H. GREG LEE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF RAYMOND CONSUL v. MARK CHMIELEWSKI AS COURT APPOINTED GUARDIAN FOR MATTHEW MARTIN ( 2019 )

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
H. GREG LEE, personal )
representative of the Estate of )
Raymond Consul, deceased, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D17-4275
)
MARK CHMIELEWSKI, as court )
appointed guardian for Matthew )
Martin, )
)
Appellee. )
)
Opinion filed November 15, 2019.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota
County; Frederick P. Mercurio, Judge.
Paul L. Nettleton of Carlton Fields Jorden
Burt, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.
Kristin A. Norse and Stuart C. Markman
of Kynes, Markman & Felman, P.A.,
Tampa, for Appellee.
LEFLER, LAWRENCE M., Associate Judge.
H. Greg Lee, personal representative of the Estate of Raymond Consul,
challenges the final judgment entered in favor of Mark Chmielewski, as court-appointed
guardian for Matthew Martin, in Martin's action against Consul for damages resulting
from a tragic car accident that left Martin in a vegetative state.1 We must reverse the
final judgment because the trial court erred by entering summary judgment for Martin
and denying Consul's summary judgment motion in which he alleged that he and Martin
had entered into a binding settlement agreement prior to trial.
Martin sustained his injuries as the result of a motor vehicle accident in
which he was a passenger in a car operated by Consul. When the accident occurred on
September 20, 2010, Consul had an automobile insurance policy through GEICO
Indemnity Insurance Company that provided bodily injury coverage of $10,000 per
person.
In August 2011, GEICO, operating under the mistaken belief that Martin's
father Michael Martin held a power of attorney for his son, tendered a check for policy
limits in the name of Michael Martin. Michael Martin cashed the check and executed a
release on his son's behalf. Subsequently, in January 2012, GEICO contacted Michael
Martin's former attorney seeking documentation that Michael Martin had the legal
authority to represent his son. The attorney responded that she had no such
documents. The record before us reflects that GEICO took no further steps to ensure
that it had tendered policy limits to the correct party.
On July 15, 2013, Chmielewski was appointed plenary guardian of the
person and property of Martin. When Chmielewski learned that GEICO had tendered
payment of policy limits to Martin's father, he retained counsel for Martin and authorized
counsel to make an offer to GEICO to settle Martin's claim against Consul. By letter of
November 26, 2013, counsel for Martin informed GEICO that any payment made to
1Raymond Consul passed away during the pendency of this appeal, and
H. Greg Lee, as personal representative of the Estate of Raymond Consul, was
substituted as appellant.
-2-
Michael Martin was unauthorized. Counsel additionally conveyed the following
settlement offer:
Our client, Mr. Chmiel[ew]ski, reviewed the prior
correspondence associated with the claim of Matthew and
we have determined that his father, Michael Martin, was
never Matthew's authorized legal representative. I
understand that Geico tendered the limits of coverage to the
father and apparently received a purported release of
Matthew's claim. It is clear that the release was a Geico
form release which was modified for execution by the father.
It is now clear that Geico tendered the funds to an
unauthorized representative. A part of my duties involves
exploring any and all avenues of recovery for Matthew. I
would like to resolve any question of the legitimacy of the
prior release by providing Geico with an opportunity to
tender the bodily injury limits under the above-referenced
insurance policy to Matthew's legal court-appointed
representative, Mark Chmiel[ew]ski, as Guardian for
Matthew Martin. If this offer is accepted, I agree to have Mr.
Chmielewski execute a legally-enforceable release
containing the same material terms and conditions as the
prior release and also obtain any required . . . guardianship
court approval of the settlement.
I believe you have received all necessary information
necessary to evaluate this claim. Based on the fact that the
Geico automobile insurance policy accompanying your letter
to me dated 11/8/2013 reflects that the limits of bodily injury
liability insurance for Mr. Consul is $10,000 per person,
please send your $10,000 check payable to Mark
Chmielewski, as Guardian for Matthew Martin. This offer will
remain open for fourteen (14) days from the date of this
letter after which it will be withdrawn without further notice.
