HOMER MCABEE, III v. ALICIA MARIE MCABEE , 259 So. 3d 134 ( 2018 )


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  •            DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    HOMER McABEE, III,
    Appellant,
    v.
    ALICIA MARIE McABEE,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D17-3450
    [December 12, 2018]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Michael G. Kaplan, Judge; L.T. Case No. DVCE 17-
    004334.
    Michael M. Giel of Giel Family Law, P.A. and Kyle A. Bedran of Bedran
    Law, Jacksonville, for appellant.
    Jonathan Z. Schiller of Brinkley Morgan, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
    FORST, J.
    Homer McAbee, III (“the father”) appeals from the trial court’s final
    judgment of injunction to protect the parties’ minor child from domestic
    violence. Pursuant to the final judgment, the trial court terminated the
    father’s contact with the child for the rest of her minority.
    The parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the trial court properly
    exercised its temporary emergency jurisdiction over the child under the
    Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”).1
    However, what we have here is a failure to communicate, as the Florida
    trial court failed to consult with the Virginia court—where custody
    proceedings had been ongoing for years, and which had made a custody
    determination just two months earlier—before making its own custody
    determination, in violation of a mandatory directive of the UCCJEA. The
    trial court’s failure to communicate with the Virginia court before making
    a custody determination requires that we remand for further proceedings.
    1   Section 61.517, Fla. Stat. (2017).
    Background
    A full recitation of the facts is necessary to demonstrate the purpose of
    the UCCJEA and why its communication requirement is vital.
    The father and Alicia Marie McAbee (“the mother”) married in South
    Carolina in 2007, and divorced in Virginia in 2015. They have one
    daughter (“the child”), born in 2009.
    At issue are the mother’s allegations that the father sexually abused
    the child—at age 3 in Virginia, and age 6 in Florida. The mother first
    alleged the sexual abuse in 2012, around the time the parties separated.
    At that time, the father admitted to sexually abusing the child in graphic
    detail in letters to the mother and journal entries (collectively, “the father’s
    writings”). The father also documented having a “sex addiction.” The
    father later denied the sexual abuse, claiming he falsely admitted to it only
    after the mother’s interrogations and threats. He further claimed the sex
    addiction was a reaction to medication he was taking at the time.
    The mother filed for custody in Virginia in 2013. The father underwent
    psychological and sexual addiction evaluations, and the parties received
    counseling from a psychologist. The psychologist concluded the father
    was no threat to the child and recommended contact.
    The father moved to Jacksonville, Florida in January 2014, and filed
    for divorce in Virginia that April. The mother and child moved to Orlando
    (Orange County, Florida) in May 2014, where they remained until August
    2016.
    The Virginia court heard the father’s motion for visitation in July 2014.
    The mother had refused him contact with the child for 575 days. She
    objected to visitation based on the father’s writings, in which he described
    violent, forcible abuse on the child, including penetration. The father
    testified about the mother’s interrogations and threats that, unless he
    admitted everything she accused him of, he would go to jail, lose his job
    and never see his daughter again. The Virginia court also heard from the
    father’s psychologist and sexual disorder specialist. The mother argued
    the father’s writings proved abuse, but the judge noted that the allegation
    of abuse “wasn’t corroborated” by either the interviews conducted by Child
    Protective Services, or the child’s examination by a sexual assault nurse
    examiner (“SANE” nurse). The Virginia court granted the father supervised
    visitation.
    Two months later, the mother petitioned for relief in Orange County,
    2
    Florida. The Orange County court conferred with Virginia pursuant to the
    UCCJEA and dismissed the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.
    In early 2015, after an evidentiary hearing on the abuse claims and the
    father’s   writings—which      included     testimony   of   the   father’s
    neuropsychologist and a videotaped portion of the mother’s “interrogation”
    of the father—the Virginia court concluded that no sexual abuse had
    occurred. Accordingly, in April 2015, the Virginia court entered a custody
    order giving graduated visitation to the father. Specifically, after four
    supervised visits, upon the written recommendation of the court-
    appointed doctor, the father would have visitation every other weekend. If
    necessary (i.e., absent the parties’ agreement), the court would consider
    further extending the father’s visitation after August 2015.
    The mother filed more Florida petitions in October 2015. She again
    relied on the father’s writings, but added claims that he had abused the
    child in Florida in 2015. The Orange County court denied the petitions,
    noting its previous dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and stating that time-
    sharing issues should be addressed in the parties’ Virginia divorce
    proceeding.
    The following month, the Virginia court was to hear the appropriateness
    of extending the father’s visitation, as referenced in its April 2015 order,
    and the father’s motion for emergency transfer of custody. After the
    hearing, the court entered its final order of divorce. The order provided
    that the April 2015 custody order “remains in effect” and, because of the
    mother’s Florida filings, reserved for later determination the father’s
    transfer of custody motion.
