Deborah O'Connor v. North Okaloosa Medical Center , 152 So. 3d 843 ( 2014 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
DEBORAH O'CONNOR, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D14-0623
NORTH OKALOOSA
MEDICAL CENTER AND
GALLAGHER-BASSETT
SERVICES, INC.,
Appellees.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed December 12, 2014.
An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.
Nolan S. Winn, Judge.
Date of Accident: November 10, 2004.
John W. Wesley of Wesley, McGrail & Wesley, Fort Walton Beach, for Appellant.
Cindy R. Galen and Barbara J. Glas of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall, Indek, Goodman &
Waters, LLC, Pensacola, for Appellees.
PER CURIAM.
In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals the judge of
compensation claims’ (JCC) denial of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for
a defined period, based on his ruling that the benefits at issue were barred by res
judicata. Because we conclude that the JCC erred by applying the doctrine of res
judicata in this case, we reverse.
The facts in this case are undisputed. In 2004, Claimant sustained a
compensable injury to her right, dominant hand, which ultimately resulted in a
diagnosis of reflex sympathetic dystrophy/ complex regional pain syndrome of the
right hand and wrist. This condition was accepted as compensable by the
Employer/Carrier (E/C) and it provided extensive medical treatment, including
injections from an authorized anesthesiologist. On January 14, 2011, following over
six years of medical treatment, Claimant’s authorized treating anesthesiologist
placed her at maximum medical improvement (MMI); the doctor also opined that
Claimant was unable to work. The E/C acted on this MMI date by suspending all
temporary disability benefits, as is required by section 440.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes
(2004); Claimant had not exhausted here entitlement to 104 weeks of temporary
benefits when this suspension occurred.
In September 2011, by which time all Claimant’s other treating medical
professionals had also placed Claimant at MMI, Claimant filed a petition for
permanent total disability (PTD) benefits based on the January 14, 2011, date of
MMI; the petition necessarily, under section 440.32(3), Florida Statutes (2004),
averred that Claimant had reached MMI. The E/C contested Claimant’s entitlement
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to PTD benefits, but not on the ground she had not reached MMI; to the contrary, in
the pretrial stipulation pertaining to Claimant’s PTD claim, both parties stipulated
that Claimant reached MMI on January 14, 2011. On March 1, 2012, the JCC
entered an order (the prior order), the decretal portion of which reads (all emphasis
from the original): “Claimant’s claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits
from 01-14-11 is not ripe for adjudication and is therefore DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.” The body of the order explains that the JCC reached this disposition
based on his finding that Claimant had not reached MMI, making the claim
“premature.” The JCC did not base his finding regarding MMI on a statement of
such from a medical professional, but rather based on his interpretation of the
anesthesiologist’s testimony, which established that Claimant’s medical recovery
had plateaued but there was a possibility of further recovery once Claimant received
additional treatment for a non-compensable neck injury, which treatment was on
hold pending a dispute with another carrier. In the prior order, the JCC also found
that Claimant was totally disabled from January 14, 2011, and thereafter. The prior
order was not appealed by either party.
After her claim for PTD benefits was denied “without prejudice” and without
an adjudication thereon, Claimant then filed a petition seeking TTD benefits from
January 14, 2011, and continuing. The E/C raised the defense of res judicata against
Claimant’s entitlement to TTD benefits from January 14, 2011, through February
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14, 2012, the date of the hearing that gave rise to the prior order. In the order on
appeal, the JCC accepted the E/C’s defense, reasoning that Claimant “could have”
pled a claim for TTD benefits as an alternative to the PTD claim addressed in the
prior order, in the “event that the facts were not determined to be as Claimant
perceived.” The JCC awarded, however, TTD benefits beginning on February 15,
2012 (the day after the hearing giving rise to the prior order), through September 19,
2012 (when Claimant reached MMI). This appeal followed, challenging only the
denial of TTD benefits that the JCC concluded were barred by res judicata.
A lower court’s ruling that bars relief on the grounds of res judicata is
reviewed de novo. See Felder v. Fla. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs., 993 So. 2d 1031, 1034
(Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Campbell v. State, 906 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 2d DCA
2004)). The doctrine of res judicata can be applicable to workers’ compensation
cases. See Buena Vista Constr. Co. v. Capps, 656 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA
1995). The general principle behind the doctrine of res judicata is that a final
judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is absolute and puts to rest every
justiciable, as well as every actually litigated, issue. See Caron v. Systematic Air
Servs., 576 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (citing Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.
2d 40 (Fla. 1952)). However, this principle only applies when the elements of res
judicata are present and the doctrine properly applied. See id. Here, the doctrine was
not properly applied.
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The very foundation of the doctrine of res judicata is the existence of a “final
judgment” on the merits in a previous action. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945
So. 2d 1246, 1259 (Fla. 2006); see also Smith v. Time Customer Servs., 132 So. 3d
841, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Thus, where there is an absence of a prior final
adjudication on the merits, res judicata does not apply. In the instant case, the prior
order expressly withholds adjudication on the entirety of Claimant’s claim for PTD
benefits from January 14, 2011, and continuing, with no portion of the claim being
adjudicated with finality because the JCC concluded the claim was premature;
further, the denial of the entire claim was expressly made “without prejudice.” The
dismissal of a prematurely filed claim does not bar a subsequent action, under the
doctrine of res judicata. See Shuck v. Bank of Am., N.A., 862 So. 2d 20, 24 (Fla.
2d DCA 2003). Although it could be argued that the JCC could or should have
adjudicated some portion of the PTD claim with finality in the prior order, he did
not. Hence, under the particular facts of this case, res judicata does not operate to
bar Claimant’s subsequent claim for TTD benefits – or in fact any other claim.
Based on the foregoing, the appealed order is AFFIRMED in part (relative to
the TTD benefits awarded), REVERSED in part (relative to the TTD benefits
denied), and REMANDED for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
PADOVANO, THOMAS, and CLARK, JJ., CONCUR.
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