Fourteen days later, on December 10, 2013, at 5:01 p.m., GEICO faxed to
Martin's counsel a letter seeking an extension of time to respond to the offer. At 5:42
p.m., GEICO sent a second fax to Martin's counsel, the cover sheet of which stated,
"Acceptance of demand." The attached letter read: "In response to your demand letter
dated November 26, 2013, GEICO Indemnity Company is agreeing to tender the [bodily
injury] limits of $10,000 as outlined in your demand. The check and release will follow
-3-
under separate cover."2 Additionally, GEICO instructed one of its field representatives
to deliver a $10,000 check to counsel's office. The field representative attempted to call
counsel's office between 5:15 and 5:45 p.m., but no one answered. He testified at
deposition that he did not leave a message and that he did not "recall having the ability
to leave a message." He then went to counsel's office with the settlement check. When
he arrived between 7:00 and 7:15 p.m., the front doors of the building were locked and
there was no mail slot, so he left with the check. The following day, he returned to
counsel's office with the check, which he left with an employee.
On December 11, 2013, counsel for Martin sent a letter to GEICO,
acknowledging receipt of the letter faxed on December 10, 2013, but stating that "the
time frame for acceptance of our November 26, 2013 settlement offer expired yesterday
at 5:00 p.m." Counsel also stated that Martin had directed him to move forward with a
lawsuit against Consul. By letter dated December 16, 2013, counsel returned the
settlement check to GEICO.
On December 12, 2015, Chmielewski filed on Martin's behalf an action
against Consul for damages incurred due to the injuries Martin suffered as a result of
the accident. In his answer, Consul asserted as an affirmative defense that the action
was barred by a prior settlement. Consul subsequently filed numerous motions for
summary judgment, maintaining that GEICO, acting on his behalf, had accepted
Martin's settlement offer either (1) by its December 10, 2013, fax in which it stated that it
accepted the offer and that the check would follow; (2) by its field representative's
bringing a check for policy limits to counsel's office on December 10, 2013; or (3) by
2Although the letter was dated December 11, 2013, it is undisputed that it
was faxed to Martin's counsel at 5:42 p.m. on December 10, 2013.
-4-
delivering the check to counsel's office the next day and having it accepted by counsel's
staff. The trial court, however, denied all of Consul's motions for summary judgment but
granted Martin's motion for summary judgment as to his affirmative defense that
Consul's claim was "barred by prior settlement and/or accord and satisfaction." In its
order, the trial court ruled that "GEICO failed to tender the settlement funds as required
by the settlement offer. As a result, GEICO's attempted acceptance of the settlement
offer was not absolute and unconditional, identical with the offer terms, and therefore
fails to comply with Florida's requirement of a mirror-image acceptance." The case then
proceeded to jury trial, and the trial court entered final judgment on the jury's verdict in
favor of Martin and against Consul in the amount of $14,399,363.05.
On appeal, Consul argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions
for summary judgment as to his settlement defense and granting summary judgment in
favor of Martin because GEICO accepted the offer according to its terms when it faxed
its acceptance to Martin's counsel at 5:42 p.m. on December 10, 2013. Because
Martin's offer was not specific as to time and manner of acceptance, we must agree.
"Settlement agreements are governed by contract
law." Schlosser v. Perez, 832 So. 2d 179, 182 (Fla. 2d DCA
2002) (citing Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385
(Fla. 1985)). A settlement agreement forms only when one
party makes an offer and the other party accepts. . . . The
general rule is that "an acceptance of an offer must be
unconditional and identical with the terms of the offer." Id.
(citing Giovo v. McDonald, 791 So. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 2d DCA
2001)).
Lunas v. Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de Puerto Rico, 100 So. 3d 239, 241 (Fla.
