LAURA ROSALES v. RIC L. BRADSHAW, Sheriff of Palm Beach County ( 2019 )


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  •         DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    LAURA ROSALES,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    RIC L. BRADSHAW, as Sheriff of Palm Beach County,
    Respondent.
    No. 4D19-1082
    [August 28, 2019]
    Petition for writ of prohibition to the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
    Beach County; Scott R. Kerner, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2015-CA-013281-
    XXXXMB-AJ.
    Isidro M. Garcia of Garcia Law Firm, P.A., West Palm Beach, for
    petitioner.
    Robert L. Norton and Suhaill M. Morales of Allen Norton & Blue, P.A.,
    Coral Gables, for respondent.
    GROSS, J.
    Petitioner’s attorney represents multiple clients with pending lawsuits
    against respondent. In one of those cases, the trial judge recused himself
    based on his “family relationship” with the respondent. Relying on this
    recusal, petitioner’s attorney moved to recuse the trial court in this case.
    The court denied the motion.
    Where a judge has recused himself because of a personal relationship
    with a party or attorney, that relationship is sufficient to require recusal a
    short time later when brought to the judge’s attention by motion. See
    Walls v. State, 
    910 So. 2d 432
    , 433 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). “‘Any time a
    judge feels it is necessary to recuse himself from an attorney’s case on
    account of an overriding friendship with the attorney then he should do so
    in all, not just some of that attorney’s cases.’” Mulligan v. Mulligan, 
    877 So. 2d 791
    , 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Leigh v. Smith, 
    503 So. 2d 989
    , 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)). The same principle applies where a judge
    recuses himself because of his relationship to a defendant. See Catasus
    v. Tabone, 
    19 So. 3d 427
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (holding that where the judge
    recused himself in a related proceeding because of a voluntarily revealed
    personal relationship with the parties, the judge should have granted a
    motion for disqualification in the separate case involving the same parties).
    We reject respondent’s argument that recusal was not required because
    of minor technical deficiencies in the oath and certification accompanying
    the motion. See Livingston v. State, 
    858 So. 2d 353
    , 354-55 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2003).
    We grant the petition for writ of prohibition and remand to the circuit
    court for assignment of the case to another judge.
    WARNER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.
    *        *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-1082

Filed Date: 8/28/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/28/2019