellant.
Amy Brigham Boulris, Lauren Vickroy
Purdy, and Jonathan Kaskel, of Gunster,
Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., Miami, for
Appellees.
Allison D. Daniel, of Institute for Justice,
Miami, Amicus Curiae Brief, for Appellees.
EDWARDS, J.
Neither law nor equity can furnish a sufficient description of land to be conveyed
where the parties have failed to do so. Specific performance is only available to compel
the transfer of land that is specifically described in the parties’ agreement alone or where
its identity is clear from an agreement that is appropriately supplemented by parol
evidence. The parties’ agreement in this case contained only a general description of the
land to be conveyed; however, it lacked a legal description, street address, or any other
information to assist in the identification of the specific parcel of land. The ambiguity was
not cured by the trial court’s consideration of parol evidence. Indeed, in the course of
litigation, the parties identified three different parcels of land of significantly different sizes,
each of which fit the agreement’s general description. Accordingly, we find that the trial
court erred in decreeing specific performance by compelling the conveyance of one of
those three parcels.
Boardwalk at Daytona Development, LLC (“BDD”) appeals the final judgment
decreeing specific performance of an agreement and compelling BDD to convey specific
real estate to Panormitis K. Paspalakis, Eleny Lisa Psaros, and A.L. & P. Corporation
(collectively “Appellees”). Though BDD raises several issues on appeal, our
determination that specific performance was not an appropriate remedy renders the other
issues moot.
This dispute arises from a public-private economic development project. BDD’s
predecessor obtained Appellees’ property located on the Daytona Beach Boardwalk
using the City of Daytona Beach’s eminent domain power, but the land was purchased
with private funds.1 The Boardwalk Project contemplated the construction of buildings
1 As noted in the amicus brief filed by Institute for Justice, the Boardwalk Project
was similar in many respects to the facts of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005), in terms of the use of governmental condemnation power for private real estate
development. In 2006, Florida reacted by amending its eminent domain statutes and
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operating dually as hotels and residential condominiums. The structures would also
contain retail space. To resolve the condemnation litigation, the parties entered into a
mediated settlement agreement that set the price Appellees would receive for their
property and granted Appellees an option to purchase and refurbish a specific building,
which was located on the Boardwalk. The mediated settlement agreement was
subsequently amended, providing Appellees with three different options to purchase and
operate 7500 square feet of retail space on the Boardwalk.
Appellees chose the option that required BDD to transfer property to Appellees
who, in exchange, would pay $250,000. The amended agreement did not contain a legal
description or street address for the property to be conveyed to Appellees. However, the
amended agreement indicated that the property would be adjacent to the Mardi Gras, a
Daytona Beach business; that it would have a minimum of 50 frontage feet on the
Boardwalk; and that it would have “sufficient land to build a 7500 square foot one story
building, free of any and all liens.” Appellees advised BDD they were “willing to close the
purchase of the property as soon as the site and legal description have been confirmed.”
BDD provided Appellees with a survey sketch and legal description of property that
it proposed for the conveyance, stating that the 7682 square foot lot included 53.4 feet of
Boardwalk frontage and would have sufficient area for construction of a 7500 square foot,
one story building. Use of this lot would require locating the storm water vaulting system
beneath the occupied building, an unusual design feature that caused concern to
Appellees. Further, BDD insisted that the conveyed property would be subject to a
passing a constitutional amendment to prohibit the use of condemnation in similar
situations. See Chapter 73, Florida Statutes (2007); Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const.
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perpetual, irrevocable, and permanent negative easement for light, air, and unobstructed
view for the benefit of BDD’s adjacent property. Appellees objected, asserting that the
amended agreement did not discuss any such easement.
BDD filed suit against Appellees, seeking a declaratory judgment that the property
BDD tendered, including the negative easement, conformed to the amended agreement.
Appellees counterclaimed, seeking damages and specific performance that would require
BDD to transfer the land described in the amended agreement, i.e., sufficient to build a
7500 square foot, one story building with a minimum of 50 feet of Boardwalk frontage in
fee simple, without restrictions.