    In March 2016, the Orange County court again declared that it lacked
    jurisdiction, and that Virginia retained it. Several months later, at a
    UCCJEA hearing to address the mother’s action to register the Virginia
    divorce decree, the Orange County court ruled, yet again, that Virginia
    retained jurisdiction over modification. After that hearing, the mother fled
    to South Carolina with the child, without notice to the father or the court.
    The record reflects that the mother and child lived in South Carolina from
    August 2016 to April 2017.
    The Virginia court entered an April 2, 2017 order on the father’s
    amended emergency motion to transfer custody. The order awarded the
    father sole physical and legal custody of the child, effective immediately,
    based on the following findings:
    •   the initial supervised visitation was done pursuant to the
    3
    court’s April 2015 custody order, and the child’s therapist
    supported increased visitation;
    •   the April 2015 order provided for review of visitation after
    August 2015;
    •   the review had not occurred but was reserved, along with
    the father’s emergency motion, in the November 2015 order
    and both were properly before the court for determination
    on the merits;
    •   related proceedings occurred in Orange County, Florida—
    however, after the Virginia and Florida courts conferred
    regarding jurisdiction, Florida deferred to Virginia which
    retained jurisdiction over custody;
    •   the mother violated the April 2015 custody order as
    perpetuated by the November 2015 divorce decree by
    removing the child from Florida and secreting her
    elsewhere     (South    Carolina)   without     notice    or
    communication to the court or to the father, and denied
    the father access to the child as required by the court’s
    orders, and;
    •   the mother was personally served with timely notice of the
    subject hearing.
    Based on these findings, the Virginia court held that the mother’s
    “unjustifiable conduct in removing [the child], secreting her, and denying
    the Father visitation violates [the child’s] best interests and the orders of
    this Court . . . .” It thus ordered that the child have no contact with the
    mother pending further ruling.
    The mother did not appeal the April 2017 Virginia order. Instead, in
    May 2017, she sought a protective order in South Carolina. The South
    Carolina court denied the petition, finding “the VA order controls” and that
    “[o]rders presented this date clearly show that UCCJEA conferences have
    been held and that VA continues to retain jurisdiction . . . .”
    On June 2, 2017, the mother filed the underlying Broward County
    petition, again alleging the father had sexually abused the child and
    referencing some of his writings. The mother further alleged that the
    father “has somehow, without notice to me gone to a VA court,” without
    telling the Virginia court “about the open Family court case in Orlando.”
    She attached to her petition a stale shelter order from the Orange County
    dependency proceedings. The trial court granted a temporary injunction
    and set a hearing. The father successfully moved to vacate the temporary
    injunction, and on June 13, 2017, the court ordered the mother to return
    4
    the child by noon that day. The mother did not return the child, however,
    and approximately fifteen minutes before the noon deadline, a maternal
    relative brought the child to a local police department where the child
    reported for the first time to a law enforcement officer that her father had
    sexually abused her.
    The father moved to dismiss the Broward County petition, arguing res
    judicata among other things. The father also requested that the court take
    judicial notice of the previous Virginia, South Carolina and Orange
    County, Florida orders. At the start of the three-day hearing, the court
    denied the motion to dismiss and addressed the mother’s notice of intent
    to offer child hearsay statements—including the child’s recent, first-time
    disclosures to a police officer and 2013 and 2015 statements to her
    godmother. After the police officer, the godmother and both parties
    testified, the court ruled the child hearsay was admissible, and found “it
    really incredulous to believe that [the father] could be forced under any
    circumstances to make these statements where he acknowledges abusing
    his daughter, and with the specifics that he did and the manner that he
    did.” The trial court then entered its final judgment of injunction—effective
    until March 2, 2027—finding the child “is the victim of domestic violence
    or has reasonable cause to believe that [she] is in imminent danger of
    becoming a victim of domestic violence” by the father. The trial court also
    ordered that the child have no contact with the father.
    In seeking rehearing, the father argued res judicata and improper
    admission of child hearsay. For the first time, he also argued the trial
    court was required to communicate with the Virginia court under the
    temporary emergency jurisdiction statute and collateral estoppel. The trial
    court denied rehearing and this appeal followed.
    It is undisputed that the parties and child have not lived in Virginia
    since 2014, and that Florida was not the child’s “home state” at the time
    of the proceedings below, with the mother and the child having just
    returned to the state only a week or so before the mother filed her petition.2
    The issue we address on appeal is whether the Seventeenth Circuit (FL)
    trial court should have conferred with the Virginia court before making a
    custody determination.
    2 Home state is defined as “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a
    person acting as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before
    the commencement of a child custody proceeding. . . . A period of temporary
    absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.” § 61.503(7), Fla.
    Stat. (2017).
    5
    Analysis
    The father argues the trial court erred by not immediately contacting
    the Virginia court upon learning of its custody orders, in violation of the
    UCCJEA. We agree and remand for further proceedings.
