Balas v. State , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 13524 ( 2016 )


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  •                NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    ANDREW C. BALAS,                   )
    )
    Appellant,              )
    )
    v.                                 )                  Case No. 2D15-2286
    )
    STATE OF FLORIDA,                  )
    )
    Appellee.               )
    ___________________________________)
    Opinion filed September 9, 2016.
    Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P.
    9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for
    Pinellas County; Nancy Moate Ley,
    Judge.
    NORTHCUTT, Judge.
    Andrew C. Balas appeals the order summarily disposing of his motion and
    amended motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
    3.850. Balas raised three grounds for relief. We affirm the dismissal of grounds two
    and three without further comment. However, we reverse the summary denial of
    Balas's amended ground one because the postconviction court overlooked his timely
    supplement to his amended ground one.
    Balas entered an open guilty plea to one count of causing death or serious
    bodily injury by carelessly or negligently operating a motor vehicle while his driver's
    license was revoked. See § 322.34(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010). The trial court sentenced
    Balas to 90.75 months' imprisonment, which the sentencing transcript indicates was the
    lowest permissible sentence that he could receive under his Criminal Punishment Code
    (CPC) scoresheet. Balas appealed, but on July 3, 2013, this court granted his motion to
    voluntarily dismiss his appeal.
    On June 6, 2014, Balas filed his original rule 3.850 motion raising three
    grounds for relief. The postconviction court reserved ruling on grounds two and three,
    and it struck ground one as facially insufficient. Ground one asserted that counsel's
    misadvice rendered Balas's plea involuntary and that counsel performed ineffectively at
    sentencing. The court granted Balas leave to amend the claims set forth in ground one.
    See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(3). It then granted a motion for extension of time, which
    directed Balas to file his amended motion on or before March 16, 2015.
    On February 4, 2015, Balas filed a motion amending his claims in ground
    one and providing additional details regarding his counsel's alleged misadvice and
    deficient performance. Balas further expanded his allegations from ground one with the
    filing of another amended motion on March 6, 2015.
    On March 31, 2015, the postconviction court issued an order addressing
    the original motion and the February motion. The postconviction court denied amended
    ground one as conclusively refuted by the record, and it dismissed grounds two and
    -2-
    three as not cognizable in a rule 3.850 motion. The court failed to address the March
    motion. 1
    Any claims in the March motion that related to amended ground one in the
    February motion were timely filed under the postconviction court's order extending the
    period for Balas to amend that claim. Further, any new claims raised in either the
    February or March motions were timely filed within two years following the voluntary
    dismissal of Balas's direct appeal. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b); Cabrera v. State, 
    721 So. 2d 1190
    , 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that the two-year time period to file a
    rule 3.850 motion begins when the district court grants a motion to voluntarily dismiss a
    direct appeal). Therefore, the court should have addressed those new claims on the
    merits because it had never ruled on the merits of Balas's original motion. See Fla. R.
    Crim. P. 3.850(e); Pritchett v. State, 
    884 So. 2d 417
    , 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding
    that the postconviction court erred in denying a motion to supplement a rule 3.850
    motion because both the original and amended motions were filed within the statutory
    two-year time limitation and the postconviction court had not issued a final order
    disposing of the claims in the original motion); cf. Hempstead v. State, 
    980 So. 2d 1254
    ,
    1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that amendments made to a motion after the
    postconviction court ruled on the original motion were improper, successive motions).
    Accordingly, without commenting on the merits or facial sufficiency of any
    of the amended or new claims in the February and March motions, we reverse the order
    denying amended ground one in the February motion and remand for the postconviction
    1In fact, the circuit court docket reflects that the postconviction court has
    yet to dispose of the March motion.
    -3-
    court to reconsider the February motion in conjunction with its consideration of the
    March motion.
    Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
    LaROSE and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2D15-2286

Citation Numbers: 210 So. 3d 104, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 13524

Judges: Northcutt, Larose, Sleet

Filed Date: 9/9/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024