Derek Jamal Flowers v. State of Florida , 149 So. 3d 1206 ( 2014 )


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  •                                        IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
    DEREK JAMAL FLOWERS,                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    Appellant,                       DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    v.                                     CASE NO. 1D14-0496
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________/
    Opinion filed November 6, 2014.
    An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
    J. Bradford Stetson, Judge.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public
    Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney
    General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    CLARK, J.
    Beware what you ask for. Here, defense counsel requested a jury instruction
    on a lesser included charge. Mr. Flowers was then convicted on that lesser included
    charge, and Mr. Flowers now seeks to be released without the possibility of retrial
    because the lesser included charge his attorney requested was time-barred. The
    invited error doctrine precludes such a “heads I win, tails you lose” game.
    The State initially charged Mr. Flowers with robbery, aggravated fleeing,
    and kidnapping.     Defense counsel successfully argued that the robbery and
    aggravated fleeing charges were time-barred. The kidnapping charge survived;
    and the State proceeded to trial on the kidnapping charge.          At the charge
    conference, defense counsel requested a jury instruction on false imprisonment—a
    lesser included charge of kidnapping. The court obliged. And the jury returned a
    verdict of guilty as to false imprisonment.
    After the verdict was in, the jury dismissed, and the court adjourned, the
    court recalled both attorneys to the courthouse to discuss a potential statute of
    limitations issue. It was there the court raised the issue of whether the conviction
    for false imprisonment, a third-degree felony, was time-barred, as were the other
    counts the court had previously dismissed. See §§ 787.02(2), 775.17(2)(b), Fla.
    Stat. (mandating commencement of prosecution for third-degree felony within
    three years). Ultimately, the court determined Mr. Flowers and his attorney had
    sought the instruction and reaped the benefit of the instruction; they could no
    longer claim error. We agree.
    The invited error doctrine is succinct:      “[A] party cannot successfully
    complain about an error for which he or she is responsible or of rulings that he or
    she invited the court to make.” Anderson v. State, 
    93 So. 3d 1201
    , 1203 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 2012). Put another way, “a party may not make or invite error at trial and
    2
    then take advantage of the error on appeal.” 
    Id. at 1206.
    As applied here, “counsel
    should not be allowed to sandbag the trial judge by requesting and approving an
    instruction they know or should know will result in an automatic reversal, if
    given.” Weber v. State, 
    602 So. 2d 1316
    , 1319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
    We do not suggest defense counsel here nefariously or perniciously sought
    to dupe the court. But given his successful use of the statute of limitations defense
    against the two other charges and his admission it was his (sound) trial strategy to
    instruct the jury on the lesser included charge, counsel cannot now reap the benefit
    of crying foul upon the jury obliging his request.
    The Fifth District addressed a very similar scenario. See 
    id. at 1317-18.
    There, a defendant was indicted for murder, but found guilty of the lesser included
    offense of manslaughter.     
    Id. at 1317.
    During trial, “the prosecutor, defense
    counsel and judge discussed” instructing the jury on the lesser included offenses of
    murder. 
    Id. “Defense counsel
    said ‘give it.’” 
    Id. And in
    closing, defense counsel
    argued the lesser included offenses. 
    Id. Throughout, there
    were no objections. 
    Id. Nor did
    counsel object after return of the lesser included verdict. 
    Id. A week
    later,
    counsel raised the issue by way of motion for arrest of judgment. 
    Id. at 1318.
    The
    trial court found the issue was “waived.” 
    Id. at 1317.
    On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed the defendant’s conviction for the
    lesser included charge. 
    Id. at 1318-19.
    The court explained that “if a defendant
    3
    requests a time-barred lesser included offense instruction, and is convicted on such
    charge, he or she may be estopped from later challenging the conviction on statute
    of limitations grounds.” 
    Id. at 1318.
    And where a defendant takes “affirmative
    acts either in seeking or acquiescing in the erroneous instruction,” a failure to
    object precludes the error from being fundamental. 
    Id. (citing Ray
    v. State, 
    403 So. 2d 956
    (Fla. 1981)). The court found Weber’s counsel accepted and approved
    the lesser included instruction in Weber’s presence, argued it to the jury, and failed
    to object to the instruction or otherwise apprise the court of a potential issue. 
    Id. at 1317.
    Here, Mr. Flowers and his counsel were well aware of the statute of
    limitations; they had successfully obtained dismissals of the other two counts for
    statute of limitations reasons.     Despite this knowledge, and in what counsel
    admitted to be his trial strategy, counsel successfully sought to have the jury
    instructed on a time-barred, lesser included offense.        This occurred with Mr.
    Flowers present. And counsel not only affirmatively sought the instruction, but he
    failed to object at any point during the proceedings—at the charge conference,
    prior to instructing the jury, during the instructions, after the instructions, during
    jury deliberations, and upon return of the verdict. In fact, it was the court who saw
    a potential issue and asked counsel to return after the verdict was in, the jury
    dismissed, and court adjourned.
    4
    In short, counsel affirmatively requested the court instruct the jury on a
    lesser included offense he, at minimum, should have known was time barred as
    part of (sound) trial strategy. The jury agreed and convicted Mr. Flowers on the
    lesser included offense. Mr. Flowers knowingly sought the instruction, the jury
    used the instruction, and he now takes issue with the instruction.       This falls
    squarely within the invited error doctrine.    The sandbagging and windfall in
    seeking instruction on a crime for which it would be illegal to convict—without the
    ability of retrial because of double jeopardy issues—is exactly what invited error
    seeks to avoid. We join the Fifth District in finding the invited error doctrine
    applicable under this factual scenario.
    Appellant’s judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED. 1
    PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
    1
    Mr. Flowers raised one other issue. We affirm without comment.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1D14-0496

Citation Numbers: 149 So. 3d 1206

Judges: Clark, Padovano, Thomas

Filed Date: 11/5/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024