M.M. v. State ( 2014 )


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  •  Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed December 3, 2014.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D13-3012
    Lower Tribunal No. 13-1850
    ________________
    M.M., a juvenile,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    The State of Florida,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria De Jesus
    Santovenia, Judge.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Brian L. Ellison, Assistant Public
    Defender, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael W. Mervine, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and LAGOA and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
    FERNANDEZ, J.
    M.M., a juvenile, appeals his conviction for possession of drug
    paraphernalia.   We reverse because the State failed to present evidence
    demonstrating that the residue from M.M.’s pipe was a controlled substance.
    Additionally, the State failed to present evidence to prove that M.M. had
    possession of paraphernalia with the intent to use it to consume a controlled
    substance.
    During the State’s case-in-chief, law enforcement officers Ray Quintero and
    Peter Delgado testified that they drove to M.M.’s apartment building after they
    received a dispatch call. Officer Quintero knocked on the apartment door, while
    Officer Delgado remained on the first floor observing the interactions. M.M.
    answered the door, holding a pipe in his hand. When the door opened, Officer
    Quintero could smell marijuana inside the apartment.         He did not see M.M.
    smoking marijuana, nor was there any smoke emanating from the pipe. There was
    no marijuana discovered on M.M.’s person. Although the pipe M.M. was holding
    contained residue, the officer did not test the residue at the scene, or later at a
    laboratory, to confirm that it was a controlled substance.
    Officer Delgado admitted that the pipe M.M. held could also be used to
    smoke tobacco. Marijuana was found in the apartment. M.M.’s sister, Dunia
    Piloto, admitted possession of it and was charged separately. The State did not
    introduce any other evidence during its case-in-chief.
    At the close of the State’s case, M.M. moved for a judgment of dismissal
    because there was no evidence presented that linked the pipe to an illegal
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    substance. M.M. argued there was no testimony that the pipe contained, or was
    around, marijuana. The State responded that circumstantial evidence provided the
    requisite intent and connected the pipe to marijuana. The trial court denied M.M.’s
    motion.
    During the defense’s case-in-chief, M.M. called his sister to testify. Piloto
    identified the residue in the pipe as marijuana, but claimed that she was the only
    one who smoked it in the apartment. She also took responsibility for the marijuana
    found in the apartment. Piloto testified that the pipe belonged to her and that it
    was never in M.M.’s possession. The trial court ultimately found M.M. guilty of
    possessing drug paraphernalia.
    On appeal, M.M. contends that the State failed to prove the charges against
    him by the end of its case-in-chief, when M.M. moved for dismissal. We agree
    with M.M. that the trial court should have granted his motion for dismissal. The
    State did not establish that the residue in the pipe was a controlled substance, and it
    did not establish M.M’s constructive possession. Consequently, the State failed to
    establish a prima facie case of possession of paraphernalia with the intent to use,
    pursuant to section 893.147(1), Florida Statutes (2013).
    Section 893.147(1) requires the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    M.M. used or had in his possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, and that
    M.M. had knowledge of the presence of the drug paraphernalia. See Lawson v.
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    State, 
    666 So. 2d 193
    , 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The State cannot establish the
    requisite intent without evidence linking the presence of an illegal substance to the
    alleged paraphernalia. See Goodroe v. State, 
    812 So. 2d 586
    , 587–88 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2002) (finding that a combination of factors such as residue not being tested,
    no evidence residue was a controlled substance, and lack of possession of illegal
    drugs upon arrest, was insufficient for satisfying the intent element).
    To determine whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to deny M.M.’s
    motion for dismissal, we will only consider the evidence presented during the
    State’s case-in-chief. See State v. Pennington, 
    534 So. 2d 393
    , 395 (Fla. 1988)
    (opining that “[i]f at the close of the evidence for the State or at the close of all the
    evidence in the cause, the court is of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to
    warrant a conviction, it may . . . enter a judgment of acquittal.”).
    First, the State failed to establish that the residue in the pipe was a controlled
    substance. An officer with experience in narcotics can testify as to the identity of
    cannabis without any further scientific testing. See Brooks v. State, 
    762 So. 2d 879
    , 892–94 (Fla. 2000); Pama v. State, 
    552 So. 2d 309
    , 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
    (finding that the State proved a substance was cannabis based on the testimony of
    an experienced law enforcement officer who examined and identified the
    substance);    A.A. v. State, 
    461 So. 2d 165
    , 165–66, n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
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    (holding that an officer’s testimony sufficiently established the identity of a
    substance as marijuana based on its appearance, odor, and packaging).
    The officers testified about the existence of the pipe and about the residue
    inside the pipe, but they failed to positively identify that residue as a controlled
    substance. See 
    Goodroe, 812 So. 2d at 587
    ; see also T.E.D., III v. State, 
    627 So. 2d
    118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (finding evidence insufficient to prove possession, as
    the “alleged paraphernalia tested negative for any controlled substance and the
    record is devoid of any evidence that appellant possessed it with intent to use it for
    the illegal purposes set forth in section 893.147(1)”). As in T.E.D., the State failed
    to offer evidence that linked the pipe to an illegal substance or activity, and it
    likewise failed to establish the requisite intent required under section 893.147(1).
    The State asks this Court to rely on circumstantial evidence and irrelevant
    testimony to establish that the residue in the pipe was marijuana. The State looks
    to circumstantial evidence, namely the testifying officers’ general observations, to
    establish the identity of the residue as marijuana. We find no support for this
    proposition. The testifying officers, although qualified based on their training,
    failed to conclusively identify the residue as marijuana during their testimony.
    This omission is critical.
    In addition, the State argues that Piloto’s testimony, which identified the
    residue as marijuana, is relevant. Again, we do not agree because Piloto testified
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    after the close of the State’s case-in-chief and after M.M. had already moved for
    dismissal. See State v. Pennington, 
    534 So. 2d 393
    , 394 (Fla. 1988).
    Second, the State did not show that M.M. had constructive possession of the
    marijuana found at the apartment.      To establish constructive possession of a
    substance, the State must prove: “(1) the accused’s dominion and control over the
    contraband, (2) the accused’s knowledge that the contraband is within his or her
    presence, and (3) the accused’s knowledge of the illicit nature of the contraband.”
    See T.W. v. State, 
    666 So. 2d 1001
    , 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (finding that T.W.
    did not have constructive possession of a controlled substance because the State
    did not present evidence indicating that it was hers or that she had knowledge of its
    presence).
    The record reflects the State introduced no evidence to establish M.M’s
    control and dominion over the marijuana found. In addition, the State, just as in
    T.W., failed to establish, with independent evidence, M.M.’s knowledge of the
    marijuana confiscated from the apartment.
    We thus conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of proof before
    M.M. moved for dismissal. We therefore reverse, vacate M.M.’s conviction, and
    remand this case to the trial court with instructions to discharge M.M.
    Reversed and remanded with instructions.
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