During the pendency of the litigation, BDD submitted two site plans to
governmental authorities. The first site plan was for a 17,350 square foot lot. This plan
provided for the storm water system located under the building and arranged for the
excavated soil to be deposited on the lot. The second site plan was for an 8594 square
foot lot. In this second plan, the storm water system was located under the building and
the excavated soil had to be deposited on the beach. BDD dismissed its complaint
against Appellees, and defended against Appellees’ amended counterclaim by asserting
that there was no agreement to be specifically enforced because there was no meeting
of the minds regarding the exact size, location, easements, and legal description of the
property. In their second amended counterclaim, Appellees requested the court to order
BDD to convey the parcel described in the first site plan or, in the alternative, to order
BDD to convey the parcel described in the second site plan while ordering BDD to accept
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the transfer of the excavated sand from the site plan to the dunes on its adjacent
property.2
During the four-day nonjury trial, the parties’ witnesses testified regarding the
feasibility of locating a storm water system beneath an occupied building, how to dispose
of the excavated soil, the terms of the amended agreement, and how those issues did or
did not define what piece of land was “sufficient for a 7500 square foot building.” In closing
arguments, Appellees initially urged specific performance by forcing BDD to convey the
8592 square foot lot described in the second site plan. When the trial court remarked that
the larger 17,350 square foot lot described in the first site plan might be more suitable,
Appellees stated that they would accept either parcel. The final judgment decreed
specific performance by ordering BDD to convey the land described in the first site plan
to Appellees without the negative easement. BDD timely appealed.
“The decision whether to grant or withhold a judgement for specific performance is
a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court which will not be disturbed on appeal
unless clearly erroneous.” Muniz v. Crystal Lake Project, LLC, 947 So. 2d 464, 469 (Fla.
3d DCA 2006) (citing Henderson Dev. Co. v. Gerrits, 340 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 3d DCA
1976)). “[T]he right to exercise this judicial discretion does not extend to the power or
authority to contravene the legal requirements which must exist to give a litigant grounds
upon which he may invoke the remedy.” Id. (alternation in original) (quoting Castigliano
v. O’Connor, 911 So. 2d 145, 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)). “A decree of specific
performance . . . . can be granted only when ‘1) the plaintiff is clearly entitled to it, 2) there
2Paragraph one of the second amended counterclaim states that specific
performance and money damages exceeding $15,000 are sought; however, money
damages are never mentioned again nor are they sought in the ad damnum clause.
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is no adequate remedy at law, and 3) the judge believes that justice requires it.’” Invego
Auto Parts, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 34 So. 3d 103, 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (quoting Castigliano,
911 So. 2d at 148). In contrast, “[t]he interpretation of a contract involves a pure question
of law for which [the appellate court] applies a de novo standard of review.” Muniz, 947
So. 2d at 469 (citing Kissman v. Panizzi, 891 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).
“In order for a court to grant specific performance, the parties must have entered
into an agreement that is definite, certain, and complete of all its essential terms.” Id.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). “As a general rule, ‘[t]here is no definitive list of
essential terms that must be present and certain to satisfy the statute of frauds [and] the
essential terms will vary widely according to the nature and complexity of each transaction
and will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.’” de Vaux v. Westwood Baptist Church,
953 So. 2d 677, 682 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Socarras v.
Claughton Hotels, Inc., 374 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)).
However, for land contracts, a description of the land to be conveyed is generally
an essential part of the agreement. See Rhode v. Gallat, 70 So. 471, 472-73 (Fla. 1915).
A “meeting of the minds of the parties on all essential elements is a prerequisite to the
existence of an enforceable contract, and where it appears that the parties are continuing
to negotiate as to essential terms of an agreement, there can be no meeting of the minds.”
de Vaux, 953 So. 2d at 681 (citing Cent. Props., Inc. v. Robbinson, 450 So. 2d 277, 280
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (additional citations omitted)).
Here, BDD argues that the term “sufficient land for a 7500 square foot building” is
ambiguous and, therefore, an essential term of the contract was absent from the
agreement. In support of this argument, BDD cites Bay Club, Inc. v. Brickell Bay Club,
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Inc., 293 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). In Bay Club, the plaintiff “executed a written
agreement with [defendants] to lease a portion of the Brickell Bay Club condominium
which was then in the early stages of construction for the operation of a private club by
[defendants].” 293 So. 2d at 138. “The agreement was contingent upon the defendants
being able to obtain a zoning variance to permit the operation on the proposed club.” Id.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint for rescission of the agreement, alleging that
defendants were in violation of the contract. Id. Defendants counterclaimed for specific
performance. Id. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that the
contract was insufficient to “form a predicate for a claim of specific performance.” Id. The
trial court dismissed the counterclaim. Id.