2d DCA 2012). Here, the offer stated, "I would like to resolve any question of the
legitimacy of the prior release by providing Geico with an opportunity to tender the
bodily injury limits under the above referenced policy to Matthew's legal court-appointed
-5-
representative." (Emphasis added.) The offer also stated: "If this offer is accepted, I
agree to have Mr. Chmielewski execute a legally enforceable release . . . . [P]lease
send your $10,000 check payable to Mark Chmielewski, as Guardian for Matthew
Martin." (Emphasis added.) Finally, the offer defined the time period in which it would
remain a valid offer: "This offer will remain open for fourteen (14) days from the date of
this letter after which it will be withdrawn without further notice."
With regard to the timing of GEICO's response on December 10, 2013,
although it may have been reasonable for Martin's counsel to close his office at normal
business hours on December 10, 2013, because Martin's offer did not indicate a specific
time on the fourteenth day when it would expire, we cannot read such a limitation into
the offer. See Razin v. A Milestone, LLC, 67 So. 3d 391, 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
("[W]here there is 'an unambiguous contractual provision . . . , a . . . court cannot give it
any other meaning beyond that expressed and must construe the provision in accord
with its ordinary meaning.' " (quoting Emergency Assocs. of Tampa v. Sassano, 664 So.
2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995))). Giving ordinary meaning to the offer's time
provision of "fourteen days from the date of this letter," GEICO had the full twenty-four
hours on December 10, 2013, to accept the offer.
The question then becomes whether GEICO's actions on December 10,
2013, were sufficient to accept the offer. We conclude that they were.
On appeal, Consul argues that Martin's settlement offer was a bilateral
contract that required GEICO to merely promise to pay the policy limits in order to
accept the offer. Chmielewski, however, maintains that the settlement offer amounted
to a unilateral contract by which GEICO was required to tender policy limits in order to
accept the offer before it expired. The trial court seems to have agreed with
-6-
Chmielewski, as it determined that GEICO's actions were insufficient to accept the offer
because "GEICO failed to tender the settlement funds as required by the settlement
offer." In reviewing this ruling, we conclude that we need not determine whether
Martin's settlement offer constituted a unilateral or a bilateral contract because in either
case GEICO's actions were sufficient to accept the offer before it expired.
First, if GEICO needed only to promise to tender policy limits by the end of
December 10, 2013, in order to accept the offer, it accomplished that with the fax it sent
at 5:42 p.m., which stated that GEICO was accepting the offer and that the check and
release would "follow under separate cover." But even if actual tender of the check was
required for GEICO to effectively accept Martin's settlement officer, GEICO achieved
that when its field representative arrived at counsel's office between 7:00 and 7:15 that
evening with check in hand. Despite the fact that no one was present to accept the
check, such was sufficient to constitute a tender of the settlement funds. See
Distribution Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. S. Waste Sys., Ltd., 948 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 3d DCA
2006) ("[A] tender is an unconditional offer of payment, and . . . the 'only distinction
between tender and payment lies in the fact that a tender is not accepted, while a
payment is.' " (quoting Rissman ex rel. Rissman Inv. Co. v. Kilbourne, 643 So. 2d 1136,
1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994))); cf. Southfork Invs. Grp. v. Williams, 706 So. 2d 75, 79 (Fla.
2d DCA 1998) ("To make an effective tender, [one] must actually attempt to pay the
sums due; mere offers to pay, or declarations that the [individual] is willing to pay, are
not enough."). Consul should not be penalized because Martin's counsel was not
available to accept the tender. See Cullum v. Packo, 947 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2006) ("[T]he unrebutted evidence shows that Cullum delivered the check to
Packo on April 16—well within the ten-day cure period. We see no reason why Cullum
-7-
should be penalized for Packo's failure to be available to accept payment.").
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that GEICO had failed
to accept Martin's settlement offer and in denying Consul's motion for summary
judgment and instead granting Martin's. As such, we must reverse the final judgment
and remand for entry of summary judgment in Consul's favor.3 Because we reverse the
final judgment, we must also reverse the final judgment awarding costs pursuant to
section 57.041, Florida Statutes (2017).
Reversed and remanded.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
3We note that best practices would suggest that insurers like GEICO not
wait until the last day of an offer period to first consider an offer or wait until after normal
business hours to contact an offeror.
-8-