    “The UCCJEA is a jurisdictional act that governs subject matter
    jurisdiction over child custody matters.” M.A.C. v. M.D.H., 
    88 So. 3d 1050
    ,
    1053 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction
    pursuant to the UCCJEA is a question of law reviewed de novo. In re
    D.N.H.W., 
    955 So. 2d 1236
    , 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
    The UCCJEA provides for temporary emergency jurisdiction over child
    custody “if the child is present in this state and . . . it is necessary in an
    emergency to protect the child because the child . . . is subjected to or
    threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” § 61.517(1), Fla. Stat. (2017).
    Here, the parties do not dispute that the child was physically present in
    Florida when the mother filed the underlying petition alleging sexual
    abuse. Thus, we agree that the trial court had emergency temporary
    jurisdiction over the matter.
    However, the UCCJEA also provides that
    [a] court of this state which has been asked to make a child
    custody determination under this section, upon being
    informed that a child custody proceeding has been
    commenced in, or a child custody determination has been
    made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under ss.
    61.514–61.516, shall immediately communicate with the
    other court. . . .
    § 61.517(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
    “‘Child custody proceeding’ means a proceeding in which legal custody,
    physical custody, . . . or visitation with respect to a child is an issue,” and
    “includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, . . . abuse, . . . and
    protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear.” §
    61.503(4), Fla. Stat. “‘Child custody determination’ means a judgment,
    decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical
    custody, residential care, or visitation with respect to a child. The term
    includes a permanent, temporary, initial, [and/or] modification order.” §
    61.503(3), Fla. Stat. Here, it cannot be disputed that a child custody
    proceeding had commenced in Virginia (as early as 2013), and that a
    custody determination had been made by a Virginia court—most recently,
    6
    in April of 2017.
    At the hearing below, the trial court acknowledged it “ha[d] seen the
    orders from Virginia.” However, the record provides no evidence that the
    court ever communicated with the Virginia court—much less, that it had
    “immediately communicate[d]” with the Virginia court, as required by
    section 61.517(4). 3
    Mandatory words impose a duty. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
    READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 112 (2012). In S.R. v.
    State, 
    346 So. 2d 1018
     (Fla. 1977), the word “shall” was held to be
    mandatory in a statute stating a “petition alleging delinquency shall be
    dismissed with prejudice” if it was untimely filed, even though the
    implementing rule of juvenile procedure provided the petition “may” be
    dismissed. 
    Id. at 1019
    . The court stated that whether “shall” is mandatory
    “depends upon the context in which it is found and upon the intent of the
    legislature as expressed in the statute.” 
    Id.
     Section 61.517(4), Fla. Stat.
    provides no indication that the legislature intended to give the Florida trial
    courts discretion whether to contact the sister court before holding a
    hearing and rendering a decision. “[S]hall immediately communicate” is a
    mandatory directive.
    The statute ensures that the court exercising temporary emergency
    jurisdiction—which has only a snapshot of information pertinent to the
    custody determination—obtains the knowledge of the other court to make
    the best decision possible for the child. Such knowledge is especially
    important in a case such as this that has involved a years-long contentious
    custody dispute, heinous allegations of abuse, and the exact opposite
    custody determination from the other court just two months prior.
    The appropriate remedy for the trial court’s failure to immediately
    communicate with the Virginia court is to remand this matter for the
    Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court to contact the Virginia court pursuant
    to section 61.517(4). This course of action is supported by precedent from
    the Fifth District Court of Appeal. See Earney v. Quiloan, 
    206 So. 3d 147
    ,
    150 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (“[B]ecause the trial court failed to satisfy the
    contact requirement imposed by section 61.517(4), we remand with
    instructions that the Florida court contact the Texas court to resolve any
    conflicts that exist between the Texas divorce decree and the Florida order
    suspending timesharing.”); Steckler v. Steckler, 
    921 So. 2d 740
    , 745 (Fla.
    3 To the extent any contact was made with the Virginia court, the Florida trial
    court failed to make a record and inform the parties of the communication, as
    required by section 61.511(4), Fla. Stat. (2017).
    7
    5th DCA 2006) (affirming trial court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction
    determination, but remanding for contact with the out-of-state court).
    Conclusion
    The record lacks any indication that the trial court followed the
    requirements of section 61.517(4), which mandated that the court
    communicate with the Virginia court as part of its exercise of temporary
    emergency jurisdiction.      Accordingly, we remand this matter for
    compliance with the statute. See Steckler, 921 So. 2d at 745. Because
    the remand proceedings may require the trial court to revisit its rulings
    made before final judgment, we do not consider the points raised on appeal
    as to those issues. Custody of the minor child shall remain with the
    mother pending the court’s compliance with section 61.517(4), and any
    order directing a change in custody.
    Affirmed in part, and remanded with instructions.
    GERBER, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur.
    *        *        *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-3450

Citation Numbers: 259 So. 3d 134

Filed Date: 12/12/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021