The Third District affirmed, finding that the agreement, which described the leased
area “as approximately 20,000 square feet without any designated location thereof in the
31 story building,” lacked “so many of the essential elements of a lease for the operation
of a business that the court for specific performance thereof, would have to write a
comprehensive lease based on parol evidence which [it] may not and shall not do.” Id.
(emphasis added). Similarly, here, while the amended agreement indicated that the land
to be conveyed was adjacent to the Mardi Gras property with a minimum of 50 frontage
feet on the Boardwalk, it did not provide any further specifics that would assist in
identifying the parcel of land. Instead, the amendment merely required BDD to convey
“sufficient land” for a 7500 square foot building. While the Mardi Gras property may
provide a starting point for the identification of the land, as did the thirty-one story building
in Bay Club, the description in the amended agreement is too ambiguous to enforce via
specific performance.
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As the amended agreement did not specifically describe the exact property to be
conveyed, the trial court considered and relied upon parol evidence offered by the parties
regarding what would be “sufficient for the construction of a 7500 one story building.”
“[P]arol evidence is admissible to determine the description so long as the instrument
itself shows that the parties were contemplating a particular piece of property – rather
than an unspecified piece of property . . . or alternative descriptions . . . or property to be
obtained later.” Bajrangi v. Magnethel Enters., Inc., 589 So. 2d 416, 418-19 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1992) (footnotes omitted) (citing Edmun Realty Corp. v. Kearns, 28 So. 2d 834, 836
(Fla. 1947)). “[T]he description [of land] is sufficient if the reference to the property in the
deed is such that the court, by pursuing an inquiry based upon the words of reference, is
able to identify the particular property to the exclusion of all other property.” Id. at 419.
But cf. Venema v. Tost, 424 So. 2d 786, 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (reversing the trial court’s
granting of specific performance because the contract did not sufficiently describe the
real property in question and holding that the “use of parol evidence to remove a patent
ambiguity with respect to a legal description in a conveyance is error” (citations omitted)).
Jordan v. Boisvert, 632 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), proves helpful in deciding
this issue. In Jordan, the parties entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of real
property. 632 So. 2d at 255. The “contract fixed the price, contained a description, and
called for a survey to establish the exact legal description of the property to be conveyed.”
Id. Attached to the contract was a “sketch of the general area of the property.” Id.
Defendant subsequently contacted the plaintiff via mail and informed him that he would
“not really know how many acres are involved until the survey is complete and the
calculations are made.” Id. The correspondence additionally provided boundary
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landmarks for the property to be conveyed. Id. Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff
obtained a survey that indicated “the proposed sale involved 5.95 acres.” Id. Defendant
obtained a second survey that indicated that the proposed sale involved 5.40 acres. Id.
Plaintiff subsequently obtained a third survey. Id. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for
specific performance. Id. The trial court “ruled that the legal description in the contract
was insufficient to allow a surveyor to locate and establish boundaries on the land.” Id.
at 256. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in failing to consider
appellee’s letter in determining whether there was a clear and unambiguous description
of the land to be conveyed. Id.
The First District affirmed and determined that the plaintiff did not show “that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying specific performance of the written agreement
signed by the parties.” Id. at 257. The court indicated that “[f]undamental to a grant of
specific performance of a contract for purchase and sale of property is ‘whether a surveyor
with the deed before him and with or without the aid of extrinsic evidence can locate the
land and establish the boundaries.’” Id. at 256 (quoting Mogee v. Haller, 222 So. 2d 468,
469 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)). In determining that specific performance should not be granted,
the court emphasized that:
The fact that the surveyor performed three surveys, each of
which varied the boundary lines of the property at issue,
constitutes substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that even considering the description in the contract for
sale, attached drawing, and extrinsic evidence, the
description was insufficient to permit a surveyor to establish
the boundaries of the property.
Id. at 257.
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Here, there were three different parcels of land identified as being potentially
“sufficient” for the 7500 square foot building, with lot sizes ranging from 7682 to 17,350
square feet. Each of the three lots was adjacent to the Mardi Gras and each had a
minimum of 50 feet Boardwalk frontage. However, neither the amended agreement alone
nor the amended agreement as supplemented by the trial evidence established a meeting
of the minds on what real estate was being bought and sold. Thus, the trial court erred
in granting specific performance. We reverse the final judgment granting specific
performance in favor of the Appellees and remand for entry of final judgment in favor of
BDD.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SAWAYA and PALMER, JJ., concur.
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